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Introduction
Klaus von Beyme
“Radical” in German sounds “more radical” than in the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion and in French ideologies because German liberalism since the 19th centu-
ry was rarely radical. Radicalism as a characterization of a way of thought in
political science implies two aspects:
• A normative position that is not satisfied with a focus on individuals’
political behavior and on institutions, as it has been predominating since
the behavioral revolution in the United States.
• A rather moderate leftist position as an engaged political scientist.
After the Second World War, the critical Frankfurt School in the tradition of
Adorno, Horkheimer and later Habermas was the incarnation of such a nor-
mative position of committed leftist social scientists. Not by chance, Rainer
Eisfeld took his PhD in Frankfurt and wrote his first German-language books
on “Pluralism between Liberalism and Socialism” (1972) and, dealing with
the leftist experiment in Portugal, on “Socialist Pluralism in Europe”. Two of
his shorter works on Portugal are included in this volume (Chapter V, 1 and
2).
In this tradition, Eisfeld is a “radical liberal” who never opted for one of
the authoritarian branches of socialism or communism. Eisfeld had some
sympathies for the “Praxis movement” in Yugoslavia. One of his articles on
“Pluralism as a Critical Political Theory” was published in the journal Praxis
International in 1986 – edited by Seyla Benhabib and Svetozar Stojanovič –
which oriented itself towards “Marxist humanism” and “democratic social-
ism” (Chapter I, 4 in this volume). Eisfeld based his assumptions originally
on Harold Laski’s ideas of a dynamic theory centering on the fundamentally
associative character of society and aiming at an egalitarian basis for redis-
tributing material advantages between social groups and classes.
Later Rainer Eisfeld moved closer to German versions of “neopluralism”
in the tradition of Ernst Fraenkel who had developed his ideas as an émigré in
the United States and later taught in Berlin. Neopluralism became the ideo-
logical opposition to authoritarian Communism in East Germany and in the
Soviet Union. After the collapse of Communism, these ideas won relevance
for the new systems in their transition to democracy. Eisfeld did not overlook
the problem that an oligarchic structure of society may result in a “limited
pluralism” as a consequence of the internationalization of capital. In his stud-
9
           
        
          
          
         
           
              
     
            
            
             
          
            
             
          
          
   
           
              
              
          
           
       
 
ies, Robert Dahl’s analyses of the “dilemmas of pluralist democracy” fre-
quently emerge as a normative point of reference.
Eisfeld is a rather unorthodox representative of political science. His plu-
ralism is proved already by his multidisciplinary approach. According to
Mattei Dogan’s and Robert Pahre’s Creative Marginality (Boulder 1990),
innovations mostly take place at the intersections of social sciences. This
insight is pertinent to Eisfeld’s oeuvre: He has a strong interest in history and
in the popular arts.
Great attention was paid by him to the development of German political
science under the Weimar Republic and the Nazi regime. Eisfeld’s book on
those exiled German social scientists who in spite of their fate were quite
right-wing-oriented, some even close to the Nazi movement, caused a vehe-
ment debate in Germany. “The ambivalent response to the 1933 Nazi seizure
of power”, which derives from it, is included in this volume (Chapter II.2).
His historical interests are also demonstrated in his analyses “From Hegelian-
ism to Neo-Pluralism” (Chapter III.1) and of the “Mitteleuropa” myth (Chap-
ter III.2).
Finally, that part of the Frankfurt tradition which corresponds to Rainer
Eisfeld’s interest in arts and literature, shows up in the book’s pieces on the
myth of the Western, and on fantasies about Mars (Chapter IV, 1 and 2).
Elsewhere, he has written about teenagers’ dreams in the 1950s.
I hope that this engrossing pluralistic volume may find the interested
readers which it richly deserves.
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When, in 1949, the inclusion of political science into the curricula of West
Germany’s universities was first discussed, the discipline, for the Munich
University’s rector, might be compared only to theology – “always a matter
of belief”. Half a century later, prominent political scientists expressed their
own severe misgivings. Giovanni Sartori, for one, contended that political
science “is a largely useless science that does not supply knowledge for use”.
Former IPSA Secretary General John Trent, in 2011, voiced the key question
for the readers of European Political Science: “Is political science out of
step with the world, and if so what might be done about it?” To the contro-
versial debate in the same EPS issue, I contributed the following fairly une-
quivocal opinion.
How Political Science Might Regain Relevance
And Obtain an Audience:
A Manifesto for the 21st Century
In July 2009, at the IPSA World Congress in Santiago de Chile, John Trent
(2009) raised a number of critical questions about the relevance of our disci-
pline. About three months later, on 5 November 2009, the U.S. Senate reject-
ed Coburn Amendment 2631 to the 2010 Commerce, Justice & Science Ap-
propriations Act. The Amendment would have prohibited the National Sci-
ence Foundation ‘from wasting federal research funding on political science
projects’.1 62 senators voted ‘nay’; 36, though, voted ‘yea’. Among the rea-
sons for his motion, Senator Thomas Coburn (R, OK) included the statement
that scarce funds should be spent on endeavours ‘yield[ing] breakthroughs
and discoveries that can improve the human condition’. The implication was
evident.
The Coburn Amendment triggered a 19 October 2009 New York Times
article. Writer Patricia Cohen (2009) quoted Joseph S. Nye to the effect that
political science may be ‘moving in the direction of saying more and more
about less and less’. She also cited Perspectives on Politics editor Jeffrey C.
Isaac, who held that political scientists ‘should do a better job… of doing
more relevant work’.
The Coburn Amendment and the U.S. Senate vote, the New York Times
write-up and John Trent’s assessment all highlight a number of preoccupa-
tions about our discipline, among which are the discipline’s compartmentali-
zation, its quest for relevance and for an audience, and – in the earlier in-
stances at least implicitly – the continuing tension between normative and
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote; http:/coburn.senate.
gov/ public/index.cfm?_FuseAction=RightNow, both accessed 5/27/2010.
1
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empirical approaches. These challenges contrast conspicuously with the re-
cent advances that political science has made in quantitative terms.
During the 1990s, as the discipline established its institutional footing
across the European continent’s central and eastern regions, the total number
of academic staff engaged in political science roughly doubled in Europe.
The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), established in 1970
and easily the discipline’s most important European association in terms of
promoting cross-national cooperation, acquired new institutional members
from countries such as Albania and Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia, Latvia
and Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic and, not least, Russia. The
European Confederation of Political Science Associations (ECPSA), founded
in late 2007 to promote the discipline’s common interests in teaching, re-
search and funding, consists of at present 19 member organizations, ranging
from the Russian to the British, from the Hungarian to the German, from the
Slovenian to the Spanish Political Science Associations. Regional and inter-
regional cooperation is flourishing; numerous networks of political scientists
are emerging across the continent.
Such progress stands at odds with the discipline’s modest contribution to
addressing the highly relevant issues of regulating financial and economic
globalization, of making the best of regional and global migration, of not just
combating terrorism, but promoting the reduction of its underlying grievanc-
es and causes. Central and Eastern Europe’s nascent political science ‘cul-
tures’ have been merging into an empirically-oriented ‘mainstream’ whose
research has mainly focused on national political systems, comparative poli-
tics, European studies and international relations.
On the one hand, considerable advances have been made in these fields.
On the other hand, however, political studies have largely been reduced to a
functionalist science of ‘managing’ parliamentary and party government.
Central and Eastern European political science is not alone in being been
marked by an ‘almost total absence of critical theory’ (Hankiss 2002: 22).2
There has been no systematic reflection of the ‘state of the art’ after the col-
lapse of ‘actually existing socialism’. At the heart of politics – including
democratic politics – are issues of power and authority, of participation and
of control over agenda-setting. Unfortunately, these issues no longer figure at
the centre of the discipline’s attention.
In a period of globalization-induced financial and economic crises, too
few political scientists concern themselves with examining the political be-
haviour of business and the structural connections between business and
government – in other words, with a renewed and reinvigorated political
economy. In an era of increasing ethno-cultural pluralisation, there is a lack
of studies which can blend political, psychological, cultural, and economic
See also Eisfeld and Pal (2010).2
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aspects, to advance integration and cultural cross-fertilization. In short, we
lack a political science of recognition that can adequately address issues of
cultural segmentation and ensuing socio-political cleavages. In a context of
millennialist violence, the discipline needs to offer well-reasoned concepts
against adopting anti-terrorist policies which, relying solely on repression,
threaten fundamental democratic values without actually offering prospects
of success. We need to develop concepts for a social defence against terror-
ism that can pay heed to the satisfaction of basic needs, to a more equitable
distribution of political resources, to cultural recognition, and to broader civic
participation.
Bringing these pressing regional and global challenges closer to their so-
lution is a political project that involves many years (history), levels (struc-
ture), and players (agency). It is these challenges which any political science
– not just European political science – now needs to address. That the disci-
pline flourishes solely in a democratic environment bears repeating (even if
authoritarian regimes have demonstrated a use for truncated versions, adapted
to their purposes). Political science should, therefore, (re-) define itself as a
science of democracy, as it did with particular emphasis subsequent to the
Great Depression and World War II, to Fascism and Stalinism.
2009 Economics Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom has attested a ‘neglect of
the citizen’ to the present discipline. In an interview, she illustrated her criti-
cism with the following observation: ‘Once while waiting at a meeting of the
Political Science Association I was asked why I was reading a book on peas-
ants. Political science was about presidents, parties, and Congress’. (Toonen
2010: 197).3 As a science of democracy, political studies should redirect their
principal concerns, addressing the afore-mentioned challenges not least in a
determined effort ‘to help citizens prepare themselves for various possible
futures’ (Hankiss 2002: 22).4 Otherwise, ‘perplexity, distrust, fear and intol-
3 The political scientist who remains unconvinced by the mere reference to Professor
Ostrom’s reading habits could do worse than glance at the following sentences: ‘Reading
and writing letters for illiterate peasants made me understand that poverty takes many cruel
forms other than occasional hunger… I sensed how my intrusion must have inhibited them
and saw how inarticulate they were… I also remember the shock of discovering at an early
age that illiteracy or semi-literacy were not a product of casual neglect but part of the estab-
lished social order… As I ended an afternoon reading session in a gathering of pea-sants
eager to listen to the speeches of President Roosevelt promising freedom, I was suddenly
seized by a rural Republican Guard… He threatened to beat me up if I persisted in disturb-
ing the minds of local people with that “Communist poison”, as he put it. I swore to myself
that I would one day be able to explain the motivations and the power behind that rural
guard’ (Figueiredo 1975: 10-12]. This report might spur the scholar to further peruse, e. g.,
Cutileiro (1971).
4 Cf. also Maxwell (1984:, 46, 51, 66) who defines the academic community’s ‘basic task’ as
promoting rational thinking and problem-solving in ‘the rest of the human world’ so that it
may, over time, become capable of ‘rational social action’. While I evidently consider this
idea sound enough, some readers may find Maxwell’s extensive from-knowledge-to-
wisdom argument a bit contrived.
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erance’ may overwhelm large segments of society, (ibid.: 20),5 making them
strike out against democratic principles and practices.
Citizens grapple with a plethora of economic, political, and cultural chal-
lenges; it is vital that they understand public policies designed to provide
solutions. Political science should support these citizens in their searches,
acting ‘as an aid, refiner, extender’ of lay inquiry (Lindblom 1990: 216 –
17)6. Whenever necessary, it should play the uncomfortable part of a critical,
even an oppositional force; it should be critical of power structures skewed in
favour of economically-privileged minorities or culturally-privileged majori-
ties. It should stand in opposition to prevailing socio-political ‘fads’.
Efforts at teamwork across sub-fields, across disciplines, and across
countries are essential to make the most of existing specialization. Normative
notions should emerge as an indispensable part of the discipline, though
definitely not at the cost of empirical rigour.7 The discipline needs to go
beyond theories of what ‘good governance’ should be (this ‘Bismarckian’
notion has more to do with administrative ‘efficiency’ and the pursuit of the
Rechtsstaat ideal, than with parliamentary or other forms of democracy).
Political science should develop ‘visions’ of how a ‘good society’ might be
designed and politically attained – a society which recognizes ethno-cultural
heterogeneity, which is able to defend itself socially against terrorism, and
which can draw consequences from the insights of political economy. In the
doing, it needs to incorporate history, structure and agency – historical
changes and their dynamics;8 embedded socio-economic and political power
relations; individuals, associations, parties, and social movements as players.
This brings up a second and related point. In trying to understand some
of the deeper causes of the present financial and economic crisis, political
scientists have begun to realize that the ongoing process of financial and
economic globalization has not occurred without political intervention. Quite
the contrary, it is precisely pro-market state intervention which has been on
the increase. With regard to both public services – including welfare benefits
– and regulation, governments have been restricting their performance in a
determined fashion. Under the impact of an increasingly hegemonic neo-
liberal discourse, administrations led by social democratic parties have joined
their liberal-conservative counterparts in opting for privatization and deregu-
latory policies. Government and market players alike have offered competing
5 Cf. Theodor Geiger’s (1930) exemplary depiction of ‘desperation’ and ‘panic’ induced by
the Great Depression that prompted Germany’s middle classes to largely vote for the Nazis.
See also Geiger (1932: 118, 121).
6 See also Lupia (2000: 12).
7 A „regression’ to „more diffuse’ theories with „less empirical content’ [Feyerabend (1976:
212)] is not implied. ‘Removing intellectual rubbish’ [ibid.: 25] may, however, be part of
the job.
8 Smith (1997: 273).
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recipes for the ‘slimming down’ of states; they are bent on cutting expendi-
tures and supervision.
This is established wisdom;9 I am not presenting any new insights. My
point is that the trend of pro-market intervention needs to be reversed, and
that political science needs to intervene in the debate. Capitalist economies,
certainly including financial institutions, require tough regulation. To be
effective, such supervision must be internationally coordinated and endowed
with robust powers to enforce strict standards.
But, again, the political problems go deeper. If globalization has acted as
a constraint on redistributive and regulatory policies, the downsizing of social
security budgets and the reduction of resources available for allocation by
representatives to constituents have weakened the legitimacy of democratic
states. Due to the influence of multinational investors and of foreign competi-
tive pressures, there has been a reduction in both the power and the accounta-
bility of democratic legislatures and administrations. The net result has been
a weakening of citizen loyalty and of grassroots commitment to democratic
processes.10 The danger that more and more individuals might react against
democracy is not the least reason why political science should be partisan in
conflicts between business interests and democratic government.
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, the ‘Roosevelt Revolution’ after 1933,
did not restore, for the United States, prosperity in peacetime. But it did suc-
ceed (besides alleviating the suffering of millions of unemployed) in estab-
lishing organized labour and organized agriculture as political players along-
side business in bargaining for political benefits. Capitalism, it appeared,
might be reformed; democracy broadened.11
We may be at another crucial juncture. By legislating New Dealish
measures, democratically elected representatives need to demonstrate that
business has not acquired veto power in economic and social policy-making.
Political science must emerge visibly as their ally in this contest. Regulatory
reforms may not be easy to achieve, but by making the case, our discipline
will be meeting again, as stipulated above, ‘the needs of (those) ordinary
9 Cf., e.g., Cerny (1997, 1999).
10 That is the sobering outcome of the studies conducted under the Norwegian Power and
Democracy Project (1998-2003). Appointed by the government of Norway in early 1998,
and headed by Øyvind Østerud (University of Oslo), the state-funded research group
worked on the basis of a 1997 mandate by the Norwegian Parliament to compile a report on
Power and Democracy within a period of five years. See Ringen (2004); Engelstad and
Østerud (2004).
11 In the 1970s, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, after having turned more skeptical and
radical in their assessments, explained their earlier commitment to the ongoing political
system thus: „The New Deal was not a remote historical episode. It provided grounds for
thinking that reform periods would again occur with some frequency’; cf. Dahl and Lind-
blom (1976: XXX).
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citizens’ who should be the ‘intended beneficiaries of (its) professional in-
quiry’.12
In other words, political science must address the public—the citizens
whom it needs to win as an audience – and it must take sides in the doing. As
a science of democracy, it is inevitably partisan. It should opt for acknowl-
edging partisanship, explaining aims and implications.
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Is political science “with a regional stamp” a concept which makes sense?
Maybe not in exactly the same way as American Studies or, closer to the
topic, European Studies do. Still, the suggested focus on ethno-cultural diver-
sity in Central-East Europe would tackle one of the region’s perennial key
issues on which, according to Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka, there is
“a great need for new work”. As subsequently set out in more detail, the
proposal was inspired by one of the major findings of Leslie Pal’s and my co-
edited 2010 book on the discipline’s state of the art in Central-East Europe –
that institutional cooperation and research networks are decidedly underde-
veloped in and among the region’s countries. A thematic focus might be
needed, around which a major part of research efforts in several countries
could crystallize. I expounded the idea at a conference held in Vilnius on the
“Baltic-Black Sea Intermarum” as a “New Region of Europe”, and the Lith-
uanian Foreign Policy Review elected to publish my remarks in its No. 25
(2011) issue.
Towards Creating a Discipline With a “Regional Stamp“:
Central-East European Political Science and Ethno-Cultural
Diversity1
I
On our continent, political science has recently made conspicuous advances
in quantitative terms. During the 1990s, with the discipline’s institutionaliza-
tion across Europe’s central and eastern regions, total academic staff engaged
in political science in Europe approximately doubled. The European Consor-
tium for Political Research (ECPR), established in 1970 and easily the disci-
pline’s most important European association in terms of promoting cross-
national cooperation, acquired new institutional members from Albania and
Bulgaria through Croatia and Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania to Poland, the
Czech Republic and Russia. The European Confederation of Political Science
Associations (ECPSA), founded in late 2007 to promote the discipline’s
common interests in teaching, research and funding, at present consists of 22
member organizations, including 8 from Central-East Europe.
However – and this may serve as a first caveat, – the ECPSA Executive
Committee more than mirrors the numerical preponderance of Western Euro-
pean groups, with just two of its seven members coming from Central-East
This is the revised version of a paper read at the academic conference “A New Region of
Europe: Regional Development Paradigms in the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarum”, Vilnius,
November 26-27, 2010.
1
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Europe – more precisely, from Hungary and Slovenia. Similarly, engagement
in CEPSA, the Central European Political Science Association established as
early as 1994, has remained restricted to a core group of 8 organizations. The
simple reason is that, in a number of Central-East European countries, either
no political science association has formed, or existing associations are large-
ly inactive. The degree and effectiveness of professional representation indi-
cate considerable intra-regional disparities in our discipline’s evolution. A
discussion of the problem will follow below.
The considerable quantitative progress which, nevertheless, has been vis-
ible is at odds with the discipline’s modest contribution to addressing the
salient contemporary issues of regulating financial and economic globaliza-
tion, of making the best of regional and global migration, of not just combat-
ing terrorism, but promoting the reduction of its underlying grievances and
causes. In summing up the country reports, which Canadian political scientist
Leslie Pal and this author have recently compiled in a book, it may be safely
stated that the influence of university departments and foundations from
Western Europe and the United States has encouraged the merger of Central
and Eastern Europe’s nascent political science “cultures” into an empirically
oriented “mainstream” focusing on national political systems, comparative
politics, European studies and international relations. Across the region, the
discipline’s dominant approach is institutionalist, with emphasis on current
policy-making and on applied research. This tendency has been favoured by
the emergence of numerous non-governmental research institutes and analyt-
ical centres (“think tanks”), often financed by Western foundations, with the
professed mission of contributing to the consolidation of democracy.
On the one hand, considerable advances have been made in the fields just
mentioned. On the other hand, political studies have largely been reduced to a
functionalist science of “managing” parliamentary and party government. In
a way, that is hardly surprising. Establishing a new political system means
that, once institutionalized, political science will rather automatically turn to
explaining the workings of that system. To a certain extent, political science
in any country with new political institutions will be descriptive and institu-
tionalist. The problem, obviously, is to what extent, and how can it grow
beyond that focus?
In post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe, political science has
been marked by an “almost total absence of critical theory”.2 No systematic
reflection of the “state of the art” occurred after the collapse of “actually
existing socialism”. Instead, the discredit wrought upon Marxist-Leninist
ideology and its anti-empirical normativism was rather automatically extend-
Hankiss E., “Brilliant Ideas or Brilliant Errors? Twelve Years of Social Science Research in
Eastern Europe”, in Kaase M., Sparschuh V., eds., Three Social Science Disciplines in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, Berlin/Budapest: Social Science Information Centre
(IZ)/Collegium Budapest, 2002, p. 17-24, quote on p. 22.
2
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ed to normative conceptions of any kind. The baby was thrown out with the
bath-water.
In large parts of the region, political science has been facing an addition-
al problem: more often than not, the discipline is suffering from extreme
theoretical and methodological fragmentation, accompanied by low research
standards. In almost half of the 19 post-Communist societies included in
Pal/Eisfeld’s collected volume, the authors – without exception experts from
the countries under survey – found individual and institutional cooperation
deficient, research networks underdeveloped, professional interests insuffi-
ciently represented.3
Absence of internal cohesion has its analogy in a lack of sustained re-
gional cooperation. By reason of the earlier transfer of resources and concep-
tual approaches, international links established by Central and East European
political scientists are typically East-West. The sort of fragmentation just
referred to often implies a divide between a minority of internationally con-
nected and a majority of inward-looking academics.
Three major challenges, it would seem, are at present facing political sci-
ence disciplines in the region: A paucity of normative theory-building (which
is not meant to imply a regression to more diffuse conceptions with less em-
pirical content); a need for a thematic focus, around which a major part of
segmented research efforts in a number of countries might crystallize; and a
comparatively informed, decidedly “regional stamp” of that focus, which
might serve to strengthen the cross-border cooperation of political scientists.
II
The chapter started out by arguing that too few political scientists have so far
concerned themselves with the increasing ethno-cultural “pluralization”, in
William Connolly’s pertinent words, of already pluralist polities,4 with mil-
lennialist terrorist violence, with the required robust international regulation
of business and finance. Bringing these pressing regional and global chal-
lenges even remotely closer to their solution is a political project that in-
volves many years (history), many levels (structure), and many players
(“agency”, in political science terminology). Addressing them requires the re-
emergence of normative notions as an indispensable part of the discipline,
though – again – definitely not at the cost of empirical rigor in researching
constraints and perspectives.
3 Eisfeld R., Pal L. A., “Political Science in Central-East Europe and the Impact of Politics:
Factors of Diversity – Forces of Convergence”, in id., eds., Political Science in Central-
East Europe: Diversity and Convergence, Opladen/Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich,
2010, p. 9-35, esp. 21-25.
4 Connolly W. E., The Ethos of Pluralization, Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota
Press, 1995, p. XIX-XXIV.
23
  
            
               
            
            
          
             
          
        
        
       
         
         
         
          
       
               
                
          
          
            
           
         
            
          
          
            
            
         
            
          
          
          
           
                                                                        
                
          
            
          
             
                
            
    
             
             
    
The discipline once again needs to go beyond conceptions of what “good
governance” should be – a notion that should by no means be held in low
regard, but which has more to do with administrative “efficiency” and the
rule of law, than with parliamentary or other forms of democracy. Generally
speaking, political science should develop “visions” how a “good society”
might be designed and politically attained. In doing so, the discipline (as has
just been emphasized) needs to incorporate history, structure and agency:
historical changes and their dynamics;5 embedded socio-economic and politi-
cal power relations; individuals, associations, business corporations, political
parties and social movements as players.
As Lithuanian scholars Dovilė Jakniūnaitė and Inga Vinogradnaitė have
noted, in Central-East Europe, the evolving political science might reasona-
bly start “challeng[ing] the ‘mechanical’ application” of Western concepts,
looking for “a more elaborate conceptualization” of the region’s own “expe-
rienced ‘realities’”.6 Several reasons suggest selecting ethno-cultural plurali-
sation from among a number of such realities – and from among the triad of
pressing issues earlier referred to in this paper – as a major, in fact, the major
thematic focus of a political science with a “regional stamp”.
In the first place, policies shaping the position of ethno-cultural minori-
ties have been a perennial issue in Central and Eastern European countries
since the Habsburg and Czarist empires. Secondly, “learning to live with
the… institutionalization of ethno-cultural diversity” may well be considered
“a key condition for [any] stable and just democracy”.7 Finally, “virtually all
aspects of the transition from Communism to democracy… have displayed
ethno-cultural dimensions which cannot be ignored”.8
Most conspicuous among these, of course, were the civil wars in Serbia
and Croatia, which shocked the world with their levels of brutality. The
atrocities of "ethnic cleansing" dramatically disproved the hopes pronounced
a decade and a half earlier, when cautious optimism in assessing societal
levels of toleration had still seemed indicated: "A multi-lingual and multi-
ethnic society like Yugoslavia may exhibit considerable frictions between its
constituent units, but those frictions will not necessarily threaten the exist-
ence of the society itself".9 Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, for
5 Cf. Smith R. M., “Still Blowing in the Wind: the American Quest for a Democratic, Scien-
tific Political Science”, Daedalus 126, 1997, p. 253-278, esp. 273.
6 Jakniūnaité, D., Vinogradnaité, I., “Political Science in Lithuania: A Maturing Discipline”,
in Eisfeld, Pal, ibid., p. 177-191, quotes on p. 186-187.
7 Kymlicka W., Opalski M., eds., Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political
Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001, p. 1.
8 Kymlicka W., “Preface and Acknowledgments”, in Kymlicka, Opalski, ibid., p. XII-XVII,
quote on p. XII.
9 Weale A., “Toleration, Individual Differences, and Respect for Persons”, in Horton J.,
Mendus S., eds., Aspects of Toleration, London/New York: Methuen, 1985, p. 16-35,
quote on p. 26.
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their part, also experienced ethnically driven struggles. In the Ukrainian case,
these were settled by the establishment of the Autonomous Republic of Cri-
mea within Ukraine (60% Russians, 25% Ukrainians, 12% Crimean Tatars).
In the other instances, conflicts continue to linger – Karabakh, Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Transnistria. In 1993, Czechoslovakia split over the question
how to satisfy the demands of the Slovaks as the largest minority group.
In newly independent Slovakia, sizable minorities have emerged again:
Hungarians (10% of the population) and Roma. Russian minorities account
for 28% of the Latvian and 25% of the Estonian populations. Ukraine has a
Russian population of some 17%, concentrated in the country’s Eastern re-
gion. In Belarus, Russians comprise 11% of the population, and of the coun-
try’s two official languages, Russian is much more widely used than Belarus-
ian.
The present situation may be summed up as follows: The numerical pro-
portion of the region’s ethno-cultural minorities has considerably declined
since the 1930s. Still, the socio-economic and political problems associated
with such minorities have not abated proportionally.10 On the contrary, ideo-
logical disorientation, economic anxiety and mounting social inequality have
fueled the “rediscovery” of ethnicity as a source of belonging, of identity, of
imagined “certainty in an uncertain world”.11
III
A Central-East European political science focusing on ethno-cultural diversi-
ty might seek to advance integration and cultural cross-fertilization, in con-
trast to discrimination, segmentation, and ensuing socio-political cleavages.
Some recent approaches in the region which might point the way toward such
a project will now be provided.
The chapter earlier referred to the compact Russian minorities in Latvia
and Estonia. Political science disciplines in these two Baltic states have been
setting examples regarding comparative, policy-oriented studies on ethno-
cultural conflict and accommodation. In the case of the Tallinn University’s
Department of Government, this work has led to involvement in the concep-
tualization and drafting of Estonia’s minority integration policy.12 In Latvia,
led by the non-governmental Latvian Center for Human Rights and Ethnic
10 Liebich A., “Ethnic Minorities and Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement”, in
Zielonka J., ed., Europe Unbound, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 117-136, esp. p. 117.
11 Durando D., “The Rediscovery of Identity”, Telos No. 97, 1993, 21-31, quote on p. 26.
12 Pettai V., “Political Science in Estonia: Advantages of Being Small”, in Eisfeld, Pal, ibid.,
p. 119-133, esp. p. 123, 130.
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Studies, several institutions have been focusing their research on the role of
ethnicity in politics, minority rights and societal integration.13
In Ukraine, too, the discipline’s evolution has included a focus on ethno-
politics, “born out of the specific need for political science to offer proposals
for… preserving territorial unity”, against the backdrop of the tendencies for
ethnic separatism mentioned earlier.14 Political science has not produced a
comparable thrust in Bulgaria, with its Turkish (nearly 10%) and Roma (5%)
populations, nor in Romania and Slovakia with their ethnic Hungarian minor-
ities of 6.5 and 10% respectively.
A decade ago, the noted Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka,
widely known for his work on multicultural societies, along with East Euro-
pean Studies specialist Magdalena Opalski, undertook the project of inviting
a number of academics and writers from Central-East Europe to comment on
a liberal-pluralist model of managing ethno-cultural diversity which
Kymlicka had prepared. The commentators hailed from Russia, Hungary,
Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Ukraine. None of the issues
they raised and discussed have lost their saliency over the intervening years:
perspectives for the further development of civil societies and civic cultures
as counter-forces to ethnic nationalism; status and conceivable rights of eth-
no-cultural groups in relation to those of individuals on the one hand, and of
civil and political associations on the other hand; instances of ethno-cultural
minorities holding oppressive values vis-à-vis other – internal or external –
minorities; different formal and (hardly less important) informal practices in
the handling of language interests; pros and cons of federal arrangements
and/or territorial autonomy as minority rights regimes.
The resulting volume remains a rich source of sophisticated observations
on ethnic relations in the region, including public discourses at popular and
elite levels; on the challenges and dilemmas facing attempts to apply the
liberal-pluralist approach to Central-East Europe; and – in the two editors’
concluding words – on “the immense potential of, and the great need for, new
work in this area”.15
The substantive context of the debate initiated by Kymlicka and Opalski
was transition from Communism and consolidation of democracy in the re-
gion. In 2008, Politics and Central Europe, the journal of the Central Euro-
pean Political Science Association, in a thematic issue entitled “Values and
Diversity in Contemporary Europe” shifted the focus to European integration,
and, more specifically, toward the quest for an eventual European identity. In
an environment characterized by the increasing value pluralism of European
13 Ikstens J., “Political Science in Latvia: Learning the Basics”, in Eisfeld, Pal, ibid., p. 163-
175, esp. p. 164-165.
14 Kruglashov A. M., “Ukrainian Political Science: From Quantity to Quality”, in: Eisfeld,
Pal, ibid., p. 291-304, quote on p. 294.
15 Kymlicka, Opalski, ibid., p. 9.
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societies, how should cultural differences be reconciled? Should Europe seek
consistency in the ways such issues were tackled by different countries?16
The example selected for discussion was religious symbols in the public
space as a salient expression of cultural pluralisation. Two instances must
suffice here to indicate the character of the problems scrutinized in the jour-
nal’s issue. How might religious freedom of expression be guaranteed, and
yet the discrimination of certain lifestyles by a specific religion be avoided?
On what grounds should religious minorities be allowed to claim special
treatment, up to being granted exemptions from general law?
While highly significant for the region, these questions are, of course, not
peculiar to Central-East Europe. Rather, their treatment may be hoped to help
putting in a better perspective challenges which have emerged across the
entire European continent, and also to help dealing with them more reasona-
bly, flexibly and equitably. A regional focus would absolutely not involve
detaching political science from its West European or American counterparts,
but would – quite the contrary – emphasize its particular contribution to a
global scholarly effort.
This has been illustrated by a recent (June, 2010) St. Petersburg confer-
ence on “Ethno-Cultural Diversity and the Problem of Tolerance”, jointly
organized by the Russian Political Science Association, the non-
governmental Saint Petersburg Centre for Humanities and Political Studies,
and the International Political Science Association’s Research Committee on
Politics and Ethnicity. Several of the major presentations focused on a central
feature of present societies, already mentioned earlier, which the migration
component of globalization may be safely predicted to produce on an increas-
ing, rather than a lessening, scale: the resort to ethnicity as a source of social
identification and identity – not just for these societies’ minorities, but also
for their majorities.
How much heterogeneity will these majorities accept? How may cultural
narratives be advanced, which promote mutual “recognition” and tolerance,
rather than separation and conflict? Might “symbolic” politics help in devel-
oping such discourses – politics, for instance, which emphasize a civic “Ros-
siyskij” rather than an ethno-cultural “Russian” polity? Should political sci-
ence, along the lines of the sociological role model, attempt to develop con-
cepts replacing the idea of a single identity by the notion of “a set of identi-
ties”, allowing the individual “to participate in various [cultural] communi-
ties”?17
The issues raised in the cases cited here concern a plethora of challenges
with which both policy-makers and any number of individual citizens grap-
16 Strnadová L., “Editorial”, Politics in Central Europe 4 (2), 2008, p. 2-7, esp. p. 5-6.
17 Kuznetsov A., “Political Science Before a Challenge of Ethno-Cultural Pluralism”, in:
Ethno-cultural Diversity and the Problem of Tolerance in a Globalizing World (Conference
Proceedings), St. Petersburg: n. p., 2010, p. 96-110
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ple. Political science should particularly support the latter in their search,
“help[ing] citizens [to] prepare themselves for various possible futures”.18
Otherwise, “perplexity, distrust, fear” and the intolerance born out of distrust
and fear may overwhelm large segments of society.19
Finally, the discipline should, whenever necessary – not merely, but cer-
tainly also in the Central-East European region, – play the admittedly uncom-
fortable part of a critical, even an oppositional force. It should be publicly
critical of power structures skewed in favour of ethnically privileged majori-
ties (or, for that matter, of politically and economically privileged minori-
ties). In 2007, Estonian political scientists were among those who warned
against the removal of the Bronze Soldier memorial in Tallinn, whose razing
later sparked two days of violent protest among Russian-speaking youth.20 If
the xenophobic “All for Latvia” Party had been included in that country’s
next governing coalition, as originally announced by Prime Minister Valdis
Dombrovskis, Latvian political scientists might have had reasons for a simi-
lar move.
In a region where “hybrid” regimes with more or less authoritarian ele-
ments have been emerging alongside consolidated democracies, a discipline,
such as the one portrayed here, might emerge as a science of democracy.
Such a science would be partisan insofar, as it would pursue research and
teaching in a humanist spirit, emphasizing broad societal participation in the
shaping of public policies, which would not least be informed by a vision of
ethno-cultural non-domination and cross-fertilization.
18 Hankiss (note 1), p. 22.
19 Ibid., p. 20.
20 Pettai (note 11), p. 130.
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Pluralism may well (re-)emerge as the discipline’s dominant paradigm for
inquiring into the 21st century’s increasingly multi-ethnic, multi-cultural
polities – endorsing, as it does (in Giovanni Sartori’s pertinent words), the
intrinsic worth of cultural diversity in “cross-fertilized” cultures. The con-
cept has a long and diverse history: Between 1915 and 1925, English plural-
ists, focusing on the fundamentally associative character of society, had
called for the democratic control of the various communities of which each
individual is a part. From the 1950s to the 1970s, American group-centered
pluralism “gave capitalist democracy a little theoretical apparatus which
discriminated nicely between this system and other systems with which we as
a nation were in rivalrous relations” (Douglas Rae, Yale University). React-
ing to increasing criticism of the model’s shortcomings on both theoretical
and empirical grounds, a few of its main proponents during the 1980s and
1990s returned to pluralism the democratizing dimension which the English
pluralists had first supplied. Simultaneously, a debate on the “recognition”
and “inclusion” of ethno-cultural – analogous to political – pluralism began
to set in, and has since been stepping up. The following chapter reviews a
century of pluralist investigation into how economy, civil society and gov-
ernment have been interacting – and how they should interact, if securing
broad democratic participation in the shaping of public policies remains a
foremost concern. It was first published as a section of the author’s edited
book Pluralism. Developments in the Theory and Practice of Democracy
(Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006). The volume’s other parts were written
by Philip G. Cerny, Avigail Eisenberg, and Theodore J. Lowi.
Pluralism and Democratic Governance:
A Century of Changing Research Frameworks
I. A Pluralist Perspective on Capitalist Democracy
Empirical Diagnoses, Normative Visions, Legitimating Ideologies
Theorizing about the presumed pluralist structure of Western capitalist socie-
ties and about the access pluralist players have in fact, and should have, to the
setting of public agendas commenced in earnest a century ago. Emerging in
the early 20th century when it was finally recognized that the small, non-
industrial community envisaged by “classical” political theory had, for most
practical purposes, disappeared, the original variety of pluralism was con-
structed as a critical political theory (cf. Gettell 1924: 470), providing an
approach both descriptive and prescriptive.
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Even before World War I, business corporations and industrial combines
– the first multinationals among them – had risen to prominence, underscor-
ing the unequal distribution of power between labor and capital. However, if
continuing entrepreneurial hegemony seemed assured, a century had also
passed since Adam Smith’s grim dictum that the laboring poor were destined,
by “the progress of the division of labor”, to remain “as stupid and ignorant
as it is possible for a human creature to become” (Smith 1776: 366). After
bitter struggles, a labor movement had emerged. Unions had been organized,
and in most industrialized countries the right to strike had been won.
Concurrently, the 19th century’s rigid class structure was already dissolv-
ing. The working class was segmenting into numerous blue- and white-collar
strata – groups, in fact – differentiated by vocation and attitude, by income
and education and, again, by grossly unequal influence and control both eco-
nomically and politically.
The intellectual climate seemed to be ready for a “new” political concept,
analytical no less than normative, reformulating the notions of freedom and
democracy in a determined attempt at attaining the “good society” in the
context provided by organized capitalism and the large nation state. The
answer was a theory of associations, of positive, interventionist government
and of a more participatory political system, with industrial democracy as a
complement of political democracy. In 1915, the British Labor Party intellec-
tual Harold J. Laski gave the name “pluralism” to the new approach, borrow-
ing the term from the pragmatist philosophy of William James who had used
it to describe the character of a “distributive” reality (in contrast to monist
ideas, particularly Hegel’s, about a unified “bloc universe”).
Less than half a century later, “pressure politics”, the lobbying activities
by which organized groups, now including labor, were seeking to influence
parties, legislatures, governments and administrative bureaucracies, had be-
come increasingly topical. At the same time, against the backdrop of the Cold
War, the need was felt for a comprehensive theoretical perspective designed
to explain and justify the political systems of the “free world”, meaning the
United States and post-World War II Western Europe. Stripped of most of its
prescriptive – certainly its anticapitalist – implications, reduced to a “legiti-
mating discourse” (Merelman 2003: 9) and in tune with “realistic” Schum-
peterian theories of democratic elitism prevalent at the time (see, e.g., Held
2003: 200), the concept of pluralism (supplemented now, more often than
not, by the prefix ‘liberal’ or ‘neo-’, in contrast to ‘radical’) seemed to serve
the purpose perfectly.
Another five decades later, nation-states in North America, Western Eu-
rope and elsewhere are being affected by growing economic-financial global-
ization and permeation no less than by increasing ethno-cultural pluralization
and diversification, due to regional and global migratory movements. The
pattern of societal cleavages and linkages is changing, the fragmentation of
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interests furthered, the role of the positive state is questioned, adherence to
traditional institutional loyalties put in jeopardy. How, then, can we accept
both economic globalization and the further pluralization of plural societies
without, on the one hand, sacrificing electoral responsiveness and govern-
mental accountability and, on the other, furthering a fundamentalization of
group values that would, in Arthur Schlesinger’s phrase, “disunite” society
and polity?
Once again, the concept of pluralism may come to the rescue. Because
the concept’s endorsement of diversity is considered to include cultural mul-
tiplicity, a “revived pluralist perspective” now stands for “full and pluralist
cultural inclusiveness” (McLennan 1995: 40) – for the assertion and public
expression, the institutionalization even, of ethno-cultural differences, pro-
vided that basic rights and principles of justice remain respected and protect-
ed. However, it is precisely the extent of differentiated treatment to be ac-
corded to ethnic groups, in order to protect and develop their special cultural
characteristics and practices, which has been the subject of continuing con-
troversy. So far, this debate has achieved nothing which even remotely re-
sembles conceptual clarity.
The specific problem illustrates a general point. Every variety of political
pluralism so far put forward has been critically challenged: Early radical
pluralism by liberal pluralism, with the challenge returned later for good
measure; liberal pluralism, in addition, by neo-corporatism; cultural pluralism
by a liberal individualism arguing in favor of impartiality. Actually, there
have never been full-fledged “theories” of pluralism, but rather empirical
and normative research programs focusing on the means, constraints, and
perspectives of societal participation in the shaping of public policies.
Frameworks for these programs have included the web of social organiza-
tions which has increasingly been referred to as civil society, the linkages of
individuals, associations and governments (ranging from the internal gov-
ernment of associations to the pressures exerted by such organizations on
each other and on state administrations), the building of legitimacy, consen-
sus and cohesion on the basis of conflictual interests, the validity of the tradi-
tional division into private and public spheres (with ensuing limitations on
the applicability of democratic principles), inequalities in the availability of
political resources, finally the powers and the rights of majorities and minori-
ties.
In the final analysis, successive pluralist research programs have
amounted to nothing less than a persistent inquiry into the theory and practice
of democracy under changing socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions.
31
  
    
  
               
           
           
          
              
          
             
           
              
            
           
           
         
             
          
             
              
              
            
               
              
              
              
                
      
           
           
              
          
             
          
            
       
             
             
          
          
           
II. Underpinning Political by Economic Democracy:
Harold Laski and the Emergence of Radical Pluralism
As noted at the outset, the first two decades of the 20th century “revealed new
problems of economic and political power for which the older democrats,
whether liberals or socialists, had no ready solutions” (Beer 1975: IX). Amer-
ican philosophical pragmatism, developed by William James and insisting, as
it did, on a “pluralistic” – rather than a monistic – interpretation of the cos-
mos, assumed “vital significance” for the slowly emerging “pluralistic theory
of the state” (Laski 1921: 169; id. 1917: 23): None of reality’s elements “in-
cludes everything or dominates everything ... The pluralistic world is thus
more like a federal republic, than an empire or a kingdom ... However much
may be collected, ... something else is self-governed ... and unreduced to
unity” (James 1909: 208). Translated into political terms, such a “pluralistic
universe” could be construed as a polity where groups, associated for “essen-
tial social ends” and “eliciting individual loyalties”, evolved naturally, pos-
sessing inherent rights not conceded by the state (Coker 1924: 89, 93).
Harold Laski went even further. With “group competing against group”,
the state, as he would maintain in a 1915 lecture delivered at Columbia Uni-
versity, had to prove its superiority “by virtue of its moral program”. Only in
this way could it claim obedience from its citizens. And in a typical turn,
which heralded the further development of his position, Laski added: “A state
may in theory exist to secure the highest life for its members. But when we
come to the analysis of the hard facts it becomes painfully apparent that the
good actually maintained is that of a certain section, not the community as a
whole. I should be prepared to argue, for instance, that in England before the
war the ideal of the trade unions was a wider ideal than that which the state
had attained” (Laski 1917: 15, 23).
The ideas of the Fabian Society, that intellectual circle of “respectable”
socialists – established, among others, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and
George Bernard Shaw – which took part in the formation of the British Labour
Party, considerably influenced Harold Laski’s thinking. So did the argument
of the guild socialists (“young rebels” in the Fabian ranks, building on French
anarcho-syndicalism), particularly G. D. H. Cole, who held that associations
sprang up in society according to the logic of functional differentiation and
that self-government, consequently, was identical with functional representa-
tion on every social level (see Eisfeld 1996: 269/270, 272 ss.). That definitely
included the workplace, the factory, the enterprise – in a nutshell, “control of
production” by worker organizations –, since individuals (having, by steps,
been enfranchised in the political sphere) had remained “enslaved” by indus-
trial autocracy in the economic sector (Cole 1918: 40, 103 ss.).
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Like Cole, Harold Laski remained convinced that “no political democra-
cy (could) be real” without being underpinned by “an economic democracy”
(Laski 1919: 38). Like Cole, too, he initially envisioned that the body politic
should be “divide(d) upon the basis of functions”, resulting in a dual legisla-
ture: a vocational Congress – after a transition period of joint industrial con-
trol by labor and capital – and a territorial Parliament. “Joint questions”
would have to be solved by “joint adjustment” (Laski 1919b: 74, 87 ss.).
Avoiding the term “conflict”, Laski made no provision for any mechanism
whose role went beyond mere “coordination”. A certain “weakness on the
constructive side” (Ellis 1923: 596) was apparent.
In his 1925 magnum opus entitled a Grammar of Politics, Laski retained
two central contentions:
(1) The structure of social organisation involves, not myself and the state, my groups and
the state, but all these and their interrelationships ... The interest of the community is
the total result of the whole pressure of social forces (Laski 1925: 141, 261).
(2) Exactly as the evolution of political authority has been concerned with the erection of
limitations upon the exercise of power, so also with economic authority ... In a sense
not less urgent than that in which Lincoln used it, no state can survive that is half-
bond and half-free. The citizen ... must be given the power to share in the making of
those decisions which affect him as a producer if he is ... to maximize his freedom
(ibid.: 112/113).
Repudiating the institutional project of the guild socialists whose difficulties
he had come to consider “insurmountable” (ibid.: 72), Laski now focused on
that distinction which would remain pivotal to conceptions of democratizing
society: the distinction between ownership of the means of production and
their control (ibid.: 112):
Just as the holder of government bonds has no control ... over government policy, so it is
possible to prevent interference with the direction of an industrial enterprise by the loaners
thereto of capital ... The present system of private property does not in the least involve the
present technique of industrial direction.
It required the Great Depression of 1929 and the circumstances of the for-
mation of the British National Government in 1931 for Laski to move more
clearly in a Marxian direction without, however, as has been erroneously
suggested, “rejecting” pluralism (Deane 1955: 153). Rather, by combining
pluralism and Marxism, he proposed in 1937 to transcend the capitalist sys-
tem, envisaging not violent action but, in a term Laski was to coin during
World War II, a “revolution by consent” (Laski 1925: XII):
The purpose of pluralism merges into a larger purpose ... The object of the pluralist must be
the classless society ... If the main ground of conflict is thus removed, it becomes possible
to conceive of a social organization in which the truly federal nature of society receives
institutional expression. And in such a social organization, authority can be pluralistic both
in form and expression.
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In modern terms, Laski’s pluralism aimed at a more participatory democracy
and an employee-controlled economy, diminishing the discretionary exercise
and grossly unequal distribution of organizational – political and economic –
power. ‘Radical’ pluralism, as it came to be called (Apter 1977: 295), em-
phasized the substantial equality of political resources.
III. The New Deal and the Cold War as Backdrops:
Liberal Pluralism’s Focus on the Status Quo
According to Harry Elmer Barnes, writing in the 1921 American Political
Science Review, both Cole and Laski – besides searching “for some method
of social improvement” – could be given credit for having played a part in
that “cardinal contribution of sociology to politics”: the interpretation of
government as the “agency” through which interest groups either “realize
their objects, or effect ... (an) adjustment of their aims with the opposing
aspirations of other groups”. However, Barnes also contended that the “most
thorough and comprehensive exposition” of that view could be found not in
the works of English pluralists or guild socialists, but in Arthur F. Bentley’s
The Process of Government (Barnes 1921: 495, 512).
Rejecting both individualism and institutionalism, Bentley in his 1908
treatise aimed at introducing the group as the central analytical category.
Describing his effort as “strictly empirical ... ‘positively’ grasp(ing) social
facts just for what they are”, he went on to argue that every activity could be
stated “either on the one side as individual, or on the other side as social
group activity”. In interpreting social processes, however, the former was “in
the main of trifling importance”, whereas the latter “is essential, first, last,
and all the time” (Bentley 1908: 56, 176, 210, 214/215).
In the United States, Harold Laski’s normative considerations were ech-
oed, to a certain extent, by progressive thinkers such as Mary Follett – who
argued that the economic philosophy of individualism had resulted in the
“crushing of individuals”, of “all – but a few” (Follett 1918: 170) – and John
Dewey who, like Follett, called for the “positive state”, contending that “a
measure of the goodness of the state is the degree to which it relieves indi-
viduals from the waste of negative struggle” (Dewey 1927: 72; Follett 1918:
182, 184). For a “brief moment”, it seemed as if American progressives and
British socialist pluralists might join in “accept(ing) the pluralist agenda”,
and that there might be a realistic chance, after World War I, to construct “a
new political and social order” (Stears 2002: 2/3, 261). However, concepts
for industrial citizenship did not catch on. In the United States, corporations,
“with the full support of Democratic and Republican administrations in
Washington”, pushed back industrial relations to the practices “of the late
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nineteenth century”. In England, the guild socialist tendency all but disap-
peared after the trade unions’ defeat in the General Strike of 1925. The Brit-
ish Labour Party, subsequently, subscribed to the nationalization, rather than
to democratic control, of key industries (Stears 2002: 263, 268).
Still, the behavioral group approach propounded by Bentley, which
Barnes judged “the most notable American contribution to political theory”,
was likewise “neglected” after Bentley’s book had first come out (Barnes
1924: 493, 494 n. 18). Eight decades later, informed opinion continued to
agree: Bentley’s “immediate impact on the discourse of political science”
was “minimal” (Gunnell 2004: 105). That situation would change, after a
considerable number of pressure group studies had been published in the
United States between World Wars I and II, and after the New Deal had final-
ly established organized labor and organized agriculture as industry’s “junior
partners” in bargaining for political benefits. As more and more social inter-
ests organized and ‘log-rolling’ became the established legislative procedure,
the “acceptance of groups as lying at the heart of the process of government”
was judged conceptually “unavoidable” (Truman 1951: 46).
For David Truman who, echoing Bentley, would state that “we do not, in
fact, find individuals otherwise than in groups”, Bentley’s analysis had
served as “the principal bench mark” (Truman 1951: IX, 48). However, the
political system, according to Truman, was not merely accounted for “by the
‘sum’ of organized interest groups”. He included constitutionalism, civil
liberties, and representative techniques such as the “rules of the game”
among the norms according to which organized groups had to operate. Oth-
erwise, they risked bringing large, still unorganized “potential” groups into
action, whose widely held attitudes and values Bentley had termed the sys-
tem’s “habit background” (Truman 1951: 51, 159, 524; Bentley 1908: 218).
In its entirety, the group concept resembled a modified marketplace
model (‘interest-group liberalism’, in Theodore Lowi’s term): “The notion of
individual competition is replaced by a network of organizational competi-
tion ... This makes for a system of countervailing powers” (Apter 1977: 312,
314/315). That “central ingredient of a stable pluralist democratic system”
(ibid.: 355/356), countervailing power, was supposedly guaranteed by a “nat-
ural self-balancing factor ... almost amount(ing) to a law” – in other words,
Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ in new clothes: “Nearly every vigorous push
in one direction stimulates an opponent or a coalition of opponents to push in
the opposite direction” (Milbrath 1955: 365; see also Kornhauser 1961: 130).
Resulting from ever-present counterbalancing tendencies, “tam(ing), civi-
liz(ing), ... and limit(ing) power to decent human purposes”, competing “mul-
tiple centers of power” were supposed to resolve conflicts “to the mutual
benefit of all parties” (Dahl 1967: 24).
The group theorists’ ‘analytical’ (Latham 1952: 9) or ‘sociological’ (Li-
jphart 1968: 2n.) pluralism, while claiming to disregard considerations of a
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normative kind, was admittedly biased toward group leadership. It was, in
fact, an elite model, according to which leaders of associations conducted the
process of organized pressure and bargaining, thereby “control (ling) each
other” (Dahl/Lindblom 1953: 23, 325/326). Control among leaders, however,
provided but one significant attribute of the political process. A second was
control of leaders by means of periodic elections, holding them accountable
to party or interest group members, and to the electorate at large. “Civic trust
in leaders, and leaders’ responsiveness to potential interest group claims
might be expected to do the rest” (McLennan 1995: 35/36).
The Cold War confrontation encouraged the introduction of a more or
less explicitly normative element into the concept. The rise of fascism and,
more importantly after 1945, of communism were interpreted to demonstrate
the dangers of mass movements. Because in Western political systems lead-
ers were assumed to have been “socialized into the dominant values ... of
industrial society”, politics of group leadership were supposed to ensure
moderate, rational conflict, serving as a demarcation line domestically against
radicalism and the “irrationality and chaos” of mass politics, internationally
against totalitarianism (Rogin 1967: 10, 15; see also Nicholls 1974: 25).
Liberal pluralism “portrayed capitalist democracy in a favorable light and
gave it a little theoretical apparatus which discriminated nicely between this
system and other systems with which we as a nation were in rivalrous rela-
tions” (Douglas Rae, quoted by Merelman 2003: 50/51). Put otherwise, the
static descriptive (see Rothman 1960: 31/32) and the anti-totalitarian norma-
tive dimension blended in a manner to ensure the “astonishing career” (Stef-
fani 1980: 9) of pluralism as a “public philosophy” which “public men” grew
accustomed to use rather instinctively both as guideline and justification for
their policies (see Lowi 1967: passim, and id. 1979: 51 ss.). Substantiation of
the argument is provided by two not untypical examples, both a decade and a
continent apart: When the Portuguese “revolution of carnations” seemed to
veer to the left during 1974/75, the European Community’s Council of Heads
of State and Government declared “that the EC, because of its political and
historical tradition, can grant support only to a pluralist democracy” (Com-
mission 1976: 8). And in the United States, the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) was set up by the early 1980s with a view to promoting
“American-style pluralist societies” (New York Times 1984: B 10).
In politics as in political science, “pluralism’s flexibility, adaptability,
terminological simplicity” (Merelman 2003: 117; also ibid.: 123) helped to
spread the discourse. The quote by Winfried Steffani referred to West Ger-
many, where every major political party, as Steffani showed, professed to
back “free and pluralist democracy”. In post-World War II Germany, the
experience by many of intellectual exile in the United States during the Nazi
regime had favored the emergence of a ‘neo’-pluralist concept largely analo-
gous to the American model (and indeed influenced by David Truman’s
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argument; cf. Eisfeld 1998: 394/395). The approach was judged in retrospect
“probably the most important product of the early stage of (West-German)
political science” (Blanke et al. 1975: 76):
Not only could ‘neo’-pluralism lay claim to putting the theory of parlia-
mentary democracy on a new footing; it also won wide acceptance beyond
the discipline of political science. Explicitly substituting totalitarianism –
“the construct beyond the ‘Iron Curtain’ and the Wall” (Fraenkel 1968: 165)
– for monism as the principal counterpart to pluralism, it also served as a
perfect Cold War term. Ernst Fraenkel who had initially embraced the notion
with some hesitation (cf. id. 1957: 236), only to push it the more vigorously
later, bluntly professed that neo-pluralism was “fighting – to say nothing of
Hitler’s shadow – the much less faded shadow of Stalin” (Fraenkel 1968: 187).
The simplified ‘neo’-pluralism/totalitarianism dichotomy would soon prove a
major reason for questioning the model (Eisfeld 1972: 86; Kremendahl 1977:
209/210).
Liberal pluralists usually conceded that income, education and status
were apt to determine, to a considerable extent, political activity, including
control of leaders and access to government (Truman 1951: 265;
Dahl/Lindblom 1953: 315). They also noted that these resources were not
merely unequally distributed between business and labor (Truman 1951:
ibid.), but that the system offered “unusual” opportunities for “pyramiding”
such resources into structures of social power (Dahl 1963: 227). However,
the prospects for “citizens weak in resources” to influence government –
principally by associating with others – were not seriously questioned, be-
cause “probably no resource is uniformly most effective in American poli-
tics” (Dahl 1967: 378; see also id. 1963: 228). Generally, it was formal
equality of opportunity which liberal pluralism emphasized.
IV. Democratizing Economy and Society: Dahl’s and Lindblom’s
Transformation of Liberal Pluralism
During the late 1960s, when the Cold War had thawed, when radical dissent
over ever more massive American bombing in Vietnam brought the “armies
of the night” converging on Washington and Lyndon Johnson’s vision of a
Great Society succumbed to the exigencies of the same Vietnam War, the
then president of the American Political Association felt bound to note that
political scientists, “in some considerable measure, (had) worn collective
blinkers”. Their restricted vision had prevented them from recognizing major
flaws in current interpretations of democracy, making them susceptible to
“governmental interpretations of American interests ... both at home and
abroad” (Easton 1969: 1057). David Easton therefore supported a rearrange-
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ment of research priorities “in the light of a better understanding of own
value assumptions”, including the construction of political alternatives, rather
than “uncritically acquiesc(ing) in prevailing politics” (id.: 1058/1059, 1061).
Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, having turned more skeptical and
radical in their assessments, later explained their earlier commitment to the
ongoing political system in sentences that read like a comment on Easton’s
statement: “The New Deal was not a remote historical episode. It provided
grounds for thinking that reform periods would again occur with some fre-
quency” (Dahl/Lindblom 1976: XXX; see also David Mayhew in a 1997
interview, quoted by Merelman 2003: 85: “Pluralism [was] a New Dealish
philosophy”). In looking back on his career a few years earlier, German polit-
ical scientist and sometime emigré Ernst Fraenkel likewise attributed his “de-
velopment of a pluralist model of democracy” to “the experience of the ‘Roo-
sevelt Revolution’” when labor and agriculture had been recognized as politi-
cal players alongside business (Fraenkel 1973: 26).
Looking for ways to remedy what Dahl eventually would identify as the
“dilemmas of pluralist democracy”, Dahl and Lindblom singled out the large
business corporation – the “corporate leviathan” (Dahl 1970: 117) – as the
major target for structural, participatory reforms. To a remarkable extent,
liberal pluralist thinking (unlike Laski’s radical pluralism) had previously
failed to diagnose and analyze economic constraints. No systematic conse-
quences had been drawn from the acknowledgment that oligopoly, “the most
frequent market form of modern (capitalist) economies”, and the resulting
monopolistic competition are “group phenomena” (Latham 1952: 5). Instead,
as shown by the quotes included above, it had been maintained as a general
supposition that “organization begets counter-organization” (Latham 1952:
31).
In a manner reminiscent of Harold Laski’s earlier argument, but more
systematically, Dahl and Lindblom now focused their analysis on the trans-
formation of the privately owned and managed firm into the joint-stock com-
pany, the ensuing divorce between property and control, and the exercise, by
the large corporation, of power comparable to that of states: “The small fami-
ly enterprise run by its owner became the large enterprise in which operation
was separated from ownership. The ideology of the private enterprise of
farmer and small merchant was transferred (, however,) more or less intact to
the big corporation ... (even if) nothing could be less appropriate than to con-
sider the giant firm a private enterprise” (Dahl 1970: 119/120; also
Dahl/Lindblom 1976: XXVIII).
Nothing could be less appropriate, because business corporations – with
regard to sales, assets, numbers of employees, the impact of their pricing,
investment, and financing policies – had developed into social and public
institutions, “political bodies” with an “internal government”. As Dahl and
Lindblom went on to emphasize, because of the persisting application of the
38
            
         
         
             
           
              
         
              
         
         
           
            
         
          
            
               
              
             
               
            
 
                   
            
             
            
         
          
        
           
        
            
         
            
      
         
            
           
          
         
          
           
          
ideology of private ownership to the large corporation “excessive weight (is
given) to the particularistic interests of managers and investors”
(Dahl/Lindblom 1976: XXIX). The ensuing “privileged position of business”
– and of “corporate executives in particular” – involves the capacity to distort
public policies, or – should undesirable measures nevertheless be legislated –
to contract out from under the effects of such legislation (Dahl 1982: 40 ss.).
Thus, it “restrict(s) polyarchical rules and procedures (i.e. those approximat-
ing democracy) to no more than a part of government and politics, and ...
challenge(s) them even there” (Lindblom 1977: 172, 190).
Suggesting that corporate “rulers” were subject neither to effective inter-
nal control by stockholders, nor to adequate external control by governments
and markets, Dahl went on to propose a determined effort at further democra-
tization – the “enfranchisement” of blue- and white-collar employees, realiz-
ing industrial self-government in the sense originally propounded by Harold
Laski (Dahl 1982: 199, 204; Dahl 1989: 327 ss., 331/332). Dahl’s position
may not have been one “with any clear sense of its connections to the past”
(Gunnell 2004: 235), even if in one instance he did acknowledge that, by the
late 1930s, he had “read Laski”, and that he and Lindblom “were familiar
with the British ... ideas about pluralism” (Dahl 1986: 234, 282 n. 11). At any
rate, the following quote might have come straight from Laski’s Grammar of
Politics:
To say that people are entitled to the fruits of their labor is not to say that investors are
entitled to govern the firms in which they invest” (Dahl 1989: 330).
In Germany, a distinct “Laski School” (Detjen 1988: 63) had emerged by this
time whose exponents, not unlike Dahl and Lindblom, argued in favor of
“democratizing” the economy and, by fusing everyday “social” with “politi-
cal” activity, developing perceptions and qualifications conducive to a more
participatory political process (Eisfeld 1972: 21, 103; Bermbach/Nuscheler
1973: 11; Nuscheler 1980: 158/159). Pointing to the legitimating functions of
the established pluralist discourse (Eisfeld 1972: 85/86; Bermbach/Nuscheler
1973: 10; Nuscheler 1980: 157), these writers also took pains to emphasize
the inequality of political resources and, consequently, the limited representa-
tiveness of interest groups – pluralism “as a smokescreen for the realpolitik
of elite accommodation” (Garson 1978: 157).
In the United States, the indictment of pluralism’s egalitarian shortcom-
ings by Dahl and Lindblom amounted to an “internal transformation” of the
concept by two of its leading exponents (McLennan 1995: 4). Earlier cri-
tiques of the model’s shortcomings had served as forerunners. Liberal plural-
ists had argued that cross-cutting pressures from overlapping group member-
ships affecting an individual were apt to promote “compromise through bar-
gaining” (Truman 1951: 162/163, 166; Dahl/Lindblom 1953: 329). In the last
instance, conflicting group loyalties supposedly served to advance “a high
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degree of liberty and consent” (Kornhauser 1961: 80). Allusions to political
apathy had at least surfaced as a quite different possible outcome in the texts
of both Truman and Dahl/Lindblom, even if neither had pursued the implica-
tions for democratic politics. A more detailed examination based on the same
empirical findings would conclude that apathy, in practice, may either mean
frustration, the “compartmentalization of simultaneously maintained loyal-
ties”, or “non-rational adaptation” – in other words, inertia and docility
(Mitchell 1963, as quoted by Lijphart 1968: 11; Eckstein 1966: 72 ss.).
Severe doubt was thus cast on the supposedly democratic effects of liber-
al pluralism’s central provisions. In addition, it was demonstrated that the
entire model of group interaction “breaks down” (Rothman 1960: 23) if the
concept’s reasoning is reversed, as Truman had done in his book’s conclud-
ing chapter. Defining, as will be recalled, potential groups in terms of “wide-
ly held”, but “unorganized” interests (i. e. attitudes), Truman had singled out
“multiple memberships” in these potential groups as the political system’s
“balance wheel” – in other words, the polity’s decisive factor (Truman 1951:
512, 514). He had thereby resorted to a “deus ex machina” which could be
brought in “for any purpose” (Rothman 1960: 23; see also Lowi 1979: 37).
Closer examination of the countervailing-power hypothesis shattered a
final corner-stone of liberal pluralism. Even if this particular debate largely
focused on the specific economic form given to the argument by John Ken-
neth Galbraith– according to whom “in the typical American market”, private
economic power was supposed to generate “the countervailing power of
those who are subject to it” (Galbraith 1956: 125, 151, 182) –, still it had
something generally applicable to say about the “romantic” attribution of
“proxy-mindedness” to organizational oligopolies (Stigler 1954: 9/10). The
concept, as was shown, basically amounted to a philosophy of “perpetual
stalemate” which made it conservative in impact and undemocratic in action
(McCord Wright 1954: 14; see also Lowi 1967: 20). In addition, the critique
of the countervailing-power scenario suggested other analyses that depicted
today’s large-scale organizations as “unwieldy”, “unresponsive” – to changes
in their environments – and “insensitive” – to the need for flexibility. Cum-
bersome and immune to internal or external control, they were charged with
generating alienated, angry and/or apathetic individuals who “feed streams of
hostility and aggressiveness into both domestic and international affairs”
(McClelland 1965: 268).
If the liberal variety of pluralism emerged distinctly frayed from the me-
lee, the debate had also emphasized the normative challenge posed by plural-
ism’s inherent anti-monist, anti-hierarchical, participatory implications. Rad-
ical pluralist propositions, such as those put forward by Robert Dahl from the
mid-1970s, have consequently merged into the larger, more comprehensive
debate on democratization, a “spill-over” of democratic norms onto economy
and society. The attribute “political” has thus been reconceptualized, now
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relating to any form of group decision-making. Pluralist democratization
would be intended to make “all societal sectors more responsive to their
members” and thereby society as a whole “more receptive” to its own pivotal
value – the norm of political equality (Etzioni 1968: 6).
Actual evidence is ambiguous as to what extent such visions of increased
citizen competence and control might be accepted, internalized, or practiced
by increasing segments of “consumption-oriented, acquisitive (and) privatis-
tic” societies (Dahl 1970: 135). Experiences with isolated “participatory
environments” do not automatically promote general orientations furthering
broad social change in a more egalitarian direction (see Greenberg 1981).
The present situation not only warrants further research, but more participa-
tory experimentation. This seems unlikely, however, as democratic govern-
ance is being delegitimized under the impact of the increasingly “hegemonic”
neo-liberal discourse accepted by governmental and market players alike who
rival each other in “reinvent(ing)” and reorganizing the state “along the lines
of private industry” as a “quasi-‘enterprise association’” bent on cutting out-
lays and proving competitiveness (Cerny 1997: 251, 256, 269; id. 1999: 2).
V. The Rise and Demise of the Neo-Corporatist Alternative
On top of the reemergence of radical pluralism, likewise taking “a less benign
view of the democratic credentials of group politics” in comparison to liberal
pluralists (Williamson 1989: 3), neo- or liberal corporatism was the second
conceptual challenge to confront liberal pluralism during the early 1970s. By
the mid-sixties, Stein Rokkan had already characterized “established” trian-
gular interest representation in Norway as “corporate pluralist” – labor, farm-
ing and business interests maintaining existing inequalities by conspicuously
excluding the unorganized from bargaining processes at the top, as “corporate
pluralist” (Rokkan 1966: 105). Referring to the post-World War I involve-
ment of organized business interests with public administrations in formulat-
ing economic policies to “recast bourgeois Europe”, Charles Maier had also
used the term “corporate pluralismto label such interplay (Maier 1974:
202 ss.; and id. 1975: 353/354, 543).
Neo-corporatists, with Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch in the
forefront, now focused more systematically on “institutionalized patterns” of
policy formulation and implementation, in which organized business and
organized labor “cooperate(d) with each other and with public authorities” at
the leadership level, controlling and mobilizing group members in a top-
down process (Lehmbruch 1979: 150, 152; Panitch 1979: 123; Jessop 1979:
200). Such patterns required the involved leaders’ commitment “to the over-
all legitimacy of the existing economic system”, expressed in their willing-
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ness to “confin(e) themselves to demands”, or to push for compromises,
compatible with steady economic growth (Jessop 1979: ibid.).
Consequently, the neo-corporatist school of thought has insisted that
(1) the “social and economic attributes around which interests organize” are
“unequally distributed”,
(2) that such “socio-economic inequalities are reflected in, and indeed rein-
forced by, the politics of organized interests”, not least because
(3) certain associations, particularly organized business and organized labor,
are “granted privileged access” to governmental decision-making pro-
cesses,
(4) that political processes typically take the form of oligarchically struc-
tured “interest intermediation” through a “closed process of bargaining”
among leaders, “consciously or not” guided by efforts at promoting sys-
tem stabilization, rather than interest maximization, and implying
(5) that involved associations, far from providing “valuable route(s) to par-
ticipation”, allow leaders “a regulatory role over their members” (Wil-
liamson 1989: 2/3, 68/69).
Proponents of corporatism and liberal pluralism alike have usually conceded
that pluralist and corporatist arrangements more often than not may occur in
mixed combinations, with (West) Germany providing a typical example (see,
e.g., Beyme 1979: 238, 241; Streeck 1983: 279). Both varieties may, in fact,
not perform too differently, considering what liberal pluralism had to say
about bargaining among leaders and about the possible “pyramiding” of une-
qually distributed political resources.
Because trade union leaders may be expected to face particularly difficult
tasks in “delivering their members” on agreements reached, the involvement
of social democratic parties as predominant players able to secure trade un-
ion support has been considered a salient requirement of corporatist struc-
tures (Panitch 1979: 129/130; Jessop 1979: 207/208). As conclusively
demonstrated by recent French and German experience, that condition was
linked, in its turn, to a “fair-weather” situation of high economic growth,
allowing for high real wages and high welfare benefits. The social democrat-
ic/trade union alliance was eroded when governments led by social democrat-
ic parties, accepting the notion of international “competitiveness” as the new
social and economic orthodoxy, joined conservative administrations in at-
tempts at mediating the consequences of globalization by the pursuit of de-
regulatory and privatization policies (Cerny 1997: 258 ss.). Recent develop-
ments have not borne out optimistic contentions that social democratic corpo-
ratism could be expected to remain politically and economically viable, be-
cause it provided not just a profitable, but also a stable “home for business”
(Garrett 1998: 155, 157).
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Corporatism, moreover, had always remained very much a “Europeanist”
concept. With regard to the United States, observers continued to note “the
strength of corporate business in the circles of decision” (Salisbury 1979:
213) even in the brief historical moment when the Nixon administration,
during the early 1970s, seemed to be endorsing a corporatist solution. After
that attempt had been abandoned, it was diagnosed that precisely because of
that political strength, “and the concomitant weakness of labor”, no genuine
interest in such an arrangement existed on the part of the American business
elite (Salisbury 1979: 228).
In present-day European polities, too, with “pro-market state intervention
on the increase”, and governments ever more determinedly “underperform-
ing” with regard to regulation and public services, tripartite neo-corporatist
arrangements including trade unions are replaced by a more assertive
reemergence of “overarching” corporate hegemony (Cerny 1999a: 19/20). Or
one could use the term ‘corporate pluralism’, lately preferred by Theodore J.
Lowi, for a constellation which radical pluralists had diagnosed much earlier.
By transferring production facilities and investment outlays between coun-
tries, shifting profits via transfer-pricing, and moving large amounts of liquid
assets, multinational companies had long been able to opt out of the effects of
national economic policies. The monetary and fiscal tools of legislative and
governmental interventionism were already proving inadequate. With the
progress of globalization, the mere threat by large transnational corporations
of moving capital or economic enterprise out of the country has now gained so
much in credibility that it “radically eats into the capacity” of legislatures. To
comply with the demands of international investors and foreign competitive
pressures, welfare states “must be traded down to minimal safety nets”. Cor-
porate hegemony means that “business has acquired veto power in economic
policy” (Hirst 2004: 155; Ringen 2004: 4).
VI. The Ethno-cultural Issue: Toward a Politics of Pluralist
Inclusion?
In the increasingly multicultural Western-type societies which the migration
component of globalization has entailed, mounting social inequalities and
economic insecurities rank high among the factors which have been fueling
the rediscovery of ethnicity as a source of belonging, of ostensible “certainty
in an uncertain world” (Durando 1993: 26). As far back as three decades ago,
analysts recorded a pronounced growth in tendencies by persons in many
countries to insist on the significance of their groups’ distinctiveness and,
consequently, in the “salience of ethnic-based” (as against class-based,
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“which of course continue to exist”) “forms of social identification and con-
flict” (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 3, 7).
With these developments in mind, two arguments were advanced in favor
of applying the norms of political pluralism to the problems posed by accept-
ing (“recognizing”) the cultural, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity of
different ethnic groups, without inviting further societal segmentalization:
(1) Because pre-World War II strands of pluralist theory included the
roles that associations play in individual self-development as a central
theme, “striking similarities” were suggested to exist between these ap-
proaches and “the new theories of difference and identity” in a multicultural
context. A ‘reconstructed’ normative theory of pluralism, it was argued,
ought to provide for every individual’s chance of both “engagement and
disengagement with groups” to develop a “critical perspective” (Eisenberg
1995: 1, 3, 188, 190). Pluralism therefore should assess political systems not
least “in terms of whether they contribute to the well-being of societal (i.e.
ethno-cultural) groups”.
(2) Because pluralism affirmed the belief “in the worth of diversity”, the
notion was held to “endorse”, first and foremost, “cultural multiplicity” in
the sense of a “cross-fertilized” rather than a “tribalized” culture (Sartori
1997: 60/61, 62).
Like political pluralism, the idea of cultural pluralism had also been in-
spired by William James’ philosophy (see Menand 2001: 379, 388). When
the term “cultural pluralism” was first introduced by Horace M. Kallen in
1924, immigrant subcultures were flourishing in the eastern United States,
after nearly 15 million immigrants – mostly from southern and eastern Eu-
rope – had been admitted to the country between 1901 and 1920 (id. 2001:
381). Writing between 1915 and 1924, arguing against assimilationist pres-
sures and “melting pot” conformity, Kallen offered his vision of a “com-
monwealth of cultures”, a “federated republic” of different nationalities
(Kallen 1924: 11, 116). Convinced that self-government was impossible
without “self-realization”, that the latter – in the sense of personal identity –
hinged upon the assertion of ethnic differences, and that society’s creativity
would benefit from such heterogeneous strains, he proposed granting equal
treatment to each ethnocultural tradition.
Cultural pluralism, as advocated by Kallen, evidently requires a measure
of “structural” pluralism (Gordon 1975: 85, 88): To persist, ethnic groups,
co-existing within the same society, must maintain some separation from
each other. Policies of differentiated group treatment – e.g., affirmative ac-
tion; official multilingualism; a composition of political agencies reflecting
the existence of various ethnic groups – may work to reinforce both cultural
and structural pluralism. To be effective, such policies need to show an
awareness of the connection between cultural and economic power or, in
other terms, between “workable” recognition and concomitant re-distributive
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measures (Phillips 2004: 71, 75). Radical ethno-cultural pluralism – to avoid
Milton Gordon’s rather confusing term “corporate pluralism”, meant to de-
note that the approach focuses on group rights (see Gordon 1975: 106; id.
1981: 182 ss.) –, in analogy to radical political pluralism, emphasizes equali-
ty of condition.
Such pluralism is in opposition to public policies that remain neutral to-
ward ethnocultural differences: Neutrality implies that discrimination on
ethnic grounds is legally prohibited, while benefits are provided according to
individual eligibility. “The unit of attribution for equity considerations is
always and irrevocably the individual” (Gordon 1981: 184). For that model,
Gordon has retained the term liberal pluralism (see id. 1975: 105/106; id.
1981: 184). Again, it is equality of opportunity which the liberal-pluralist
approach emphasizes.
Most of the relevant debate has been centering on the controversial rela-
tion existing between “pluralism and liberal neutrality”, as one volume’s title
has summarized the central issue (see Bellamy/Hollis 1999). Should liberal
principles and procedures be reinterpreted in scope and character, or – as
maintained by, e.g., Chandran Kukathas – “is there insufficient reason to
abandon, modify or reinterpret liberalism”, for “its very emphasis on individ-
ual rights ... bespeaks ... wariness of the power of the majority over minori-
ties” (Kukathas 1997: 230)? Would not any determined movement in the
direction of group rights imply that “the individual’s claim to be considered
only as an individual, regardless of race, color, or national origin”, will be
irrevocably reduced (Glazer 1997: 137)? Might the acceptance of such rights,
even inadvertently, work to endanger individual autonomy, to bar individuals
from “opting out” of their group by adopting ideas and practices running
counter to their ethnocultural heritage? Obviously, “groups as well as the
state might violate ... individual rights” (Van Dyke 1976/77: 368).
More basically, where Bentley and Truman had favored the group as the
primary unit, they were arguing in analytical terms. If the individual could
always be found within groups, as both insisted, these were groups “of his
choice” (Goulbourne 1991: 224). Conceptions of ethnocultural recognition
and inclusion have, however, tended to assign a normative priority to their
groups. The inadvertent result might consist in confining individuals to a pre-
modern, neo-feudal “ascribed group definition and status” (Goulbourne
1991: ibid.).
Should not, consequently – and so as to avoid the promotion of “ethnic
sectarianism” (Waldron 1997: 113) –, compromises rather than clear-cut
solutions be sought? Bellamy, for one, has argued in favor of a politics of
continuing “negotiated compromise” as a central feature of democratic pro-
cesses guided by a vision of “non-domination, mutual acceptance and ac-
commodation” (Bellamy 1999: 138). Such compromises might most likely be
worked out in those cases where a “definite assessment of the oppression,
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discrimination and persistent exclusion of (a particular) group is possible”
and the conflict with liberal principles thus “less sharp” (Galeotti 1999: 50).
A pluralist politics informed by a spirit of both political participation and
social justice clearly would concede such groups “some” political standing
and “some” legal rights (Walzer 1997: 149). Clearly, then, elements of the
corporate model should be introduced into liberal pluralism – but to what
extent?
Available options (which, of course, may overlap) include legal protec-
tion and public funding for the expression of cultural pecularities; federalism
as a form of self-government; finally group-based political representation, up
to the complex arrangements of consociationalism, which have been attract-
ing “increasing attention” as devices for “overcoming ethnic cleavages by
political accommodation” (Stanovcic 1992: 368; see also Kymlicka 1995:
chs. 2, 7). A general argument advanced in favor of such politics of recogni-
tion/inclusion has been that, while “the sense of being a distinct nation within
a larger country” is indeed “potentially destabilizing”, the “denial of self-
government rights is also destabilizing, since it encourages resentment and
even secession” (Kymlicka 1995: 192). Put in optimistic terms (and con-
trasting with Arthur Schlesinger’s fears quoted at the outset), group-differ-
entiated citizenship may result in the ability of “the plural state, unlike the
liberal state, ... to offer an emotional identity with the whole to counterbal-
ance the emotional loyalties to ethnic and religious communities, which
should prevent the fragmentation of society into narrow, selfish communal-
ism” (Modood 1999: 88).
Consociationalism, identical with a high degree of group-based political
representation, includes the following basic elements (Lijphart 1977: 25):
Considerable autonomy for each involved group in the management of its
internal affairs; application of a proportional standard in political representa-
tion, civil service appointments, and allocation of financial resources; right of
mutual veto in governmental decision-making; finally, joint government by
an either official or unofficial grand coalition of group leaders.
In a case study of consociational democracy in the Netherlands during
the 1950s and 1960s, a number of significant negative consequences had
been spelled out – elite predominance, the arcane character of negotiations, a
large measure of political immobilism (Lijphart 1968: 111, 129, 131). At an
even more basic level, group autonomy (as already indicated above) may
involve internal restrictions on the right of individual members “to question
and dissent from traditional practices” (Kymlicka 1995: 154) – barriers which
run counter to a liberal conception of minority rights: Groups “cannot act
rightly in ways that disempower individuals ... from living successfully out-
side their bounds” (Galston 2002: 104).
In addition, immobilism – which Lijphart concedes to be “the gravest
problem” (Liphart 1977: 51) – may lead to morally reprehensible deadlocks
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by “entrench(ing) an unjust status quo” (Bellamy/Hollis 1999: 75; see also
Bellamy 1999: 127). The right of mutual veto in matters of public policy
amounts to “concurrent”, in John C. Calhoun’s term, rather than numerical
majority rule, and Calhoun’s proposal for such a procedure was designed at
the time to put America’s pre-Civil War south in a position for “effectively
block(ing) ... deliberation of the slavery question” (Bellamy/Hollis 1999: 74).
Thus, expectations may not be met that a high degree of group-based political
representation would contribute to a more vibrant democracy.
VII. The Challenge of Participatory Pluralism in a Globalizing World
The same issues have kept resurfacing during this overview of research on
pluralism and democracy: A grossly unequal distribution of political re-
sources; skewed power structures; a “centripetal politics” enacted – even
before the advent of globalization – by a web of governmental-corporate
centers proceeding in “partnership” (Ionescu 1975: 8/9). As a research
framework for inquiring into these problems which will persist to haunt
21st century democracy, pluralism – it should be repeated – will be of contin-
uing relevance if it reverts to the role of a “critical political theory” (Gettell
1924: 470). It must be critical, as it sporadically has been, about the status
quo of concentrated economic and political power.
Such a radical pluralist approach may start from where early pluralists –
Harold Laski and Mary Follett in particular – had left off in their attempt to
define the social obligations of both business corporations and trade unions,
and to surmount the unequal distribution of power between capital and labor
(see Laski 1921: 97/98. 272 ss., 289 ss.; Follett 1918: 170). It may build on
Robert Dahl’s and Charles Lindblom’s analyses and on Dahl’s ensuing pro-
posal to “achieve the best potentialities of pluralist democracy” by realizing
what Dahl termed “a third democratic transformation”: democratic internal
government of economic enterprises (Dahl 1982: 47, 110, 170; id. 1989: 312,
327/328, 331/332).
Resorting to an analysis guided by a set of group-centered propositions, a
radical pluralist approach is able to explain the segmentation of class struc-
tures into blue and white collar strata differentiated by vocation and attitude;
the emergence of additional patterns of ethnocultural cleavages exacerbated
by economic injustices; the continuing inequalities of economic influence
and control, equivalent to so many structurally embedded participatory barri-
ers; basic origins of social passivity and depoliticization; resulting unequal
chances for the organized representation of interests; limits of redistributive
and regulatory public policies before and since the onset of globalization; the
weakening of state legitimacy due to the downsizing of public budgets and
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the reduction of resources available for allocation by representatives to con-
stituents (e.g., Eisfeld 1986: 281/282; Putzel 2005: 12).
The normative challenge posed by pluralist analysis thus becomes appar-
ent: At the very moment in history when the power and the accountability of
democratic governance are literally bleeding away, when – consequently –
the reasons “for high levels of citizen loyalty to the state or active commit-
ment to the democratic process” are disappearing fast (Hirst 2004: 155), a
determined effort at democratization merits to be once again put high on the
agenda of our thinking about democracy.
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In 1981, Praxis International was launched as a journal first of “Marxist
humanist”, subsequently of “democratic socialist” orientation. Seyla Ben-
habib and Svetozar Stojanović, its editors, published the following article in
1986. Adding an international dimension, and including the military institu-
tion in the pluralist approach to participatory democracy, I tried to show
how and why pluralism and socialism may not only be compatible, but com-
plementary tasks. In addition to numerous other scholars, the editorial board
of Praxis International included Mihailo Marković and Rudi Supek, along
with Stojanović members of the Yugoslav Praxis group which Tito had at-
tempted to silence: The original journal Praxis, started in 1965 as a forum
for discussing ways of attaining “self-management socialism”, was banned
nine years later, the legendary summer schools on Korčula island stopped,
members of the group who taught at Belgrade University suspended. Interna-
tional protests, however, met with some success. The group was conceded a
research institute, Praxis was continued as Praxis International by Oxford
publisher Basil Blackwell until 1991, while the Inter-University Center in
Dubrovnik replaced Korčula as a venue for regular international meetings of
philosophers and social scientists.
Pluralism as a Critical Political Theory
I
When elaborated during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the
concept of pluralism in its initial stages assailed monist ideas ascribing to the
modern state „a unitary and absolute sovereign power“ as the sole and direct
source of either legal or political authority.1 On principal and on empirical
grounds, pluralists stressed the fundamental independence of social associa-
tions – trade unions no less than churches – from the sovereign command of
the state. Insofar as alternative institutional arrangements were proposed,
however, these were apt to vacillate between transferring sovereignty to the
diverse groups, channelling dynamic social interests into permanent corporate
arrangements, or even reintroducing, in new clothes, „the monist’s over-
lord“.2
1 Hsiao, Kung Chuan (1927), Political Pluralism, London/New York: K. Paul, p. 7.
2 For the last quote, see Coker, Francis W. (1921): „The Techniques of the Pluralist State“,
American Political Science Review, XV, p. 207. The „sovereign group“ and corporate falla-
cies were first critically referred to by Elliott, William Yandall (1925): „Sovereign State or
Sovereign Group?“ (1925), American Political Science Review, XIX, p. 479, and Bonn,
Moritz J. (1925): Die Krisis der europäischen Demokratie, Munich, p. 115.
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Redefining sovereignty so as to represent the „totality of social purpos-
es“, and interpreting group organization as part and parcel of the „multicellu-
lar democratic organism“3 provided the way out of the impasse for pluralism:
If the social needs of individuals, expressed by their associations, constitute
one focal point and governmental interventionism the other, the two are
linked by the „constant and complex interactions“ of „the individual, the
group, the state.“4 The pluralist norm, then, is expressed precisely by that
„constructive social policy… for the individual man“ which accounts for the
state’s attributes as a „public service corporation“ promoting men’s positive
liberties.5
In a second step, pluralism was thus constructed as a dynamic theory
centring on the fundamentally associative character of society, yet placing the
„individual at the centre of things“,6 while stressing the state’s task to act as
an agency for the political improvement of individual conditions of existence.
Rapidly, however, it was discerned that repudiating the state’s claim to for-
mal sovereignty would not suffice, if the pluralists were to remain true to
their effort of forging a political philosophy attempting „to formulate the
fundamental content of freedom and democracy“.7 Accepting the pluralist
norm of socio-political interaction also meant recognizing that an egalitarian
basis for such a process had yet to be created by redistributing material ad-
vantages between social classes: While „the State has sovereign rights“, polit-
ical power is largely „the handmaid of economic power… The political per-
sonality of the average citizen is made ineffective for any serious purpose“.8
The conclusion, at the time, was unambiguous:
“No political democracy can be real that is not as well a reflection of an
economic democracy…The present system of property does not in the least
involve the present technique of industrial direction.”9
Pluralism was thus originally formulated as a theory at once positive and
normative of social (interest) groups and of individual participation (via asso-
ciations) in the political process – a theory unavoidably critical of capitalist
economy and society which, just as unavoidably, it proposed to transcend:
3 Cf. Hsiao, op. cit., pp. 141, 144.
4 Follett, Mary P. (1920): The New State, New York: Longmans, Green, pp. 10, 61.
5 Ibid., pp. 182, 184; Laski, Harold J. (1968; 11919): Authority in the Modern State, Hamden:
Archon, pp. 31, 55.
6 Cf. Laski, Harold J. (1977; 11925): A Grammar of Politics, London: George Allen & Un-
win, p. 67; also id.: Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (1917), New Haven/London:
Yale University Press, p. 19.
7 Magid, Henry Meyer (1941): English Political Pluralism, New York: Columbia University
Press, p. 65.
8 Laski, Studies, p. 15; and id. (1921): The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays,
London: Harcourt, Brace, p. IX.
9 Laski, Authority, p. 38; id., Grammar, p. 112.
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“The objective of the pluralist must be the classless society…If the main ground of conflict
is thus removed, it becomes possible to conceive of a social organization in which the truly
federal nature of society receives institutional expression.
In such a social organization, authority can be pluralist both in form and expression.”10
II
Two generations later, however, it was the very concept of political pluralism
that came to be identified, for West European societies, as a major barrier
against social and economic reforms meant to redistribute advantages be-
tween social classes:11 While
pluralism’s embrace of positive government [had] first put it at an ideological pole opposite
capitalism…, the two apparent antitheses [had] ultimately disappeared… Capitalism and
pluralism were not actually synthesized, however; in a sense, they absorbed each other.12
The reasons for that development were at least threefold. The conceptual
approach of „analytical“, in contrast to „philosophic“ pluralism,13 offered a
status quo-centred alternative: whereas the pluralist conception aimed at
reinstating individual man, acting through his freely established associations,
as the central political figure capable of influencing a polity at once grown
overwhelmingly powerful and largely monopolised by the economically
strong, group theory strictu senso, turning against individualism and institu-
tionalism at the same time, limited itself to proclaiming the group as the cen-
tral analytical category:14
10 Laski, Grammar, p. XII. Ernest Barker (who was Laski’s tutor at Oxford) had earlier
emphasized the „polyarchical“ character of a social order constituted by organized groups,
but had confined his normative argument to noting that the state would have to gain corre-
spondingly in regulatory power to prevent group despotism. Cf. Barker, Ernest (1915): Po-
litical Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, London/New York:
Williams & Norgate, p. 183; also Adolf M. Birke (1978): Pluralismus und Ge-
werkschaftsautonomie in England, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, p. 197. The West-German „neo“-
pluralist school (cf. infra), not desirous of going beyond current concepts of the Western
European welfare state, has stressed its indebtedness to Barber. Cf. Fraenkel, Ernst (1964):
Der Pluralismus als Strukturelement der freiheitlich-rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie, Mün-
chen: C. H. Beck, p. 11.
11 Cf. Parkin, Frank (1972): Class Inequality and Political Order, St. Albans: Paladin, pp. 181
ss.
12 Lowi, Theodore J. (2rev1979): The End of Liberalism, New York/London: W. W. Norton, p.
35.
13 Latham, Earl (1952), A Group Basis of Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 9, and
Lijphart, Arend (1968), The Politics of Accommodation, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University
of California Press, p. 2n., argue in these terms.
14 Truman, David B. (1951): The Governmental Process, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 48.
Even more emphatically, Arthur F. Bentley – whose Process of Government (Evanston:
Principia) served as the „principal bench mark“ for Truman’s thinking (cf. Truman, op. cit.,
p. IX) – had argued in 1908 that every activity can be stated „either on the one side as indi-
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We do not, in fact, find individuals otherwise than in groups… ‚The individual’ and ‚the
group’ are at most merely convenient ways of classifying behavior, two ways of approach-
ing the same phenomena, not different things.
Attempting „to reduce human behavior to patterns of group interactions and
their disturbances“, the group doctrine blinded its protagonists to the im-
portance of changes in the socio-economic structure as well as in the norma-
tive dimensions of political action.15 However, for reasons that will be dis-
cussed below, the approach prevailed. Initial pluralist propositions gave way
to the behavioral interest „analytical“ pluralism displayed in the structure and
activity of existing – even more, of dominant – groups. Attempting to pass as
value-free, group theory succumbed to the normative temptation by assuming
conservative and apologetic traits.16
Reflecting the process whereby paradigms tend to emerge in the social
sciences, the prevalence of the group approach was favored by the descriptive
interest political sociology had begun to display – especially in the United
States – in the lobbying activities of „pressure groups“. The influences exert-
ed by organized business, labor, farm, and other professional groups – but
also by veterans’, women’s, or temperance organizations – on political par-
ties, legislatures, executives, and administrative bureaucracies were being
subjected to increasing scrutiny. As social interests successively began to
organize, and „pressure politics“ became increasingly topical, the „ac-
ceptance of groups as lying at the heart of the process of government“ was
judged conceptually „unavoidable“.17
In the political domain, finally, the rise of fascism and communism
seemed to suggest „the similarities between the extreme Right and the ex-
treme Left and the dangers of mass movements“. Haunted by the twin spec-
ters of radicalism and totalitarianism, „modern“ pluralism pitted group poli-
tics – ultimately, politics of group leadership -, because they produced „sen-
sible and orderly“ conflict, against the „irrationality and chaos“ of mass poli-
tics:
vidual, or on the other side as social group activity“, but that, in interpreting social process-
es, the former „is in the main of trifling importance“, whereas the latter „is essential, first,
last, and all the time“ (ibid., p. 215).
15 Cf. Rothman, Stanley (1960): „Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group
Approach“, American Political Science Review, LIV, pp. 31, 32.
16 Cf. Hale, Myron Q. (1960): „The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley“, American Political
Science Review, LIV, pp. 956, 958 on Bentley; Bluhm, William T. (1965): Theories of the
Political System, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, pp. 357-358, on Latham and Truman.
17 In offering this statement, Truman, op. cit., p. 46, on the same page refers to a considerable
body of pressure group studies published between World Wars I and II.
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Pluralism analyzes efforts by masses to improve their condition as threats to stability. It
turns all threats to stability into threats to constitutional democracy. This is a profoundly
conservative endeavor.18
In its tendency to equate group politics with Western representative democra-
cy, the „vulgarized version“19 of the pluralist model was considerably
strengthened by the advent of the Cold War confrontation between the Atlan-
tic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. A more or less explicitly normative ele-
ment was reintroduced into the theory, particularly in the West German ver-
sion of „neo“-pluralism20 – substituting, however, „totalitarianism“ (succes-
sively identified with Stalinism, communism, or even socialism in general)
for monism as the principal counterpart to pluralism.
The notion of monism which had pointed to structural defects of capital-
ist societies – because an economic system that „reserves disposition over
productive means to private owners and their authorized agents, the ‚manag-
ers’“, has justly been labelled not pluralist but monist -,21 thereby all but
disappeared from consideration. The static descriptive and the anti-
totalitarian normative dimension blended in a manner to ensure the „astonish-
ing career“22 of pluralism as the prevailing „public philosophy“ which „pub-
lic men“ have grown accustomed tuse rather instinctively both as guideline
and justification for their policies.23 „Modern“ pluralism has thus served to
legitimize and stabilize existing power structures in the „free world’s“ post-
war societies.
III
Like national pluralism, international pluralism is structurally biased in more
than one respect: Interdependence is fundamentally „lopsided“ and „asym-
18 The quote is taken from Robin, Michael Paul (1967): Intellectuals and McCarthy: The
Radical Specter, Cambridge/London: M.I.T. Press, p. 282. Cf. also, for the preceding ar-
gument, pp. 15, 25, 78-79.
19 Lowi, Theodore J. (1967): „The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism“, American
Political Science Review, LXI, p. 12.
20 As developed by Ernst Fraenkel (1964): Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien,
Stuttgart: Kohlhammer; id., Der Pluralismus als Strukturelement, op. cit.; id. (1969):
„Strukturanalyse der modernen Demokratie“, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 49/69; id.
(1973): Reformismus und Pluralismus, Falk Esch & Frank Grube, eds., Hamburg: Hoff-
mann & Campe; also Kremendahl, Hans (1977): Pluralismustheorie in Deutschland, Le-
verkusen: Heggen; Steffani, Winfried (1980): Pluralistische Demokratie, Opladen: Leske &
Budrich. For a critical discussion, cf. Eisfeld, Rainer (1972): Pluralismus zwischen Libera-
lismus und Sozialismus, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
21 Pross, Helge (1963): „Zum Begriff der pluralistischen Gesellschaft“, in: Max Horkheimer,
ed.: Zeugnisse – Theodor W. Adorno zum 60. Geburtstag, Frankfurt: Europäische Verlags-
anstalt, p. 447.
22 Steffani, Pluralistische Demokratie, op. cit., p.
23 Cf. Lowi (1967), op. cit., passim.
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metric in power“.24 On the economic, military and political levels, an interna-
tional hierarchy persists (albeit in varying degrees) between the capitalist
„center“ and the Third World „periphery“, in relations between capitalist
countries themselves, and finally within the so-called Socialist system. To-
day’s international relations are very obviously characterized by economic,
political, and military threats, pressures, destabilizing acts, direct aggressions
(„interventions“), and hegemonic control; by the manifest reality of the ca-
pacity for thermonuclear „overkill“, and by the distinct possibility of ecocide,
as much as genocide.
In such a less than pluralist environment, socio-political values, struc-
tures and goals „developed in the ‚mother country of liberalism’“ (meaning
the United States), „or in the fatherland of socialism“ (referring to the Soviet
Union) „may function as exemplary models because of their place of origin,
not by virtue of their substance“.25 By a „total diplomacy“, pyramiding „la-
bor, diplomacy, intelligence, and business activities in foreign policy“,26
patterns of ideological interpretation – reinforced by enticements and pres-
sures – are being spread in order to exercise influence on socio-political pro-
cesses in any one country. At the same time, these values and norms serve to
justify precisely the occurring „penetrative“ (Rosenau) activities. Among
them, the „public philosophy“ of pluralism has been of crucial importance. A
most recent example is provided by the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) which, set up in the United States during 1984, is destined to promote
„American-style pluralistic societies“ in foreign countries.27 For its first year,
it received from Congress $26.3m in federal money;28 additional corporate
donations were expected to start flowing before long.
Even more instructive is the case of the Portuguese „revolution of carna-
tions“ during 1974/75 where the „Atlantic“ yardstick of pluralism was une-
quivocally applied to the granting of economic aid, elucidating the drastic
manner in which, both within the Eastern and Western spheres of influence,
not only foreign, but also domestic policy options have been reduced: After
the dictatorial Caetano regime had been overthrown by Portuguese officers in
early 1974, and Portuguese administrations had repeatedly asked the EC for
24 Vernon, Raymond (1971): „Multinational Business and National Economic Goals“, Inter-
national Organization, XXV, p. 705; Morse, Edward L. (1971): „Transnational Economic
Processes“, International Organization, XXV, p. 393.
25 Galtung, Johan (1981): „Pluralismus und die Zukunft der menschlichen Gesellschaft“, in:
Dieter Senghaas, ed.: Kritische Friedensforschung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 57.
26 Cox, Robert W. (1971): „Labor and Transnational Relations“, International Organization,
XXV, p. 555.
27 New York Times (1984): „Project Democracy Takes Wing“, No. 56,059, May 29, p. B 10.
28 Of which $13,8m went to the AFL/CIO-run American Institute for Free Labor Develop-
ment, $2,5m to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s new Center for International Private En-
terprise, and $5m each to the Democratic and Republican National Committees’ newly cre-
ated international institutes. Cf. ibid.
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financial support, the EC Council of Heads of State and Government, on 17
July 1975, finally declared that „the EC, because of its political and historical
tradition, can grant support only to a pluralist democracy.“29
At the time, a social mass movement among the industrial and rural
workers of Lisbon and the Portuguese South, as well as a series of political
crises mobilizing an ever widening part of the population, had turned the
original coup into a social revolution. The leftward trend of the country’s
internal social and political power struggle was reflected by the composition
of successive cabinets and by their socializing measures. From spring to
autumn, 1975, Portugal had left-leaning (as distinct from moderate or social-
democratic) governments.30 The North Atlantic Alliance, however, viewed
the country not as a developing polity and society in its own right, but solely
in terms of a „domino“ – NATO’s „crumbling Southern flank“ – in the East-
West power contest.
Because of its deteriorating economic situation, U.S., NATO and EC atti-
tudes came to be particularly important for Portugal – and particularly for the
final outcome of the domestic political conflict. A loan was conceded by the
EC not before October, 1975, after a new, de facto social-democratic gov-
ernment had been in office for three weeks; disbursements were finally made
in April, 1976.
In foreign policy, as well as domestically, the notions of „modern“ plu-
ralism have contributed to shape the perception of Western interests. These
notions, however, have increasingly met with criticism, leading to a norma-
tive initiative implying structural societal changes and accordingly termed
„structural“ or „socialist“ pluralism. Incidentally, hardly four weeks before
the EC ultimatum, the group of Portuguese officers that had overthrown the
dictatorship had declared that their aim consisted in precisely such a „social-
ist pluralism“.31
IV
A more profound critique of „modern“ pluralism attempting to arrive at a
„structurally“ pluralist alternative would start from where early pluralists had
left off, namely the rise of business corporations and industrial combines on
the one hand, and trade unions on the other hand, in an attempt to define the
social obligations of both and to discuss the unequal distribution of power
29 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (1976), Die Beziehungen zwischen der EG
und Portugal, Brussels, p. 8.
30 For more comprehensive analyses, cf. this book’s Section V below.
31 For a translation of the entire text (published on June 21, 1975), cf. Appendix J to Fields,
Rona M. (1975), The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement, New
York/London: Praeger.
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between capital and labor.32 In striking contrast, a definite lack in diagnosing
and researching economic constraints has persisted in „modern“ pluralist
thinking. That oligopoly, „the most frequent market form of modern [capital-
ist] economies“,33 and the resulting monopolistic competition are „group
phenomena“, has been acknowledged by the group approach.34 Still, its ad-
vocates have failed to draw any systematic consequences from this insight,
even though oligopoly capitalism has continued to make ineffective, in Har-
old Laski’s quoted words, „the average citizen’s political personality“.
In order to update and reformulate in a more systematic manner the early
pluralist’s analysis, five separate – if interconnected – aspects of socio-
economic development need to be considered:35
(1) Pursuing tactics of integration and collusion, oligopolistic corporations
have advanced from being „price takers“ to being „price makers“. Their
„administered“ prices show a perverse flexibility over the business cycle,
preparing the way for stagflation. As means of effective external (public)
control over these groups’ pricing and investment-financing power, the
anti-trust, monetary, and fiscal tools of interventionist government have
proved inadequate.
(2) With regard to sales, assets, and number of employees, large corporations
have developed into social and public (rather than individual and private)
institutions. Although every such corporation is, in fact, a „body politic“
with an „internal government“, it is not subject to effective internal (pri-
vate) control, because the typical small stockholder, for all practical pur-
poses, has become „disenfranchised“.
32 Cf. Laski, Foundations of Sovereignty, pp. 97/98, 272 ss.; Follett, New State, p. 170.
33 Sylos-Labini, Paolo (1969): Oligopoly and Technical Progress, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press,
p. 14; cf. also Rothschild, Kurt W. (1971): „Price Theory and Oligopoly“, in: Alex Hunter,
ed.: Monopoly and Competition, Harmondsworth: Penguin, passim.
34 Cf. Latham, Group Basis, p. 5.
35 For some of the following considerations, see already Eisfeld, Pluralismus, esp. chs. XI,
XVI, XVII. Among the relevant literature, cf. Berle, Adolf A./Means, Gardiner C. (1967):
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan; Dahl, Robert A.
(1959): „Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science“, American Politi-
cal Science Review, LIII, 1-34; Galbraith, John Kenneth (1968): The Affluent Society (Har-
mondsworth: Pelican); Hymer, Stephen/Rowthorn, Robert (1970): „Multinational Corpora-
tions and International Oligopoly: The Non-American Challenge“, in: Charles P. Kindle-
berger, ed., The International Corporation, Cambridge/London: M.I.T. Press, 57-91;
Kefauver, Estes (1966): In a Few Hands, Harmondsworth: Pelican; Mielke, Siegfried
(1973): „Multinationale Konzerne: Zur Deformation pluralistischer Systeme“, in: Günther
Döker/Winfried Steffani, eds.: Klassenjustiz und Pluralismus, Hamburg: Hoffmann &
Campe, 362-378; Preiser, Erich (1971): „Property, Power, and the Distribution of Income“,
in: Kurt W. Rothschild, ed.: Power in Economics, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 119-140;
Riesman, David (1958): Die einsame Masse, Reinbek: Rowohlt; Whyte, William H. (1956):
The Organization Man, New York: Simon & Schuster.
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(3) The privileges of oligopoly are reinforced by those of quasi-monopoly
(Preiser): Owning, or controlling, property advances elasticity in a per-
son’s conduct of life, while lack of property still forces relative rigidity
upon the wage-earner.
(4) While trade unions have, at least within certain limits, added to the inde-
pendence of wage-earning blue-collar workers, the compliance and docil-
ity of salaried white-collar employees (their „other-directedness“, in
Riesman’s famous expression) has increased with the grouping of busi-
ness firms into ever larger organizational units. White-collar strata, how-
ever, have been increasing, in absolute numbers as in proportion, in the
course of and due to the implied logic of economic development.
(5) Finally, multinational corporations – in fact, international oligopolies –
have come to decree part and parcel of what happens in national econo-
mies by transferring production facilities and investment outlays between
countries, shifting profits via transfer-pricing, and moving large amounts
of liquid assets. In a nutshell, they pursue fiscal and foreign exchange
policies without, again, individual governments sufficiently controlling
or checking their power.
By taking into account these structures, strategies, performances, and percep-
tions, pluralist theory is capable of explaining, on a coherent, group-oriented
basis, the segmentation of the earlier rigid class structure into blue- and
white-collar strata differentiated by vocation and attitude; the continuing
inequalities of economic influence and control; central origins of political
apathy and alienation; the resulting unequal chances fort he organized repre-
sentation of interests; finally, the most important sources and limits of state
interventionism.
At the same time, the normative challenge posed by pluralist analysis be-
comes apparent: given the present economic structure, the individual cannot
realize his inherent possibilities by means of the multifarious social groups
and associations. Pluralism’s inherent anti-monist, anti-hierarchical, partici-
patory implications qualify the approach normatively to transcend the partici-
patory barriers structurally embedded in the capitalist socio-political system.
V
The tendency of present pluralism „to function only in certain sectors, where-
as others remain highly authoritarian“,36 does not apply, of course, merely to
the economic base of society. When it was first suggested to analyse socio-
36 Beyme, Klaus von (1980): „The Politics of Limited Pluralism? The Case of West Germa-
ny“, in: Stanislaw Ehrlich/Graham Wootton, eds.: Three Faces of Pluralism, Westmead:
Gover, p. 97.
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political systems by sectors in order to discover their more or less pluralist or
monist character (instead of considering capitalist representative democracies
as a priori pluralist), three sectors, because of their hierarchical, authoritarian
structure were immediately singled out as being „from a pluralist viewpoint,
institutions apart“: governmental bureaucracy in general; the foreign policy
apparatus in particular; finally, the armed forces.37
Concerning the latter, it was noted even at the time that „a not insignifi-
cant part of politics is determined by military considerations in the largest
sense“, and it was emphasized that it would be „inconsistent“ to leave the
military domain outside the scope of pluralism.38 However, once more the
(understandable) research myopia of „modern“ pluralists prevailed and con-
tributed to the failure of political science to link military developments to the
problem of maintaining (not to mention extending) already limited pluralist
structures.
The case of the foremost European „axis“ country defeated during World
War II, (West) Germany, may serve to illustrate the importance which trends
in armament and the existence of armed forces are apt to acquire for democ-
racies that are usually referred to as „pluralist“.
The Federal Republic of Germany, formally demilitarized – along with
the whole of the former „Reich“ – at the Potsdam Conference, existed with-
out armed forces (not counting frontier protective troops) for six years –
though not, of course, as an entirely sovereign state. A „military constitution“
proper was inserted into the West German Basic Law only in 1956, after the
latter had been amended two years earlier by assigning legislative compe-
tence in defense matters to the federal parliament. In 1955, West Germany
joined the North Atlantic Alliance; during the same year, the first regiments
were enrolled. Hardly two decades later, these had expanded into the largest
conventional force in Europe, disposing of 12 army divisions and altogether
460,000 soldiers. These, plus 180,000 civilian employees working in the
armed forces administration (not counting the 120,000 civilians employed by
the allied troops stationed in the Federal Republic, by 1973 accounted for
12.5% of all government personnel.39
Available data suggest that universal military training contributes to ri-
gidities of perception and conduct (a „militarization of needs“) tending to
offset the development of less conventional standards that would coincide
with pluralist norms. This is especially salient for the West German case,
where the „citizen in uniform“ concept was introduced during the 1950s as a
deliberate break with Germany’s military past. Meant to advance, by „intra-
37 Narr, Wolf-Dieter (1969): Pluralistische Gesellschaft, Hannover: Niedersächsische Lan-
deszentrale für Politische Bildung, pp. 59, 62, 67.
38 Ibid., p. 62.
39 Cf. Schmidt, Manfred G. (1975): „Staatliche Ausgabenentwicklung und Akkumulation im
Rüstungssektor der Bundesrepublik“, Gesellschaft, 5, p. 28.
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unit guidance“, the draftees’ civic education, it was, by degrees, reduced to
military „human relations“ and „anti-totalitarian indoctrination“.40 Its failure
has tended either to reinforce, in draftees, psycho-social deficiencies acquired
during their pre-military socialization – those rigidities already referred to -,
or has forced upon them a segmentation of attitudes into „conventional“ and
„post-conventional“ patterns, required by conflicting military and civilian
roles,41 but hardly conducive to the development of a profoundly pluralist
culture.
West Germany’s steady military spending is acting, in budgetary terms,
as a constraint on welfare and social security expenditure, thus contributing
to thwart – under conditions of persisting mass unemployment – the estab-
lished pluralist principle of offering a „new“ (or even, hopefully, „fair“) deal
to those social groups whose living conditions are deteriorating. In spite of
decreasing public revenues and efforts to reduce the national debt, defense
spending is still given highest priority, with labor and social security outlays
falling behind, and expenditures for children, family and health decreasing
conspicuously,42 so that the continuing military build-up is at least indirectly
financed out of non-defense cuts. In the United States and the United King-
dom, the „warfare-welfare tradeoff“ (Peroff)43 has been even stronger in
evidence.
Finally, the West German government has actively encouraged first the
build-up, subsequently the concentration of an armament industry.44 Thus,
firms on the one hand have become increasingly dependent on armament
contracts for their existence; on the other hand, the defense industry’s oligop-
olistic structure is permitting large corporations to contract out from under
more restrictive governmental armament planning by first increasing their
capacity and then campaigning for the production and purchase of additional
weapons systems, arguing that otherwise their firms „would collapse“.45
40 Cf. Bredow, Wilfried von (1973): Die unbewältigte Bundeswehr, Frankfurt: S. Fischer, pp.
101 ss.; Bald, Detlef at al. (1981): „Innere Führung und Sozialisation. Ein Beitrag zur Sozi-
o-Psychologie des Militärs“, in: Reiner Steinweg, ed.: Unsere Bundeswehr? Zum
25jährigen Bestehen einer umstrittenen Institution, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 137 ss.
41 Cf. Bald et al., op. cit., pp. 151 ss.; Wakenhut, Roland (1979): „Effects of Military Service
on Political Socialization of Draftees“, Armed Forces & Society, 5, 626-641.
42 Cf. Krasemann, Peter (1985): „Sozialausgaben und Rüstungsfinanzierung in der Bundesre-
publik“, in: Reiner Steinweg, ed.: Rüstung und soziale Sicherheit, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p.
70.
43 Peroff, Kathleen (1977): „The Warfare-Welfare Tradeoff: Health, Public Aid, and Hous-
ing“, Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, IV, pp. 46-55.
44 For, e.g., the aviation industry, cf. Schlotter, Peter (1975): Rüstungspolitik in der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland. Die Beispiele Starfighter und Phantom, Frankfurt/New York: Campus,
pp. 82 ss. For figures on domestic armament expenditures during the 1960s and 1970s, cf.
Schmidt, op. cit., p. 36.
45 Again for West Germany, cf. Schlotter, op. cit., pp. 35 ss. For the U.K. and especially the
U.S., where the strategy has been observed on a much larger scale, cf. Prins, Gwyn (1983):
Defended to Death, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 150 ss.
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Thus, not only does the goal of „reconversion“, of economic readjust-
ment to civilian production, not enter into corporate considerations,46 but
organized as well as unorganized labor is included in lobbying efforts for
self-perpetuation of the defense industry.47 The build-up of an armament
industry has resulted in entrepreneurial and labor pressure for the continuing
production of new, plus the additional export of existing weapons systems,
thereby undermining the support for and democratic legitimacy of defense
cuts and more comprehensive disarmament efforts, which would most cer-
tainly have to be considered as advantageous to national and international
pluralism. This again raises the question of the values and norms of large
parts of the population.48
The consequences of the internationalization of capital have been the
subject of much scholarly debate – although even there contributions from
the pluralist camp in political science have been, to say the least, rare. In
comparison, the internationalization of militarism seems to have gone largely
undiscussed.
To grasp realistically what is going on, the traditional notion of milita-
rism needs to be replaced no less than the more recent concept of an isolated
military-industrial complex. Instead, „civil“ society itself has to be pictured
as moving in the direction of a system in which the distinction between (for-
merly civilian) policy and (formerly military) strategy is being eroded by the
common momentum of political/ideological/military/academic/corporate/
organized labor interaction. The outcome of the process may be considered a
continuous technological, manufacturing, and political „warfare overa-
chievement capability“, in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms.49 
46 For a survey of the reconversion literature, cf. Albrecht, Ulrich (1979): Rüstungskonver-
sionsforschung, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Relevant post-WW II experiences exist for demili-
tarized West Germany and especially for the United States, where some systematic federal
planning was done.
47 For example, in 1975/76 shop committees from West Germany’s largest defense contrac-
tors clamored for governmental licensing of „stop-gap“ (i. e. export) orders from „non-
tension regions“, because otherwise „colleagues who had carried out their duty to the state“
(!) would stand in peril of losing their jobs. By 1980, with unemployment mounting, the
employees of the Howaldt shipyard in Kiel struck for several hours, with their manage-
ment’s consent (!), to emphasize their demand fort he production and delivery – which had
come under public criticism – of two submarines to the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. Cf.
Mechtersheimer, Alfred (1977): Rüstung und Politik in der Bundesrepublik: MRCA Torna-
do, Bad Honnef: Osang, p. 137; Rodejohann, Jo (1985): „Nicht nur einfach ein Job: Ar-
beitsplatzrisiken in der westdeutschen Rüstungsindustrie“, in: Steinweg, Rüstung, p. 133.
48 If much more empirical research would appear necessary to further substantiate preliminary
results like these, one of the problems involved is precisely that such research has not been
promoted by a common and profound concern to overcome the rather narrow reasoning of
„modern“ pluralist analysis.
49 This attempt at a more comprehensive formulation has been suggested by the arguments of
Senghaas, Dieter (1972): Rüstung und Militarismus, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 11 ss., and
Prins, Defended, pp. 136, 148 ss.
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Such militarisation is brought about „subtly, noiselessly, hardly contested
anywhere“.50 Like a disease, the ideologies and strategies of ever new „com-
pensating armaments“ are spreading to through the First and Second and
from both to the Third World. Increasingly, moreover, U.S. „vital“ interests
and the military means to secure them have become globally defined, as
indicated by conceptions like „power projection“ (signifying the capability to
intervene), „forward deployed presence“ or „integrated battlefield“, the latter
referring to development of the ability „to deliver conventional and/or nucle-
ar fires throughout the spectrum of a battle… in all U.S. army units world-
wide.“51 The USSR, as far as its resources are apt to permit, can be counted
upon (if it has not already done so) to follow this change in strategical em-
phasis. It should not be a matter of much conjecture that the socio-political
structures, the values and norms promoted by an ever more sophisticated
global militarization not only pose a medium- or even short-term threat to the
survival of the human race, but an immediate challenge to pluralists every-
where.
VI
When – two generations after the socialist implications of pluralist theory had
first been spelt out -, the anti-participatory, inherently monist bias of oligop-
oly capitalism came to be critically assessed again by pluralists, it was also
apparent that ‚actually existing’ socialism had long been degenerating into
monopoly socialism.52 By Euro-communist parties (particularly the PCI), by
dissenters from the ranks of their more orthodox sister organizations, by
Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian communists, pluralism was re-discovered as
„an inner requirement of socialism“.53 It was acknowledged that pluralist
interests would continue to exist in socialist societies, that such societies
would entail „neither the disappearance of differences nor the ceasing of
strife and dissension“, and that, in the relations and contradictions between
social interests, „no social power (may) be absolute arbiter…particularly not
on the basis of state authority.“54 Accepting organizational autonomy not
50 Senghaas, Dieter (1977): Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik. Plädoyer für
Dissoziation, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 223.
51 General Donn R. Starry, now in charge of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, quoted by
Evangelista, Matthew A. (1983): „Offense or Defense: A Tale of Two Commissions“,
World Policy Journal, I, pp. 53, 57.
52 The expression was coined by Kuron, Jacek and Modzelewski, Karol (1969): Monopolsozi-
alismus – Offener Brief an die Polnische Vereinigte Arbeiterpartei, Hamburg: Hoffmann &
Campe, esp. pp. 12-13.
53 Lombardo-Radice, Lucio (1965): Pluralismus in der gesellschaftlichen Praxis, Salzburg, p.
1. He was then a member of the PCI Central Committee.
54 Cf. ibid., pp. 1, 3; Kardelj, Edvard (1962): Über die Prinzipien des Vorentwurfs der neuen
Verfassung des sozialistischen Jugoslawien, Belgrade, p. 6.
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only for „the judiciary, the economic administration, the system of education,
science, etc.“, but also for trade unions and, last not least, for „those people
and groups who do not support socialist options“55 followed as the logical
next step in the „discovery of socialist pluralism“:56 Existing civil rights
might thus be freed from structural limitations because of which „they have
dried up in capitalist society“, and present „rigid“ pluralism might be trans-
formed into a „dialogical“ and „dialectical“ pluralism.57
These positions directly influenced the Czechoslovakian discussion be-
fore and during 1968.58 The necessity not only to „recognize the pluralist
structure of socialist society“ but to institutionalize „guarantees for the con-
frontation of interests“59 was accepted during the short-lived Czechoslovaki-
an experiment: Until the country came under military occupation,60 ‚reform
communists’ projected workers’ councils, political, producers’ and consum-
ers’ associations as „multiple autonomous subjects“ of the economic and
political process.61
The Yugoslav model, having evolved since 1950 through successive
stages of extensive discussion and no less continuous constitutional experi-
mentation and change, has so far remained the only attempt to arrive at an
institutionalized „pluralism of self-managed interests in society“62 by apply-
ing one structural principle, the delegate system, to the sectors of associated
labor, socio-political affairs, and commune/republic/federation. Increasingly
rooted in a growing critique of „actually existing“ socialism’s statist tradition
that suffocated the effective representation of workers’ rights by independent
55 Lombardo-Radice, ibid.; Ingrao, Pietro (1964): „Ein Ansatz zu einer Diskussion ueber den
politischen Pluralismus“, in: id.: Massenbewegung und politische Macht, Hamburg: VSA,
p. 72. Ingrao was then a member of the PCI National Directorate. In 1976, he was elected
President of the Italian Chamber of Representatives.
56 Sláma, Jiří (1968): „Die Entdeckung des sozialistischen Pluralismus“, in: Josef Skvorecky,
ed.: Nachrichten aus der CSSR, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 191-199..
57 Lombardo-Radice, ibid.; Ingrao, op. cit., p. 75.
58 Cf. Klokocka, Vladimir (1966): „Verfassungsprobleme im sozialistischen Staatssystem“,
Der Staat 5, pp. 74, 78; and id. (1968): Demokratischer Sozialismus, Hamburg: Konkret, p.
33.
59 Klokocka, Demokratischer Sozialismus, pp. 35, 41.
60 After the Czechoslovakian attempt at fundamentally reforming existing socialism had been
put down, „pluralist marxism“ was promptly castigated by the orthodox East German SED
as leading to the „ideological decomposition of Marxist-Leninist parties and, in conse-
quence, to the unchaining of counter-revolution in the socialist camp“. Cf. Klaus,
Georg/Buhr, Manfred, eds. (1976): Philosophisches Wörterbuch, Leipzig: VEB Bibliogra-
phisches Institut, p. 940.
61 Cf. Sláma, op. cit., p. 192, 195; Pelikán, Jirí, ed. (1971): The Secret Vysocany Congress –
Proceedings and Documents, London: Allen Lane, pp. 202 ss.
62 Kardelj, Edvard (1979): Die Wege der Demokratie in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft,
Cologne/ Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, p. 107.
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organizations,63 the Yugoslav perspective of „expropriating political authori-
ty“ after economic property64 primarily (though by no means exclusively)
hurts itself through the „specific position of power“ unchangingly conferred,
in the Yugoslav political system, on the League of Communists.65
No less than the Portuguese „revolution of carnations“ referred to earlier,
but with more immediately brutal consequences for the country concerned,
the Czechoslovakian experiment proved that socialist pluralism is a prospect
whose attempted realization endangers material and ideological interests in
the Atlantic and actually existing socialist „camps“, and therefore touches off
internal and external resistance. Much more drastically than the short-lived
Portuguese experience of 1974/75, the decade-long Yugoslav effort demon-
strates that structural (i. e. socialist) pluralism denotes an aim as well as a
drawn-out, difficult process continuously menaced, apart from foreign inter-
vention, by domestic compromises and setbacks, bureaucratic resistance,
individual and group egoism.
Yet, at the very least, conceptions of structural pluralism seek to diminish
institutional rigidity, socio-economic inequality, and political apathy in a
more decisive manner than might be envisaged under foreseeable capitalist
and actually existing socialist systemic conditions. Such conceptions have
ranged from the Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian experiments briefly de-
scribed here to the Portuguese constitution of 1976.66 More recently, they
63 Cf., e. g., Marković, Mihailo (1968): Dialektik der Praxis, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 97 ss.;
Stojanović, Svetozar (1972): Kritik und Zukunft des Sozialismus, Frankfurt: S. Fischer, pp.
37 ss., 41 ss.
64 Horvat, Branko (1979): Some Political Preconditions for a Free Society, unpubl. paper,
Moscow: XI IPSA World Congress, p. 5.
65 The problem is admitted by Kardelj, Wege der Demokratie, p. 68. The country’s ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic fragmentation, increased by profound economic inequalities and
jealousies between the six republics and two autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia, pro-
vides the second most important hurdle. Research conducted in Serbia and Croatia has
pointed, moreover, to unsatisfactory connection and coordination on all levels of the dele-
gate system, to marked discrepancies between formal participation and actual influence, fi-
nally to insufficient social representativity of the system on higher levels. Cf. Marinković,
Radivoje and Tomić, Vinka (1979): The Functioning and Implementation of the Delega-
tional System in Yugoslavia, unpubl. paper, Moscow: XI IPSA World Congress; Šiber, Ivan
et al. (1979): The Functioning and Realization of the Delegate System, unpubl. paper, Mos-
cow: XI IPSA World Congress. For a recent survey (published in Slovania) of a good part
of the Yugoslav discussion over the decades, cf. Bibič, Adolf (1981): Interesi in politika,
Ljubljana: Delavska Enotnost. – The debate over pluralism has also been taken up in Hun-
gary. Cf. the appropriately titled article by Bayer, József (1983): „A pluralizmus mint
kényes kérdés“ [‚Pluralism as a Delicate Question’], Part I, Kritika 83/10, Oct.; Part II,
Kritika 83/11 (Nov.).
66 The constitution proclaimed as its fundamental principle the „plurality of democratic ex-
pression and democratic political organization“ in order „to ensure the transition to social-
ism“. The form of industrial and agrarian social property „which shall tend towards pre-
ponderance“ was to be based on „production managed by local authorities; and on the
kooperative sector“. The constitutional revision during 1982 abolished the greater part of
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have included Robert A. Dahl’s proposals (rooted in his analyses of Ameri-
can government) „to achieve the best potentialities of pluralist democracy“
by realizing a „radical alternative to the American and Soviet status quo“ of
concentrated (pseudo-private here, pseudo-public there) economic power in
the form of self-managed market socialism, combined with external controls
and a decentralization of political authority.67 And, from an „abstract alterna-
tive“, they have been brought back to include the „sum of real particular
worlds“ by Michael Rustin’s contention (founded upon his background in the
British New Left) that „pluralist socialist politics“ should be developed not
least by drawing on the experiences of (feminist, cultural, environmental,
workers’ plans, anti-nuclear) single-issue movements and groupings „within
which individuals have found meaning“.68
These notions cannot be discussed here in detail. Like other, comparable
perspectives resulting from critiques, by structural pluralists, of capitalist and
actually existing socialist societies, they have merged into a common set of
propositions focusing on the self-management of blue- and white-collar em-
ployees in corporations and firms, reinforcement of consumer associations
and their rights, indicative planning of resources and investments, and a more
profound and continuous fusion of everyday „social“ with periodical „politi-
cal“ activity through a network of organizational groupings.69 By insisting
that, in terms of social and political justice, more horizontal and vertical mo-
bility, more participatory democracy, less inequality and hegemony (over
foreign societies in space as well as, by using up available resources, over
future generations in time) should be realized within and between societies,70
an additional international dimension has been introduced, and the military
institution has been included in the normative pluralist approach.
VII
Already domestically, the increasing tendency of governments over the last
decade to substitute social policies (designed to ameliorate injustices) by
strengthening states’ means of violence and by a more pronounced policing
this (as judged by Mário Soares, General Secretary of the Partido ‚Socialista’) „ideological
burden“.
67 Cf. Dahl, Robert A. (1975): Und nach der Revolution?, Frankfurt/New York: Campus
(transl. from id. [1970]: After the Revolution. Authority in a Good Society, New Ha-
ven/London: Yale University Press), pp. 107, 121, 130; id. (1982): Dilemmas of Pluralist
Democracy, New Haven/London: Yale University Press), pp. 129, 202 ss.
68 Cf. Rustin, Michael (1985): For a Pluralist Socialism, London: Verso, pp. 36, 84, 94, 174.
69 In addition to the literature already referred to, see also Fischer, Ernst (1968): Auf den
Spuren der Wirklichkeit, Hamburg: Rowohlt; Galtung, Johan (1971): Pluralismus und die
Zukunft der menschlichen Gesellschaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1971; Bermbach, Udo/ Nu-
scheler, Franz, eds. (1973): Sozialistischer Pluralismus, Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe.
70 Cf. Galtung, Pluralismus und die Zukunft, esp. pp. 186 ss.
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of society, poses a problem of alarming dimensions for pluralists. Still, the
vexing problems of what to do about the armed forces, military policies, and
the international threat systems have – apart from the substantially isolated
efforts of peace research – received scant attention. Yet they need to be ad-
dressed alongside the democratization of the economy by any cogent struc-
turally pluralist exposition.
What structural changes would have to be wrought within the armed
forces to prevent military, rigid, hierarchical values from „spilling over“ into
society, and to prevent military influence fusing with other interests into the
tangled web of relationships referred to above?
For a brief time, the Portuguese officers – the so-called Armed Forces
Movement, or MFA – who overthrew the Caetano dictatorship in 1974 and
who, as already noted, expressly advocated a socialist pluralism, attempted to
provide an answer. These officers, politicized by the increasingly savage and
hopeless colonial wars the regime has been waging in Africa, were very
much aware of the dangers a mere „operational“ attitude extolling traditional
military discipline and professionalism over structural change – if it contin-
ued to prevail among the armed forces – would imply for their program of
bringing decolonization, democracy and economic development to Portugal.
Accordingly, the MFA – initially a mere officers’, mainly a captains’ move-
ment – intended to change both the hierarchical relations between the upper
and lower armed forces echelons and the estranged relations between the
military and civil society.
When delegate assemblies were set up for the army, the navy, and the air
force – as well as on a comprehensive armed forces level – by March, 1975,
officers, non-coms and privates obtained representation in the ratio of 4 : 1 :
1. If officers thus kept their numerical superiority, the move, for military
thinking, was certainly revolutionary. A „new“ soldier, politically informed
and alert, came to be in demand, and a dynamic understanding of command
and discipline – calling fort he replacement of simple top-down orders by
group participation in decision-making processes – was promoted. „Detach-
ments of dynamization“ were added to the staffs and units of the three ser-
vices, always including non-coms and privates in addition to officers. Apart
from the delegate assemblies, the new detachments developed into the most
important feature of the reorganized armed forces.
The attempted „democratization of the barracks“ – the combination of
politicization, participation and pluralism – suggests an important contribu-
tion to the theory and practice of socialist pluralism. By allowing for orga-
nized group processes and individual participation not merely on the – in
itself increasingly important – technical („team“) level of handling complex
weapons systems, such democratization would be apt to promote, in a com-
prehensive sense, the soldiers’ qualifications, their capability to engage in
joint reflection and action. By favoring decentralization – the determination
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and practice of action in small groups -, it would tend to work against a hier-
archy that is proving, to the everyday experience of civil and military life,
neither humane nor effective. To a much larger degree than presently, the
armed forces would be established as part and parcel of civil society.
From group discussion and participation among the military, alternative
proposals to prevailing defense strategies – political „inputs“ to the public, to
parties, parliaments, and governments – might result. The West German
„Darmstadt Signal“, a group of 150 officers and N.C.O.s which, having
emerged during the missile deployment debate of 1983, continues to speak
out publicly and in seminars for steps toward disarmament and for alterna-
tives to nuclear deterrence policies, provides an example of such – as yet
informal – participation.71
The emergence of „participatory armed forces“ should be accompanied
by gradual „transarmament“, the elimination, by stages, of „the more provoc-
ative, aggressive, or escalatory aspects of armaments“ and the definition of
national defense „in the narrowest and strictest sense“.72 Such a process
would, of course, imply both institutional and value changes occurring „in a
gradual, interactive manner“73. Step by step, present nuclear deterrence poli-
cies would have to be replaced by a „mixed“ strategy combining convention-
al military, paramilitary (guerilla) and non-military (i. e.. social) means.74
Such an „inoffensive defense“ – which has also been termed „defensive
defense“ or „defensive deterrence“ – is based on recognizing that nuclear
defense would equal nuclear aggression in literally annihilating a society’s
own population. Inoffensive defense is „as much a signal of political re-
sistance as it is of military defense.“75 It implies a fundamental alternative to
the present East-West threat system. Its emphasis on small, mobile, highly
autonomous units (using precision-guided weapons), combined with civil
71 An analysis of the Portuguese attempt may be found in Eisfeld, Rainer (1984): Sozialis-
tischer Pluralismus in Europa. Ansaetze und Scheitern am Beispiel Portugal, Cologne:
Wissenschaft und Politik, esp. parts III/IV. The Portuguese effort started to run off the rails
when the MFA attempted to act, simultaneously, as „motor of the revolutionary process“.
Ideological cleavages between military factions were prone to appear to the extent that po-
litical parties and foreign governments now attempted to impress their political projects up-
on the MFA. In the end, a revolt of left-wing units was suppressed by carefully pre-
arranged measures of a „centrist coup“ that expanded into a general purge and terminated
the MFA. As a consequence, delegate assemblies and detachments of dynamization were
immediately abolished. Professional officers came to the fore again; during 1976, U.S. and
West German military advisers flocked to Portugal.
72 Forsberg, Randall (1984): „The Freeze and Beyond: Confining the Military to Defense as a
Route to Disarmament“, World Policy Journal I, pp. 287, 310.
73 Ibid., p. 309.
74 Cf. Galtung, Johan (1984): „Transarmament: From Offensive to Defensive Defense“,
Journal of Peace Research 21, pp. 127-139.
75 Kaldor, Mary (1983): „Beyond the Blocs: Defending Europe the Political Way“, World
Policy Journal I, p. 14.
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disobedience and non-violent action of a country’s groups and associations,
clearly favors the sort of „participatory“ armed forces advocated here.
VIII
Transarmament measures would combine domestic with foreign policy ef-
fects: in foreign policy by confidence-building measures and cooperation,
hopefully initiating a „virtuous circle of trust“;76 domestically by strengthen-
ing participatory structures in military and civil institutions. As a concept
centering on the membership of individuals in – more or less (permanently)
organized – groups and associations which exert influence on each other and
on governments to translate conflicting or complimentary interests into dis-
tinctive policies, pluralism, provided its implications are taken seriously, is
necessarily a participatory concept. By exploring foundations for and alterna-
tives to unequal positions of socio-economic power – implying unequally
distributed political resources -, pluralism becomes structural in its analysis,
socialist in its program. As monist barriers to participation are neither only
embedded nationally nor merely in economy and civil society, pluralism
must add an international as well as a military dimension to its argument.
Thus, in summary, pluralism, if not reduced to a mere ideology, proves a
more inclusive and, at the same time, more radical concept than is usually
acknowledged – a dynamic theory of the socio-political democratization of
capitalist and actually existing socialist societies. To the extent that such a
fundamental, if yet tentative alternative to the systems of East and West
should gain more ground in European political culture, if might – for a start –
work as an antidote to the ideological hegemony which both „modern plural-
ism“ and „democratic centralism“ have been enjoying, for obvious reasons
and with doubtful results, within the respective „camps“.
76 Rustin, Pluralist Socialism, p. 255.
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In 2010, Leslie A. Pal (Carleton University, Ottawa) and I co-edited a vol-
ume reviewing the development and state of political science throughout
Central-East Europe. The book’s chapters, written by scholars from the
countries under survey, provided the first comprehensive account of the dis-
cipline’s institutionalization in 19 post-communist countries. In addition to
research and teaching, problems of funding – including outside support by
foreign governments, foundations and universities – received extensive atten-
tion. The work identified Western interventions as powerful external forces
pushing Central-East Europe’s nascent political science “cultures” toward
convergence. But it also depicted another external factor primarily responsi-
ble for persisting disciplinary disparities: the rise of “hybrid” political re-
gimes in the region. Where autocratic elements have persisted, the institu-
tionalization and independence of political science have been negatively
affected. Recommended by the International Political Science Association
(IPSA), the book (published by Barbara Budrich) contained an introductory
overview written by the two editors, which appears here. A shorter version
was pre-published in the June 2010 issue of European Political Science, the
journal of the European Consortium for Political Research.
Political Science in Central-East Europe and the Impact of
Politics:
Factors of Diversity, Forces of Convergence
With Leslie A. Pal
1 Democratization and the Emergence of “Hybrid” Regimes
Political Science has sometimes been portrayed as an inherently “moral”
discipline, imbued with democratic ideals, bound to contribute to the “emer-
gence and stabilization of democracy”.1 This is a powerful narrative because
it adds ethical legitimacy to the field – something which political scientists
may find helpful in cases where the discipline’s institutionalisation meets
with resistance.
1 Huntington, Samuel P. (1988): „One Soul at a Time: Political Science and Political Re-
form“, AmPolScRev 82, 3, 7.
75
  
          
        
             
             
         
   
          
          
           
            
           
          
        
        
           
             
           
            
            
          
        
             
            
          
         
                                                                        
             
            
     
              
          
              
            
         
  
            
           
      
        
              
           
     
    
              
       
              
     
History records, however, “that political science has also been practiced
under non-democratic regimes”.2 Authoritarian states have demonstrated a
use for the discipline – albeit for a truncated version adapted to their purpos-
es. Some have been known to offer material support and official prestige to
political scientists, even if distinctions between scholars and ideologues be-
come blurred.
Such “authoritarian temptations” might have been solely an issue of so-
ber reflection about the discipline’s past,3 had not post-1989 political trans-
formation in East-Central Europe refused to follow “a clear and simple trajec-
tory leading from state socialism to Europe and democracy.”4 In many cases,
political elites and individual players chose to struggle over institutions and
power, rather than “competing over policy alternatives and votes”.5 During
the process, initial wide-spread visions of straightforward democratization
“grew more and more blurred by…new… uncertainties”.6
An initial post-Cold War wave of democratization was followed by what
has been referred to as “an even larger wave of hybridization” – implying
continuing (rather than “transitional”) absence or abolition of one or more
key attributes of democracy such as free and fair competitive elections, civil
liberties, the accountability of governments. The result has been more or less
“hybrid” regimes.7 Recent attempts at assessing the ensuing state of democ-
racy in Central-East-Europe’s post-communist countries have ranged from
“not fully outgrown ‘adolescence’ after 13 years” for the Baltic states8 to “a
seemingly endless transition” in the case of Romania.9 Mirroring the actual
variety of both democratic and “hybrid” cases, classifications at present in-
clude “consolidated democracies” (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary,
2 Easton, David/Gunnell, John G./Stein, Michael B. (1995): “Introduction”, in: id. (eds.):
Regime and Discipline. Democracy and the Development of Political Science, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 3.
3 Cf., e. g., Eisfeld, Rainer/Greven, Michael Th./Rupp, Hans Karl (1996): Political Science
and Regime Change in 20th Century Germany, New York: Nova.
4 Hankiss, Elemér (2002): „Brilliant Ideas or Brilliant Errors? Twelve Years of Social Sci-
ence Research in Eastern Europe”, in: Max Kaase/Vera Sparschuh (eds.): Three Social Sci-
ence Disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe, Berlin/Budapest: GESIS/Collegium Bu-
dapest, 21.
5 Christensen, Robert K./Rakhimkulov, Edward R./Wise, Charles, R. (2005): “The Ukrainian
Orange Revolu-tion: What Kind of Democracy Will the Institutional Changes Bring?”,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38, 228.
6 Hankiss, ibid.
7 Levitsky, Steven/Way, Lucan A.: Competitive Authoritarianism: The Emergence and Dy-
namics of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era, unpubl. manuscript,
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/ comparative.speaker.series files/ levitsky_with_bibil.pdf, ac-
cessed 11/12/2009, 4, 20.
8 Reetz, Axel (2005): „Die vierten Parlamente in Estland, Lettland und Litauen: Ähnliche
Voraussetzungen, verschiedene Pfade“, ZParl 36, 347, 348.
9 Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina (2001): „The Return of Populism – The 2000 Romanian Elections”,
Government & Opposition 36, 252.
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Poland, or Slovenia), “defective democracies” (for instance, Albania, Bulgar-
ia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine) and “competitive autocracies” (e. g., Arme-
nia, Belarus, Georgia, Russia).10
The picture of post-communist countries in some sort of ‘gray zone’ be-
tween open autocracy and liberal democracy”11 should not be painted too
bleakly. While Slovakia could have been labeled as “competitive authoritari-
an” between 1994 and 1998,12 the 1998 elections – won by an opposition
coalition – returned the country to the path to democratization. The 2002 and
2006 elections consolidated the establishment of – according to the current
Freedom House survey – a “pluralistic democracy” with a “vibrant” civil
society.13 Ukraine, during the 2004/2005 ‘Orange Revolution’, emerged from
a competitive autocracy at “midpoint” on the way towards a consolidated
democracy,14 even if fierce infighting has since barred further progress. Ser-
bia, impeded by the late fall of the Milosevic regime (2000) and the increas-
ingly dysfunctional union with Montenegro (2003-2006), has made demo-
cratic headway under a new (even if so far insufficiently implemented) con-
stitution.15
The situation would look much brighter, were it not for the authoritarian
turn in Russia and the shadow it casts on the region’s democratization pro-
cess. Between 2000 and 2008, Vladimir Putin and a supporting group of
political players established a competitive autocracy with a rubber-stamp
parliament, limits to the competitiveness of elections, harassment of inde-
pendent media and journalists, drastically reduced horizontal separation of
powers, an extensively regulated civil society, and impediments to the free-
dom of expression and assembly.16
10 Cf. Levitsky/Way, ibid., 1, 2, and Melville, Andrei (2008): Russia in Today’s World: An
Experiment in Multidimensional Classifications, UNISCI Discussion Paper No. 17 (May),
56.
11 Croissant, Aurel/Merkel, Wolfgang (2004): “Introduction”, Democratization 11 No. 5,
Special Issue: Consolidated or Defective Democracy? Problems of Regime Change, 3.
12 For a contrary view, cf. Henderson, Karen (2004): “The Slovak Republic: Explaining
Defects in Democracy”, Democratization 11 No. 5 (n. 11), 148/149 et passim.
13 Cf. Levitsky/Way, 1; Geoffrey Pridham (2003): „The Slovak Parliamentary Election of
September 2002: Its Systemic Importance“, Government and Opposition 38, 334;
www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php? option=242:nati-ons-in-transit-2009&ca, accessed
11/12/2009, 480, 481.
14 D’Anieri, Paul (2005): „The Last Hurrah: The 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections and
the Limits of Machine Politics“, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38, 248; see also
Christensen et al. (n. 4), 228.
15 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (2009): Serbia 2009 Progress Report,
COM(2009) 533, 6/7.
16 For overviews, see Beichelt, Timm (2004): „Autocracy and Democracy in Belarus; Russia
and Ukraine”, Democratization 11 No. 5 (n. 11), esp. 120 ss., 126 ss.; Stykow, Petra
(2008): “Die Transformation des russischen Parteiensystems: Regimestabilisierung durch
personalisierte Institutionalisierung“, ZParl 39, particularly 773/774, 784.
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A presidential party, “United Russia”, founded in 2001 for the purpose of
endorsing Putin’s policies, won a two-thirds majority of seats in two succes-
sive parliamentary elections, benefitting from electoral legislation requiring
parties to be registered as “all-Russia” associations, from partisan use of state
resources, and from biased media reporting.17 Regional governors, popularly
elected to office until 2005, were reduced to presidential appointees. Non-
governmental associations, dissenting demonstrators, and non-state media
have been obstructed and attacked under restrictive legislation, sometimes
also unlawfully.18 The message to civil society has been unmistakable:
groups or individuals considered detrimental to state authority will be mar-
ginalized.
Putin’s policies have been justified by the proclaimed need to strengthen
administrative capacity, create political stability, and ensure economic pros-
perity against the backdrop of the political turmoil and economic deprivation
experienced by a majority of Russians during the 1990s. Certainly, the re-
gime “derives legitimacy from citizens’ broad endorsement”,19 as evidenced
by Putin’s high approval ratings among the public.
Divergences in democratic performance have thus become a distinct fea-
ture of the region’s post-communist states. Twenty years after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact regimes, no universal era of democra-
cy has been ushered in throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The variety of
transitions from communism, different in ideological and institutional conse-
quences, clearly affected the evolving political studies discipline, generating
modifications in concepts, theories, methods and research agendas.
2 “Scientific Communism”, Regime Hybridization and Ideological
Continuities in Political Science
With Russia’s recent political evolution as a first example, it comes as no
surprise that “reforms of the political system” in the early 2000s “dramatical-
17 Cf. www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14523.html for the OSCE observation mission’s report
on monitoring the 2003 parliamentary elections (accessed 11/12/2009); see also the OSCE
report after observing the 2004 presidential elections (www.osce.org/odihr-
elections/14520.html, accessed 11/12/2009). Because of Russian restrictions, the 2007 par-
liamentary and the 2008 presidential elections were boycotted by OSCE observers. Ad-
dressing the 11th “United Russia” congress on Nov. 21, 2009, Putin’s successor Medvedev
confirmed and criticized administrative manipulation of regional elections.
18 Cf. Amnesty International (2008): Document – Russian Federation: Freedom Limited. The
Right to Freedom of Expression in the Russian Federation (www.amnesty.org/en/ li-
brary/asset/EUR46/008/2008/en/32ee.118-8f09-4e99-8c47-f7eddbee710f/e, accessed 11/
12/2009).
19 Stykov, ibid., 773.
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ly changed” the research agenda of Russian political science.20 The “visible
decline of electoral competition” and “reduction of electoral politics” com-
promised “prospects for study[ing] electoral processes”. Curbing regional
governments’ power “confined the field for regional political studies”. Final-
ly, “the non-transparent character of political elites’ recruitment and rotation
complicates research on these dynamics.” The discipline inevitably is con-
strained, even contorted by the systems within which it operates: political and
institutional developments “are critical for the perspectives of political sci-
ence.”21
An extreme case is Belarus, where “official” political science – part of a
split professional community – has been contributing to the development of
an ideology of “Belarusian statehood” promoted by autocratic president Ale-
ksandr Lukashenka. The thrust of that ideology’s rhetoric has been to popu-
larize the message that there exists a “peculiar [collectivist] Belarusian men-
tality” and, consequently, a peculiarly Belarusian – state-centered and anti-
Western – “way of [economic, social and political] development”.22 In this
official interpretation, the “basic source of the Belarusian tradition is consid-
ered to be the Soviet era”, and Belarusian ideology should retain a considera-
ble part of that experience.23
Such ideological continuity was explicitly promoted not just by the gov-
ernment of Belarus, but also in Romania, where PCR members created the
post-1989 National Salvation Front, and where the subsequently formed
Social Democratic Party’s “reconstructed” communists carried national elec-
tions in 1990 and 1992. In academe, instructors in “scientific Communism”
concurrently “changed their vocabulary, without unwrapping their under-
standing of politics from its Leninist core”. Successive governments set up
the necessary public “institutions of continuity”, so that the “members of this
network” succeeded in perpetuating an approach to politics “indebted to
nationalism and vulgar Marxism”.24 As in Belarus, this is not the entire pic-
ture: several university departments and think tanks have assumed roles as
agents of conceptual change. But no Romanian political science community
worthy of the name has so far emerged.
20 For this and the following quotes, cf. Ilyin, Mikhail/Malinova, Olga (2008): “Political
Science in Russia: Institutionalization of the Discipline and Development of the Profession-
al Community”, GESIS Newsletter, Special Issue: Political Science Research and Teaching
in the Russian Federation, 11.
21 These developments would of course, in principle, not exclude both comparative and
critical studies. For the absence of the latter, see below. Regarding the former, the article
paraphrases the opinion of a leading Russian comparativist, who is “rather critical” about
the condition of his sub-field.
22 Bekus, Nelly (2008): „European Belarus versus State Ideology: Construction of the Nation
in the Belarusian Political Discourses“, Polish Sociological Review 163, 273, 274, 275/276.
23 Ibid., 276, 277.
24 Barbu, Daniel: „Political Science – Romania“ (2002), in: Kaase/Sparschuh (n. 4), 327, 331,
338.
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Ideological continuity, involving both conceptual and methodological
constraints, may have persisted for a different reason, even without govern-
mental aid and abetment. There was the factor of the “survival” of instructors
schooled in “scientific Communism”, among them jurists, sociologists, phi-
losophers. In Albania, for example, the 1990s – due to governmental corrup-
tion, economic and political turmoil, organizational and functional problems
of educational institutions – was essentially a lost decade. A small number of
faculty were dispatched to European universities to learn modern approaches,
but a true scholarly discipline of political science did not begin until 2000. In
Moldova, the persistence of low academic salaries and a lack of aspiring
newcomers seem to have been more responsible for such “survival” than the
return of a non-reformed Communist Party to power for nearly a decade in
the 2001 and 2005 elections. Indeed, these ”survivors” have stayed on to the
extent that Marxist-Leninist and Western approaches are currently pursued
side by side. In Serbia, the persistence of the Milosevic regime, and of in-
structors close to that regime, likewise worked to impede the discipline’s
evolution well into the 21st century. The situation has not been that much
different in Armenia and in Slovakia – where most “scientific Communism”
faculty were able to keep their positions during and after the “velvet” revolu-
tion – or in Ukraine, where the training of qualified younger political scien-
tists has been beset with difficulties.
In the Czech Republic, in contrast, a new generation of political scien-
tists, primarily trained in Western methods and approaches, was quickly
recruited after 1989. The influence of Marxist-Leninist cadres remained mar-
ginal. Generational change also played a decisive role in Bulgaria and Esto-
nia. In Lithuania, a different approach was used: employment contracts re-
quired academics to publish, and where professors of “scientific Com-
munism” lacked such publications, contracts were terminated. Nowhere,
however, with the single exception of the German Democratic Republic after
unification,25 were instructors in Marxism-Leninism summarily dismissed.
In three instances – Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia – a different kind of
continuity left its mark on the evolving discipline, which at first glance might
impress the observer as beneficial rather than detrimental. During the 1960s
and 1970s, these countries for different reasons experienced a “controlled
liberalization of intellectual life, though with some recurrence of tough or-
thodox policies.”26 Professional contacts with Western scholars and universi-
ties were (re)established, and for political scientists, the “IPSA Connection”
became particularly important. In Poland, mandatory courses in Marxism-
Leninism had been already abolished in 1957, subsequent to the “October
Thaw”. Obligatory political science classes arrived a decade later. In Slove-
25 For details, cf. Eisfeld/Greven/Rupp (n. 3), 151, 161/162.
26 Gebethner, Stanisław/Markowski, Radosław (2002, rev2009): Political Science – Poland,
Knowledge Base Social Sciences Eastern Europe, Berlin: GESIS, 4 (accessed 11/15/2009)
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nia, the Yugoslav leadership’s abortive experiments in “self-management
socialism”27 led to an institutionalization of political science during the
1960s. Hungary was the latecomer: only in the 1980s, following the 1979
IPSA World Congress in Moscow,28 did “so-called ‘legitimizing’ debates”
emerge which “set the stage for the institutionalization of political science”,
and only then was some “research related to political science” carried out.29
“Scientific socialism” departments in Hungary continued to exist until 1989,
even if Western concepts and frameworks were increasingly slipped into
mandatory courses.
In each instance, this would prove an ambivalent situation, similar to
what has been noted for the Russian discipline concerning the “groundwork”
supposedly laid in the USSR by political studies “on a limited range of issues
(mostly chronologically or geographically distant)… under the guise of other
disciplines.” Ideological notions intruded into research and persisted: these
studies shaped “terminological conventions” that continue “to interfere with
the development of more advanced research approaches… in post-Soviet
Russia”.30
On the one hand, early research, publishing and teaching activities con-
tributed to “reinforcing the status” of political science even before 1989.
Once the process of political transformation got under way, some intellectual
and institutional resources were already available, on the basis of which the
discipline could evolve further. Nevertheless, the final result in the Slovenian
case has been judged “a relatively weak” discipline – “even in relation to
other social sciences in the country.” Resources came to work as constraints:
an “excessively normative stand” often prevailed; empirical research was
rare; important sub-fields of the discipline were neglected; qualified instruc-
tors were lacking.31 In the case of Polish political science, it has been argued
that “this particular legacy is very likely the main factor” why the discipline
“did not flourish after 1990 as visibly” as in those instances where “its devel-
opment started from scratch.”32
27 Cf. Sekelj, Laslo (1992): „’Real-Existing Selfmanagement’ and the Disintegration of
Yugoslavia“, Südosteuropa 41, esp. 326, 329, 330.
28 An exercise in „peaceful coexistence“, held at Lomonosov University, whose students were
not permitted to attend the sessions’ often spirited debates.
29 Szabó, Maté: „Political Science – Hungary“ (2002), in: Kaase/Sparschuh (n. 4), 258, 260.
30 The article quoted here refers to political studies of ethnicity as an example, but adds that
difficulties deriving from stereotypes introduced by Soviet social studies “might be found
also in the other sub-fields of political science”: Ilyin/Malinova, ibid. (n. 20), 10.
31 Cf. Bibič, Adolf (1996): „The Development of Political Science in Slovenia: Democratisa-
tion and Transformation of the Discipline“, European Journal of Political Research 29,
426/427, 428, 444. A section in Danica Fink-Hafner (2002): ”Political Science – Slovenia”,
in: Kaase/Sparschuh (n. 4), 362, was captioned: “Redefinition of the discipline since 1990:
from one periphery to another?”
32 Gebethner/Markowski, ibid. (n. 32), 5.
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3 Prevalence of Functionalism, Absence of Critical Theories
Two characteristics provided the background to the discipline’s beginnings in
practically every Central-East European country. They were, first, the exces-
sively normative stand (owing to dogmas about the presumed merits of “ac-
tually existing socialism”) just referred to, and second, a paucity of empirical
research (to avoid revealing the gap between official statements and deviant
reality). But, of course, these characteristics fail to explain the conceptual and
methodological consequences during and after transformation. An un-
published assessment of dominant trends in Lithuanian political science pre-
pared by Dovile Jakniunaite and Inga Vinogradnaite may help to arrive at
some general conclusions about the region under survey:
“The research agenda is to a considerable degree shaped by national po-
litical concerns… [and] present-day problems of the political process…
There is a… reluctance to engage in broader cross-national comparisons…
and a general orientation towards applied research… Methodological and
meta-theoretical debate is virtually absent.”
From this vantage point, we derive three hypotheses for the discipline’s
development in European post-communist countries:33
1. Functionalist, institutionalist and neo-institutionalist approaches predom-
inate in Central-Eastern European political science. Political studies are
largely focused on the “management” of existing systems of government.
2. Critical theories are almost totally absent.
3. Theses (1) and (2) hold equally well for consolidated democracies, defec-
tive democracies, and competitive autocracies. Therefore, the above as-
sumption of a linkage between different regimes and different political
science approaches should be modified in part.
Belarus again provides a convenient starting-point. As summarized by Svet-
lana Naumova: “There is not a single governmental research unit concerning
itself with any issue save state-building. Etatist schemes and a narrow institu-
tional approach continue to dominate the agenda.”34 In Hungary, since publi-
cations during the early 1990s emphasized political institutions, the “institu-
tional approach has prevailed ever since” (Arató/Tóth). Or take Bulgaria
(“…democratic consolidation, institution-building, powers, activities, rela-
tionships of the centers of government” as “’hot topics’…considered from an
institutionalist approach”, with studies of elites and their strategies providing
an additional focus – Kostova/Avramov); single out Czech political science
with, according to Holzer/Pšeja, its “current focus on institutions and political
behavior”; pinpoint Estonia where institutionalism has been dominant in
33 For the first two, cf. already Hankiss, ibid. (n. 4), 20, 22.
34 This and the following assessments may be found in chapters of the book edited by Eisfeld
and Pal, to which the present article served as an introduction.
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studies of policy-making and the party system (Pettai); choose Moldova
(…based on institutional and functional methods, the majority of publications
continue to display a descriptive character” – Mosneaga); Serbia (“overpro-
duction of party studies… focus on institution-building…mostly of a descrip-
tive nature” – Pavlović), or Slovakia (emphasis, once again, on institutions –
Rybar). The same pattern keeps re-surfacing.
In a way, that is hardly surprising. Establishing a new political system – a
parliamentary or presidential democracy, with (either embedded or defective)
checks and balances, popular majority, rule of law, political parties and inter-
est groups – means that political science, once institutionalized, will rather
automatically turn to explaining the workings of that system. This holds as
well for autocracies, which – as mentioned at the outset – also have use for
such information. To a certain extent, political science in any country with
new political institutions will be descriptive and institutionalist. The problem,
obviously, is to what extent, and how can it grow beyond that focus?
In a number of countries (Armenia, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Roma-
nia, Serbia), analyses of domestic government and politics have not or have
only rarely proceeded to a comparative level. In others, such as Bulgaria,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Ukraine, comparative work –
particularly in the form of area studies, including other post-communist coun-
tries and transformation processes – acquired early importance. In Russia, an
ambitious comparative project resulted in the recent publication of an index-
based Political Atlas of the Modern World, whose variables range from re-
sources of state capacity and potential for international influence to quality of
life, the institutional basis of democracy and, finally, external and internal
threats35.
The protracted impact of Marxism-Leninist ideology (or, in the former
Yugoslavian states, of a more original “Marxian” approach) produced two
initially different consequences, which came to coincide in today’s virtual
absence of any critical theory of politics and society. In a few instances, the
Soviet period’s anti-empirical normativism proved habit-forming, with the
result that, at least for a time, this (again) “excessively normative stand”
persisted after transition – as in Romania, Serbia or the Czech Republic. In a
majority of cases, the discredit wrought upon Marxist or Marxist-inspired
approaches extended to normative conceptions as such. “The community of
35 Cf. Melville, ibid. (n. 10), p. 56/57 et passim, and id. (ed., 2009): Political Atlas of the
Modern World, Moscow: MGIMO University Press. Among 192 countries, Russia comes
off 7th in international influence and 27th on the state capacity index, but ranks only 73rd
in quality of life, 93rd as to institutional democratic potential, and 81st on the index of
threats (including AIDS, demographic decline, and undiversified exports). From the “insti-
tutional basis of democracy” rating, Melville and his collaborators conclude that Russia is
“leaning” neither “toward manifest autocracies” nor “mature democracies” (Political Atlas,
200).
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‘normativists’ is small” – a statement about Lithuanian political science 36
that might be made about most Central-East European countries.
Two exceptions may be noted. One is Ljubljana University’s Institute for
Social Sciences which, since 2006, includes a Research Center for Critical
Politology. That Center’s work “is based on a critical theory of society, com-
parable to that developed by the ‘Frankfurt School’” (Zajc).37 The second is
Zagreb University’s Faculty of Political Science, where Croatian academics
have been including “diminished” subtypes of democracy in their research on
East-European transformation processes, investigating long-, medium- and
short-term “reasons for democratic deficits”.38
Generally, the influence of scholars, university departments and founda-
tions from Western Europe, Scandinavia and the United States, of the Euro-
pean Union, U.S., British and French government programs has encouraged
the merging of Central and Eastern Europe’s nascent political science “cul-
tures” into an empirically oriented political science “mainstream” focusing on
national political systems, comparative politics, European studies and inter-
national relations. Across the region, the discipline’s emphasis is on current
politics and policy-making (monitoring, polling, offering expertise) and on
applied research. This tendency has been favored by the emergence of nu-
merous non-governmental research institutes and analytical centers (“think
tanks”), often financed by Western foundations, with the professed mission
of contributing to the evolution of civil society and the consolidation of de-
mocracy. Bulgaria and Georgia are particularly conspicuous instances; in the
latter case, these institutions have been judged “an effective basis for dissem-
inating social sciences and a specific feature of Georgian social science de-
velopment.”39 A closer look at Western advice and funding seems warranted.
4 The Role of International Donors and Partners
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant rise of sovereign
states, the majority of which wanted to “modernize,” created an unprecedent-
ed opportunity for the West, the “winner” in the Cold War. Modernization, of
course, meant to certain extent “westernization” and at least initially even a
degree of Americanization. Consultants from the World Bank, the UNDP, the
OECD, bilateral donor agencies, foundations and NGOs swarmed over the
region, acting as transmission belts of so-called “best practices” in economic
policy (creating market economies through legal reforms, privatization, and
36 Cf. the assessment by Jakniunaite and Vinogradnaite referred to above.
37 As in n. 34.
38 As in n. 34.
39 As in n. 34.
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de-regulation), infrastructure, governance, and core institutions (e.g., health
and education institutions).
To a large extent, the exercise depended on winning “hearts and minds,”
especially minds, and to literally convert the way that people thought about
government, management, law, or human rights. In addition, the successful
transition from communism to post-communism (initially optimistically
assumed to result in stable democratic, market societies) meant converting
old elites to new ideas, and raising a new generation of elites better suited to
a post-communist world.
The higher education system was the obvious target for these efforts.
Ironically, whereas under communism the social sciences, and particularly
political science, public policy, and public administration, had been smoth-
ered if not eradicated by “scientific socialism” and the varieties of Marxism-
Leninism, western organizations and governments aimed precisely at these
disciplines in order to engender democracy in the political system, and demo-
cratic administration and public policy-making within the state. While there
was of course some sensitivity to local circumstances and pride, the agenda
was basically to encourage reforms that would align these disciplines with
western standards. It must be said as well that in most countries, academics
within these disciplines were starved for knowledge of western methods,
theories, approaches, and methods. They willing embraced and participated
in this “know-ledge transfer”, in part because in many cases enormous re-
sources (by eastern European standards) flowed with the reform process.
On the bilateral front, the Germans were very active in the early days of
transition, but afterwards as well. In Slovakia, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung supported the purchase of computers and
development of libraries; in Ukraine, by funding conferences, round tables,
seminars, they provided important venues for communication, and also sup-
ported applied research. The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung was particularly
important in the Czech case, where the discipline, even after some years,
remained inward looking and thus disadvantaged in applying for EU funding.
In Serbia, after 2000, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Belgrade supported
research on political parties, party competition, party identification, electoral
behavior, political participation, public opinion, and democratization. The
foundation also sponsored publications on various topics in Romania and
Georgia.
As would be expected, the United States played an active role as well.
With respect to Albania and Armenia, during the 1990s, pedagogical support
for modernizing higher education began to flow into the country – both by
IREX, the International Research and Exchanges Board under the auspices of
the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the US State
Department. Summer schools and international conferences were held, inau-
gurating – as far as Albania was concerned – the institutionalization of the
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discipline at Tirana University. Of course, the American influence was much
broader than USAID. It came from several sources. First, the simple fact that
American political science is the largest concentration of scholars, depart-
ments and institutions in the world gives it a gravitational pull in terms of
publications, pedagogy, and research. Second, American universities, as
institutions, were engaged in partnerships with sister institutions in the region
to develop courses and train teachers and researchers. For example, American
institutions were active in Moldova, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Third, as noted
earlier, there were numerous instances of young scholars from the newly
emergent states winning scholarships and financial support to study at Amer-
ican institutions, learn about American political science, and bring it back to
their home countries.
Finally, and obviously, the Europeans and the EU took a hand in what
was happening as well, initially through the TEMPUS (Trans-European Mo-
bility Program for University Studies). This was launched in 1990 with a
direct focus on countries from the former Soviet Union, as well as the Middle
East. If we exclude the Middle East for a moment, the target regions were
Eastern Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian
Federation, Ukraine), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). The intent was robustly transparent:
“to establish new courses or reform former ones in the list of national priori-
ties; to help higher education institution to restructure and to reform their
management; to encourage institutions to work together and set up networks,
for instance in a particular discipline; to help higher education institutions to
assist in the transition process in the social, economic and political fields by
organising retraining courses for professionals outside the academic world; to
provide limited material so that institutions are equipped with basic logistics
at least.”40
Not every report in this volume highlights TEMPUS, but it obviously be-
came involved in all the countries reviewed here. The chapters on Belarus,
Latvia, Albania, Lithuania, and Estonia make specific mention of the contri-
bution of TEMPUS in developing their disciplines. Coupled with TEMPUS
was a successor program, TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of
Independent States), which was originally aimed at a dozen countries in east-
ern Europe and central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
and Uzbekistan. Chapters on Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia refer to TACIS
as an important support mechanism for the evolution of political science.
40 http://www.tempus.am/tempus%20program/prog.html
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In recent years the converging effects of the EU have been felt most
powerfully in the rapid spread of the Bologna process, an effort to create a
European Higher Education Area (EHEA). The Bologna Declaration was
signed in 1999 by representatives of 29 European nations. The reform pro-
cess has since expanded to 46 countries – obviously, participants do not have
to be members of the EU. The broad aim is standardization of the overall
structure of bachelor, master, and doctoral programs in terms of both credits
and years spent in each cycle, with an aim to facilitate quality assurance,
standards, and mobility by mutual recognition through the European Credit
Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS). A sign of the impact of Bologna
is that practically every chapter mentions the process. This is a powerful
converging force that is creating structural symmetries in all 46 countries,
increasingly also in terms of competencies and quality assurance, as well as
mobility among students and faculty, and the facilitation of joint research.
Later in this chapter we will review some of the enduring specificities of the
discipline in different countries in central and eastern Europe, but in ten or
twenty years these may be eclipsed by a more uniform EHEA.
An extraordinarily important and influential catalyst to the development
of political science in the region was not an international government organi-
zation, or a major national, but in fact a private donor: virtually every country
report highlights the role of the Soros Foundation in supporting the early
development of institutions, teaching and training in political science. George
Soros,41 the billionaire financier, listed by Forbes as the 29th richest person in
the world, is both a philanthropist and activist. Galvanized as a student by the
teachings of Karl Popper, he became an implacable foe of communism as
well as a defender of the “open society.” He was actively engaged in support-
ing dissidents in Poland and Hungary, privately financed the Central Europe-
an University, and more recently was reputed to have been engaged in sup-
porting the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia.
A key pillar of an “open society” is a transparent and accountable politi-
cal system, and Soros (someone with strong academic inclinations and a
writer on financial systems as well as global capitalism)42 understood the
special role of the social sciences in building the foundation of an open socie-
ty. He also recognized the institutional brickwork necessary for that founda-
tion: universities, NGOs, think tanks, networks of scholars, researchers and
activists. His activities in central and eastern Europe in the 1990s – through
41 Cf. Kaufman, Michael T.: Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf 2002; also the earlier study by Slater, Robert: Soros: The Unauthorized
Biography, the Life, Times and Trading Secrets of the World’s Greatest Investor, New
York: McGraw-Hill 1997.
42 E. g., The Alchemy of Finance (1988), New York: Simon and Schuster; The Crisis of Glob-
al Capitalism: Open Society Endangered (1998), New York: Little, Brown; George Soros
on Globalization (2002), New York: Public Affairs; The New Paradigm for Financial Mar-
kets (2008), New York: Public Affairs.
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the Open Society Institute and sometimes nationally based Soros Foundations
– were extraordinary. It is no exaggeration to say that political science in the
region would be considerably less developed without Soros’s interventions.
Examples of this early work abound: in Albania, the sponsoring of re-
search projects; in Armenia, pedagogical training programs; in Moldova,
support for the training of political science instructors in France and the U.S.,
for operating the “think tank” IDIS Viitorul (established in 1993), for found-
ing, in 1999, of the Institute of Public Policy; in Romania, financial aid
through the Open Society Foundation to another “think tank”, the Romanian
Academic Society; in Georgia, the financing by the Open Society Institute of
projects contributing to the transformation of social science university curric-
ula; in Ukraine, financial assistance for political science research through the
Renaissance Foundation (but also abandonment at an early stage, for unspeci-
fied reasons, of that foundation’s “Megaproject HELP – Higher Education:
Leadership for Progress” to create two political science/European studies
quality centers); in Lithuania, being one of the most generous sponsors for
the re-education of political scientists in foreign institutions; in Latvia, simi-
lar funding to seek credentials and training abroad.
In Bulgaria, the Soros Foundation (with the United States Agency for In-
ternational Development) provided initial funding of the American Universi-
ty in Blagoevgrad. Through its International Higher Education Support Pro-
gram, the Open Society Institute continues to assist the European Humanities
University, originally founded in Minsk, since 2004 located in Vilnius (Lith-
uania) as a Belarusian university-in-exile. The role of Budapest’s Central
European University (CEU), established by Soros in 1991, has remained
particularly important as a sort of social science Mecca for students in the
region. Teaching in English, with a large complement of foreign scholars,
and located in the heart of Europe, CEU has been a perfect instrument for the
inculcation of western standards of social science education, particularly in
political science. According to its mission statement, the university continues
to work “hand-in-hand with the Open Society Institute, providing academic
and professional backing for OSI’s global agenda of democratic governance,
human rights, and economic, legal and social reform”.43
The Soros Foundation also created the Local Government and Public
Service Initiative (LGI), which targeted research and training at the local
government level and the public sector more broadly, as well as PASOS
(Policy Association for an Open Society, established in 2003), linking think
tanks throughout the region. It was further instrumental in the original and
continued funding for NISPAcee (Network of Institutes and Schools of Pub-
lic Administration in central and eastern Europe), which embraces both aca-
demic institutions as well as ministries throughout the region, attracting
43 www.ceu.hu/about/organization/missionhistory
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scholars as well as practitioners, and sponsoring research and conferences. Its
original objective was to build anew the foundations of public management
scholarship and practice in central and eastern Europe, as well as build bridg-
es to western scholarship and best practices.
Surveying these efforts in international support and funding and – it must
be frankly stated – intervention and proselytizing,44 it is easier to both under-
stand and appreciate the development of political science in the region. As a
thought experiment, imagine that the hundreds of millions of dollars spent in
this effort over twenty years had not happened. Given the distinct origins and
experiences mentioned in this overview, it is clear that the disciplines in our
survey would have spun out into their own widely distant orbits, or conceiva-
bly even imploded, becoming black holes in a galaxy of separately burning
stars.
5 Problems of Fragmentation and Deficient Research
And yet, the disciplines that travel in these now more proximal orbits are
considerably different as regards their composition. Some resemble more or
less compact planets. Others recall the image of numerous minuscule aster-
oids: individual and institutional cooperation are deficient, research networks
underdeveloped, professional interests insufficiently represented. Fragmenta-
tion of the discipline will subsequently be a recurrent theme.
In Georgia – where the political science community is “deeply segment-
ed in terms of theoretical and methodological approaches”45 – and Moldova,
repeated attempts to establish national political science associations have
gone awry for lack of human and financial resources. In Belarus, several such
organizations exist which play no public role and have failed to unite the
political science community. Bulgaria has had a political science association
since 1974, whose journal Political Research had to be discontinued after
1993, because “Bulgarian political scientists are still too fragmented to guar-
antee the journal’s financial support”. The Czech Republic’s Political Science
Association “lacks resources, influence and organizational capacity”. Divi-
44 To illustrate that foreign financial donors need not just good intentions, but also tact, former
Romanian Minister of Culture Andrei Pleu commented, in his own particular way, on a
certain apocryphal story. Both the story and the comment bear repeating: “Ava Gardner de-
cided to leave one of her husbands and submitted ‘mental cruelty’ as grounds for divorce.
Asked to explain this in greater detail, she said Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain was the
cause. ‘He forced me to read this damned book.’” Adds Pleu: “Mutatis mutandis, Eastern
Europe’s intellectuals sometimes feel like Ava Gardners terrorized by ‘civilizing’ spouses.
And in this case, it’s not even Thomas Mann…” (Pleu, Andrei [2002]: “Financing Differ-
ence: Fostering the Social Sciences in the Field of Tension Between Homogenization and
Differentiation”, in: Kaase/Sparschuh, ibid. (n. 4), 14.
45 Cf. above, n. 34. These and the subsequent quotes – including those following the table -
have also been taken from the book’s respective country reports.
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sion is present here, too – between one group that sets the discipline’s re-
search agenda, and a second group which, due to its members’ media pres-
ence, determines the discipline’s public perception. The Romanian Political
Science Association has sunk into obscurity, its political science community
“split into factions viciously fighting each other”. And in Ukraine, the disci-
pline is also “plagued by low quality research and fragmentation”.
The subsequent, more detailed table highlights the persisting considera-
ble differences between the region’s political science communities:
Country
Albania Severe communist experience; 1990s the “lost decade” of a tumultuous
transition. Political science is taught at Tirana University only since 2000
and at several private universities (licensed from 2003). The Bologna
system has been introduced. Private research institutes (“think tanks”)
were set up with foreign support over the last decade.
Armenia Armed conflict over the Karabakh region with Azerbaijan, pre-dating
Armenian independence, was followed by political instability, violence
and corruption. The first political science courses, developed during
1990/91, aimed at replacing “scientific communism” by the civic educa-
tion of a new generation of citizens. However, “scientific communism”
faculty remained in place. Development of the discipline proceeded
hesitantly. The Bologna system has been introduced. Non-governmental
research centers play a considerable role.
Belarus Little pressure for reform during the Gorbachev period. Formation of
political science began in 1992/93 (Belarusian State University, Europe-
an Humanities University [EHU], both in Minsk, the latter now in exile
[Lithuania]). The Bologna system, while introduced in theory, is not
practiced; the two-tier postgraduate system (candidate/doctor) has been
retained. Re-emergence of an authoritarian state after 1996, which from
2003 mobilized political science in “state-directed institutions” to support
an ideology of Belarusian statehood. A parallel, independent sector of
research and study institutes, likewise dating from 1992/93 and in part
also registered in Lithuania, continues to operate, as does EHU from
Vilnius. The discipline is deeply divided: “two sciences, two professional
communities, two systems of communication”.
Bulgaria Pragmatic, nationalist and nepotistic communist regime. Early begin-
nings of the discipline: BCP Academy for Social Sciences and Public
Policy, 1970-1989; Research Institutes of Contemporary Social Theories
and International Relations (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), 1975-
1989. Establishment of Political Science Department (at the time “Histo-
ry and Theory of Politics”) at Sofia University in 1986, at University of
National and World Economy in 1990, at the private New Bulgarian and
American in Bulgaria Universities in 1991. The Bologna system has been
introduced. Low academic salaries require second jobs. Disuniting effect
of intense rivalry for research funds. No national political science jour-
nal. Private research and study centers were founded with foreign support
after 1989.
Croatia Civil war 1991-1995 (“Krajina”); defective democracy in the 1990s.
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Early beginnings of the discipline in 1962 at the University of Zagreb’s
Faculty of Political Sciences: amalgamated (“sciences”), ideologized,
insufficiently professionalized. A single discipline with sub-fields
evolved during the 1990s; the Bologna system has been introduced. The
Faculty remains the only political science teaching institution and the
only significant research center in the country, though new ones are
projected for 2009/10.
Czech Republic Early beginnings of the discipline were twice abolished by the com-
munist regime (1945-52 School of Political and Social Sciences, Prague;
1967-70 [“Prague Spring”] Charles University Prague, Comenius Uni-
versity Bratislava). Re-establishment occurred after 1989 at the country’s
most prestigious universities and was only marginally influenced either
by communist instructors, by returning émigrés, or from abroad. The
Bologna system has been introduced. At present, 9 peer-reviewed politi-
cal science journals are published. The scholarly community remains
bifurcated – researchers with international reputations hardly contribute
to building Czech political science; researchers preoccupied with the
discipline’s domestic development do not publish internationally.
Estonia Minimal communist legacy. Formative influences from the United States,
Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Small political science
community that started from scratch, but rapidly inter-nationalized. The
Bologna system has been introduced. Exemplary efforts at public re-
search funding. Considerable impact of the discipline on public debates
(societal stratification, minority policies, electoral reform).
Georgia Civil wars 1991-95 (including the secessionist territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia), Rose Revolution 2003, defective democracy and
Georgian-Russian military conflict 2008 have resulted in a political
science “community” not united by common professional standards and
deeply segmented in terms of theoretical and methodological options,
reflecting profound political cleavages in Georgian society. Two major
trends are a reformist approach that idealizes western methods and
models, and a traditionalist approach that aims at rediscovering the
Georgian past. Georgian-language teaching materials are rare, and there
is little research.
Hungary Well-developed political science community, with roots in the mid-1980s
and even earlier in the late 1970s as a commission in the Academy of
Sciences under Kadar’s “goulash communism”. There remains a strong
tradition of public intellectuals, and the distinction between them and
professional political scientists is sometimes blurred. The Bologna
system has been introduced. Hungary also has a unique institution, the
English-language, Soros-financed Central European University (CEU,
with degrees accredited both in the United States and Hungary), as well
as a growing number of think tanks such as Századvég and Demos.
Latvia “Re-educated” faculty from philosophy, history and law played a major
role, aided by formative assistance from Scandinavian countries. Weak
research tradition, reinforced by extremely low public funding, better
developed at private institutes (limited, however, to applied policy re-
search). Against the backdrop of a large Slavic minority, the role of
ethnicity in politics, models of societal integration, and minority rights
have figured prominently in the discipline. The Bologna system has been
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introduced.
Lithuania Comparable to Latvia, “re-educated” faculty played a certain role, while
the discipline was built on western, primarily Scandinavian models (with
some American influence). There is a general orientation toward applied
research, driven by current political concerns (weak civil society, corrup-
tion, ineffective civil service, unstable party system) and generat-ing
policy recommendations. The tendency is reinforced by close links
between academics and government agencies (e. g., consulting), and by
the existence of numerous private “think tanks”. The Bologna system has
been introduced.
Moldova The initial (1991-1994) Popular Front Government’s nationalist orienta-
tion, subsequently the election (twice) of an unreformed Communist
administration (2001-2009) led to pressures on political science educa-
tion, even an exodus of scholars from the country. The discipline’s
evolution was further impeded by a continuing pre-ponderance of “scien-
tific communism” faculty, who continue to pursue Marxist-Leninist
approaches, even if the Bologna system has been introduced. Low aca-
demic salaries, lack of coordination on every level of education and
research policies contribute to profound fragmentation and a deep-seated
malaise of the political science “community”. There is no national politi-
cal science journal.
Poland Periods of “thaw” under communist rule permitted the early emergence
of an active political science community. A national association was
founded in 1956, teaching institutions were established in 1967 (Warsaw)
and 1970 (Cracow), a Political Science Committee set up at the Polish
Academy of Sciences in 1972. International contacts through IPSA
played a major role in the discipline’s evolution. 82 public and private
higher education institutions currently offer study programs in political
science. The Bologna system has been introduced.
Romania Former communists won the first two elections during transition (1990,
1992); party school and universities retained their communist staff. The
small political science “community” is highly factionalized; university
corruption further impedes the implementation of professsional stand-
ards. A largely Soros-financed “think tank”, the Romanian Academic
Society, promotes academic excellence. The Bologna system has been
introduced.
Russia “Political and state studies” existed even under communist rule; a corre-
sponding Soviet association was formed in 1960, and the 1979 IPSA
World Congress was held in Moscow. But this was not an academic
discipline. After the collapse of communism, there was rapid growth in
institutions and personnel. Since 2007, slow moves toward a higher
education reform in line with the Bologna system have been made; the
two-tier Soviet system of conferring post-graduate degrees (candi-
date/doctor) has been retained. Public funds in support of research and
further development of university centers remain short and unevenly
distributed between the country’s center and periphery.
Serbia Development was retarded by a decade since many faculty kept ties with
the “transformed communists” retaining power until 2000. Political
science is taught at only one institution, the Faculty of Political Science
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in Belgrade (established as a party school for the teaching of Yugoslavi-
an “self-governing socialism” in 1960, transformed into a university
faculty in 1968). The Bologna system has been adopted, but not fully
implemented. The political science community is small and poorly
integrated internationally. Several governmental and private research
institutes have been set up, the latter with foreign support.
Slovakia Due to the „velvet” character of the Czechoslovakian revolution, com-
munist faculty were largely kept on, seriously impeding the moderniza-
tion of the discipline. The Slovak government established a number of
new universities during 1997/98, all of which offered political science
programs. Private universities and independent research institutes were
added; funding from abroad played a major role. The Bologna system has
been introduced. Research tradition, however, is weak. Journals are
published by departments or institutes, contributing to the profession’s
fragmentation. The discipline remains poorly connected to international
research.
Slovenia Among the states of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia for extended periods
had the most flexible communist regime, and Slovenian social sciences
remained open towards Western ideas. Early developments of the dis-
cipline were analogous to those in Serbia (establishment of a teaching
school for “self-government socialism” in 1960, transformation into a
Faculty of the University of Ljubljana by 1968). The discipline partici-
pated in the debates preceding Slovenian independence and democratiza-
tion and, with support from abroad, quickly modernized after 1989. The
political science community is small, but strongly integrated internation-
ally. As in Croatia and Serbia, a single department of political science (at
the Ljubljana Faculty of Social Sciences) remains the sole teaching
institution for the discipline. The Bologna system has been introduced.
Public research funding is available as part of national research pro-
grams.
Ukraine Competitive authoritarian, corrupt regime under Kuchma 1994-2004.
The discipline’s development in terms of quality and professional stand-
ards was impeded by the continued influence of instructors from “scien-
tific communism”. The community grew rapidly after 1993 (when politi-
cal science was recognized as a separate academic field), but remained
fragmented. The Bologna system has been introduced, the two-tier
postgraduate system (candidate/doctor) retained. With a strong tradition
in the humanities, empirical research is weak and overshadowed by
abstract theorizing. Public funding of research is limited, selective and
arbitrary.
The quote immediately preceding the table and data in the table itself point to
low quality research as a further deficiency. This shortcoming has been
linked to fragmentation not just in Ukraine, but also in Slovakia – both dis-
ciplines burdened, as noted above, by strong personal continuities -, where
political science “still suffers from elementary problems”, and remains “on
the whole, amateurish and largely a-theoretical.” For Belarus, “a deficit of
institutionalization, curbs on research themes, a shortage of qualified person-
nel” have been identified as identical problems in the state-directed and the
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independent research sectors. In Bulgaria, quality research remains an unreal-
ized ambition because of inadequate funding and low academic salaries,
obliging professors to “regularly have a second job”. In Moldova, things are
much the same. In deeply polarized Georgia, “hidden ideologization and
teleology” continue to intrude into research; “professional standards are not
well established”. In Romania, these standards are “acknowledged by a mi-
nority only”. Serbia, like Albania, is another case where the 1990s was a lost
decade: lacking analytical tools and theoretical paradigms, and insufficiently
distanced from the regime, Serbian political scientists “played a poor role in
analyzing and explaining transition processes and post-communist politics.”
Research only began to evolve after 2000. And as regards Latvian political
science, research “has traditionally been weak,” because “there was no real
pressure on faculty to publish.” Accordingly, both “the quantity and quality
of research offer room for growth.”
In other words, cohesion of the discipline and a high quality of research
are lacking in almost half of the countries included here.
6 Diversity, Convergence, and Some Horizons for Central/East
European Political Science
For the purposes of this concluding assessment, the surveyed states may be
grouped as follows:
1. Six present or former CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) mem-
bers: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia (withdrew in 2008), Moldova, Russia,
Ukraine (de facto participation until 2005).
2. Three Balkan states: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania.
3. Three further Balkan states emanating from the former Yugoslavia.
Croatia; Serbia, Slovenia.
4. Three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
5. Two former “reform communist” states: Hungary, Poland.
6. Two states emanating from former Czechoslovakia: Czech Republic,
Slovakia.
Regime hybridization has been pervasive in both the first and second group,
with competitive autocracies concentrated in the first. The two groups form a
geographical cluster, which may play a role in the consolidation of authoritar-
ian features. “The less a young democracy is surrounded by stable democratic
countries”, according to a recent hypothesis, “the lower are the costs of semi-
democratic rulers to violate constituent rules of liberal democracy. This is
especially true for countries at the eastern fringe of eastern Europe.”46
46 Merkel, Wolfgang/Croissant, Aurel (2004): „Conclusion: Good and Defective Democra-
cies“, Democratization 11 No. 5 (n. 11), 207.
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Excepting Russia and, partly, Bulgaria, these are also the countries where
political science is weakly embedded, fragmented, and poorly connected
internationally. In addition to the above depiction, this may largely be recog-
nized from the extent to which (and, if at all, at what point in time) profes-
sional – let alone peer-reviewed – journals have appeared:
Political Science Journals or General Outlets
Country
Albania Albanian Journal of Politics (since 2005; peer-reviewed, in English)
Polis (since 2006; in Albanian)
Politika & Shoqëria [Politics & Society] (since 2000; in Albanian)
Armenia 21st Century (since 2003; Armenian, Russian and English editions)
Globus National Security (in Armenian)
Belarus Vestnik Belorusskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta [Bulletin of the
Belarusian State University] (government-controlled; in Belarusian)
Belorusskaya Dumka [Belarusian Thought] (since 1996, government-
controlled; in Belarusian)
Politicheskaya Sfera [Political Sphere] (since 2001; in Belarusian)
Bulgaria Razum [Reason – Journal for Politics and Culture] (since 2002; in Bulgari-
an)
Croatia Politička misao [Political Thought] (since 1962, with four issues a year in
Croatian and one in English as Croatian Political Science Review)
Anali [Annals] (since 2004; in Croatian)
Međunarodne studije [International Studies] (since 2000; in Croatian)
Političko obrazovanje [Political Education] (e-journal, since 2006; in
Croatian)
Czech Republic Politologický časopis [Czech Journal of Political Science] (since 1993;
peer-reviewed, in Czech)
Mezinárodní vztahy [Journal of International Relations] (since 1966; peer-
reviewed, in Czech)
Politologická revue [Political Science Review] (since 1995; in Czech)
Revue Politika [Politics Review] (since 2003; in Czech)
Politics in Central Europe (since 2005, peer-reviewed; in English)
Perspectives. Central European Review of International Affairs (since
1993, peer-reviewed, in English)
Středoevropské politické studie [Central European Political Studies Review]
(e-journal, since 1999; in Czech)
Evropská volební studia [European Electoral Studies] (since 2006; in
Czech)
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Global Politics (e-journal, since 2001, in Czech)
Estonia Trames Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (since 1997, peer-
reviewed; in English)
Georgia None
Hungary Politikatudományi Szemle [Hungarian Political Science Review] (since
1992; in Hungarian)
Külpolitika [Foreign Policy] (since 1974; in Hungarian)
Southeast European Politics (since 2000, peer-reviewed; in English)
Századvég [End of Century] (since 1985, re-launched in 1996; in Hungari-
an)
Kommentár [Comment] (since 2006; in Hungarian)
Latvia Humanities and Social Sciences (since 1993; in English) Latvijas zinātņu
Akad mijas V stis [Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences, Section A:
Human and Social Sciences] (since 1946; in Latvian, English, German and
Russian)
Lithuania Politologija (since 1989; in Lithuanian)
Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook (since 2000; in English)
Viešoji politika ir administravimas [Public Policy and Administration]
(since 2002; in Lithuanian)
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review (since 1998; in English)
Lietuvos metinė strateginė apžvalga [Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review]
(since 2003; in Lithuanian and English)
Tiltai: humanitariniai ir socialiniai mokslai [Bridges: Humanities and
Social Sciences] (since 1997; in Lithuanian, English and German)
Sociologija: mintis ir veiksmas [Sociology: Thought and Action] (since
1997; in Lithuanian and English)
Moldova Revista de Filozofie, Sociologie si Stiinte Politice [Journal of Philosophy,
Sociology and Political Science] (since 1991; in Moldavian)
Administrarea publica [Public Administration] (since 1993; in Mol-davian)
MOLDOSCOPIE – Probleme de analiză politică [Problems of Political
Analysis] (since 1992; in Moldavian)
Revista de Relatii Internationale [Journal of International Relations] (since
2006; in Moldavian)
Poland Studia Polityczne [Political Studies] (since 1991; in Polish)
Przeglad Politologiczny [Political Science Review] (since 1966; in Polish)
Civitas. Studie z Filozofii Polityki [Studies on the Philosophy of Politics]
(since 1997; in Polish)
Politeja [Political Letters] (since 2004; in Polish)
Europa rodkowo-Wschodnia [Central-Eastern Europe] (since 1991; in
Polish)
Sprawy Miedzynarodowe [International Affairs] (since 1948; in Polish)
Stosunki Miedzynarodowe – International Relations (since 1982/2000; in
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Polish and other languages)
Romania PolSci – The Romanian Journal of Political Science (since 2001; peer-
reviewed, in English)
Romanian Journal of Society and Politics (since 2001; in English)
Studia Politica – Romanian Political Science Review (since 2001; in Ro-
manian, English, French, German, Italian
Sfera Politicii [Sphere of Politics] (since 1992; in Romanian and English)
Idei în dialog [Ideas in Dialogue] (since 2004; in Romanian)
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences (since 1998, peer-
reviewed; in English)
Russia Polis – Political Studies (since 1991; in Russian)
Politicheskaia nauka [Political Science] (since 2000; in Russian)
Politex – Politicheskaia expertisa [Politex – Political Expertise] (e-journal,
since 2005; in Russian)
Serbia Nova srpska politička misao [New Serbian Political Thought] (since 1998;
in Serbian)
Godisnjak [Yearbook], Serbian Political Science Association (since 2007;
in Serbian)
Slovakia Politické vedy [Political Sciences] (since 1998, in Slovak)
Slovenská Politologická Revue [Slovak Review of Political Science] (e-
journal, since 2001; in Slovak)
Studia Politica Slovaca (since 2008; in Slovak)
International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs (since 1992; in
English)
Slovenia Teorija in Praksa [Theory and Practice] (since 1963; in Slovenian)
Družboslovne razprave [Social Science Debates] (since 1984, in Slovenian)
Journal of International Relations and Development (since 1998, peer-
reviewed; in English)
Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government (since 2003, peer-
reviewed; in English)
Ukraine Lyudyna i Polityka [Man and Politics] (since 1999; in Ukrainian)
Natsional’na bezpeka i oborona [National Security and Defense] (since
2000; in Ukrainian and English)
Politychnyi Menejment [Political Management] (since 2003; in Ukrainian)
In the third group of states, which resulted from the disintegration of Yugo-
slavia, Serbian political science was considerably disadvantaged vis-à-vis
Croatia and Slovenia, because the country’s eventual transition to democracy
only occurred in 2000. At present, the discipline has no professional research
journal at its disposal, and (as may gleaned from this chapter’s concluding
table below) the Serbian Political Science Association’s membership
amounts to just one tenth of its Slovenian and a mere twenty-fifth of its Croa-
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tian counterparts. Lack of competition among academic centers remains a
conspicuous feature in Serbia as in Croatia and Slovenia, with the discipline’s
teaching (and, by and large, also research) restricted to a single university.
As noted earlier, Croatian political science has generated analytical ef-
forts at explaining reasons for the country’s democratic deficits, focusing on
long-established belief patterns and behavioral traditions, on institutional
arrangements and the personality structures of leading political figures. Slo-
venian political scientists, for their part, have been working on a critical theo-
ry of advanced societies inspired by the Frankfurt School of socio-
philosophical inquiry. These efforts may eventually contribute to what Dovile
Jakniūnaite and Inga Vinogradnaite, in our book’s chapter on the Lithuanian
discipline, identify as a tendency “to challenge the ‘mechanical’ application”
of Western concepts by looking for “a more elaborate conceptualization” of
the “experienced ‘realities’” in the region’s post-communist countries.
One of the perennial issues in Central and Eastern European countries
since the Habsburg and Czarist empires, it should be recalled, has been poli-
cies shaping the position of ethno-cultural minorities. As recently as 1993,
Czechoslovakia split over the question how to satisfy the demands of the
Slovaks as the largest minority group, with Hungarians (10%) and Roma
figuring as sizable minorities in newly independent Slovakia. Armenia,
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine experienced ethnically driven struggles – not to
mention the atrocities of “ethnic cleansing” during the civil wars in Serbia
and Croatia. In the Ukrainian case, these were settled by establishment of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (60% Russians, 25% Ukrainians, 12%
Crimean Tatars) within Ukraine, while conflicts in the other instances con-
tinue to linger. High on the agenda of a regionally inspired discipline would
be major contributions to the debate on how to make the most of migration
and the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of societies. A political science of
“recognizing” minorities, in other words, which, by blending political, psy-
chological, cultural and economic approaches, would seek to advance inte-
gration and cultural cross-fertilization, in contrast to discrimination, segmen-
tation and ensuing socio-political cleavages.47
With Russian minorities accounting for 28% of the Latvian and 25% of
the Estonian population, political science disciplines in these two Baltic
States have been setting examples regarding comparative, policy-oriented
studies on ethno-cultural conflict and accommodation. In Ukraine, too, with a
Russian population of some 17% concentrated in the Eastern region, the
47 Cf. also Rechel, Bernd (ed., 2009): Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe, Lon-
don: Routledge, with country reports on Bulgaria (Bernd Rechel), the Czech Republic (Eva
Sobotka), Estonia (Vello Pettai/Kristina Kallas), Hungary (Balazc Visi), Latvia (David
Galbreath/Nils Muiznieks), Lithuania (Dovile Budryte/Vilana Pilinskaite-Sotirovi), Poland
(Peter Vermeersch), Romania (Melanie H. Ram), Slovakia (Stefan Auer) and Slovenia (Jel-
ka Zorn).
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discipline’s evolution has included a focus on ethno-politics. A comparable
thrust has not evolved in Bulgaria with its Turkish (nearly 10%) and Roma
(5%) populations, or in Romania and Slovakia with their ethnic Hungarian
minorities of 6.5% and 10%.
In 2008, Politics and Central Europe, the journal of the Central Europe-
an Political Science Association to be discussed below, dedicated a thematic
issue to “Values and Diversity in Contemporary Europe”, focusing on reli-
gious symbols in the public space as a salient expression of cultural pluralisa-
tion. In general, however, pushing the elaboration of well-reasoned responses
to such pluralisation closer to the discipline’s center of attention provides one
more conspicuous instance where, in Krisztina Arató’s and Csaba Tóth’s
concluding words on Hungarian political science, “regional cooperation in
Central and Eastern Europe waits to be strengthened.”48 The determined
transfer of resources, information and conceptual approaches from the West
to the East, discussed earlier in this chapter, has produced its drawbacks –
among them the fact that, at present, international links established by Cen-
tral and East European political scientists are typically West European. In the
Czech case, even two largely separate groups of academics have emerged,
needing to be integrated: Scholars “building the domestic discipline”, who
are “hardly present” internationally; and those who do not “significantly”
contribute to research and teaching in the Czech language, but “have
achieved success in the international” – meaning the Western – “arena”.49 As
the subsequent country chapters will show, fragmentation more often than
not also implies a divide between a minority of internationally connected and
a majority of inward-looking academics.
Such absence of internal cohesion has its analogy in a lack of sustained
regional interaction between the disciplines considered here.50 Professional
associations could play a considerable role in promoting scholarly coopera-
tion and the creation of networks. However, organizations as different in
membership and scope of activities as the Czech, Lithuanian, Romanian and
Slovenian Political Science Associations have uniformly attested to a lack of
human and financial resources as a constraining factor for such services.51
The disparities are displayed in this chapter’s final table. Disadvantages
due to regime hybridisation or late transition to democracy once again be-
come apparent:
48 Quoted from the book’s chapter on Hungary (see also above, n. 129).
49 Quoted from the book’s chapter on the Czech Republic.
50 That conclusion may be drawn from McGrath, Conor (2008): „ Increasing cooperation
among political science associations in Europe“, European Political Science 7, 360, 365.
The same result emerged from an October 2009 workshop organized by Irmina Matonyte
for the Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science and the
Lithuanian Political Science Association, attended by participants from 7 Central-East Eu-
ropean countries (Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Ukraine).
51 Cf. McGrath (2008), 358.
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Political Science Associations
Country Est. Active/Reduced/ Comments
Inactive
Albania 2000 Active Founded in 2000. Not an IPSA member. Since
2005 publishes the Albanian Journal of Politi-
cal Science and co-sponsors the CEU online
journal Southeast European Politics.
Armenia 2003 Inactive Not an IPSA member.
Belarus 1993 Reduced 1. Belarusian Association of Political Science.
“Governmental”; about 100 members. Confer-
ences limited to other CIS countries. Not an
IPSA member.
1998 2. Belarusian Academy of Political Science.
“Governmental”. Not an IPSA member.
1997- Inactive 3. Belarusian Association of Think Tanks
2006 (BATT). “Non-Governmental”. 18 members.
First steps have been taken by the Belarusian
Institute of Strategic Studies toward setting up
a new organization.
Bulgaria 1974 Active 50-60 members. Established to join IPSA for
the 1979 Congress in Moscow. The Sofia
University for National and World Economy’s
Department of Political Science is a member of
the European Consortium for Political Re-
search (ECPR).
Croatia 1966 Active The association has 500 members. It includes
political scientists serving as educators, civil
servants, and in the media, and belongs to
IPSA, the Central European Political Science
Association (CEPSA) founded in 1994, and the
recently (2007) established European Con-
federation of Political Science Associations
(ECPSA). The Zagreb Faculty is an ECPR
member.
Czech
Republic
1990 Active With some 380 members, the CPSA belongs to
IPSA, CEPSA and ECPSA. Five depart-
ments/institutes – the Institute of Sociology of
the Academy of Science, the Institute of Inter-
national Relations, the Faculty of Social Sci-
ences at Charles University, the Faculty of
Social Sciences at Masaryk University, and the
Department of Political Science at Palacký
University – are institutional members of
ECPR.
Estonia Inactive Attempt at establishing an association failed in
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the 1990s. Departments at Tallinn and Tartu
Universities are members of ECPR.
Georgia 1998 Inactive Two founding attempts during the 1990s had to
be discontinued for lack of human and financial
resources.
Hungary 1982 Active Currently it has some 500 members, including
many students. It operates in thematic sections
that organize discussions and other events.
HPSA joined IPSA in 1985, is also a member
of CEPSA and ECPSA. Departments at CEU,
ELTE and Miskolc University are ECPR
members.
Latvia 2003 Active With approximately 35 members, the associa-
tion is a member of ECPSA, but not of IPSA.
Departments at Latvia, Riga Stradi š and
Vidzeme Universities are institutional mem-
bers of ECPR.
Lithuania 1991 Active The association has about 70 members. It
joined IPSA in 1994. Since 2001, it has also
been a member of CEPSA (and more recently,
of ECPSA). The Institute of International
Relations and Political Science at Vilnius
University is an ECPR member.
Moldova Inactive Attempts in 1994 and 2004 to form an associa-
tion failed.
Poland 1956 Active Joined IPSA in 1956, CEPSA in 1994. Depart-
ments at the universities of Krakow, Lodz and
Lublin are members of ECPR.
Romania 1999 Reduced The first association was formed in 1994, but
failed. Another attempt was made in 1999. It
publishes the Romanian Journal of Society and
Politics, but otherwise is hardly active. Mem-
ber of IPSA and ECPSA.
Russia 1991 Active The Russian Political Science Association is a
successor of the Soviet Association of Political
Science (set up in 1960, former Soviet Associa-
tion for Political and State Studies), a member
of IPSA and of ECPSA. During the last years
its membership has stabilized around 550-600
who represent more then 50 regions. In 2006
the Youth Branch of RPSA was reconstituted
(it combines more than 400 young political
scientists from 27 regions). PRSA is an initia-
tor and organizer of the All-Russia Political
Science Congresses that – since 1998 – are
held every 3 years.
Serbia 2006 Active The Serbian Political Science Association was
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only re-established in 2006, after having first
been founded in the early 1950s as a part of the
Yugoslav Association of Political Science
(dissolved in the 1990s). It joined IPSA in
2008, and presently counts about 20 members.
Slovakia 1990 Active The SPSA joined both IPSA and CEPSA in
1994, and also belongs to ECPSA. It has about
90 members. The department at Comenius
University Bratislava is an ECPR member.
Slovenia 1968 Active The Slovenian Political Science Association
has 234 members and holds annual conferen-
ces. The organization is a member of IPSA,
CEPSA and ECPSA. The Ljubljana Univer-
sity’s Faculty of Social Sciences became an
ECPR member in 1992.
Ukraine 1992 Active /
Reduced
The association has 220 members and is a
member of IPSA. So far, it has not addressed
problems of research quality, professional
ethos, educational standards, and linking
Ukrainian political science inter-nationally.
As also evidenced by the table, there have been two attempts since 1989 to
create region- or even continent-wide opportunities for deliberation and
knowledge exchange by setting up more continuous working relationships
between national associations.
The first such attempt was the 1994 establishment of the Central Europe-
an Political Science Association (CEPSA) by the Austrian, Czech, Hungari-
an, Polish, Slovak and Slovenian national organizations, later joined by their
Croatian and Lithuanian counterparts. Jerzy Wiatr (Poland) was CEPSA’s
first president for a decade, followed by Attila Ǎgh (Hungary) in 2003. Since
2006, a new generation has assumed the mantle, represented by Silvia Mihal-
ikova (holder of the Jean Monnet Chair at Bratislava’s Comenius University)
and her 2009 successor Karin Liebhart (teaching European studies at Inns-
bruck and Vienna).
The second venture consisted in the more recent (2007) founding of the
European Confederation of Political Science Associations (ECPSA), eight of
whose presently 22 members stem from post-communist Central-Eastern
Europe (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia and Slovenia). Suzanne Schuettemeyer, former Chair of the German
Political Science Association, was elected ECPSA’s first president. The
ECPSA Executive Committee mirrors the numerical preponderance of West-
ern and Northern European groups, with just one of its five members coming
from East-Central Europe (more precisely, Hungary). The association’s mis-
sion statement emphasizes issues of teaching, curricula, qualification, and
mobility in the European Higher Education Area created by the Bologna
process. In a survey preceding the ECPSA launch, national associations had
suggested a number of practical measures that would particularly benefit
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smaller, modestly endowed groups, such as reciprocal offers of reduced con-
ference and membership fees, organization of joint conferences and work-
shops both at associational and sub-section levels, compilation of a register of
research interests to facilitate networking.52 While ECPSA’s mission state-
ment does not, of course, exclude such activities (fee reduction has, in fact,
been tackled on a bilateral basis), it also does not grant them priority.
CEPSA, in contrast, lists annual conferences as its “main activity”, sup-
plemented since 2005 by the publication of Politics in Central Europe, a
peer-reviewed journal brought out in Pilsen by the West Bohemian Universi-
ty’s Department of Politics and International Relations. Consecutive confer-
ences were held in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania,
Slovakia and Slovenia, with sessions organized by post-doctoral students “an
important part” of such meetings.53 The most recent (September 2009) con-
ference, however, did not take place as a separate event, but as a mere work-
shop within the annual conference of the Polish Political Science Associa-
tion. Politics in Central Europe, on the other hand, has continued to flourish.
So far, eight thematic issues have focused on, e. g., the international role of
small European states, the Europeanisation of Central European parties, Eu-
ropean energy security and – as mentioned above – public policies vis-à-vis
religious diversity.
CEPSA’s conferences and journal certainly provide a measure of support
to the emergence of a political science with a more distinctly “regional”
stamp. The central problem remains, of course, that in those countries where
the discipline is deeply fragmented, either no political science association has
formed, or existing associations are largely inactive – with the consequence
that engagement in CEPSA continues to be restricted to a core group of or-
ganizations. In the end, CEPSA does not seem to work as a very strong cata-
lyst of Central/East European convergence.
From this chapter’s final table, we can deduce that the ECPR (European
Consortium for Political Research), whose activities date back to 1970, ac-
quired new institutional members throughout Central-East Europe after 1990.
Their total number in the countries surveyed here amounts to 31. Albania,
Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia each have one single member insti-
tution, while Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine are
lacking any. To put these numbers in perspective, it should be added that the
United Kingdom alone has 53, Germany 46, Spain 18, Italy 17, and the Unit-
ed States – somewhat paradoxically, but attesting to ECPR’s international
standing – 30.54
With its joint workshop sessions, general and graduate conferences,
summer schools and journals in mind, ECPR has been characterized as “for
52 Cf. McGrath (2008), 60.
53 www.cepsa.cz/index.php?page=about, 1, accessed 12/28/2009.
54 http://ecprnet.eu/membership/member_countries.asp, accessed 12/28/2009.
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most practical purposes…the European Political Science Association”.55
Regarding Central-East Europe, it may well become again “the major force”
to socialize political scientists “into a broad, but nevertheless diverse ‘main-
stream’ of shared standards of excellence and relevance”56 – provided that a
significant external factor does not interfere with the process:
The Soros Foundation, the European Union, American, German and
Scandinavian agencies, foundations and university departments, and the Bo-
logna process were earlier identified as external factors pushing the region’s
nascent political science disciplines toward a measure of convergence. How-
ever, the rise of “hybrid” political regimes has been operating as a counter-
vailing force, tending to limit such convergence. Should the process of “hy-
bridization” persist or even intensify, it will not cause political studies to
disappear, because – as noted at the outset – authoritarian regimes, too, need
their trained “eyes and ears” to understand and deal with competing political
systems. But any proliferation of defectively democratic or competitively
autocratic regimes will bode ill for the existence of independent political
science in Central and Eastern Europe.
55 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (2007): „European Political Science – The Role of the European
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), in: Hans-Dieter Klingemann (ed.): The State of
Political Science in Western Europe, Opladen/Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich, 414.
56 Berg-Schlosser, ibid., 412.
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In the previous chapter, the extent became apparent to which external factors
– in the broadest sense, social and political events – may impinge on the
evolution of an academic discipline. If we look around for a country where
20thsuch events, during the century, have repeatedly produced drastic
changes in social structure, ideological orientation, political behavior, and
governmental set-up, Germany emerges as a sure-fire candidate. Conse-
quently, attempts were launched after World Wars I and II to politically edu-
cate the various classes in German society: Widespread “unpolitical” atti-
tudes – or so the diagnosis ran – were ultimately responsible for the repeated
catastrophic upheavals. The establishment of a German Political Studies
Institute – a Deutsche Hochschule für Politik -, located in Berlin, was intend-
ed after 1918 to provide an extramural solution to the problem. In 1933,
however, the new regime found collaborators among the institute’s staff, as it
did elsewhere, who were prepared to help bring into line political science.
The following chapter explores the reasons for such lack of immunity to the
authoritarian temptation and reconstructs the subsequent reduction of the
discipline to an instrument of the Nazi regime. It appeared first in 1999 as
part of a jointly compiled volume by Michael Th. Greven, Hans Karl Rupp
and this author: Political Science and Regime Change in 20th Century Ger-
many (Nova Science Publishers).
German Political Science at the Crossroads:
The Ambivalent Response to the 1933 Nazi Seizure of Power
I
Compelled by the National Socialists to leave their home country for political
and/or “racial” reasons, German intellectuals investigating problems of gov-
ernment and society – historians, sociologists, psychologists, political scien-
tists – were forced into exile in large numbers between 1933 and 1938. Most
of these expelled scholars, sometimes after arduous detours through various
European countries, eventually wound up in the United States.
The experience of exile became significant for both the emigrants and the
social sciences in America. The exiles contributed to the development of new
and to the sophistication of existing approaches. In such areas as political
theory, comparative government, and international relations, for instance,
exiled German scholars exerted a considerable influence on American politi-
cal science. Hannah Arendt, Hans J. Morgenthau, Karl Löwenstein, Franz L.
Neumann, John H. Herz, Karl W. Deutsch are among the names that instantly
spring to mind.
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The exiled political scientists, whether advocating structural reforms or
supporting the socio-political status quo they found, shared a commitment to
democratic values and politics – liberty and human dignity, equal rights and
opportunities, government by majority rule. In many cases, it was this com-
mitment that, in the first place, had led to their dismissal. Not a few cooperat-
ed with American government agencies during the war, later continuing to
advise United States occupation authorities in Germany. Several, too, became
involved in efforts to introduce the discipline into German university studies
as part of an attempt at renewing Germany’s traditional educational system.
The emigrants’ attachment to democratic ideals, the mere circumstance
of their exile seemed to suggest that the – still largely extramural – begin-
nings of German political science during the Weimar Republic, too, had been
democratically inspired. This, in fact, became the accepted version in writ-
ings about the evolution of political science in Weimar Germany. The emerg-
ing discipline was presented as a “thoroughly republican-democratic enter-
prise” that, having supported the Weimar Republic “against challenges from
the Left and Right”, consequently refused “to offer its services in 1933 to
National-Socialism” (Fijalkowski 1981: 3; Kastendiek 1977: 139/140). Por-
traying the science of politics, of all sciences, as having avoided being caught
up in the political miscarriages of Germany’s past – “the only discipline uni-
formly rejecting any cooperation with the Nazis” (Beckmann 1987: 3) –
provided a powerful narrative. Not least because it added legitimacy to a field
whose institutionalization met with initial resistance from many universities,
the portrayal was gratefully accepted among the political science community.
Closer inspection has proved such alleged homogeneity a fiction. Hetero-
rather than homogeneity marked German political science before and during
the Nazi seizure of power. As the discipline started to evolve in Weimar
Germany, three different schools – a national, a functional and a democratic
approach – emerged. When the curtain came down in 1933, these were to
differ considerably in their degree of immunity to the antidemocratic tempta-
tion. The reasons that were responsible for such heterogeneity will be ex-
plored next.
II
A German Political Studies Institute (Deutsche Hochschule für Politik) – an
extramural facility, free of the rigid constraints of Germany’s traditional
system of higher education – was twice, in the course of 20th century German
history, considered the adequate institutional response to the perceived need
of politically educating the German people. In 1920 as in 1949, it would be
located in Berlin, and would originally resemble an adult education estab-
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lishment offering evening classes. So far, the two projects bore a striking
resemblance. In other respects, however, there were important differences.
After 1945, the task of political education appeared to consist “in helping
to provide the informational and behavioral underpinnings required by a
‘democratic fresh start’” (Blanke/Jürgens/Kastendiek 1975: 54). Not so after
1918. In the words of Theodor Heuss, first Director of Studies at the
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (much later, of course, also the German
Federal Republic’s first President), German politics, “forced into a system of
humiliations by external force and through its own fault, [knew] but one
issue: the struggle for national liberation” (Heuss 1921: 33/34). To that aim,
the DHfP had to contribute by instruction and example.
The necessary money was initially provided, first and foremost, by Prus-
sia and the Reich, supplemented by grants from industry (Bosch, Siemens).
The Prussian Minister of Education, Carl Heinrich Becker, echoed Heuss:
Fostering political understanding should be “deliberately” employed “to
strengthen Germany domestically and to contest other peoples externally”
(Becker 1919: 13).
Nor did Ernst Jäckh, the Hochschule’s first and only president, mince
words when he pronounced himself in favor of an institute that would pro-
vide “a focal point around which to crystallize a new Germany and, thereby,
a new Europe possessed by a new spirit (albeit not the pointless, brutal ‘spir-
it’ of Versailles)” (Jäckh 1921: 31). Thirteen years later, after Hitler’s ap-
pointment as Chancellor, Jäckh was no less unequivocal. In letters to the new
Prussian Minister of Education, Bernhard Rust, and to Hitler’s aide Hans
Heinrich Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, he emphasized the
Hochschule’s “unique opportunity to speak out abroad in favor of German
revision politics” (Jäckh 1933d: 411) – ‘revision’ again referring, of course,
to a removal of the constraints imposed on Germany by the Versailles Peace
Treaty.
Those letters were never mentioned by Jäckh after 1945, who also omit-
ted the part about “the pointless, brutal ‘spirit’ of Versailles” from post-
World War II reprints of his earlier speech (cf. Jäckh 1952: 14; id. 1960:
77/78). At the time, however, the revisionist impulse was unmistakable when
the DHfP came to be established. For the Institute’s sponsors, the purpose of
political science consisted in aiding German aspirations to recapture the
country’s prewar position of power on the continent, refusing to acknowledge
the defeat of 1918. Even where Jäckh ostensibly invoked the “new” spirit of a
“new” Europe, he merely took into account the fundamentally changed Euro-
pean environment affecting Germany’s traditional aim of continental hegem-
ony – as evidenced by his (and Heuss’) rejection not only of the Versailles
settlement, but also of French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand’s later Pan-
European proposals (cf. Heuss 1929: 117; Jäckh 1932a: 46).
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Intent on “displacing the existing continental power structure to the ad-
vantage of the Reich”, revisionism pervaded Weimar Germany’s society
during the twenties (cf. Salewski 1980; for the quote, see Hillgruber 1984:
84). In theory as in practice, it reinforced a functional, instrumentalist ap-
proach to both domestic and foreign policy. If democratic government, if the
League of Nations proved unable to achieve revision, both might be expend-
able.
Functional interpretations of democracy did not appear with amazing
suddenness. During the war, Jäckh (who in 1916 was awarded a chair for his
efforts at the Institute of Oriental Languages – Orientalisches Seminar –,
established by Bismarck as a facility for training recruits to the Foreign Ser-
vice) and Heuss had collaborated with Friedrich Naumann as political jour-
nalists in promoting German war aims. Naumann, a publicist and politician
who became famous when, in 1915, he circulated his ideas on a “fourth
world empire” Mitteleuropa to be shaped by Germany, had earlier supported
a “democratic imperialism” promoting social reform at home, thereby secur-
ing a solid foundation for national expansion overseas (cf. Naumann 1900).
He, in turn, had been thoroughly influenced by Max Weber, for whom “all
questions of government were vastly eclipsed by Germany’s interest in its
power as a nation”. Consequently, parliamentarization and democratization to
Weber “first and foremost offered a means to achieve domestic prerequisites
for an effective world policy” (Mommsen 1959: 394).
Naumann died in 1919, Weber in 1920. It was the former who had first
suggested establishing a center for political education, even starting a “Civics
School” for the liberal Progressive People’s Party (FVP) which, after the
revolution of November 1918, was reorganized and became the German
Democratic Party (DDP). When Jäckh took over from Naumann, he endeav-
ored to put the venture on a broader basis, including among its tasks training
for the Civil Service and the education of future “leaders”.
Selecting and training political leaders had been another common theme
running through the works of Weber and Naumann, which was now adopted
by the DHfP’s functionalists: “If a problem exists for modern democracy that
deserves the most impassioned consideration, it is the problem of leadership”
(Heuss 1921: 35). Grounded on liberal elitist thinking no less than on past
acquiescence in Germany’s authoritarian political system (including the Bis-
marck myth), the leadership ideal was tied to “great-man doctrines” and came
to acquire “metaphysical significance” during the twenties (Struve 1973: 9;
Döring 1975: 231). More often than not, even self-styled republicans were
wont to link an overemphasis on leadership to the eventual destinies of Wei-
mar Germany “in a manner that did not exclude an antiparliamentary and
antidemocratic backlash” (Faulenbach 1980: 310).
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III
During the Great War, Ernst Jäckh had not contented himself with supporting
Friedrich Naumann’s design of Mitteleuropa “unified under German leader-
ship, politically and economically consolidated against England and America
on one, against Russia on the other side” (Fischer 1969: 746). Driven by
inflated war-time expectations, he had proclaimed a Greater Central Europe
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece) to be
led “organically”, “without despotism”, by the German Empire, complement-
ing Germany’s “seaward orientation, especially toward a future ’Middle
Africa’” (Jäckh 1916: 6, 11, 17). The extent to which such conceptual pathol-
ogy was rampant at the time is indicated by the fact that programs like Jä-
ckh’s were considered “moderate”, because they renounced formal annexa-
tions, focused on Eastern rather than Western Europe, and lacked a repressive
domestic element.
After Germany’s defeat in 1918, the völkische – radical nationalist – ver-
sion of revisionism immediately commenced to crystallize around the coun-
try’s alleged Mitteleuropa “mission”. The self-styled “national opposition’s”
concept remained vague in detail, yet concrete in its rejection of the political
settlement the Versailles and St. Germain treaties had introduced into Central
Europe. Essential targets of nationalist ire: the “inflated multi-ethnic Polish
state” and the “Czechoslovakian motley conglomeration” (Boehm 1923: 15).
Against these, German “leadership of Central Europe” would have “to be
earned, perhaps asserted in combat” (Brauweiler 1925: 249). As Martin
Spahn, Reichstag delegate for the German National People’s Party (DNVP),
summed up the radical revisionist approach: “If we succeed in shaping Cen-
tral Europe, we shall rise again to the position of Europe’s leading people”
(Spahn 1925: 40).
A conservative Catholic historian, Spahn had received his first chair at
the University of Strasbourg in 1901, his second (after the return of Alsace to
France) in 1920 at the University of Cologne. A year later, he left the catholic
Center Party, joining the DNVP where he sided with newspaper tycoon Al-
fred Hugenberg’s rabidly antidemocratic position. By 1933, explaining that
“we need a single leader, and that is Hitler”, he switched his political alle-
giance again, going over to the National Socialist parliamentary party.
In 1919, Spahn was recruited into the “revolutionary-conservative” circle
that had been gathering around the literary and art historian Arthur Moeller
van den Bruck, author of the notorious pamphlet The Third Reich, who would
commit suicide by 1925. Lihe his principal associates, Heinrich von Gleichen
and Max Hildebert Boehm, Moeller van den Bruck had been involved in the
war-time propaganda efforts of the Supreme Army Command run by Hin-
denburg and Ludendorff. Experiencing the Great War as a “formative pro-
cess” of the first magnitude, the group responded to the November Revolu-
109
  
          
             
             
          
          
               
            
            
         
            
           
             
            
             
          
           
           
          
             
        
          
          
            
           
            
          
           
         
       
           
         
         
              
         
            
 
           
           
            
         
        
            
            
tion by proclaiming the “politicization of the nation” under mass-based au-
thoritarian – rather than monarchical – leadership (cf. Moeller van den Bruck
31931: XI, 280). When the Versailles Treaty was signed in June 1919, the
circle, to emphasize its protest, assumed the name June Club.
Fundamentally, “politicizing the nation” was not too different from what
Jäckh and his more moderate faction had in mind. In the case of the June
club, however, the aim was equal to “converting the people to nationalism”
(Moeller van den Bruck), “militantly opposing a state that intends to force
republican persuasions on us”, “expelling by revolutionary methods the liber-
alism which had invaded Germany” (Spahn 1928: 2; id. 1933: 1). Like Nau-
mann, Jäckh and their collaborators, Gleichen and Spahn began planning for
a school of politics to “educate leaders”. Gleichen and Jäckh were in touch
during 1919, and initially it seemed that agreement on a common project
might be reached. However, Jäckh was not willing to forego, in addition to
funding provided by industrialists Robert Bosch and Carl Friedrich von Sie-
mens, subsidies from the Prussian and Reich governments. When that option
proved unacceptable to the June Club, Jäckh went ahead single-handedly. On
October 24, 1920, the DHfP was inaugurated. German Foreign Minister Wal-
ter Simons and Wilhelm (Bill) Drews, soon to be appointed President of the
Prussian Administrative Court, were among the speakers.
A mere week later, on November 1, the revolutionary-conservative group
followed suit by establishing a Politisches Kolleg (Political College, PK),
also located in Berlin, under the direction of Martin Spahn. The institute’s
program for “scholarly political analysis” appealed to a “militant and manly
community” of students “unwilling to let the fatherland perish by the hands
of inadequate leaders and external enemies” (Politisches Kolleg 1922/23: 3).
Financial support, during the subsequent seven years, would be provided by
heavy industry – or, more precisely, by Alfred Hugenberg’s Wirtschaftsver-
einigung zur Förderung der geistigen Wiederaufbaukräfte (Economic Asso-
ciation for the Promotion of Spiritual Reconstruction), to whose coffers coal
and steel corporations such as Vereinigte Stahlwerke (Albert Vögler), Gu-
tehoffnungshütte (Paul Reusch) and others regularly contributed (see Leopold
1977: 12, 18, 180 n. 67). By 1927, the DNVP would temporarily join a gov-
ernmental coalition (before its final, fatal radicalization under Hugenberg’s
leadership allied the party with the Nazis), and public funds would become
available.
The role of the Political College has been downplayed by successive
studies. A University of Chicago dissertaion is exemplary in asserting that
“the Politisches Kolleg never developed an identity or a program” and that,
consequently, its competition with the DHfP “from the very begin-
ning…degenerated into parody” (Korenblat 1977: 63; see, however, Ko-
renblat 2006 for a more nuanced assessment). Both contentions are rash, to
say the least. The individuals recruited for the College staff forged an ap-
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proach focusing on a set of ideas that included conceptions of “nation”,
“state”, “leadership”, “pan-Germanism”, and “Mitteleuropa”. Precisely be-
cause it was higly ideological, the approach implied a program.
When the Hochschule and the PK concluded a formal cooperation
agreement (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) in 1927, continuing – even extending – the
arrangement on an informal basis from 1930, that program increasingly took
hold at the DHfP. The influence it exerted on the School’s teaching and re-
search would prove far more important than the PK’s institutional demise.
IV
“The revision of Versailles must commence by revising Weimar” (Mariaux
1932: 83): Writ large, that was the momentum at the back of the “New Front”
slogan coined by the June Club (cf. Moeller van den Bruck/Gleichen/Boehm
1922). Domestically no less than externally, by defeating 1789 and 1989 –
“inner” and “exterior” France -, every essential outcome of the Great War
was to be undone. Political science would have to contribute: On the one
hand, “occupied with politics”, it was charged with reasoning out “the herit-
age of the political Romantics and of every 19th century conservative ap-
proach”. On the other hand, “rooted” as it was “in politics”, it supposedly had
to reflect “our people’s distinctive political disposition, inclined neither to-
wards Western nor towards Eastern Europe” (Spahn 1931: 1/2; Politisches
Kolleg 1922/23: 4).
‘Science’ thus was to build on the ideology of a distinctively German “pecu-
liar course” which
• had virtually pervaded the political culture of Imperial Germany (see, e.
g., Mommsen 1995: 208),
• had found its most “graphic expression” (Mommsen: ibid.) in the “ideas
of 1914” – order, duty, community – which were meant to counter the
ideals of 1789, liberty, equality and fraternity (see, e. g., Kjellén 1915;
Plenge 1916; Troeltsch 1925), and
• after 1918 would continue to serve, with marginal modifications, as a
basis for the “national opposition’s” campaign against the Weimar Re-
public.
The conception of political science, as it was published at the Kolleg and
taught not least in extension courses for student fraternities, drew on several
essential components of such presumed distinctiveness:
First and foremost, a notion of the homogeneous nation, a “community
originally rooted in blood and soil” (Spahn 1931: 2/3; cf. also Boehm 1923:
315), distinct from “atomistic” capitalist society.
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Second, rejecting “mechanistic” Western conceptions of parliamentar-
ism, the idea of a corporatist, “organic” state, conquering “decay”, re-
inforcing leadership by “preparing thr ground for a new upper stratum”
(Brauweiler 1925: 248).
Third, a firm belief in the paramount role of strong political leadership,
entitled to “devotion and allegiance” (ibid.: 246; Boehm 31933: 50), as op-
posed to democratic “leveling”.
Fourth, derived from a refusal to come to terms with the demarcation
lines drawn in 1918, an emphasis on irredentism, perceiving the ethnically
German population of border regions as the “genuine object of German for-
eign policy” (Hoetzsch 1925: 4/5).
Finally, the perspective (already discussed above) of Mitteleuropa, im-
plying German hegemony in that area as “the German people’s historical
duty” (Brauweiler 1925: 249), a “continuing German mission” (Boehm 1925:
252).
The approach pursued at the Political College amounted to politicized,
rather than political, science. Inevitably, it paved the way for the Nazi dogma
that no science could escape being political science, serving purposes laid
down by political, viz. National-Socialist, authorities. It could hardly come as
a surprise that, among the Kolleg’s principal figures, none remained immune
to the Third Reich’s ideology after 1933.
How immune, however, to the conceptions put forward by the national
approach did the DHfP’s founders prove in the first place? As indicated earli-
er, both Jäckh and Heuss – and, it should be added, another close associate of
Friedrich Naumann, DDP Reichstag delegate Gertrud Bäumer who also be-
came involved with the Hochschule – shared a commitment to revisionism no
less than to the notion of strong leadership. Did terminological affinity in-
volve affinity in content?
The answer can only be ambiguous. If the DHfP founding circle “stood
on the ground of bourgeois liberalism” (Gay 1974: 42), such liberalism meant
the principles espoused by the German Democratic Party which, significant-
ly, would change its name to State Party in 1930. While the DDP has been
labeled the Weimar Republic’s “constitutional party par excellence”, it also
subscribed to a “democratic nationalism” instrumental in preventing “the
development of a pragmatic sense of political realities” (Hess 1978: 367).
The party insisted on the relative merits of democracy as a form of govern-
ment “appropriate” to the present (cf. Heuss 1920: 43/44; id. 1926: 38). It
emphasized the significance of community – the “national corpus mysticum”
(Bäumer 1928: 5) – and leadership (“a truly authoritative democracy leads”:
Jäckh 1931a: 1). And the “vigorous” foreign policy that was endorsed to
regain Germany’s “proper place in the world” included irredentism, justified
as a principle “forced on Germany” (Heuss 1926: 282; id. 1927: 15). On top
of that, the impact of the Great Depression and the challenge of the French
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government’s 1930 proposal to negotiate a Pan-European confederation (im-
plying acceptance of the territorial status quo) combined in triggering a re-
vival of Naumann’s Mitteleuropa design by the DDP. “Natural economic
laws”, or so Jäckh predicted, would “take their course”, reinforcing Germa-
ny’s position in Central Europe (Jäckh 1931b: 18).
Any reference to corporatist traditions is conspicuously absent from the
list. Parliamentary democracy was accepted, provided it ensured strong gov-
ernment. Revisionist aims remained limited to foreign affairs, revisionist
methods to a strategy of “pacifist imperialism” – economic penetration, polit-
ical pressure, diplomatic negotiations – which, as diagnosed by Jäckh, was at
the heart of America’s international successes (id. 1929: 105) and should be
copied.
However, the perceptions of democracy as merely a (more or less) ade-
quate method of government; of community and leadership as essential ele-
ments of democracy; of international conciliation as, again, primarily a tool
for achieving revision – these would serve as a first step helping to bridge, at
the Hochschule, part of the gap between the camps of radical and democratic
nationalism. During the Weimar Republic’s final stages, they would provide
an opening for the endorsement auf authoritarian schemes as “solutions” to
Germany’s political crisis. And even in 1933, Ernst Jäckh would not be alone
among DHfP “liberals” in misjudging Nazism, after it had come to power, as
merely a “more vigorous” revisionism, a “more determined” variety of na-
tional community-building.
V
Who, actually, were the DHfP students, asked the author of a confidential
report to the Rockefeller Foundation in early 1926 – “are they indeed the
prospective political leaders of the country?” His answer was immediate and
unequivocal: The practical value of the institute’s diploma had to be consid-
ered “extremely small” (Fehling 1926: 2).
Even at the DHfP proper, however, “education of leaders”, in spite of
Heuss’ initial strong emphasis, was no longer a fashionable subject. Rather, a
posture “above party” and spirit of “civic loyalty” (Staatsgesinnung) were
advertised as the institute’s virtues with increasing success. Domestically no
less than internationally, the Hochschule gained in reputation during the
period of the Weimar Republic’s “relative stability” between the curbing of
hyperinflation and the onset of the Great Depression. Subsequent to its coop-
eration agreement with the Political College, however, it also split up along
conceptual lines. Henceforth, DHfP lectures and publications would be open
not to a reassuringly “moderate” right, as has been contended (Lehnert 1989:
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454/455), but to the intransigent enemies of a republic which they despised as
“an interim of dishonor and bondage” (Brauweiler 1933).
In 1924, Jäckh managed to set up a Board of Trustees, chaired by Su-
preme Court President Walter Simons. Close to the DDP at the time, Simons
would resign from the Court five years later over a face-off with the SPD-led
Grand Coalition. By early 1933, he and Jäckh would be offering the new
regime a “reorganization” of the DHfP Board. Continuing to be attracted to
the “ideas of 1914”, Simons would go on to defend, in 1935, the anti-Semitic
Nuremberg laws, admonishing American critics that the United States, for
want of comparable racist ordinances, would degenerate into a “state of mu-
lattos and mestizoes” (see Gründer 1978: 258, 276/277, 284).
For the present, however, Simons’ presence on the Board added to the
DHfP’s prestige. So did the membership of other public figures, such as
Hjalmar Schacht (Federal Reserve Bank) and Otto Meissner (Reich Chancel-
lery) – both, again, DDP members -, Carl Duisberg and Ludwig Kastl (Reich
Association of German Industry), Chancellor Wilhelm Marx (Center Party),
and Otto Braun, Prussia’s Social-Democratic head of state government. By
1927, the Board’s roster read like an excerpt from the German “Who is
Who”.
During 1926/27, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace became involved in subsidizing the Hochschule
– its archives, its library, not least its publications. A first Carnegie Chair in
International Relations was established in 1927, to be filled by successive
German and foreign scholars on a yearly basis, or to be used for the payment
of visiting lecturers. Rockefeller funds made possible “most of the major
publication ventures sponsored by the Hochschule” (Korenblat 1978: 217)
and permitted the institute to set up, in 1932, its short-lived research division.
The involvement of the foundations reflected the growth of American in-
terest in Germany – and vice versa. After the Dawes Plan had been signed
and the role of reparations agent devolved on the United States, American
capital commenced to flow to Germany. As the Depression would prove, the
loans were a two-edged sword even if, in the short run, they helped to pay
German reparations. American economic involvement also inspired political
hopes in German private and government circles smarting under French pre-
ponderance. They were reflected by Jäckh’s suggestion that American influ-
ence in Europe should be based on Germany and that Germany’s role, in
turn, would depend on an alliance with the United States (Jäckh 1929: 17,
105).
Jäckh’s renewed application for Rockefeller funds in 1927 furnished an-
other proof of his advertising talents. He credited a development to the DHfP
which had rather resulted from political pressure on the institute, with con-
siderations of self-interest playing a supplementary role. According to Jäckh,
the Political College had “now become part of our work”, the “central quali-
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ty” of the Hochschule thus being “acknowledged officially again” (Jäckh
1927: 1/2). Actually, the Reich Department of the Interior had gone to the
DNVP, after the “national opposition” had agreed to join a governmental
coalition. The party was, consequently, in a position to press for its demands
of integrating the College, threatened by a reduction of its industrial funds,
into the Hochschule, and of providing additional governmental subsidies for
the enlarged institute. Planning to supplement its main by an advanced level
course (Akademische Abteilung), the DHfP was not adverse to such a pro-
spect.
Negotiations between Kolleg and Hochschule resulted in an agreement
which gave the DNVP two seats on the Board of Trustees. Martin Spahn and
Otto Hoetzsch (the latter a professor of East European history at the Universi-
ty of Berlin and, like Spahn, a DNVP Reichstag delegate) were included in
the permanent faculty, Max Hildebert Boehm and Karl Hoffmann (a foreign
policy specialist at the College) taken on as instructors. The DHfP expressed
its hope that, henceforth, the PK’s own courses would also be taught “in the
spirit of a strict stance above party”.
That stipulation would prove the stumbling block after the DNVP, hav-
ing suffered a severe elctoral setback in 1928, opted tor an adamantly anti-
republican course under the chairmanship of Alfred Hugenberg. Any further
increase in public subsidies was, moreover, precluded by the Depression. In
March, 1930, a large Board of Trustees’ majoriuty voted to terminate the
agreement with the College.
Rather than having their influence cut back during the subsequent
months, however, Spahn and his nationalist circle managed to negotiate a
subsequent enlargement. They were aided by two two developments that
occurred between March and June, 1930.
At the national level, Heinrich Brüning’s appointment as chancellor of a
Presidential cabinet by Hindenburg was meant and publicly perceived as a
first decisive step toward authoritarian rule. At DHfP level, a scholar was
appointed Director under Jäckh (following the promotion of his Social Dem-
ocratic predecessor, Hans Simons, to Prussian government official) who had
very rapidly turned from a religious socialist into a “self-styled ‘Tory-
Liberal’” (Winks 1987: 40): Arnold Wolfers, who would soon denounce “an
extreme form of democratic constitution” (Wolfers 1932: 758) as the “inher-
ent weakness” of the Weimar Republic. It was Wolfers who “energetically
and successfully” (Brauweiler 1932: 1) pressed for an arrangement that fa-
vord the revolutionary-conservative cause.
Under the terms of that agreement, Spahn and Hoetzsch remained on the
DHfP faculty (to be joined in 1932 by Max Hildebert Boehm and Heinz
Brauweiler, the College’s leading propagandist of the corporatist state). Be-
yond retaining Hoffmann, two more PK teaching staff were hired as instruc-
tors – one, Kleo Pleyer, a rabid anti-Semite. Expelled from Bavaria after the
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1923 Hitler putsch, Pleyer had been indicted again two years later for partici-
pating in nationalist student riots against Emil Julius Gumbel, a Jewish paci-
fist scholar (who would be deprived of his academic position at the Universi-
ty of Heidelberg even before the National-Socialist advent to power). Lately,
Pleyer had worked as an assistant to Boehm – who has no less reason to be
satisfied with the settlement worked out by Wolfers and approved by the
Board: He was appointed to set up a Center for Problems of Expatriate Ger-
mans in Post-War Europe (Deutschtumsseminar), one among five DHfP
Centers, two of which (the Eurasian and the Geopolitical Center) were al-
ready run by individuals of, or close to, revolutionary-conservative persua-
sion.
As explained by Wolfers, the new Center would prove the Hochschule’s
“determination to provide valuable support, by academic teaching and schol-
arly research, to every effort having to do with ethnic policies (Volks-
tumspolitik), the national question, and the problems of Germans living on
and beyond the country’s frontiers” (Wolfers 1930/31: 116). The Swiss-born
Wolfers, later a luminary at Yale advising OSS, the War and State Depart-
ments, consistently misread the authoritarian and racist threat to the Weimar
Republic. Up to the autumn of 1932, he would insist that constitutional “re-
forms” contemplated by Hindenburg (“a pillar of German democracy”) and
the Papen government were “moderate”; that the danger of “dictatorship by
one party (had) been taken from Germany”; that, finally, the Nazi Party as a
mass movement provided “a safeguard against social reaction”, even “a force
making for democracy” ever more “likely to come to the fore” (Wolfers
1932:769, 771).
Subsequent to January 30, 1933, Wolfers undauntedly went on to inform
American audiences that “Hitler (had) the very highest esteem for what he
calls ‘European culture’ to defend against the threat of ‘Asiatic bolshevism’”
(Wolfers 1933a: 180), and that it might “become the greatest ambition of the
European dictatorships to prove that they (were) better able, with their inde-
pendence from parliamentary pressure, to give peace to Europe and the world
than their democratic predecessors” (Wolfers 1933b). A supporter of the
functional approach to political science in his own right, Wolfers persisted in
the same sort of self-deception about Nazism that would be exhibited by
Jäckh.
VI
When, after 1945, the Hochschule was re-established, the original institute
was in retrospect idealized as a bulwark of democracy – not least, as has been
indicated and will be explained in more detail below, by Jäckh himself. That
could make convincing reading because, compared to the “structural and
116
          
         
            
            
          
          
           
          
            
             
          
             
           
           
            
         
             
 
         
          
             
               
          
             
          
          
           
            
             
          
      
           
           
           
           
           
             
        
           
            
         
             
          
philosophical rigidities” exhibited by Germany’s universities, the DHfP “did
maintain an openness to…alternative conceptions of politics and democracy”
(Korenblat 1978: 7, 357). In addition to the national and functional varieties,
a democratic approach to political science came to exist at the institute. Do-
mestically, it focused on equality, social justice, political participation; in
foreign relations, on renunciation of hegemony, an abandonment of territorial
demands, and peaceful conflict settlement. The impact of that approach on
the political orientation of the Hochschule would be overplayed later.
Otto Suhr who, as Social Democratic mayor of Berlin, would give his
name to the re-established institute after World War II, taught as a DHfP
instructor from 1928-30; Eckart Kehr, whose monograph on domestic and
social forces at the back of Wilhelminian “world policy” would come to rank
as a pioneering study in German historiography, from 1929-32; Franz L.
Neumann (he would publish his classical work Behemoth – Structure and
Practice of National Socialism in American exile) for the same period; Hans
Speier, whose analysis of salaried employees responding to National Social-
ism would finally appear four decades later, during 1932 for just under a
year.
Among scholars of democratic persuasion, only three, however, were in-
cluded among permanent faculty (as distinct from teaching staff): Hermann
Heller, appointed professor at the University of Frankfurt in 1931, who – like
Kehr – would die in his first year of exile; Hajo Holborn, who held the se-
cond DHfP Carnegie Chair, also established in 1931; finally, Sigmund Neu-
mann, lecturer at the Hochschule since 1929 and a faculty member in 1932.
These scholars concurred in their analyses of the Bismarckian system’s
weaknesses which had “broken the back of German liberalism”, feudalized
the middle class, “depoliticized” the electorate and the parties (Heller 1926:
40; id. 1971b: 631/632; Holborn 1933a: 20ss.; Neumann 1930: 166; id. 1933:
59). By interpreting such features in terms of a distinct deficit in Germany’s
political culture, they transformed the ideological notion of the country’s
“peculiar course” into an explanatory model.
Heller, Holborn and Neumann also focused, in their approach, on the
disparity between changes in political institutions and the survival of Imperial
Germany’s social structures after the Great War. They were unanimous in
arguing that the conspicuous lack in social homgeneity posed a “serious
threat” to political democracy, including the risks of dictatorship and civil
war (Heller 1928: 40; Holborn 1930: 28; Neumann 1933: 60, 65, 76).
Differences between the functional and the democratic approaches
emerged most visibly in their analyses of fascism and National Socialism.
While not mincing words about the “browbeating” of the press and the oppo-
sition parties in Italy, Theodor Heuss maintained that Mussolini’s “personali-
ty” made him a “leader” (Heuss 1926: 97). Adolf Grabowsky who ran the
DHfP’s Geopolitical Center and, with Richard Schmidt, edited the Zeitschrift
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für Politik (Journal of Politics), acknowledged that “platitudes” and “parade-
ground drill” governed Italian public life. Yet he praised Mussolini for “hav-
ing made giant strides in eliminating brutal class conflict” (Grabowsky 1928:
410, 416/417; id. 1932a: 315, 316). In contrast, Hermann Heller in a much
more perceptive study argued that Mussolini was a dictator aiming at abso-
lute rule, rather than a “leader” interested in basing his actions on widely held
values; that, consequently, the “normless dictatorship” of fascism in no way
resembled a “national community of purpose”; and that class conflict might
be eliminated by enlarged economic, social and political participation but
hardly by resorting to “aestheticized violence” and “forced depoliticization”
(Heller 1931: 43 ss., 56, 65, 157/158).
When Heuss published an inquiry into the German Nazi leader’s political
development, entitled Hitlers Weg, a reviewer was struck by “a lack of flatly
repudiating National Socialism’s most ruthless attributes” (see Jäckel 1968:
XXIV). Such lack may hardly be explained by “contemporary uncertainties”
(ibid.: XXXVI). Rather, it revealed an analytical uncertainty typical of the
functionalist approach. The democratic school, in contrast, predicted that a
National Socialist regime would bring “the end of the rule of law in a central-
ized police state” (Neumann 1973: 109), even foreseeing that the Nazi party”,
“forced to let down” many supporters after its advent to power, would “have
to resort to force not just against adversaries, but against a good many fol-
lowers” (Holborn 1933b: 25).
To pass the acid test, political science at the DHfP between 1930 and
1933 would have had to focus
• first, on the gradual infringement, by established conservative elites, of
the Weimar Constitution and
• second, on the aggressive reactionary populism of the National Socialist
mass movement.
The writings of Heller, Holborn, and Sigmund Neumann indicate the
achievements of which a homogeneous discipline, in ths sense of a general
commitment to democratic values, might conceivably have been capable.
As matters stood, no adequate analytical assessment of National Social-
ism emerged. By 1933, that failure would make it easier, at the DHfP and
elsewhere, to harbor illusions about Germany’s new regime.
VII
Looking back, from the distance of a decade, on the destruction of the Wei-
mar Republic and the liquidation of the Hochschule für Politik, Ernst Jäckh
would present himself, in his memoirs titled The War for Man’s Soul, as a
cool, calm adversary of the Nazis, a shrewd, unfazed judge of men and
events. Hindenburg, Meissner, Schacht, above all Papen were dubbed “pa-
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thetically deceived deceivers”, “short-sighted nationalists”, “narrow-minded
reactionaries”, Goebbels the “devil” whom he, Jäckh, had been able to
“dupe” by deciding to “fight” over the Hochschule: “For once, this Machia-
velli, nay, Mephistopheles, of the Hitlerites was not to have his way by
threats and brute force. I wanted him to acknowledge rights and laws” (Jäckh
1943: 66ss., 72, 107/108).
Reality, in several ways, had been different from Jäckh’s assertions.
Since 1927, the institute’s publications had been open to writers enlarg-
ing on both “democratic and antidemocratic options” (Wolfers 1928: VII).
While including essays by Heller, Neumann, and Carl J. Friedrich, two vol-
umes on Problems of Democracy (I: 1928; II: 1931), followed by the DHfP’s
only published Political Research Annual (1933), had printed Carl Schmitt’s
infamous “friend-foe” argument about the presumed essence of politics; Max
Hildebert Boehm’s diatribes on the irreconcilability of irredentist policies and
democratic government; Otto Koellreutter’s avidly illiberal polemics.
By October, 1932, two National Socialists – Hans Heinrich Lammers, fu-
ture chief of the Reich Chancellery, and economist Carl August Fischer, soon
to fill a chair at the University of Hamburg – had been added to the roster of
instructors. Rather than resisting right-wing barrages against republic and
democracy, the Hochschule had lent them respectability. As a Rockefeller
Foundation official would sum up the DHfP strategy by early 1933: “Jäckh
ha(d) been clever in adjusting the School to (the) changing political situation
by going further and further to the Right in selecting his lecturers, without
sacrificing the old Left element in his permanent staff” (Sickle 1933a: 2).
During 1931/32 and as late as February, 1933, Jäckh had continued to
defend, in response to skeptical British and American interrogators, the in-
creasingly authoritarian policies pursued by Hindenburg and his entourage,
by Brüning’s and Papen’s Presidential administrations:
Hindenburg was sized up by Jäckh as “the German Washington: ‘first in
war, first in peace’”; Brüning as “the synthesis of thinking-action known only
in the old Greek philosophers”; Papen as “le chevalier sans peur et sans
reproche” – “reactionary? No – if ‘reactionary’ means essaying an unconsti-
tutional policy or trying to turn backward the wheel of evolution” (Jäckh
1933a: 10, 11, 20; id. 1932b: 2; id. 1931c). Only “very unwillingly” had
Hindenburg signed a series of emergencey decrees – aiming, as he did ac-
cording to Jäckh, at the “consolidation and stabilization…of the democratic
Republic”. The President and his State Secretary, Otto Meissner, “equally
experienced and trustworthy”, would continue “safeguarding the constitu-
tion”. Hitler, as judged by Jäckh, found himself “controlled” and a political
“prisoner” – “chancellor only in name”. Whatever “the result of the experi-
ment”, it would “transform National Socialism” (Jäckh 1933a: 16, 18, 19, 21,
24).
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Seriously flawed assumptions and effusive personal praise had added up
to gross political misjudgments. Attempting to reach an accommodation even
with Nazism could, as a result, seem merely one more small step.
By 1943, Jäckh would contend that, after the rigged elections of March 5,
1933, he had decided to “leave Germany for good”, as now “terror and law-
lessness would deluge the country” (id. 1943: 107). When addressing, on
March 27, the participants of a DHfP course for Prussian civil servants, he
had sounded very different (Jäckh 1933b: 401):
Three major, even historically decisive dates have intervened between the pre sent and the
last course: January 30, March 5, March 21. In turn, they signify: the legal transition of
governmental power to a revolutionary movement; the seizure of that power by the national
revolution; the legitimization of that revolution by the nation as embodied in the Reichstag.
Jäckh then proceeded to name Lammers and a few other Nazi figures (such as
educationalist Ernst Krieck, who had meanwhile also been recruited as in-
structor) to document a National Socialist presence at the Hochschule. He
concluded his address by referring to “an idea of his former student” and
associate professor at the University of Hamburg, Adolf Rein, that from now
on “the ‘political’ (would) replace the ‘philosophical’ university of the 18th
and 19th centuries, just as the latter (had) outstripped the ‘theological univer-
sity’ which (had) dominated” earlier.
Displaying an “extraordinary capacity of adaptation” (Sickle 1933e: 2),
Jäckh was attempting to convince the regime that it might profit from the
institute if it would only forego complete Nazification, viz. putting Goebbels’
Propaganda Ministry in charge. The DHfP could be used, as he wrote Bern-
hard Rust, the Prussian Minister of Education, as a “unique” instrument “to
speak out abroad in favor of German revision politics” (Jäckh 1933d: 411).
During March, Jäckh and Walter Simons offered Rust and Wilhelm Frick,
Reich Minister of the Interior, to “reorganize” the Hochschule’s Board of
Trustees. Jäckh impressed on Hitler’s aide Lammers that he had “access to
the whole British press, actually to any kind of conference in London, Ox-
ford, or Cambridge”. Keeping in mind “the absolutely misinformed Ameri-
can public, another lecture tour to the United States” might also be appropri-
ate, where he had, time and again, performed “most effectively” (id. 1933c:
37).
Lammers arranged a meeting between Hitler and Jäckh on April 1, 1933.
Later, Jäckh would melodramatically embellish his report on the encounter,
from disarmingly greeting “with a Swabian ‘Grüß Gott!’” the guards holler-
ing ‘Heil Hitler!’, to his early prediction of the Führer’s “inevitable doom”
(id. 1943: 97). What he desribed in his memoirs as an “exchange (of) views
on problems of German and international politics” (ibid.: 93), was more pro-
saically referred to in the minutesof the meeting as “confidentially informing
Prof. Jäckh about the objectives of German policy with regard to his lecture
tours abroad… and his answers to inquiries by foreign visitors” (Nieder-
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schrift 1933: 456). Otherwise, the meeting was inconclusive. Hitler simply
referred Jäckh to Goebbels for further discussing the issue of the
Hochschule’s intended transfer to the auspices of the Propaganda Ministry.
That transfer, however, was already definite. Goebbels had carried the
day against Rust and Frick. On April 16, Jäckh advised Lammers of his res-
ignation from the office of President of the German Political Studies Institute.
Later, Jäckh would publish two versions of his resignation letter – one in
the United States (1943), another in West Germany (1952). Both were dis-
torted, calculated to persuade the reader of Jäckh’s ostensibly unbending
opposition to National Socialism.
However, Jäckh also claimed to write history – the history of the DHfP.
In juggling with the facts of his biography, he was whitewashing a discipline.
An apparent ‘document’, Jäckh’s letter seemed ‘proof’ that the study of poli-
tics and government in Germany had withstood the totalitarian temptation.
As I have argued earlier (Eisfeld 1991: 99/100), it played a pivotal role in
promoting the myth that, unlike German society, German political science
did not need to come to terms with the past.
The letter’s first printed version (Jäckh 1943: 290/291) was terse and to
the point. It consisted of six sentences – a single paragraph, beginning and
concluding thus:
I have informed the commissar entrusted with the negotiations by Reich Minister Dr.
Goebbels that in view of the proposed reorganization of the Hochschule für Politik, I resign
from the office of president of the School. You will understand my attitude all the more
easily when you know that I have always refused to be tied down by a governmental office,
in Imperial as well as in Repuiblican Germany I have always been anxious to stick to my
own political line – that democratic outlook of which Friedrich Naumann was the greatest
representative.
I expressed my determination also to Chancellor Hitler at our recent meeting.
Those lines read impressive, because they omitted four fifths of the original
text. The second published version (Jäckh 1952: 20/21) was even more ques-
tionable, adding a further paragraph that had never been included in the res-
ignation letter. Part – just part – stemmed from an address which Jäckh had
given six weeks later – not in Germany, but in London (Jäckh 1933f: 3):
That the Hochschule is now taken over by the state has meant (among other things) the
application of the new regulations for civil servants, including the ‘Arian Paragraphs’(,) to
my Hochschule. In other words, it would have meant dismissing those of my tried and
valued friends and fellow(-)workers who came under those regulations. I could not bring
myself to do that, and therefore resigned.
The remaining sentences, as published in 1952, had been completely fabri-
cated by Jäckh:
You know yourself that and how I have made no secret of my view that the present perse-
cution of Jews, which I condemn, is an injustice as un-German as it is inhuman. All my
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life, I have sided with those who were unjustly oppressed and persecuted. To me, that is a
must.
On April 1, 1933, when Jäckh was received by Hitler, the regime had orga-
nized the first public boycott against Jewish stores. To have, supposedly,
protested that ominous act with a noble, at the time already exceptional,
statement must have seemed an attractive idea to Jäckh.
His actual letter to Lammers (Jäckh 1933e: 90/91) cannot be reproduced
here in full (for the complete text, see Eisfeld 1991: 101/102). The final rea-
son for Jäckh’s later distortions was that it certainly did not reveal the writ-
er’s decision “to leave Germany for good”. Jäckh was merely laying out new
activities for himself. After informing Lammers about his resignation from
the position of DHfP President, he continued:
Regardless whether Germany may be termed a First, Second, or Third Reich, remain re-
solved to serve our common mother country and the German nation … I hope I may go on
counting on your approving and favorable support, whether heading the Rockefeller Insti-
tute of Political Research, in my informal activities abroad, or in some other connection.
Even if his strategy of accommodation had failed, Jäckh, undaunted, would
embark on a new course – the establishment of a Research Institute of Inter-
national Relations, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, its trustees and
staff carefully parceled out between figures of “liberal” and “national(-
socialist)” affiliation. Only when those efforts, too, came to nothing, Jäckh
would liquidate the DHfP and go into exile.
VIII
Since early 1933, Jäckh and Wolfers had been negotiating a renewal of the
Rockefeller Foundation grant. Continued Rockefeller support was of consid-
erable importance to the DHfP – economically (governmental and private
contributions had been cut back as a result of the depression), but also politi-
cally (to impress the significance of the Hochschule’s international ties on the
new regime). The Foundation’s directors approved renewal on March 17;
however, they would reverse themselves three weeks later (Korenblat 1978:
326, 329).
At least in principle, Jäckh could initially feel confirmed in his strategy
by the Rockefeller Foundation. “Some further concessions will have to be
made, but they need not destroy the validity of the School”, John Van Sickle,
Assistant Director of the Foundation’s Social Science Division, noted at the
end of February (Sickle 1933a: 2). Four weeks later, he still seemed prepared
to tolerate such consequences: “Jäckh will doubtless have to sacrifice some of
his Jewish and Left teachers and considerable teaching freedom. Wolfers
believes, however, that freedom of research will be maintained. Berg-
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straesser, of Heidelberg” – about whom more below – “takes the same atti-
tude” (Sickle 1933b: 1).
Funding by the Rockefeller Foundation had permitted the DHfP to set up
a Research Division and publish the first Political Research Annual. When
Jäckh realized that, concerning the transformation of the institute into an
establishment supervised by the Propaganda Ministry, he might have to bow
to the inevitable, he came up with the idea of separating the teaching from the
research part. He suggested that, while the former (including the name
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik) would be turned over to Goebbels, the
latter should be expanded into “a privately financed research institute, inde-
pendent of state control, and to be known as Forschungsinstitut für Weltpoli-
tik” (Sickle 1933c: 1; for the following, 2/3).
Jäckh had Papen, Meissner, Lammers, Simons, himself, Wolfers, Fritz
Berber (Secretary General of the DHfP Research Division), and Erich von
Prittwitz und Gaffron (representing the Carnegie Foundation) slated for the
Board of Trustees. As permanent staff, he had in mind again Wolfers and
himself, Boehm and Brauweiler, Berber, Heuss, and Sigmund Neumann.
Finally, Jäckh was envisaging five study groups to focus on problems of
Northeast Europe, Southeast Europe, corporatist conceptions of the state,
statute labor, finally state and higher education – perceptible concessions to
Nazi priorities at home and abroad.
One June 1, Jäckh terminated his address at the London Conference of
Institutions for the Study of International Relations by a “farewell” in his
capacity as DHfP President and a “welcome” as Head of the “Research Cen-
ter of International Relations in its present form” (Jäckh 1933f: 5). But he had
missed the proverbial boat. Three weeks earlier, reacting to the deteriorating
situation in Germany, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Executive Committee
had voted against a transfer of the DHfP appropriation to the new Research
Institute, merely agreeing to contribute to the expenses of liquidating the
DHfP.
The formal liquidation of the Hochschule would not be completed until
early 1934, when Jäckh had already emigrated to Great Britain. During that
period, he “held his ground” with the regime, insuring that negotiated gov-
ernment funds were fully disbursed and that deposed scholars received “fair
compensation” (Korenblat 1978: 335; also Jäckh 1934: 2). His persistence
particularly benefited those who, in difficult circumstances, either remained
in Germany, like Theodor Heuss, or went into exile, like Sigmund Neumann.
Jäckh had been willing to collaborate with “the Hitlerites”, as he was lat-
er wont to call them, up to a point where his international standing was in-
volved – which, had he come under Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry, would
have been irreparably damaged. When he emigrated, he followed Wolfers
who, because of a Jewish strain in his family, had been put on the list of un-
desirables, yet had continued to strongly support Jäckh’s strategies (Sickle
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1933d: 1). As professor of international relations at Yale, Wolfers would
unaccountably maintain his attitude of qualified benevolence toward Nazi
Germany – as late as 1940 arguing for an “agreement” between Britain,
France, Germany and Italy “on the extent of their respective power and posi-
tion in the East and West… and in the Mediterranean” (Wolfers 1940: 390).
John Wheeler-Bennett, a member of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs who would later write The Nemesis of Power, a highly acclaimed
study on the German army’s role in the Weimar Republic, noted during 1933
that Jäckh seemed “to be maneuvering, or being maneuvered, into the post of
an intellectual ambassador of the new regime” (Sickle 1933e: 2). Even such
adaptability, however, might prove insufficient. Rapidly becoming en-
trenched, the Nazi regime could afford accepting or refusing liberal-
conservative overtures on its own terms, including its racist ideology. As will
be detailed below, Adolf Grabowsky and Arnold Bergstraesser were two
more political scientists who did not decide on emigrating as staunch oppo-
nents of Nazism. They were forced into exile because the regime ostracized
them as “Jews” or, in the same vein, “Jewish half-breeds”.
The susceptibility to collaboration displayed by these scholars contrasted
with the uncompromising stand taken by Hermann Heller, Hajo Holborn, and
Sigmund Neumann. The latter who, in 1932, had attested National Socialism
an “unsurpassed level of demagogy” (Neumann 1973: 86), initially emigrated
to Britain. Winding up in the United States, he became affiliated with Wes-
leyan University – for nearly a decade in the hardly attractive position of
visiting lecturer.
Hajo Holborn who had “moved close to the Social-Democratic Party”
during the Weimar Republic’s final years (Krieger/Stern 1968: XII), was
bluntly confronted with the implications of Nazism when, soon after Hitler’s
accession to power, the brother of his Jewish wife committed suicide – “a
young man of strong democratic convictions viewing what was to come in
Germany as shameful and disastrous” (Vagts 1976). The Berlin Carnegie
Chair held by Holborn was not abolished until early 1934, and while no long-
er permitted to teach, Holborn was able to continue publishing, under the
serial title Fundamental Problems of International Relations, a succession of
lectures by individual speakers.
He made no concessions. “’Politicization’ of the sciences” would be de-
liberately defined by him, by mid-1933, as “not implying political bias” but
“a methodical investigation of political phenomena” (Holborn 1933c: 1). For
the final volume, published in 1934, he picked the essay Germany and the
United States Since the Great War by Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und
Gaffron who had resigned as German ambassador after January 30, 1933. At
Yale University, until 1938 in the shaky position of visiting professor, Hol-
born would again emerge as a brilliant political historian.
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By the time Holborn came to the United States, Hermann Heller had al-
ready died in Spanish exile from a heart attack. When Prussia’s Social Dem-
ocratic parliamentary party had appealed to the Supreme Court in 1932, after
the state government’s ouster by Chancellor Papen, Heller had acted as legal
Counsel. The ruling by the court which largely upheld Papen’s unconstitu-
tional action could only have strengthened Heller’s resolve to emigrate after
Hitler had been appointed Chancellor.
Harold Laski invited him to lecture at the London School of Economics
and Political Science. When Heller discovered that he was being spied upon
in London, he accepted an appointment at the University of Madrid, rather
than returning to Germany. Some of his most important work was published
posthumously, including an article where Heller argued that, as long as polit-
ical and economic power drastically diverged, the latter might be tempted to
“directly” control the former (Heller 1971a: 41) – an argument which has
retained its saliency for present-day debates on democratizing the large in-
dustrial corporation.
IX
On October 19, 1933 – five days after Nazi Germany had left the League of
Nations -, Arnold Bergstraesser, Professor of Political Science (or, as the
German metaphor would have it, Staatswissenschaft) and Foreign Studies at
the University of Heidelberg, asserted in an address given at the Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs (Bergstraesser 1934a: 26ss., 29, 31) that “with
the exception of the Socialist parties, the whole population of Germany [had]
felt the need of increasing the authority of the State.” Bergstraesser contin-
ued:
The abuses of democratic institutions in Germany led to this lack of action which became a
genuine danger to national life…In comparison with the days of the ‘pluralist’ party sys-
tem… the work of officials… has become free from considerations which are not essential
for the problem itself…Purely tactical considerations of party policy will not obtrude as
war formerly the case.
The organization of the professional groups and the new adjustment of the relations be-
tween capital and labor have been arranged by the assistance of the Party organization…
The government in its eceonomic policy is consequently not bound to consider plans of
demagogic origin whose execution would be to the disadvantage of the whole… Thus
despair is destroyed and confidence created among those who had previously too many
reasons to suppose that some few individuals were utilizing the common ill to their own
advantage.
Bergstraesser delivered that talk although, five months before, he had been
given compulsory leave pursuant to the “non-Aryan” section of the so-called
Act to Restore a Professional Civil Service – in fact a law to purge the ad-
ministration of Social Democrats and Jews. Only under the provisions of
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another, the “veterans”, clause of the same act his removal had been first
suspended, then revoked.
In 1930, Bergstraesser had applied for the DHfP Carnegie Chair, but had
lost to Hajo Holborn. Appointed professor by 1932, he also joined the
Hochschule’s faculty, teaching both in Berlin and in Heidelberg. During the
same year, he became involved in expelling from that latter university the
statician Emil Julius Gumbel who was accused of having “vilified”, in a
lecture, “the memory of the dead of the Great War”, and whose books, fur-
nishing evidence of the incredible leniency wich the Weimar Republic’s
justice had exhibited in punishing right-wing assassinations, would be burned
on the bonfires of May 10, 1933. Appointed referee by the department, Berg-
straesser – though bound to confine his account to the details of the case –
described Gumbel as a “demagogue”, obfuscating rather than clarifying the
facts in his account (see Eisfeld 1991: 81/82).
Both Gumbel and Bergstraesser had volunteered in 1914, but had drawn
very different conclusions from their war-time experiences. Bergstraesser
remained attached to the – in his own words – “towering heights of the unify-
ing experience of 1914” (id. 1929: 147), that deeeply felt “sense of national
awakening” (Mommsen 1995: 208) that had gripped Germany at the outbreak
of hostilities. When reviewing Erich Maria Remarque’s pacifist novel All
Quiet on the Western Front, he was able to perceive merely that the author
had “violated his responsibilities to past and future”, because “campaigning
for peace…blinds to the true situation of our country” (Bergstraesser 1929:
146/147).
Accordingly, Bergstraesser rejected “acceptance of the notion of rap-
prochement as an indispensable principle of politics” (id. 1930: 89):
To come to an agreement with respect to these questions…, e. g. the question of disarma-
ment, the Eastern frontier and the union with Austria, would mean today making the will of
the enemy one’s own, i. e. in practice giving up the right to determine for ourselves our
national policies.
In his 1933 address, Bergstraesser stated that he had “felt for many years that
nothing but dictatorship would restore order and confidence in Germany” (id.
1934a: 44). A year before, he had told German exchange students on the eve
of their departure that “as to government, the appropriate form remains to be
found” (id. 1932: 8). Bergstraesser had kept echoing Max Weber’s premise
that “for internal as well as external reasons”, Germany had the “duty” to be a
world power (id. 1930: 89). The longer parliamentary democracy seemed
incapable of achieving that status for the country, the more Bergstzraesser
would adopt the ‘national opposition’s” emphasis on “will” and “determina-
tion”.
Adolf Grabowsky and Richard Schmidt, editors of the Zeitschrift für
Politik, concurred with Arnold Bergstraesser’s conviction that the Weimar
Republic lacked a “decisive”, “courageous”, “positive” foreign policy, “par-
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ticularly in the East”; that it had “not produced a leading elite” and had,
therefore, “historically failed” (Grabowsky 1931: 442, 445; id. 1932b:
189/190). Schmidt, who held a chair in public law at the University of Leip-
zig, reproached the republic for “sacrificing even the minimum in instruments
of state power indispensable for prevailing internationally” (id. 1924:
189/190). Frustrated with parliamentary democracy, these sometimes ‘repub-
licans by force of reason’ (Vernunftrepublikaner) would wax ever more un-
reasonable: a “national awakening, even if it led to more oppression”, was to
be “preferred over crippling passivity”, “an injustice over disarray”
(Grabowsky 1932c: 370; Schmidt 1933: 91).
Like so many scholars who had harbored social darwinist values to the
detriment of humanist norms, and whose resentful discontent lent itself to
political irresponsibility, Grabowsky and Schmidt merely had to continue in
the ‘Third Reich’ where they had left off in the republic. When the Geneva
Disarmament Conference commenced in 1932, the Zeitschrift für Politik had
published a special issue on the problem which had been translated into Eng-
lish and French. After Nazi Germany withdrew from both Disarmament Con-
ference and the League of Nations, another such issue entitled Disarmament
and Equal Rights was compiled, to be used for propaganda purposes by the
Foreign Ministry. In a joint foreword, Grabowsky and Schmidt, after justify-
ing the German exodus, noted that solving the disarmament problem on the
regime’s conditions “undoubtedly [would] involve the question of peace or
war” (Schmidt/Grabowsky 1934: 2, 4).
When that same regime in November, 1933, held a referendum on Ger-
many’s withdrawal from its international commitments, 950 academics –
even after the autodafé of May 10 – would sign a Declaration in Favor of
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State which read, in part (NS-
Lehrerbund 1933):
All science is indissolubly linked to the intellectual nature of the nation from which it has
grown… German science appeals to the educated of the world to view with the same sym-
pathy they expect for their own nations the struggle of the German nation united behind
Adolf Hitler for freedom, honor, justice and peace.
The Zeitschrift für Politik’s next issue, edited by Grabowsky and addressing
Fundamental Aspects of the Saar Struggle, was again, as disclosed by Vice
Chancellor von Papen who contributed the introduction, “meant for a wide
audience” (Papen 1934: VII). The issue was prompted by the imminent plebi-
scite which would permit the inhabitants of the Saarland – placed under
League of Nations administration by the Versailles Treaty – to decide on
affiliation with France or Germany. According to Grabowsky, the former
country’s aim consisted in keeping the Saar “brutally chained to France”
(Grabowsky 1934: 73).
Two months later, the ‘Night of Long Knives’ stunned Nazi Germany. In
addition to the SA (Storm Trooper) leadership, General Kurt von Schleicher
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(Hitler’s precursor as Chancellor) and his wife, Bavarian politician Gustav
von Kahr and other conservatives were murdered on June 30, 1934.
Grabowsky, who was of Jewish ancestry, saw the writing on the wall. With-
out delay, he emigrated to Switzerland.
Richard Schmidt would stay, until his retirement, on the editors’s roster
of the Zeitschrift für Politik (even if nominally) for another two years. In
1934, the dean of the University of Leipzig’s Law Department lauded him for
the “versatility of his talents” which had allowed Schmidt to “live up to” this
century’s “enormous change in legal views, including the latest revision”
(Festschrift 1936: V).
Schmidt emerged as a central figure in the attempt to justify, on the basis
of scholarly reasoning, the emasculation of political science in Nazi Germa-
ny. Like Heuss or Jäckh, he had earlier been reluctant to consider any politi-
cal system an “ideal”, insisting on “comparative government” as the “essen-
tial subject of political science” (Schmidt 1924: 24/25). He had, in 1924,
established a Center for Foreign Studies (Auslandskunde) at the University of
Leipzig. After “a strong hand” had come to “liquidate the disastrous interlude
in the evolution of our country’s laws” (id. 1934: V), Schmidt brusquely
dismissed the quest for general constitutional principles which were “impos-
sible to discover”. In the last instance, Schmidt argued, reverting to familiar
ground, a nation’s “distinctiveness”, its “tradition”, would determine the
“adequacy” of any constitution. Consequently, “the focus and method of
political science” had “to be thoroughly recast” (id. 1938: 12, 14/15):
Because, in modern states, government and law are shaped by political parties – or, possi-
bly, by a single privileged party, to the exclusion of other organizations -, Scientific Poli-
tics has essentially evolved into ‘Foreign Studies’ (Auslandskunde) with a focus on ‘Com-
parative Party Studies’.
Schmidt’s approach, of course, had its roots in widely accepted traditions
presuming a ‘primacy of foreign policy’. The emphasis on international fac-
tors also met the regime’s tangible interests. Not least, it permitted the disci-
pline to shift to grounds where – initially – ideological restrictions applied
less severely.
If Richard Schmidt assisted the process of gleichschalten political sci-
ence, imposing conformity on the discipline, Arnold Bergstraesser, until
expelled from the University of Heidelberg in 1936 (after the Nuremberg
Race Laws had abolished the “veterans” clause), contributed to academic
Nazification by replacing scholarly with political performance criteria. Dur-
ing 1934/35, he approved the doctoral theses of many students who, in sever-
al cases, had joined the Nazi party years before Hitler’s accession to power.
They had, as Bergstraesser would write in two opinions, “interestingly exam-
ined the subject in the spirit of National-Socialist politics”, “based on sympa-
thy with the present conception of the state” (Bergstraesser 1935a: 66; id.
1935b: 402/403).
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These doctorates would serve as cornerstones for many a career, as in the
case of Fritz Hippler, expelled for rioting from the University of Berlin in
1932, who would rise to the position of National Film Administrator in the
Ministry of Propaganda. In his thesis, he valued German philosopher Paul de
Lagarde’s “severe struggle against Jewry”, asserting that Karl Marx’ “perma-
nent opposition against his non-Jewish environment” could only be under-
stood “in terms of racial disposition” (Hippler 1934: 20/21, 230). Berg-
straesser applauded these chapters as a “fortunate combination of scholarly
talent and vivid political perception” (Bergstraesser 1934b: 234/235).
A second case was even more flagrant and would considerably afflict the
development of the politicized discipline until 1945. Franz Alfred Six, soon
to emerge as an influential “Nazi for all seasons” (Herzstein 1982: 1987), had
joined the party in 1930. He had written a tract which he characterized him-
self as “nothing more but a resumé of the findings of National Socialist prop-
aganda.” A few examples (Six 1936a: 20/21, 33/34, 60):
The East Galician, the fat greasy Jew, the big-shot, the social democrat’s cloth cap and the
grin of the subhuman communist were, thanks to determined enlightenment by the National
Socialist movement, soon engraved on the memory of the masses…
In the Weimar Republic…, Marxism, having seized power, developed the recourse to
terrorist methods into police terror and, by terrorist rule over schools and universities, into
subjugation of the spirit…
Successfully asserting the National Socialist creed among the German people may conse-
quently be considered the victory of the racially superior, more valuable elements over the
racially inferior, base elements of Germandom.
That malignant harangue was acclaimed by Bergstraesser as “a gain, both in
content and methodological approach, for the scholarly literature on the dy-
namics of the modern state” (Bergstraesser 1934c: 502/503). Already a
Sturmführer (Lieutenant) in the SA, Six would in 1935, after the Storm
Troopers’ fall from power, join the SS, obtain his postdoctoral qualification –
again at the University of Heidelberg – with another pamphlet (The Press of
National Minorities in the German Reich) in 1936, and be promoted to SS-
Standartenführer (Colonel) by 1938. When the moment came for establishing
a Department of Foreign Studies (Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät) at the
University of Berlin, Six would be available.
X
Paul Meier from the provincial town of Benneckenstein, whom Goebbels
appointed President of the DHfP, and who henceforth would grandly call
himself Meier-Benneckenstein, was a dismissed teacher, a Nazi campaign
speaker, and recently a senior civil servant in the Propaganda Ministry. He
symbolized the ideological conformity imposed on the Hochschule. So did
the individual who, on May 29, 1933 spoke at the opening ceremony of an
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instiute that, according to the notices which had been posted, would “no
longer be a place for liberal and marxist debates”. He was Dietrich Klagges, a
former teacher like Meier, who had joined the “movement” in 1925. As a
minister in the tiny state of Braunschweig, he had made Hitler a civil servant
in 1932, thereby naturalizing him.
Students were screened for “Aryan” descent until, by 1936, membership
in the Nazi Party or in one of its mass organizations would be required for
admission. Regular indoctrination courses were offered for Storm Trooper
and Hitler Youth leaders, the Labor Front, the Women’s and Teachers’
Leagues. “Racial Studies” was included in the curriculum as a required sub-
ject. Additional Centers for Antimarxist Research, Statute Labor, Colonial
Policy sprang up or were abolished according to political “demand”.
By 1936, the Research Division was reestablished, to be run again by
Fritz Berber who had become future Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribben-
trop’s trusted adviser. Hardly a year later, Berber, having joined the Nazi
Party, was awarded a chair at the University of Berlin. The Research Division
would publish sober analyses in fields where “political topography” was
required “in the interests of the Reich” (Six 1941: 736) – on French arma-
ments, the American conception of neutrality, the German minority in Cana-
da. Ideological pamphlets, however, prevailed.
In 1937, the DHfP was upgraded and reconstituted as a Reichsanstalt, a
facility with Reich immediacy. Now called Hochschule für Politik, it contin-
ued to be run, however, by the Propaganda Ministry. The diploma it con-
ferred was, as before, not equivalent to a university degree. Nor did the train-
ing it offered qualify for an administrative career – even if, by 1939, not quite
half of the Hochschule’s graduates were being employed by government or
prty agencies (Bericht 1939: 90/91). Pressured by the National Socialist Lec-
turers’ and Students’ Leagues, and “not too much impressed” by the HfP
(Reichsministerium 1938: 202), Goebbels agreed to turn the institute over to
Rust’s Reich Education Ministry, set up for the purpose of bringing the uni-
versities under central control.
These developments coincided with a debate on the future of the erst-
while Institute of Oriental Languages where Ernst Jäckh, during World War
I, had obtained his professor’s title. Earmarked for further expansion to pro-
vide the regime with internationally knowledgeable personnel, the institute
had been christened Foreign Studies School (Auslandshochschule) in 1935.
After his appointment to the Foreign Ministry, Ribbentrop lost much of the
enthusiasm he had originally professed for the project. By 1938/39, however,
another, more powerful player indicated his “profound” interest in the school
(Scurla 1938a: 402): Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler.
Between 1933 and 1936, Himmler’s deputy Reinhard Heydrich had re-
cruited a group of academically educated ardent Nazis: Reinhard Höhn, Otto
Ohlendorf, Walter Schellenberg, finally Franz Alfred Six. The Sicher-
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heitsdienst (SD), nucleus of the later Main Security Office (Reichssicherheit-
shauptamt), evolved into an “ensemble of the most intelligent individuals
ever engaged by National Socialism” (Höhne 1967: 196). Insisting on the
“scientific standard” of their operations, these men were resolved to trans-
form ideological myths into “bureaucratically applicable knowledge” (Ar-
onson 1967: 276). The elitist SS self-image additionally spurred a determined
academic policy which Heydrich was able to pursue the more easily as the SS
had, among the senior civil servants of the Education Ministry, recruited a
considerable number of members (Kater 1974: 132; Heiber 1966: 124).
Himmler’s organisation had, by mid-1938, already succeeded in in-
stalling a secret collaborator, Michael Achmeteli, who had built up an exten-
sive collection of records on the Soviet Union, at the Foreign Studies School
as professor and director of the Russian Center (Simpson 1988: 73; Scurla
1938b: 23, 36, 41/42). Next, Heydrich pushed for integration of the School
into the University of Berlin nd its enlargement into a Foreign Studies De-
partment. He also suggested the individual to serve as State Commissioner in
charge of setting up the new department: Franz Alfred Six, only recently
promoted to head SD Department II: “Enemy Investigation” (after establish-
ment of the RSHA, he would be put in charge of Department VII: “Ideologi-
cal Research and Evaluation”), even more recently appointed associate pro-
fessor of journalism at the University of Königsberg.
After consulting with the Foreign Ministry and the Party Chancellery, the
Education Ministry accepted Heydrich’s proposal, and Six was transferred to
the University of Berlin. When the issue of the HfP’s future came up for
discussion, the ministry’s experts rapidly concurred that the Hochschule
should be merged with the new department. Six was accordingly instructed in
September, 1939 – not quite two weeks after Nazi Germany had invaded
Poland. The end of the Hochschule für Politik came unceremoniously: Can-
cellation of the winter semester 1939/40 and a hastly arranged leaving exam-
ination, based on reduced requirements.
Meier (-Benneckenstein) faded from the scene. Franz Alfred Six, by con-
trast, would rise ever higher in the hierarchy of the ‘Third Reich’. Holding a
chair of foreign policy and foreign studies from 1940, he was appointed, at
his request, dean of the new department by the Minister of Education, re-
maining directly responsible to Rust – not, as was customary, to the rector of
the university. Six further succeeded in obtaining for himself (and the SS) an
additional Foreign Studies Center (Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches
Institut, DAWI) in order “to forge links between the department’s research
and teaching and the pursuit of cultural policies”, including “own initiatives
in the essential fields of cultural policies” (Erlassentwurf 1939). By 1942, the
Center would be granted autonomy – permitting Six to change his title from
“Director” to “President” -, and Ribbentrop would confer on Six the direction
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of the Foreign Ministry’s Cultural Division, “allowing for exceptional influ-
ence by the SS” (Vermerk 1942).
Six would terminate his career as SS-Brigadeführer, equivalent in rank to
a Major General in the German army. He was promoted to Oberführer
(Colonel) by the end of 1941 after a two months’ stint with an Einsatzgruppe
(Task Force), one of the mobile extermination units which started the sys-
tematic massacres of Jews in occupied Soviet Russia. Six had been in tempo-
rary command of Einsatzgruppe B’s Advance Detail Moscow whose partici-
pation in 2457 murders was meticulously recorded – including, during the
time Six commanded the detachment, 144 killings near the city of Smolensk
(Trials n. d.: 174, 524). After the war, an American Military Tribunal would
sentence Six to 20 years’ imprisonment. Like many other convicted war
criminals, he would be released in 1952, subsequent to the shift in American
policy triggered by the Cold War. He would first join a publishing house (C.
W. Leske) and later be employed by the Porsche Automobile Company as an
advertising executive.
Several rapid academic careers would also be started by the establish-
ment of the Foreign Studies Department and continued after World War II –
not in political science, but in international and public law (Wilhelm Grewe,
appointed West German ambassador to the United States, subsequently to
NATO), in sociology (Karl Heinz Pfeffer), in history (Egmont Zechlin).
These individuals would be offered chairs after 1945, though they had at-
tributed an “intrinsic value” to “eliminating bolshevism [as the] source of
corrupting international law” (Grewe 1941, quoted by Weber 1986: 365), had
called for “purging the German people’s body of any influence exerted by
Jewry” (Pfeffer 381935: 171), had participated in plundering the libraries of
occupied France (Zechlin 1941; see Eisfeld 1991: 162, 202 n. 107).
An exception to this opportunistic pattern was Albrecht Haushofer who
had succeeded Adolf Grabowsky as head of the DHfP’s Geopolitical Center
in 1933. “Quarter Jewish”, according to Nazi jargon, he was protected by
‘Deputy Leader’ Rudolf Hess, a former assistant of his father, Karl Hausho-
fer, at the University of Munich. Fiercely critical of universal suffrage, par-
liamentary democracy, and the Versailles Peace Settlement, Haushofer con-
tinued to pursue the aim of German hegemony in Central Europe. But he also
came to judge the Nazi dictatorship a regime of “fools and criminals”
(Haushofer 1939, quoted by Laack-Michel 1974: 346). When, by late 1940,
he was appointed professor of geography and geopolitics at the Foreign Stud-
ies Department, he had already established contacts with the German re-
sistance. Briefly imprisoned after Hess’ flight to Britain, Haushofer was once
more arrested subsequent to the July 20, 1944 coup attempt, to be murdered
by an SS commando in April, 1945, during the battle for Berlin.
By early 1941, ten among the Auslandshochschule’s professors had been
transferred to the new Foreign Studies Department, and an equal number of
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new chairs had been established. The department offered instruction in the
form either of a main or a supplementary course – foreign studies degree after
6, interpreter’s degree after 4 semesters. SD/RSHA members held the most
diverse positions in both department and DAWI, from tutor to professor of
state and cultural philosophy. Dossiers of students who either professed in-
terest in intelligence work or seemed “suitable”, were passed on to SD and
RSHA. The last DAWI progress report of March 1945, addressed to Six, to
the university rector, and to the Education Ministry, would state that “the
Center’s personnel have been increasing their contribution to the duties of the
Main Security Office” (Bericht 1945: 63).
Publications, like those issued earlier by the (D)HfP, continued to focus
on “political topography” and ideology. The former dealt with problems of
political economy, foreign policy, and international law: Germany’s econom-
ic interests in South-East Europe, the structure of the U.S. war economy,
Anglo-Saxon plans for a revamped League of Nations. Occasional historical
analyses, whether articles or monographic studies – on the evolution of elites
in France, on Imperial Germany’s acquisition of foreign outposts – were also
considered acceptable. In the ideological area, the thrust of propagandist
rhetoric was directed toward a message emerging as a major “ideological
weapon in the Nazi struggle to win the war” (Herzstein 1982: 3): the image
of a European ‘New Order’ which German hegemony would build through-
out the occupied continent.
A decade earlier, Brüning’s and Papen’s Presidential governments had
initiated a shift of German foreign trade to South-East Europe. Their policies
prefigured the economic dependence of the region’s countries which Nazi
Germany’s foreign trade strategies had attained by 1941. Small wonder that
the regime’s protagonists approvingly referred to relations with southeastern
Central Europe as the prime example of that “greater regional economy”
which was to prove a mere euphemism for the spoliation of occupied Europe
(cf. Kluke 1955: 251/252; and this book’s chapter on Mitteleuropa). In that
regard, the motto equaled the ‘New Order’ slogan which increasingly gained
currency after the invasion of the Soviet Union.
The Nazi leaders refused to consider any limits to their ruthless exploita-
tion of manpower, plants, raw materials in conquered Europe. Nor were they
prepared to bind themselves with regard to the future destiny of the peoples
which they ruled. Precisely because nothing but exploitation was “the com-
mon denominator of all economic, political, and social measures” (Neumann
1966: 183), the promise of a European ‘New Order’ could not but lack sub-
stance. It had to remain “grandiose, but vague” (Herzstein 1982: 103).
The Europeanist ideology was disseminated by department and DAWI
alike between 1941 and 1944 through publications, courses, conferences. Six
led the offensive, publishing the tracts Europe’s Civil Wars and the Present
War of Unification in 1942, Europe: Tradition and Future two years later.
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When Nazi Germany’s military situation became ever more desparate, Euro-
pean brotherhood-in-arms, basis for the continent’s alleged “crusade against
bolshevism”, was increasingly eulogized by the ‘New Order’ propaganda
(Eisfeld 1991: 154/155). In the end, the Zeitschrift für Politik was reduced to
a pamphlet attempting to work up last-minute enthusiasm by a flow of pathet-
ic verbiage (Pfeffer 1944: 378):
From Narvik to Athens and from Bordeaux to Reval, German soldiers have carried a mes-
sage that will not die. Europe has come to realize that it belongs together. Neither invasion
by foreign enemies not civil war with reactionaries can destroy that knowledge…Today’s
labor, struggle and death in the European community will tomorrow cause all those men in
Europe to finally join our ranks who cherish their own peoples and wish to build the new
future.
To the final hour of the Nazi regime, Foreign Studies remained a politically
manipulated discipline. The last sentence of the German Foreign Studies
Institute’s last report dealt with its surrender to the demands of a political
agency. In his final statement before the Military Tribunal, Franz Alfred Six,
one of that agency’s powerful figures, insisted on his scholarly respectability:
“I was always a scientist” (Trials n. d.: 396).
Jekyll and Hyde: Sebastian Haffner’s verdict on Germany, pronounced
from exile, fit like a glove the “politicized” science of the ‘Third Reich’.
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Neo-pluralism, according to Ernst Fraenkel who introduced the concept into
(West-) German political science during the 1960s, “battles – let alone Hitler
– the shadow of Stalin.” The subsequent chapter attempts to demonstrate that
he might as well have written “let alone Hegel”: Hegel’s conception of the
state as superior to civil society – guardianship by a “qualified” elite, not
subject to control by the governed – strongly imprinted itself on Germany’s
political tradition until well into the 20th century, serving to set the country
off from the West. Focusing on the decision-making processes of Western-
type democracies, particularly on political parties and interest groups, and
on the contrast between Western and “totalitarian” political systems, neo-
pluralism worked at establishing a fundamentally different paradigm. The
article was written as part of a Monographic Section on the elusive and con-
troversial notion of public, as opposed to private, interest, which I edited for
the International Review of Sociology in 1998.
From Hegelianism to Neo-pluralism:
The Uneasy Relationship between Private and Public
Interest in Germany 
Introduction
In 19th century Germany, the idea of ‘the State’ as an objectified metaphysi-
cal entity came to prevail over the more mundane concept of ‘government’
derived from the consent of the governed. By preferring ‘“totalities” over
their constituent individuals, by exalting the national body politic as the high-
est expression of reason and morality (Sittlichkeit) (cf Barker, 1915, p. 27;
Krieger, 1972, p. 131}, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy provid-
ed the doctrine underlying such “sanctification” (Gunnell, 1993, p. 40) of the
state.
In developing his conception, Hegel was inspired less by abstract ideals
than by the existing, contemporary Prussian state, as it had evolved in re-
sponse to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests (cf., e.g.,
Topitsch, 1970, p. 340}. Hegel did acknowledge civil society and private
interests as indispensable, but substantial unity had to be achieved by a state
grounded in transcendental, not in human authority. The state did not emerge
out of civil society, reflecting back on it. Rather, Hegel’s thinking revolved
around monarchical sovereignty, ‘impartial’ bureaucratic administration, and
corporate representation, qualifying the interests of “the Many” in civil socie-
ty as “elementary, irrational, violent, and frightful” (Hegel, 1982, Section
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303). His ideas caught on because Prussia, under the guise of monarchical
autocracy, had already come to be largely governed by a caste of professional
bureaucrats; because that country’s people, “divided into myriads of uncon-
nected social and regional groups”, still remained, in political terms, “an
amorphous, inarticulate mass” (Rosenberg, 1966, pp. 201, 204); and because
German 19th-century history would continue to favor a strong monarchy,
underpinned by an extensive bureaucracy, over a weak civil society.
By the standards of the epoch, Prussia after the Stein-Hardenberg era was
a modern state. So was Bismarckian/Wilhelmine Germany in many ways.
But again, its ruling class was not prepared to accept popular control. Mod-
ernization, in the case of the ‘delayed nation’, invariably meant moderniza-
tion from above. Belated German unification was achieved by Prussian arms
under Junker command, rather than by an ascending liberal middle class
establishing governmental responsibility.
After 1871, the Rechtsstaat ideal – concerned “more with the redefinition
than with the limitation of the state”, less with individual rights apart from
the state than with a state whose measures “conformed to general rules’
(Krieger, 1972, pp. 253, 460) – came to be definitely substituted for parlia-
mentary democracy. Bureaucratic administration of law, supposedly regulat-
ing private and guarding public interest, was largely equated with govern-
ment. In this respect, too, Hegel’s political ideas, as definitely elaborated by
1821 in his Philosophy of Right, would reflect “with surprising accuracy the
Germany of the Second Empire” (Sabine, 1950, p. 665).
The present essay will first discuss in more detail the confrontation of
state and civil society, of common good and private interests, in Hegel’s
theory, as well as some relationships of that conception to what has been
termed Germany’s ‘peculiar course’ in the 19th century. The influence exert-
ed by Hegel’s philosophy continued, of course, beyond 1918. After Imperial
Germany had been defeated, the founding of the Weimar Republic was re-
garded by many intellectuals as the advent of merely that “externa1, neces-
sary and rational state” which Hegel had discerned in the workings of civil
society, and whose “system of mutual dependence” was grounded not on
metaphysical splendor, but on “se1fish purposes” (Hegel, 1982, Section 183).
Hege1’s traces were no less noticeable in a post-19l8 German debate more
often than not pervaded by a “hunger for” – socia1 and politica1 – “whole-
ness’ (Gay, 1974, Chapter 4) and, consequently, by disdain for the “plu-
ra1ism of the competing political groups’ ultimately anarchical coexistence’
(Smend, 1993, p. 17).
This chapter will, however, not address the complexities of the Weimar
situation, where Carl Schmitt’s decisionist ‘friend-foe’ argument about the
supposed essence of politics and Rudolf Smend’s integrationalist philosophy,
influenced by Hegel’s thinking, were united in opposing any ‘forces which
might impede or divide the state’ (Schmitt, 1933, p. 186). Rather, focusing on
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the period after 1945, the article will look at two opposing lines of West
German political thought.
The first, arguing in the Hegelian tradition, reproached the West German
Federal Republic with its alleged lack of ‘Staatlichkeit’, insisting on the su-
premacy of the state over society which had to be guaranteed by, again, ‘im-
partial’ professional civil servants. Ernst Forsthoff, Joseph Kaiser, and Wer-
ner Weber were the leading advocates of that school.
The second approach, termed ‘neo-pluralist’ by its initial proponent,
Ernst Fraenkel, finally removed the Hegelian stigma from civil society. Re-
jecting the conception of a public interest that might be ex ante defined and
subsequently imposed by ‘en1ightened’ state servants, the neo-pluralist
school argued that only the conflict of private interests, limited by constitu-
tional ‘ru1es of the game’, could ex post determine the common good. In the
last instance, the public interest would result, according to Fraenkel, from the
“parallelogram of social forces”.
Hegel’s “monistic solution”, offering the “political ideal of a completely
integral organic totality” (Krieger, 1972, p. 125), met with recurrent response
in Germany because it promised a new and powerful political order to a na-
tion either aspiring after belated unification, as during the 19th century, or
deeply frustrated in its ambitions, as after 1918. A pluralist conception of
state and society finally gained ground after its proponents, under Cold War
conditions, introduced a specific variety of monism, Communist ‘totalitarian-
ism’, as the principal counterpart to pluralism and as the new bête noire of
political theory.
“EIementary, Irrational, Violent, and Frightful”: Hegel’s View of
Civil Society’s Special Interests
When Herbert Marcuse wrote his study on Reason and Revolution, he
shrewdly observed that “fear and anxiety’, not reactionary beliefs, had
prompted Hegel to reject the 1832 English Reform Bill (Marcuse, 1941, p.
248). Emotions such as these had earlier caused Hobbes to denounce associa-
tions, condemning them as “worms in the entrails of a natural man” (Hobbes,
1965, Chapter XXIX). And fear and anxiety presumably governed Hegel’s
thinking when, commenting on the conflict of particular interests, he wished
to see such “dangerous convulsions” alleviated by “superior, deliberate regu-
lation”, rather than leaving them to “blind necessity”(Hegel, 1982, Section
236).
Hegel conceived civil society quite literally as a ‘battleground’ for the
bellum omnium contra omnes, the “warring of every private interest against
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every other private interest” (Hegel, 1982, Section 289; see also Marx, 1968,
p. 243). Even if, following Adam Smith, he argued that “subjective egoism”,
considering the “interdependence of labor”, would inevitably contribute to
“satisfying everybody’s needs” (Hegel, 1982, Sections 189, 199), Hegel saw
the conflict of particular interests as irreconcilable: no inherent mechanism
existed by which a common interest might be arrived at (cf . Marcuse, 1941,
pp. 173-174). Lacking a state – in fact, as Hegel hastened to add, lacking a
monarch – the “people” merely impressed him as a “formless”, a “chaotic”
concept – a very Hobbesian notion indeed (Hegel, 1982, Section 279; c£
Fetscher, 1986, p. 218).
Hegel was the anti-contractual philosopher par excellence. He abhorred
the idea of the contract at the origin of the body politic, because – as will be
shown below – he was deeply convinced that the terror of the French Revolu-
tion had invalidated the idea of rational political contract between individu-
als. Not surprisingly, therefore, state and civil society were not simply sepa-
rated and contrasted by Hegel. Their relationship was one “of superiority and
inferiority” (Sabine, 1950, p. 659): civil society, “the realm of blind inclina-
tion and causal necessity”, depended upon the state
for intelligent supervision and moral significance. Considered by itself, society would be
governed only by the mechanical laws resulting from the interaction of of acquisitive and
self-centered… individuals.
Conscious action could only emanate from the state, “the power of reason
actualizing itself as will”, “the sole prerequisite for the attainment of particu-
lar ends” (Hegel, 1982, Sections 258, 261). As no preordained harmony ex-
isted between private interest and common good, the state’s task consisted in
stabilizing civil society, “realizing freedom” (Hegel, 1982, Section 258), so
that, in the end, the “system of wants” might become “a conscious scheme of
life controlled by man’s autonomous decisions in the common interest”
(Marcuse, 1941, pp, 213-214).
Regulating Private, Guarding Public Interest: ‘Neutral’ Bureaucracy
and Corporate Representation in Hegel’s Concept of the State
Why should citizens be incapable of rationally, reasonably controlling their
own lives? Why should their autonomous decisions not include the constitu-
tional form of the body politic? Because, to Hegel, history had already an-
swered that question in the negative, proving his fear and anxiety only too
justified. Unleashing, after 1793/1794, la grande terreur on the republicans
themselves, the French Revolution had demonstrated in a “most glaring and
frightful” manner (Hegel, 1982, Section 258) the fallacy of the principle of
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individual will. Basing the state on that “merely apparently reasonab1e”
principle (Hegel, 1982, Section 258) would, by necessity, result in the per-
version of freedom.
Hegel’s dismissal of the ‘atomistic’ notion that the individual citizen
should, directly or indirectly (by expressing his suffrage), participate in legis-
lative matters, implied a pointed rejection of representative parliamentarism
in favor of a corporatist system (Hegel, 1982, Section, 303). From his point
of view (Sabine, 1950, p. 660),
the individual (had to be) ‘mediated’ through a long series of corporations and associations
before he arrive(d) at the final dignity of citizenship in the state… The guilds and corpora-
tions, the estates and classes, the associations and local communities that made up the
structure of the German society… [were regarded] by Hegel as humanly indispensable.
Marcuse, in another felicitous observation, remarked that, according to He-
gel, “the unruliness of civil society” had “to be bridled” by the corporations
as economic and political institutions (Marcuse, 1941, p. 212). The corporate
assembly at the pinnacle oft the system, however, was precisely “not de-
signed to deliberate and decide on matters of state’ (Hegel, 1982, Section
314). Rather, its public sessions were meant to serve as a ‘theater’ where
officialdom might demonstrate its “efficiency, talents, and virtues’ (Hegel,
1982, Section 315). Regarding matters of public policy, the corporate ele-
ment manifestly remained a mere “illusion”: professional administrators, due
to their “necessarily more profound and more comprehen-sive judgment”,
were perfectly “capab1e of doing their best without the assembled estates”
(Marx, 1968, p. 265; Hegel, 1982, Section 301).
These bureaucrats were assigned in Hegel’s political philosophy the posi-
tion of “universal estate” (Hegel, 1982, Section 303). Mainly to be recruited
from the middle class, which Hegel considered ‘the principal support of the
state regarding uprightness and intelligence’ (Hegel, 1982, Section 297), they
were trained to rule not arbitrarily, but by orderly procedure. Representing
“the ‘reason’ of society”, detached from ‘acquisitive special interests’ (Sab-
ine, 1950, p. 662), supposed to possess moral and instrumental competence,
bureaucracy was singled out by Hegel for effectively guarding the public
interest.
The Relationship of Hegel’s Theory to the Realities of Germany’s 19th 
Century ‘Peculiar Course’
Hegel’s ideas
gave a special meaning to the concept of the state and invested that concept with connota-
tions, for which there was no analogue in the political thought of France and England, but
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which made it throughout the 19th century the central principle of German political and
juristic philosophy. (Sabine, 1950, p. 664)
Guardianship by a selected and trained minority, not subject to control by the
governed – in fact, hierarchical rule under an authoritarian system – contin-
ued to work as a powerful vision in Germany well into the 20th century. The
notion had such an intellectual impact because it reflected many realities of a
profoundly formative process – the process by which Germany achieved
national unification, including a decisive ‘Prussification’ of many of its poli-
cies.
ln Prussia, the General Legal Code (Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 had
introduced what came to be labeled ‘well·earned rights’ (remuneration, ten-
ure, and pension) for the members of a bureaucracy who henceforth would
refer to themselves as ‘servants of the state` rather than ‘royal servants’ (for
the following observations, cf. Rosenberg [1966, pp. 190-191, 199-200, 202,
211, 218]). By 1806, when Prussia was conquered by Napoleon’s armies, the
“operators of the powerful state machine” (Rosenberg, 1966), evolving into a
self-recruiting and se1f-governing corporation, had largely won emancipation
from monarchical authority. Prussia’s defeat by French arms triggered the
first of several Prusso-German “revo1utions from above’. The remaking of
the Prussian system by Stein and Hardenberg, involving the abolition of he-
reditary social estates and the abrogation of the nobility’s exclusive legal
privileges, further strengthened the position of an already well-entrenched
civil bureaucracy which now had every reason to consider itself, in Hegel’s
familiar words, ‘the universal estate”.
Gradual German unification resulted in Prussian hegemony within the
North German Confederation after l867, within the Empire from 1871. Dur-
ing the Wilhelmine Era, Prussian state tradition played a “crucial role” in
“causing the system of authority to degenerate steadily into a form of mere
rule by officialdom” which largely lacked “the breadth of vision and political
leadership” earlier demonstrated by Prussia’s administrators (Mommsen,
1995, p. 50). Nevertheless, advocates of the authoritarian Rechtsstaat were
referring to Prusso-German bureaucracy, even two generations later, “in the
same breath with England’s parliamentary government” – extolling its sup-
posedly just and “equal" personnel policies’ which were suggested “to have
stolen democracy’s thunder” (Morstein Marx, 1935, pp. 163, 197).
Such a concept of ‘democratic’ personnel selection, rather than demo-
cratic decision-making, could persist because it served to set the country off
from Western democracies, supposedly in a ‘positive’ sense (cf. Struve,
1973, pp. 462-463). The ideology of German ‘distinctiveness’ culminated at
the outset of World War I when liberty, equality, and fraternity, the ‘French’
ideals of 1789, were countered by the German “ideas of 19l4” – order, duty,
community (cf. Kjellén, 1915, Plenge; 1916; Troeltsch, 1925). Hege1’s ‘or-
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ganic’, corporatist conception of the state had contributed its share to those
notions.
The German Federal RepubIic’s Alleged ‘Lack of StaatIichkeit’:
Hegelianism After 1945
When the West German Federal Republic was founded after World War
II, its governmental institutions were consciously modeled after Western
parliamentary democracies. West Germany’s political system included an
array of parties and interest groups which had existed, albeit with considera-
ble structural modifications, since the 19th century, but whose eminent posi-
tion was now, for the first time, constitutionally acknowledged.
Unavoidably, the Hegelian conception of the state and the common good
which had so strongly imprinted itself on Germany’s political tradition, did
not disappear overnight. Continuing to emphasize that “the pluralism of in-
terests (could) not legitimize political authority’, Joseph H. Kaiser, one of its
persistent advocates, instead singled out for praise a constitutional solution
“of high formal beauty”, the “work of a genius” that, allegedly, had brought
“peace and prosperity” to another country – the corporatist system of Sala-
zar’s Portugal (Kaiser, 1956, pp. 329, 360). Having managed, in contrast with
Spain, to keep an internationally low profile as a ‘decent’ semi-fascist re-
gime, Portugal was, in fact, a repressive dictatorship whose terrorist secret
police had been modeled after the Gestapo.
Kaiser made no bones about his reasons for preferring corporatism over
pluralism: while the latter had “the power to destroy the state”, estates and
corporations had “never challenged the state as such, nor denied its suprema-
cy” (Kaiser, 1956, pp. 321, 323). In his insistence on the state’s “neutrality
vis-a-vis the struggle of social interests”, its unique “capability for objective
decisions” (Forsthoff, 1968, p. 159), Kaiser was seconded by Ernst Forsthoff
and Werner Weber: after “pluralistic oligarchies” had invaded the body poli-
tic, the Federal Republic’s constitution had “neg1ected to integrate these
groups into a totality resulting in an obligatory common will” (Weber, l970,
pp. 54, 56). Ever in danger, according to Weber, of “dissolution”, West Ger-
many “lacked a state with generally accepted authority”, which only “a pro-
fessional civil service with a universal ethos” (Forsthoff, 1968), “committed
to serve the common good” (Weber, 1970), could guarantee.
While Werner Weber diagnosed an “extraordinary instability” of the
body politic “in domestic and foreign policy matters” – “frayed” as it was by
partial interests (Weber, 1970, p. 132; see also Forsthoff, 1964, p. 77) -, For-
sthoff came to contradict that remarkably apocalyp-tic analysis, reversing his
judgment. He now conceded that “stabilizing forces” were at work in modern
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pluralist societies, including West Germany. Pluralism “no longer endan-
gered a state’ which, admittedly, had suffered a “loss of authority”, for plural-
ist interests, in turn, had lost their earlier divisive, “ideologically explosive
quality” (Forsthoff 1959, p. 16). From a post-Hegelian point of view, society
itself had become ‘rationa1’.
The ‘Parallelogram of Social Forces’, Rules of the Game, and the
Public Interest: Anti-Hegelian Elements in Ernst FraenkeI’s Neo-
pluralist Approach
With the establishment of political science as an academic discipline in West
Germany, a paradigm gradually emerged that differed fundamentally from
the Hegelian tradition of political philosophy. Largely derived from the expe-
riences which scholars expelled by the Nazis had gained in New Deal Ameri-
ca, that paradigm focused, first, on the decision-making processes of West-
ern-type democracies, including political parties and pressure groups; second,
on the development of liberal thought – in a broader sense – from its early to
its more recent forms; third (and probably most apt to ensure the rapid career
of the concept), on the contrast between Western and ‘totalitarian’ political
systems.
The approach was typified by Ernst Fraenkel, one of the discip1ine’s
dominant ‘mentors” during the early post-war period. He introduced the
notion of pluralism – or, as labeled by himself ‘neo-pluralism’ – including a
strong normative element, into West German political science. Having initial-
ly argued that the concept, as elaborated by Barker, Cole, and Laski during
the first two decades of the 20th century, was mainly of historical interest
(Fraenkel, 1957, pp. 235-236), Fraenkel rapidly came to conclude that the
irrevocable historical development of “monist communities” into “pluralist
societies” demanded a pluralist democracy within which the public interest
would be reduced to a “regu1ative idea” (Fraenkel, 1968, p. 42).
Corporatist ideals and the supremacy of a civil bureaucracy that had
“barred the political parties from governing” were included by Fraenkel
among the “historical burdens on German parliamentarism” (Fraenkel, 1968,
pp, 25, 40). A pluralist conception of society and state precluded “the exist-
ence of any definitely determinable public interest” that might be “a priori
defined” and subsequently realized by authoritarian methods. While political-
ly indispensable as a normative principle, the public interest could actually
only result “a posteriori” from the “delicate” (Fraenkel, 1968) process of
reconciling ‘the diverging ideas and interests of groups and political parties’
(Fraenkel, 1968, p. 168). That process would have to observe “generally
accepted rules of the game”. Not touching on “broad areas of basic agree-
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ment”, it would, in fact, be limited to the smaller “controversial sector” of the
body politic, permitting public opinion “to choose between competing solu-
tions” (Fraenkel, 1968, pp. 154, 161, 168). In the last instance, the common
good would result “from the parallelogram of economic, social, political, and
ideological forces”, provided that, on balance, the outcome would “corre-
spond to the minimal requirements of a just social order on the objective side
and not be regarded as unacceptable by any important group on the subjective
side” (Fraenkel, 1968, p. 21).
The similarity of Fraenkel’s approach to group theories of politics, as de-
veloped in the USA, is evident. E. Pendleton Herring had held already by
1933 that the common good, far from being definable according to “some
abstract ideal”, may only be conceived “in terms of the parties at conflict and
in relation to the law” (Herring, 1933, pp. 916-9l7, emphasis added):
Hence the public interest cannot be given concrete expression except through the compro-
mise of special claims and demands finally effected… They are the parts that make the
whole.
In his Governmental Process, David Truman (1951) explained that the politi-
cal system “is not accounted for by the “’um’ of organized interest groups in
society”. Truman included constitutionalism, civil liberties, representative
techniques among the “rules of the game”, according to which organized
groups had to operate. Otherwise, they risked bringing those “wide potential
groups” into action which adhered to the values and norms of the “habit
background” (Truman, 1951, pp. 51, 159, 524).
The criteria indicated by Truman and by Fraenkel were sufficiently
vague to draw repeated criticism. What, in the case of Fraenkel, are we to
understand by ‘objective’ minimal requirements? Exactly which interest
groups should be defined as ‘important’? And by what process, taking into
account the rigid qualification on the ‘subjective’ side, may attainment of the
former be ensured (cf. Eisfeld, 1972, p. 85; Kremendahl, 1977, p. 34)?
These questions, however, need not concern us here in detail. Fraenkel’s
approach, as compared with the Hegelian tradition, stood for the step from
the status quo-oriented, ‘peculiarly German’ conception of the state to a “re-
formist” (Fraenkel, 1969, p, 23) theory merging into the larger context of
Western political thinking. While remaining problematical, the idea of the
common good acquired fundamentally consensual qualities, losing most of its
coercive Hegelian implications in the process.
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In a preceding (the next-to-last) chapter, Central Europe – or Mitteleuropa –
already surfaced as a region on which German foreign trade strategists had
set their sight since the early 1930s: precursor of that “greater regional
economy” which the Nazis’ “Greater German Reich” would later construct
for the purposes of exploitation. Since early World War I, however, and
again during the 1920s, Mitteleuropa also served as an acronym for Germa-
ny’s desired hegemony over territories from Poland to the Black Sea. After
World War II, such aspirations seemed a matter of mere historical interest.
But from 1990, the Mitteleuropa notion regained unexpected saliency: After
Germany had achieved reunification, skeptical voices queried whether both
the former Reich and Mitteleuropa might not be ”coming back”. In 1993, the
journal German Politics and Society published an issue on the subject, to
which I contributed the following thoughts.
Mitteleuropa in Historical and
Contemporary Perspective1
When the upheaval of 1989 occurred behind what had been the iron curtain,
analysts noted that West Germany was indeed using "its economic power to
accomplish its political aims”, particularly with regard to reunification.
Change was sweeping Central Europe "in a nexus of Soviet weakness and
West German strength”. After German reunification, and due to Soviet
’“economic, political, military, and moral" weakness, they claimed, "Germa-
ny’s relative weight in European affairs is increasing in all of these spheres"
(Hoagland 1990: 34, 39; Mead 1990: 594). The Germans, analysts asserted,
"are clearly getting the version of ’Europe’ they want – with unity and with
space for economic and cultural expansion into East-Central Europe" (Weav-
er 1990: 477). From there it was but a small step to the claim that “the once
and future Reich" loomed large – "a return to German hegemony in this part
of the world”. Conclusion: "Mitteleuropa is coming back" (Mead 1990; 603,
passim).
Mitteleuropa? Has not the notion, for decades, remained marginal to in-
tellectual and political discourse in Germany (and elsewhere)? Why would
the concept, nevertheless, have remained imprinted upon the consciousness
of observers, to surface again the moment Germany’s division came to an
end? And even if Germany is ranked among the issues that "have returned to
haunt the region" – i.e. Central Europe – (Bunce 1990: 427), does Mit-
teleuropa in fact emerge as a possible, or even a probable scenario?
For support in obtaining trade and investment data, I am indebted to Dr. Klaus-Dieter
Schmidt (Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel).
1
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II
Mitteleuropa – as a concept and a strategy – first gained currency during
World War I. Friedrich Naumann argued in 1915 that Germany's lack of
population and territory (”the strongest among small peoples”, but still small
compared to the United States, Britain or Russia) meant that it had to fashion
"the fourth world state" through the economic "affiliation of the other Central
European states and nations” (Naumann 1915: 167, 177}. Naumann’s argu-
ment coincided almost to the letter with the war aims memoranda submitted
to the German government hardly a year earlier by Arthur von Gwinner, first
director of the Deutsche Bank, and Walther Rathenau, member of the board
of directors of the electrical corporation AEG. They also advocated Mit-
teleuropa, "unified under German leadership, politically and economically
consolidated against England and America on one, against Russia on the
other side" (cf. Fischer 1969: 746). War-time expectations inflated the con-
cept to the point where Naumann’s collaborator and later the president of the
Berlin School of Politics, Ernst Jäckh, proclaimed a Greater Central Europe
including Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Greece, to be led "organically," "without despotism”, by Germany, and
"complementing our seaward orientation, especially toward a future ‘Middle
Africa’” (Jäckh l9l6: 6, 11, 17). The extent to which such conceptual pathol-
ogy was rampant is indicated by the fact that programs like these were con-
sidered "moderate," because they renounced formal annexations, concentrat-
ed on Eastern instead of Western Europe, and lacked a repressive domestic
element.
If Naumann’s design was less grandiose, it was also more explicit than
Jäckh’s: The ”supra-national, cartelized state" of Central Europe would arrive
politically "formless, featureless, and democratically inadequate”, even if
Naumann did not exclude a possible future economic parliament (Naumann
1915: 166, 252). He argued that, for economic reasons, Central Europe’s
small states had no choice but to accept either "German, Russian, or British
leadership”, as they could not afford to remain isolated for more than another
generation. History decreed that economic Anschluß was "imperative, cate-
gorically neces-sary” (Naumann 1915: l78). Neumann suggested that the new
economic area’s central administrative body should base its legislation on
agreements reached by economic associations and interest groups (ibid.: l33-
134, 242, 25). Fundamentally however, discipline and organization, the
"German economic creed”, were expected to shape the “character of Central
Europe." Even if Naumann, as pointed out by Henry Cord Mayer in his 1955
book Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, called for a spirit of com-
promise and flexibility, he left no doubt that Mitteleuropa’s “core" would be
German (ibid.: 101, 104, 108-109, 114).
156
  
          
         
            
          
         
           
           
            
            
 
         
              
           
        
        
         
            
           
         
             
         
           
          
           
           
            
          
         
         
             
            
         
         
        
            
             
          
      
III
After Germany’s defeat in l918, a radical revisionism almost immediately
started to crystallize around the alleged German Mitteleuropa "mission."
Insisting on “displacing the existing power structure to the advantage of the
German Reich”, revisionism aimed at a restoration of German continental
hegemony under changed conditions. During the twenties, it pervaded Wei-
mar society , reinforcing, in theory as in practice, a "functional," instrumen-
talist approach in domestic and foreign policy. If democratic government and
the League of Nations proved unable to bring about revision, both institutions
might be expendable (cf. Salewski l980; for the quote, see Hillgruber 1984:
84).
The völkisch – racially nationa1ist – Mitteleuropa concept remained
vague in its details, yet concrete in its rejection of the political settlement the
Versailles and St. Germain treaties had introduced into Central Europe. The
"inflated multi-ethnic Polish state" and "the Czechoslovakian motley con-
glomeration, questionably structured politically no less than nationally"
(Boehm 1923: 315), were particularly denounced. German "leadership of
Central Europe" would have "to be earned, perhaps obtained with a fight"
(Brauweiler 1925: 249). As Martin Spahn, Reichstag delegate for the German
National People’s Party (DNVP), summed up the ‘national opposition’s’
approach: "If we succeed in shaping Central Europe, we shall rise again to
the position of Europe’s leading people" (Spahn 1925: 40).
The economic impact of the Great Depression and the political challenge
of the French government’s 1930 proposal to negotiate a Pan-European con-
federation, with its implied acceptance of the existing territorial status quo,
combined to influence the German foreign relations debate and strategy. Both
worked towards bridging part of the conceptual gap between the camps of
radical and “democratic” nationalism (for the latter, cf. Hess l978); Nau-
mann’s economic Mitteleuropa design was revived by the German Democrat-
ic Party (now, significantly German State Party). Economically and political-
ly, Mitteleuropa came to be perceived, by an increasing number of players, as
a definite opportunity to restore German hegemony during the final phase of
the Weimar Republic. Brüning’s presidential cabinet embarked on the ‘posi-
tive’, ‘vigorous’ foreign policy consistently demanded by the ‘national oppo-
sition’. Preferential agreements concluded with Hungary and Romania initi-
ated a shift of German foreign trade to southeastern Central Europe (cf.
Gessner 1977: 92 ss., 97 s s.), prefiguring the economic dependence of that
region’s agricultural countries on Germany which was actually attained by
the 'Third Reich’s’ foreign trade policy.
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German exports
Country Year % of Ger- % of recip-
man exports ient country’s
imports
1928 1.0 13,6
Yugoslavia 1933 0.7 13.2
1938 2.6 32.5
1928 1.3 19.1
Hungary 1933 0.8 19,6
1938 2.7 30.3
1928 1.4 23.7
Romania 1933 0.9 18.5
1938 3.0 28.0
Source: O. N. Haberl, ”Südosteuropa und das Deutsche Reich vor dem Zweiten Welt-
krieg“, Südosteuropa, Vol. 39 (1990), pp. 515-516.
By 1941, German exports to the countries listed had jumped to between one-
half and three-fourths of imports on the part of the recipients. Small wonder
that the Nazi regime approvingly referred to relations between southeastern
Central Europe and Germany as the prime example of that ”greater regional
economy" which, like the ‘New Order’ ideology, was to prove a mere eu-
phemism for the spoliation of Europe (cf. Kluke 1955: 251-52). The renewal
of plans for Central Europe by the Weimar presidential cabinets had laid the
foundation for these policies.
IV
The renaissance of concepts of Mitteleuropa that took place in the 1980s
expressed another refusal to accept the international status quo – though quite
dissimilar in character from Weimar Germany’s revisionism. Emerging from
discussions among East-Central European exiles and dissidents, this renais-
sance primarily aimed at creating a regional cultural identity in opposition to
Soviet-induced uniforrnization and ideological "brainwashing" (Kundera
1984: 33). It was conducive to common policies of "détente and reform”,
economic cooperation, and cultural linkages {cf. Waever 1990: 480; Glotz
l986: 585). These concepts were evidently based on the assumptions that both
Germany and Europe would remain divided `between blocs; that ‘actually
existing’ socialism would not crumble, because the USSR, as a last resort,
would continue to keep regimes in place by force, or by threat of force; and
that at most, one could hope for a larger measure of "Europeanization,"
meaning an all-European security perspective based on détente and confi-
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dence-building – Central Europe as "an emergency partnership" (Bender
1987: 30).
Only rarely did this debate recall the “negative, dark traits" of the re-
gion’s interwar political culture, including harsh authoritarianism, aggressive
nationalism and militant anti-Semitism, that might continue to haunt Central
Europe (cf. Hanák 1988: 34 ss.; Grupinski l988: 63-64). Rather it amounted
to an often wistful appeal to value Central Europe’s "imaginary existence”, in
cultural terms, "over the facts of Realpolitik” (Hanák 1988: 36), even if this
meant willingness “to be hamstrung with regard to direct political activity"
(Grupinski 1988: 56).
In view of the consequences of the Mitteleuropa-”mission” which Ger-
mans had claimed for themselves, the question of Germany’s inclusion into
Central Europe was heatedly debated by East European scholars and writers.
Meanwhile, arguments favoring a "cultural" Central Europe were picked up
and disseminated in West Germany. They were seized upon not least by
Social Democrats like Peter Glotz who envisioned an "enlightened," "co-
reformist" East-West policy of "decreasing the divisive effect of borders" – a
means of "squaring the circle" with regard to the supposed permanence of the
European, and therefore of the German, split (cf. Waever 1990: 480; Glotz
1986: 585).
Normally, after the revolution in East-Central Europe, ideas about a "cul-
tural" Central Europe might be assumed to have lost much oftheir signifi-
cance, since "ordinary politics” (Waever) have begun to reemerge in the
former Warsaw Pact countries. However, a shrewd observer like the Hungar-
ian philosopher Mihály Vajda was quick to discern
that the idea of Central Europe’s cultural identity today is backed by rather strong econom-
ic impulses and interests… The fact that the concept has recently gained such strength is
plainly due to…economic elements…The Federal Republic of Germany is Central Eu-
rope’s strongest country, able to get the other Central European countries out of their
misery. (Vajda l989: 56).
Subsequent events in southeastern Central Europe have lent a saliency to this
argument that could not have been expected at the time Vajda made his ob-
servation.
V
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary would again "be at the center of Ger-
man policy in the future”, prophesied one writer in 1990. His reason: Even
today German investment there “is substantially greater than investment from
any other country" (Mead 1990: 6l2). This assertion deserves a closer look.
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Percentages of Foreign Direct Investment (1990)
Poland Romania Czechoslovakia
FRG 41.1 19.9 28.3
Austria 6.6 6.6 29.8
France 4.7 14.0 2.3
UK 4.9 3,7 3.0
Source: J. R Agarwal, "Ausländische Direktinvestitionen…“, Die Weltwirtschaft (1990),
No. 2, p. 133
The table indicates that Germany is indeed very substantially ahead in Po-
land. Germany leads the field in Romania, with France (and Italy, omitted
here) close behind, and is at Austria’s heels in Czechoslovakia. (In Hungary;
in contrast, the latter two countries’ direct investment ratio is reversed: Aus-
tria follows Germany as a close second [for details, see Biró 1992: 198,
112].)
While this evidence somewhat qualifies the above-quoted assertion, a
further fact needs to be considered. The capital actually involved is still pa-
thetically small, peanuts by American standards:
Foreign Direct Investment in Selected Comecon Countries
Increase in East-West Joint Ventures 1989-91 (Millions of US dollars)
Country Jan. l, 1989 Oct. 1, 1990 Dec. 31, 1991
Poland 13 190 630
Hungary 289 700 1,200
Source: Agarwal, p.131 (1989-90); calculation by Klaus-Dieter Schmidt
(1991)
With liberalization continuing in East-Central Europe, larger investments
may be expected. Nevertheless, for the near future the data should be helpful
for keeping the proverbial sense of proportion.
Regarding Germanys share in the region’s foreign trade, the pattern
changed rather noticeably during 1990 in the wake of the drastic shift of trade
away from the former Comecon area.
West German Exports
Country Year % of West % of Recipient
German Exports Country’s Imports
1970 1.8 22.1
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Yugoslavia 1980 1.4 17.3
1988 1.1 17.3
1970 0.4 5.7
Hungary 1980 0.6 13.0
1988 0.5 13.9
1970 0.6 10.0
Romania 1980 0.5 6.7
1988 0.1 2.7
West German Exports
(FRG territory according to the boundaries valid before Oct. 3, 1990)
Country Year % of West % of Recipient
German Exports Country’s Imports
Yugoslavia 1990 1.3 18,1
Hungary 1990 0.5 17.1
Romania 1990 0.2 11.4
Source: Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel (FRG Statistical Yearbooks)
* Including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia
In the cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the proportional rise in imports;
from Germany has been even more spectacular: 26.5% of Poland’s and very
nearly 22% of Czechoslovakia’s 1990 imports originated in the Federal Re-
public (as defined by its pre-October borders), while in 1988 the correspond-
ing shares had amounted to a mere 11.4 and 9,5 percent. Export percentages
on the part of the FRG remained at their previous 0.7/0.5 levels.
On the German side, these changes have not resulted from any purpose-
ful shift in trade flows, comparable to the one that occurred during the thir-
ties. Nevertheless, the emerging state of affairs is remarkably similar to the
interwar pattern. Is the contraction of intra-Comecon trade generating the
structural prerequisites for reducing the region, once again, to its supposedly
"historical role as "German foreign policy turf"' (Livingston 1992: 168)?
VI
There can be little doubt that, henceforth, Germany will indeed be "more" of
a "Central" European state than it was in the past, given the FRG’s previously
unqualified orientation toward the West. If tentative answers to questions
regarding the implementation of a Central European role arc sought, two
contradictory tendencies may be discerned at present. On one hand, the
"model" which Germany was supposed to offer to East-Central European
countries has become badly tarnished. On the other, "Euro-stalling" (Gold-
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stein 1991/92: 129) by the members of the European Community may pro-
vide Germany with a more internationally free hand than envisioned in most
scenarios a year ago.
As quoted above, "economic, political, military and moral" weight were
German assets vis-á-vis Central Europe widely referred to during and after
l989-90. One particularly unequivocal assessment (Markovits/Reich 1992:
62} summed up:
Germany’s European neighbors, whether Eastern or Western, consider intensive economic
contacts with the Germans to be essential for them to prosper… In the East, this belief
includes the political sphere, because it is chiefly the Federal Republic’s democratic institu-
tions and arrangements which East European countries regard as exemplary in their transi-
tion to liberal-democratic polities ... East Europeans believe proximity to the Germans to
equal the mystical touch of a bearer of blessings.
Economically, however, the German integration process is proving ”more
disruptive and costly than widely thought at the outset” (OECD 1992: 10).
This is at least partly attributable to two of the government’s decisions: first,
to apply the "shock therapy" of monetary union to the East German economy
and, second, to finance the huge transfers to the new states largely by massive
deficit spending and consequently heavy public borrowing. For eastern Ger-
many, these policies may result either "in speedy transformation" or ”in a
Mezzogiorno-type economy… whereby a permanently disadvantaged region
is created, requiring massive resource transfers for many years" (Owen 1991:
171; also Collier/Siebert 1991: 200). In any case, unemployment and under-
employment (part-time work and early retirement) have soared to over 30%
in the new Lander, demonstrating to Eastern Europe that the sacrifices re-
quired by transition "fall disproportionately on blue·-collar workers" (Kramer
1992: 147). The ex- perience is justifiably throwing doubt upon the one ele-
ment which had lent, "in the eyes of so many East Europeans, a particularly
high degree of legitimacy to the 'German model"' (Markovits/ Reich 1992:
56) – its "social dimension".
Politically, constitutional changes in Poland or Romania, let alone the
"divorce" of the Czech and Slovak republics, have hardly tended to observe
the ”example" set by Germany. Nor have several recent German initiatives
with regard to East-Central Europe proved particularly inspiring. Germany
pressured the European Community into diplomatically recognizing Croatia
and Slovenia, thereby setting a precedent which precipitated the recognition
of ethnically mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina – an act that may well have trig-
gered the savage civil war there. “Intensive" negotiations with Romania re-
sulted in an agreement permitting Germany to deport a majority of would-be
Gypsy refugees hack to that country, notwithstanding persistent reports of
attacks on Gypsies there. And the accord between German coalition and
opposition parties to tighten the constitutional provisions on asylum by turn-
ing back asylum-seekers arriving from surrounding "safe countries”, creating
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a "cordon sanitaire" around Germany, is bound to put a heavy burden, in
human and financial terms, on Poland and Czechoslovakia.
These latter issues touch on the final, moral, dimension, where the recent
German record, to say the minimum, has been unimpressive. Racist attacks
on refugees and other foreigners, including homicide, murder, and relentless
fire-bombings of shelters for asylum-seekers, left seventeen people dead and
more than 500 wounded during 1992. Responses to the wave of right-wing
violence by state and federal governments, police, and courts were shocking-
ly slow to develop and initially far from adequate. These initial deficiencies
contributed to the impression that under the double strain of reunification-
induced financial burdens and refugee influx, one of the winners of the cold
war was at least partly blaming the victims of violence in lieu of the crimi-
nals. This probably – and with good reason – did more to blemish the image
of Germany as a "model" democracy than any other single circumstance.
Across Europe, economic anxieties, ideological disorientation, and the
anger resulting from perplexed insecurity have fueled re-nationalization. In
the German case, revived nationalism has functioned as a sounding board for
governmental officials and political parties intent on curbing immigration.
However; the political elite has resisted it to the extent that it adhered to the
perspective of European Political Union embodied in the Maastricht Treaty.
A year ago, further “deepening" of the European Community seemed to
be inevitable. The 1986 Single European Act had extended qualified majority
voting to most economic policy areas – though the instrument was less fre-
quently used than permitted by existing provisions, which had also lowered
the threshold for resorting to the procedure. EPC (European Political Cooper-
ation), accorded legal status in 1986, had since been institutionally stream-
lined. The Council of Ministers, not the national foreign ministries, handles
the agenda and works toward solutions. The Single European Market, to be
progressively established until December l992, could be expected to cut even
deeper into national autonomy in economic policy. The Maastricht Treaty,
finally, proclaimed as its aim the politicization of the process of integrating
the Twelve; its provisions for arriving at monetary union, and at common
foreign and security policies, seemed to chart a course toward what Iohan
Galtung had early, if critically; proclaimed "a superpower in the making."
Instead, the Danish and French referenda, while (barely) different in their
outcome, reflected widespread uncertainty about EC aims and, particularly,
policies. The recent EC presidency term, occupied by a Britain almost "vis-
cerally" ambivalent about the Community (Davidson 1992: 2), came to sym-
bolize the sort of political "Euro-stalling" that, against the background of a
slowdown in the European economy, culminated in the Edinburgh summit.
The "deepening" process was weakened by exempting Denmark from the
monetary union and common defense aims of the Maastricht Treaty, with the
feasibility of the former remaining fundamentally in doubt, not least because
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of disequilibria caused by Germany's financial management of reunification.
On the other hand, it was decided to open another “widening" round by
commencing negotiations with Austria, Finland, and Sweden early in 1993,
even before Denmark and the United Kingdom have had time to ratify the
Maastricht Treaty.
VII
Progressively "deepening" the European Community in the sense of integrat-
ing it "more" along federal lines and eventually "widening" it to include Cen-
tral Europe had been perceived solutions to the problems confronting the
whole post-cold war continent, Even where the number of players involved
substantially surpassed that of the Community' s members, western economic
diplomacy vis-à-vis East-Central Europe came to be largely EC-based. The
OECD countries’ PHARE economic support program, rapidly extended to
cover Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and, initially, Yugoslavia in addi-
tion to Poland and Hungary (hence the acronym PHARE: ”Poland/ Hungary:
Assistance to Restructuring the Economies”) was organized and administered
by the EC commission. EC association agreements with Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, and Poland were concluded in December, 1991. Progressively es-
tablishing a free trade zone is their explicit goal.
This has not meant, however, that a Community increasingly determined
to act in unison has successfully moved to fill the vacuum left by the eco-
nomic, political, and ideological collapse of "actually existing" socialism Nor
has the CSCE managed to do so, despite what seemed promising beginnings.
The rock on which attempts at a "European" foreign policy have primarily
foundered has, of course, been the civil war in former Yugoslavia. The results
of what attempts were made to arrive at common and more decisive steps in
this matter have, by turns, been labeled "schizophrenic" or "derisory" in the
international press. A sturdier EC has emerged from neither the economic,
nor the foreign, policy challenges of 1992.
The essay must, therefore, end on an inconclusive note. In contrast to the
Weimar era, no influential political players have emerged in Germany indi-
cating that they would, oven in a rudimentary way, desire to pursue once
more the Mitteleuropa concept. No broad ideological background for such a
venture seems to exist. Economically however, the writing is on the wall. The
separation of Czechoslovakia into two economically and politically weaker
states is bound to strengthen Germany’s position in the region. If the Europe-
an Community fails to coalesce in matters of political and security integra-
tion, disillusionment about the EC may favor additional bilateral arrange-
ments in East-Central Europe. Finally, if the permission given to Denmark to
opt out of the main tenets of the Political Union Treaty should come to mean
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that other EC members do not feel bound by those tenets, largely feeling free
to act unilaterally in a politically fragmented Community, then Mitteleuropa
might evolve from an unlikely outcome into a conceivable possibility.
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Political Science and Ideology (2)
Another Peculiar Course:
American ‘Gun-Mindedness’ – 
Some Origins and Consequences
 
          
           
           
            
          
           
          
            
             
            
            
        
           
           
         
            
 
  
 
 
              
           
           
           
         
             
             
            
               
             
                                                                        
                  
             
              
      
              
   
America’s frontier experience shaped the country’s “distinctiveness” – pro-
moting a leveling spirit and a rapacious instinct for acquisition, bequeathing
to succeeding generations an armed society sustained by an ideology of
“progress through violence”. Drawing on both the myth and the factual life
of an archetypical gunfighter, the following chapter discusses that ideology.
The analysis demonstrates that the myth, by constructing an epic narrative,
attaches historical “sense” to an otherwise disjointed biography. In the pro-
cess, violence is legitimized by linking that narrative to the stages through
which, and the means by which, the American nation is supposed to have
progressed. The article was first published in the Journal of Criminal Justice
and Popular Culture (1995), then included in a volume of JCJPC papers
entitled Interrogating Popular Culture (1998). Subsequently, Western history
enthusiasts chanced upon it, reprinting it twice: in the National Association
for Outlaw and Lawman History’s Quarterly (2000) and in the Western Out-
law-Lawman History Association’s Journal (2007). For that most recent
publication, I prepared an updated version of the text, which is included
here.
Myths and Realities of Frontier Violence:
A Look at the Gunfighter Saga1
I
In the third volume of his monumental trilogy on the enduring myth of the
frontier in American popular and political culture, Richard Slotkin coined the
term “Gunfighter Nation” for 20th century America. The term was not mere-
ly meant to denote, like Richard Hofstadter’s expression “gun culture”, an
emotional involvement with guns as a peculiar American characteristic, re-
sulting in a heavily armed populace and a lack of satisfactory gun controls.2
Rather, Slotkin concerned himself with the myth of the violent frontier as the
site of the clash between savagery and civilization – and with the develop-
ment of that myth into what he called “a set of symbols” capable of “shaping
the thought and politics” even of the industrial world power that the present
1 This is the revised version of a paper presented in 1994 at the 24th (Chicago) Annual
Meeting of the Popular Culture Association. For a 2007 reprint in the Western Outlaw-
Lawman History Association Journal (Vol. XVI No. 2, 22-32), the text – including the
notes – has been substantially enlarged.
2 Richard Hofstadter: “America as a Gun Culture”, American Heritage, Vol. 21, October
1970, 4–10, 82–85.
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United States is, “by transcending the limitations of a specific temporality”.3
Reducing and abstracting from reality, Slotkin tells us, the myth creates a
historical cliché. Such a cliché may serve to interpret new experiences as
mere recurrences of familiar happenings. To project from the past into the
present or even the future helps in creating a “moral landscape”, providing
the terms for responses to reality that may insofar be classed as pathological,
as they reflect a refusal to learn.
Briefly stated, the term “gunfighter nation” summarizes Slotkin’s hy-
pothesis that the violent frontier has continued to provide patterns of identifi-
cation and legitimization for American society up to the present day.
Despite the pivotal function which he ascribed to the cult of the gun-
fighter, Slotkin judged that figure a comparatively recent addition to the pan-
theon of frontier mythology. He spoke of a “subject ... distinctly marginal”
until the Cold War years (principally, the Fifties), claiming that4
“‘gunfighting’ (as) a kind of art or profession ... is the invention of movies like The Gun-
fighter5 ... the reflection of Cold-War era ideas about professionalism ... exaggerat(ing) this
aspect of (the protagonists’) lives.”
A source that, in contrast, had earlier portrayed a “gallery of gunfighters” –
Eugene Cunningham’s Triggernometry, published in 1934, reprinted in 1941,
1967, 1978 and 1996 – was dismissed by Slotkin as, again, marginal.
However, the “evolution” of dime and nickel novels had already pro-
ceeded during the 1880’s and 1890’s from portraying “Revolutionary patri-
ots” and frontier scouts to “two-gun men”, “pistol dead shots”, even “Wild
West duelists”.6 Three more instances should suffice to demonstrate that,
shortly after the turn of the 20th century, and definitely before the height of
the Great Depression, the gunfighter of fact and fiction had come into his
own:
• William Barclay “Bat” Masterson, himself no stranger to gunfire, pro-
duced a series of articles for Human Life magazine in 1907, headed “Fa-
mous Gunfighters of the Western Frontier”, dealing with, for example,
Ben Thompson, John Henry “Doc” Holliday, and Wyatt Earp.7
• When paying tribute to Earp and Masterson in a 1921 article, actor Wil-
liam S. Hart referred to them and their likes, mentioning James Butler
“Wild Bill” Hickok, Holliday and Thompson, as “gunfighters”.8
3 Richard Slotkin: Gunfighter Nation. The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America,
New York 1992, 4/5, 6/7, 14, 24.
4 Slotkin, 383/384.
5 Released in 1950, starring Gregory Peck.
6 See lists compiled by Albert Johannsen: The House of Beadle and Adams, Vol. 1, Norman
1950, and also Dixon Wecter: The Hero in America, New York 21963 (11941), 345.
7 Robert K. DeArment: Bat Masterson. The Man and the Legend, Norman/London 31989
(11979), 380.
8 Ibid., 396.
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• Finally, and crucially important for the way the concept would gain ac-
ceptance, the Saturday Evening Post – with, at the time, a weekly circu-
lation of 2.5 mio. copies – during October/November 1930 printed a
four-part advance publication of Stuart N. Lake’s inflated Wyatt Earp
‘biography’. The second installment was captioned ‘Guns and Gunfight-
ers’, with Lake once again emphasizing, in addition to Earp’s supposed
skills, Hickok’s and Masterson’s deftness at what he termed ‘gun play’.
Eugene Cunningham did not tread new ground when he, among many others,
contributed to further establishing the image in the public mind, claiming
“the gunman’s story (to be) the story of the frontier.”9 On that score, Slotkin
was wrong.
Paradoxically, he may be the more right in asserting that (1) the myth of
the violent frontier – in fact, the saga of the gunfighter –10 has evolved into a
“venerable tradition”, and (2) for this reason continues to guide the American
society’s collective perceptions of present and future courses of action.
Locating the origins of the gunfighter mystique in the 19th and the first
decades of the 20th century should provide an opportunity for testing Slot-
kin’s hypothesis by examining the factual and the legendary career of a suffi-
ciently “prominent” case. We propose to look at the ways the myth has
swerved from reality in such a specific case, attempting to diagnose if and
how it provides those patterns of identification and legitimization central to
Slotkin’s argument.
9 Eugene Cunningham: Triggernometry, Vol. 1, London 41978 (11934), 13. In his critical
study of The Western Hero in History and Legend (Norman 1965), Kent Ladd Steckmesser
consequently ranked the gunfighter, along with the mountain-man, the outlaw and the sol-
dier, as “another classic in our great Western myth” (105).
10 Into which that of the cowboy has, of course, blended. To indicate the popularity of the
myth, a single instance, Jack Schaefer’s novel Shane, must suffice here. Shane is portrayed
as the quintessential gunfighter: black trousers, black coat and hat, ivory plates set into the
grip of his gun (black again), the hammer filed to a point. The gun is kept in Shane’s saddle
roll until the time arrives when the protagonist, cool and competent, has to face a room full
of men – when “the impact of the menace that marks him” takes effect “like a physical
blow”. The book’s hardcover edition (first published in 1949), after three printings was fol-
lowed by a juvenile edition that went through another four printings. In 1953, the film, star-
ring Alan Ladd, was released. The novel’s pocket book edition saw 65 printings until 1983.
Two years later, an unacknowledged remake – different in detail, but identical in basic plot
–, Pale Rider, was produced and directed by Clint Eastwood. The number of individuals
gunned down on the screen had by now increased tenfold. – The prototype of the fictitious
gunfighter, to which Jack Schaefer’s portrait of Shane remained indebted, had much earlier
been introduced by Zane Grey in his 1912 novel (another instant success) Riders of the
Purple Sage: Jim Lassiter, black-garbed, roaming the West, always ready to place his dex-
terity with firearms into the service of a good cause.
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II
The obvious choice as the subject of such a case study is James Butler “Wild
Bill” Hickok (1837–1876), with an entry in the Encyclopedia Britannica, a
memorial in Illinois, at least seven major biographies, and more than a dozen
films to his credit. Prentiss Ingraham’s dime novel “life” of Hickok (written
in 1881, reprinted in 1884 and 1891) had already referred to him as “the
Pistol Prince”. Forty-five years later, Frank Wilstach’s Hickok biography, a
curious mixture of legend-building and determined research, had been titled
“Wild Bill Hickok, Prince of Pistoleers”.11
Sponsored by the Kansas State Department of Education, even a 1939
“guide to the Sunflower State” – one of a series compiled, during the Great
Depression, by the WPA Federal Writers’ Project – had referred to Hickok as
“the best-known gunman in the old West.”12
One supposed reason for Hickok’s fame is mentioned in the entry written
by biographer Richard O’Connor for Collier’s Encyclopedia:13
Hickok’s reputation as one of the greatest of the peace officers of the post-Civil War West
was built in the years from 1868 to 1871, when he was sheriff at Hays City and city mar-
shal at Abilene, during the wildest days of their history. Unaided, he kept the cowtowns
under control, walking the streets with .44 revolvers on his hips ... establish(ing) himself as
the prototype of the iron-handed marshal who held the line until civilization caught up with
the frontier ...
Now consider the facts:
The entry suggests several years of uninterrupted and unaided service. Hick-
ok’s actual peace-keeping activities, however, were limited to four and a half
months during 1869 in Hays City and eight months during 1871 in Abilene.
During 1868 and 1870, he did not serve at all in any such function (excepting
a stint as Deputy U. S. Marshal to which, however, O’Connor does not refer).
Rather – and even while he held his offices –, he pursued a gambling career.
11 New York 1926. – A note on sources seems appropriate here. As in several other instances
– e.g., Wyatt Earp, John Wesley Hardin, John H. “Doc” Holliday, or Henry “Billy the Kid”
McCarty –, “a fearful amount of fabricating” (Wilstach) has been going on for decades
about Hickok’s alleged exploits. Among authors subsequently quoted, Nichols and Buel (by
their distorted and false accounts) contributed to creating the Hickok legend, Wilstach,
Connelley, and O’Connor (by largely, though not wholly, uncritical repetition) to perpetuat-
ing the saga. The contrasting strand of research into primary sources, such as contemporary
(city, state, and federal, including court and army) records and newspaper accounts, letters
and diaries, is represented by Cunningham, Dawson, Dykstra, Drago, Hansen, Miller/Snell,
Steckmesser, and – most thoroughly – Rosa. For a methodical correction of untruths in the
extensive literature about frontier gunfighters, cf. Ramon F. Adams: Burs Under the Saddle,
Norman 1964.
12 Kansas. A Guide to the Sunflower State, American Guide Series, New York 21949 (11939),
355.
13 Richard O’Connor: “Hickok, Wild Bill”, Collier’s Encyclopedia, Vol. 12, New York 1966,
99.
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He had one deputy in Hays City. The Abilene City Council appointed three
deputies to assist him. They did most of the patrolling. Hickok “stayed ... at
his games ... If wanted, (he) had to be looked up.”14
O’Connor was aware of these facts. In his own earlier biography of
Hickok, he had even quoted the deputies’ names.15 And he had painted a
much more realistic picture of his protagonist when commenting on Hickok’s
murder by Jack McCall, remarking that “a slightly different shift in circum-
stances” might have made a McCall of Hickok: “The revolver was their
common denominator.”16
Yet O’Connor preferred to construct for Collier’s an image of Hickok as
a lone, dedicated agent of law and order, in stark contrast to the judgment
passed on the gunfighter by Stuart Henry, brother of Abilene’s first mayor,
the later Kansas “wheat king” T. C. Henry:17
“He acted only too ready to shoot down, to kill out-right, instead of avoiding assassination
when possible as the higher duty of a marshal. Such a policy of taking justice into his own
hands exemplified, of course, but a form of lawlessness.”
Doubtlessly, O’Connor was aware that a tradition idolizing Hickok as the
peace officer incarnate had already been fashioned by a succession of maga-
zine articles, dime novels, books, and movies.18 A particularly influential
piece of myth-making had originated, a generation earlier, from William E.
Connelley, secretary of the Kansas State Historical Society. It was Connelley
who had eulogized Hickok as a plainsman beating “the dark forces of savage-
ry and crime” (he would not be the last Hickok researcher to become fasci-
nated by his subject).19 And he had carried the argument to Homeric
heights:20
14 Stuart Henry: Conquering Our Great American Plains, New York 1930, 274/275 (for the
quote); Joseph G. Rosa: They Called Him Wild Bill, Norman 21974 (11964), chs. 8, 10.
15 Richard O’Connor: Wild Bill Hickok, New York 1959, 129, 148.
16 ibid., 255.
17 Henry, 274/275.
18 Among the latter, especially William S. Hart’s Wild Bill Hickok (1923) and Cecil B. de
Mille’s The Plainsman (1937).
19 William E. Connelley: Wild Bill and his Era, New York 1933, 7. – Joseph G. Rosa, in
concluding his original archive-based study They Called Him Wild Bill, offered this obser-
vation: “Peacemaker or killer, hero or villain, there was a man” (Rosa, 311). In the same
vein, he chose to terminate his subsequent account Wild Bill Hickok. The Man and His
Myth (Lawrence 1996) with the following quote from an article in American Rifleman:
“Whatever else we may say of him, this much is true: He shot straight, and asked few fa-
vors … and he walked like a man in the presence of his enemies.” Such fascination, how-
ever, may not always serve as the best yardstick when evaluating historical documents.
While discussing, in They Called Him Wild Bill, the killing of ruffian Samuel Strawhun by
Hickok during his brief tenure as sheriff of Ellis County, Rosa had included an eyewitness
report printed in a contemporary (1869) newspaper which proved that Strawhun had not
raised a gun, but a beer glass against Hickok (cf. Rosa, 147/148). In two subsequent books,
Rosa made the unsubstantiated assertion that Strawhun had “smashed” a glass, threatening
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“(Hickok) contributed more than any other man to making the West a place for decent men
and women to live in.”
Yet in Hays City, Hickok was defeated after his brief time as sheriff in the
November 1869 election by his deputy. Two years later in Abilene, the City
Council dismissed him without a word of thanks. He had worked for Russell,
Majors and Waddell before the Civil War, driving wagons, stagecoaches,
tending stock; had been employed as an army wagon master and government
scout; had, after 1865, gambled for a living, worked as a Deputy U.S. Mar-
shal, scouted for the U.S. Cavalry. After his discharge in Abilene, his uncer-
tain income for the remaining five years of his life again came from gam-
bling, interrupted by a brief attachment to the “Buffalo Bill Combination”,
playing to audiences in the East. His services as a lawman, consequently,
were mere biographical episodes.
A first device by the use of which the gunfighter myth operates should
now have become apparent. It attaches historical “sense” to an otherwise
disjointed biography, permitting individual identification with acts supposed-
ly committed in the fulfilment of a “mission”.
That mission – and, consequently, the purported sense of Hickok’s life
on the frontier – consists in “taming” the West in order to permit progress by
violence. Without the Hickoks, the Earps, the Mastersons, bringing “order out
of chaos”,21 no pioneers like those evoked by Walt Whitman –
the rivers stemming, vexing, piercing deep the mines within, the surface broad surveying,
the virgin soil upheaving, Pioneers! O pioneers!
This interpretation transforms the gunfighter into a true pioneer himself.
Stimulated by “that onward-thrusting, high-flaming spirit of the Pioneer” –
Connelley writing about Hickok22 –, he emerges as a necessary element of
Hickok with a “jagged” glas (Joseph G. Rosa: Wild Bill Hickok. The Man and His Myth,
Lawrence 1996, 125), further dramatizing the situation in Wild Bill Hickok, Gunfighter,
College Park 2001, 112: “A pacifist once… blanched when I described to him the terrible
injuries which could be sustained by having a broken and jagged beer bottle or glass jabbed
into one’s face”. The original newspaper report quoted by Rosa simply reads: “Wild Bill set
the glasses on the counter, Stra[whu]n took hold of one and took it up in a threatening man-
ner. He had no time to execute his design for a shot fired by Mr. Hickok killed him.” The
source given by Rosa for his allegation in Wild Bill Hickok: The Man and His Myth (251, n.
37) is Rev. Blaine Burkey: Wild Bill Hickok the Law in Hays City, Hays 21975, 10–12.
However, not the slightest reference to a “broken” or “jagged” glas may be found in
Burkey’s text (who quotes an additional eye witness account published in 1876, confirming
that Strawhun “picked up a glass to strike”). Rather, Burkey (11) raised the question:
“Since when is it justifiable to shoot to kill a man who is raising a beer glas in a threatening
manner?” Concerning his recent depictions of the Strawhun killing, the conclusion seems to
suggest itself that Rosa has joined the ranks of Hickok myth makers. Cf. also below, n. 29.
20 William E. Connelley: Wild Bill – James Butler Hickok, Reprint from Collections of the
Kansas State Historical Society, n. p., n. d. (1928), 27 (emphasis mine).
21 Wilstach, 159.
22 Connelley (as in n. 19), 7.
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westward expansion. In the last instance, it is none other than the gunfighter
who guarantees “that civilization may be free to take another step forward on
her march of progress”.23 Such a combination of devotion and boldness cer-
tainly invites identification.
Subsequently, three violent incidents in the career of Hickok – again, the
facts as well as the legend – will be reviewed, demonstrating that the overall
mechanism just diagnosed works no less conspicuously in detail, each level
reinforcing the other. Moreover, a second modus operandi adding to the
myth’s persuasiveness will be identified as the analysis proceeds.
The incidents to be discussed below are the so-called “Rock Creek Mas-
sacre” – the quarrel, in fact, that ended with Hickok killing his first man –; a
fight with troopers from the Seventh Cavalry in Hays City; and, finally, the
last shooting in which Hickok was involved, with two men dying under his
bullets. The factual events will be outlined first. In a second step, the ideali-
zations will be contrasted with the actual outcomes and prevalent motives.
III
That James Butler Hickok’s career in the public imagination was started by a
“terrible tale” in the February 1867 issue of Harper’s Magazine hardly bears
repeating. Recounting how Hickok had slain a certain “M’Kandlas” and nine
other border ruffians – some found “killed with bullets, others hacked and
slashed to death with a knife” –,24 George Ward Nichols provided a hero’s
name to which subsequent authors might attach further imaginary exploits.
The more because Harper’s New Monthly Magazine was, of course, any-
thing but another National Police Gazette. Founded in 1850 as a literary,
popular science, and travel digest, it rapidly attained the largest circulation
among periodicals published in the East – not least because its concept also
appealed to a large readership in the West: According to a contemporary
report, it could be found even “in the humblest (western) cabins”.25 Unavoid-
ably, more and more texts were published by Harper’s that dealt with the –
albeit largely romanticized – frontier. During the second half of the sixties,
the magazine rapidly regained its pre-Civil War circulation of close to
200,000 copies.26 (The American population at the time numbered just under
40 million.) A 12-page article, profusely illustrated, including a full-page
engraving of Hickok, could be quite literally expected to attract attention
across the whole country.
23 As in n. 20.
24 George W. Nichols: “Wild Bill”, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine Vol. 34, No. 201, 282.
25 Frank Luther Mott: A History of American Magazines, Vol. 2: 1850–1865, Cambridge
41970 (11938), 121.
26 Mott, 384, 391, 393; cf. also James Playsted Wood: Magazines in the United States, New
York 31971 (11949), 73 ss.
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The truth about the incident was brought to light by Charles Dawson and
George Hansen in 1912 and 1927, respectively. As stock tender for Russell,
Majors and Waddell at Rock Creek Station, Jefferson County, Nebr., Hickok
in July 1861 shot and killed David C. McCanles, the station’s erstwhile own-
er. Two of McCanles’ employees whom he wounded were subsequently
dispatched by other agents of the stage line.27
McCanles had come resolved to either collect an outstanding debt from
the (unknown to him, already bankrupt) company or to reclaim his property,
evicting the occupants by physical force. Trusting in his strength, McCanles
was very probably unarmed. At the most, he may have had a shotgun
strapped to his horse’s saddle28 which, however, he did not attempt to seize
before being shot by Hickok.
A personal feud already existed between McCanles and Hickok, who had
become enamored of the former’s mistress. McCanles is also supposed to
have acted tyrannically toward the much younger and physically inferior
Hickok. When matters came to a head, Hickok killed him from behind a
curtain.29 One of McCanles’ wounded companions (James Woods) was
hacked to death, the other (James Gordon) riddled with buckshot. Neither
Hickok nor his accomplices received even a scratch.30 While they were ar-
27 Charles Dawson: Pioneer Tales of the Oregon Trail and of Jefferson County, Topeka 1912,
218 ss.; George W. Hansen: “True Story of Wild Bill-McCanles Affray in Jefferson Coun-
ty, Nebraska, July 12, 1861”, Nebraska Historical Magazine 10 (1927), 71–112.
28 As contended by Dawson, 216 (who also wrote that McCanles’ two employees, “as was
customary in that day, … had pistols in their holsters, strapped around their bodies”). In his
1927 article, Hansen reported (a) that the bodies of McCanles, Woods and Gordon had been
buried the following morning by Frank, Thomas and Jasper Helvey from the neighboring
Helvey ranch; (b) that Frank Helvey had told him “at various times, since my first ac-
quaintance with him in 1870, particularly in 1912 when we were both associated on the
committee to mark and dedicate monuments on the Oregon Trail, and again in my office a
few weeks before his death” [in July 1918] that, when he and his brothers gathered up the
bodies, they found “no guns near any of them”. Cf. Hansen, 86; for photo of Helvey and da-
ta on him, cf. ibid., 124.
29 In a footnote to the 1974 edition of They Called Him Wild Bill, Rosa wrote that Horace
Wellman, the station superintendent, “too, had access” to the weapons which Hickok had
placed behind a curtain “in preparation for trouble” (Rosa, 47 n. 21). Twenty years later, he
claimed that “opinion remain[ed] sharply divided” on the question: “Did Hickok shoot
McCanles, or was it Wellman?” (Joseph B. Rosa: Wild Bill Hickok: The Man and His Myth,
Lawrence 1996, 116). However, he failed to offer any evidence for the alleged controversy.
30 McCanles had brought his 12 year old son Monroe along, who escaped the slaughter. In a
1927 interview, Monroe McCanles stated: “Now to bear me out that those men were not
armed, – when Woods and Gordon ran up to the door, if either or both had been armed they
sure would have had their revolvers in their hands, and while Jim was shooting Woods, one
or the other would have done some shooting, or if Woods had been armed, he would not
have let Wellman knock him in the head without trying to defend himself. Now more evi-
dence that Gordon was unarmed; … After Gordon made his getaway, being wounded, the
Station outfit put [a blood hound] on his trail; the dog trailed him down the creek 80 rods
when they caught up to him while warding the dog off with a stick. If he had been armed, is
it not reasonable to suppose he would have defended himself?” (M. I. McCreight: “The
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raigned in court on a charge of murder, the preliminary examination did not,
for various reasons, result in a trial. Hickok left the region, enlisting in the
Union Army as a civilian scout.
Nine years and three killings later (“not counting Confederates and Indi-
ans”, as the saying went), Hickok returned to Hays City, which he had de-
parted after failing to be re-elected for sheriff. In a saloon, he was attacked by
two drunken soldiers, one of whom pulled him down, the other placing a
pistol against his head that, however, misfired.31 The assailants ended up on
the barroom floor, seriously wounded by Hickok’s bullets. One trooper died,
later receiving a passing mention in Custer’s My Life on the Plains;32 the
other recovered.
If Hickok and his opponent had been rivals for the same woman in the
circumstances that resulted in his first killing, and liquor generating heedless
courage had played a prominent part in the Hays City affray, both ingredients
were involved in Hickok’s last shooting scrape that occurred in Abilene. This
was at the height of the Texas cattle trade, when Southern drovers or gam-
blers and Yankee marshals heartily despised each other, colliding in the Kan-
sas cowtowns more often than not. A particular enmity concerning a prosti-
tute named Jessie Hazel seems to have evolved between Texas gambler Phil
Coe and Marshal Hickok. At the end of the 1871 cattle season, the Texas cow
hands went on a final drunken spree. When Coe defied the firearms ordinance
by shooting his gun, Hickok and he came to a confrontation. “Wild Bill”
killed not only the Texan, but also a special policeman, Mike Williams, who
accidentally rushed into the line of fire.33
The personal feud – the drunken brawl – the services of a prostitute: the-
se were the motives that provided the principal reasons in every shooting.
Such encounters were as stupid and meaningless, as they were common on a
frontier where, “like firearms, whiskey was always within reach and more or
less constantly imbibed”.34 Violence, when it erupted, was usually devoid of
any higher purpose. It fell to the myth to invent such a purpose by first dis-
torting the actual events and then, in a second step, interpreting not a real, but
a fictitious conflict.
‘McCandless’ Gang”, Forest & Stream XCVII (1927), 740–742, 762–763; for the quote, cf.
742).
31 W. E. Webb: Buffalo Land, Philadelphia/New York 1874, 146; Rosa, 158.
32 Norman 1962 (New York 11874), 45.
33 Harry Sinclair Drago: The Legend Makers, New York 1975, 32/33; Nyle H. Miller/Joseph
W. Snell: Great Gunfighters of the Kansas Cowtowns 1867–1886, Norman 21967 (Topeka
11963), 131 ss.
34 Robert M. Utley: High Noon in Lincoln. Violence on the Western Frontier, Albuquerque
1987, 21.
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IV
When J. W. Buel, in his 1880 “biography” Life and Wonderful Adventures of
Wild Bill, the Scout depicted the fight at Rock Creek as an encounter “with-
out a parallel”, he had Hickok’s opponents inflict terrible wounds on his
hero: a fractured skull, seven balls in his legs and body, three gashes on the
breast, a cut to the bone on the left forearm. Such dedicated sacrifice on
Hickok’s part called for an ethical imperative of the highest kind, and for a
reward in moral, immaterial terms. Buel did not fail to provide both:35
This murderous gang had killed more than a score of innocent men and women for the
purpose of robbery, and yet their power was such that no civil officer dared undertake their
arrest ... After this dreadful encounter, ... the people of that section worshiped Bill as no
other man. He had civilized the neighborhood.
Hickok’s clash with two drunken troopers that occurred in Hays City had to
wait two generations longer for an analogous “explanation”. Buel sensation-
ally magnified the incident. He not only blew it up into “a fight with fifteen
(!) soldiers”, but had Hickok literally wading in his own blood that “filled ...
his boots” from the multiple injuries he had suffered while allegedly killing
four of his intoxicated opponents.36 Frank Wilstach, in his 1926 life of the
“Prince of Pistoleers”, adhered to Buel’s version, even if toning it down con-
siderably.37 However, it could not but impress the reader as a vulgar brawl,
meaningless except that it displayed the hero’s prowess under the most ad-
verse circumstances.
It fell to Connelley to discover a “mission” behind Hickok’s resort to his
guns by distorting the actual proceedings, shifting them back in time to Hick-
ok’s last (!) night in office as Sheriff of Ellis County, and having him foil a
plot engineered by Captain Tom Custer, George Armstrong Custer’s trouble-
some brother. An arrogant officer, the younger Custer – or so Connelley
would have his readers believe – “thought his military connection made him
immune from arrest by civil authority”.38 When Hickok nevertheless took
him into custody for some offense, Tom Custer swore revenge:
He selected three reckless and desperate ruffians and accompanied them into town with the
understanding that they would kill Wild Bill. It was planned that one soldier would leap
upon his back and force him over, while another was to pinion his arms. The third man was
then to kill him.
Vestiges of what actually took place may be recognized in the presentation.
Of course, Hickok prevented the trio from executing their conspiracy in,
35 Buel (as in n. 15), 13, 19.
36 Buel, 51.
37 Frank J. Wilstach: Wild Bill Hickok, the Prince of Pistoleers, New York 1926, 172/173
38 William E. Connelley (as in n. 17), 131 (also for the following).
178
           
       
           
             
           
        
 
              
                
               
                 
                 
                  
                
              
            
                 
                   
              
             
                
                  
                  
                  
                 
                
        
            
             
           
         
             
           
        
           
           
     
            
           
              
                                                                        
    
                
 
        
according to Connelley, “probably the most famous incident of coolness,
nerve and shooting the world has known”.39
Comparing his rendering of the incident with the earlier version offered
by Elizabeth B. Custer in her book Following the Guidon, published in 1890,
provides an additional idea of the methods by which Connelley proceeded.
Custer’s narrative is subsequently reproduced first, followed by Connel-
ley’s:40
Three desperate characters [from the Seventh Cavalry decided] to kill Bill… It was planned
that one soldier should leap upon his back, and hold down his head and chest, while anoth-
er should pinion his arms. It is impossible in the crowded little dens, imperfectly lighted,
and with air dense with smoke, always to face a foe. Wild Bill was attacked from behind,
as had been planned. His broad back was borne down by a powerful soldier, and his arms
seized, but only one was held in the clinching grasp of the assailant. With the free hand the
scout drew his pistol from the belt, fired backward without seeing, and his shot, even under
these circumstances, was a fatal one. The soldier dropped dead, the citizens rallied round
Wild Bill, [and] the troops were driven out of the town (Custer).
It was planned that one soldier would leap upon his back and force him over, while another
was to pinion his arms. The third man was then to kill him. Bill was found in a small sa-
loon so imperfectly lighted that it was almost impossible to distinguish one person from
another. This enabled them to approach him. One] powerful soldier leaped upon him,
bearing him over, and the second clasped him round to pinion his arms. Bill wrested one
arm free. With his left hand Bill drew his pistol and fired backward over his shoulder at the
man forcing him down. The soldier fell from Bill’s back a dead man. In a minute Bill was
erect. He shot the soldier who was waiting in front of him with drawn pistol. Then he fired
over his shoulder and killed the man who had pinioned his arms and who had his pistol
drawn… A number of soldiers [brought] to aid these select three if they should fail… were
driven from the town… [by] the citizens (Connelley).
Connelley’s version was also preferred by O’Connor two and a half decades
later, tallying – as it did – with Hickok’s now accepted social function: Act-
ing once again as the advancing civilization’s deadly instrument, he punished
the infringements of, according to O’Connor, “desperadoes in uniform”,
whom “the civilians unfortunate enough to live in their vicinity found ... not
much preferable to the savages they were being protected from.”41 Equally
important, in Connelley’s and O’Connor’s fictionalized account Hickok’s
real foe, other than the nameless rowdy troopers, acquired an identity: Cap-
tain Custer with his brazen claim to immunity personified licence, where
Hickok stood for order.
After Hickok had subsequently shot and killed Phil Coe in Abilene, Buel
interpreted the latter’s death, paralleling his depiction of the Rock Creek
event, as “a most fortunate event for the better class of citizens of Abilene,
39 ibid., 132.
40 As in n. 39 (emphasis mine); Elizabeth B. Custer: Following the Guidon, Norman 1966,
163/164.
41 O’Connor (as in n. 13), 130.
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because it at once improved the morals of the place.”42 Wilstach, in similar
terms, narrated a purported conspiracy by Texas cowboys planning “Bill’s
destruction”, because they resented the new marshal’s intent to, once again,
bring “order out of chaos”: When they “drew lots as to who was to have the
honor of taking Bill’s scalp”, a “particularly desperate person named Phil
Coe drew the short straw.”43 Connelley in his turn, before he arrived at de-
scribing the Coe incident, had already vastly aggrandized Hickok’s perfor-
mance in Abilene, maintaining that “it was a situation which never before
existed in any town in America. It was the iron will of one man holding at
bay the malice, crime and recklessness of the wickedest town on the fron-
tier.” Subsequently, with regard to the Coe – and Williams! – killings, he
claimed that “a hundred pistols were drawn and cocked as Wild Bill fired his
first shot. By the time he fired the second time, … Coe’s friends were gone”.
Subsequently, Connelley had Hickok – ever the civilizer – seek “a clergyman
and le[a]d him to Coe’s bedside”.44
In the same vein, Connelley managed to cope with the problem presented
to Hickok glorifiers after Dawson’s book had reduced the Rock Creek “mas-
sacre” to its true dimensions of another squalid frontier brawl. Dawson had
also pointed out that, although David McCanles, Hickok’s victim, was apt to
act tyrannically and overbearing, and had embezzled money before establish-
ing himself at Rock Creek, he was a rugged pioneer rather than a rascal. He
had never committed either homicide or murder. Undaunted, Connelley
maintained that McCanles’ life “had been one of progressive degeneracy”. To
leave not the slightest room for doubt, he added that “if ever a man deserved
killing, it was McCanles at Rock Creek Station”.45 Although Nichols’ and
Buel’s tall tales about Rock Creek had finally been deflated, a killing “for
which almost any fair jury would have given (Hickok), at the least, a long
penitentiary sentence”,46 and which very probably sprang from both hate and
42 Buel (as in n. 15), 54.
43 Wilstach (as in n. 38), 175, 176, 177.
44 Connelley (as in n. 19), 154, 159/160. Summing up his research into surviving municipal
records, Robert Dykstra wrote: “The traditional Wild Bill seems to be in a sort of free-agent
status as marshal, completely divorced from the prosaic duties of the modern police officer
or the discipline and direction of a municipal employer. Modification of the traditional im-
age seems in order on this perhaps subtle but important point” (“Wild Bill Hickok in Abi-
lene”, Journal of the Central Mississippi American Studies Association, Kansas Centennial
Issue 1961, 20–48; for the quote, 42). The evidence, in addition, is that “Hickok relegated
much of the police work to [his deputies]” (Larry D. Underwood: Abilene Lawmen. The
Smith-Hickok Years, 1870–1871, Lincoln 1999, 140; see also above, n. 14, 15), and that
“Texas Street” – the section of Abilene bounded by the railroad, ending in the stock yards –
, because of Hickok’s merely sporadic enforcement of the firearms ordinance, “simmered
or more or less boiled in a kind of truce” (Henry – as in n. 14 –, 275).
45 Connelley (as in n. 20), 9, 21.
46 Cunningham (as in n. 9), Vol. 2, 41.
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panic, continued to be presented in terms of an act by a man of “intrepidity”
who “killed when he was compelled to kill in the line of duty”.47
V
If this was the first method of legitimizing and idealizing gunfighter violence,
a second way emerged early in Hickok’s mythical career – in fact, with
Nichols’ Harper’s Magazine article. It reinforces the mechanism so far por-
trayed. And where the first mode permits individual identification, the second
legitimizes collective attitudes and behavior by depicting successive stages in
American history as conflicts between civilization and savagery.
Such black-and-white stereotypes encourage a restricted understanding
of social – past no less than present or future – realities. Against this simpli-
fied background, violence comes to be perceived not merely as indispensable,
but as morally adequate. When savagery challenges civilization, there need
be no hesitation, no complicated, drawn-out negotiating process. The quick
bullet is the legitimate – and easy – response.48
Writing about the killing of “M’Kandlas” by Hickok, Nichols did not
even mention the name “Rock Creek”. In fact, the prelude to events proper
was quite different from Buel’s account, with Hickok allegedly relating how
“it was in ‘61, when I guided a detachment of cavalry ... in South Nebraska”,
continuing to recount that he had earlier known “M’Kandlas and his despera-
does ... in the mountains”:49
This was just before the war broke out, and we were already takin(g) sides in the moun-
tains, either for the South or the Union. M’Kandlas and his gang were border-ruffians in
the Kansas row, and of course they went with the rebs.
There is a significant shift of emphasis in the way lines are drawn here: Wild
Bill, “Yankee” and scout for the Union, confronts McCanles, gang leader and
rebel combined. Again, it was Connelley who took up the thread, asserting
that50
... the Southern confederacy ... exerted a powerful influence on (McCanles’) life ... His
associates were the southern or border-ruffian element ... The fight ... in which he was
killed prevented McCanles from becoming a Confederate soldier.
After the tone had thus been set, Connelley pursued the Civil War subject
further:51
47 Connelley, 19, 27.
48 Cf. also John G. Cawelti: The Six-Gun Mystique, Bowling Green 1975, 36, 46.
49 Nichols, 282/283.
50 Connelley (as in n. 20), 9,11.
51 ibid., 26.
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In scouting ... for the military ..., Wild Bill put his life in jeopardy daily for more than four
years ... to preserve the Union in the Civil War. He became a spy, and put his life in forfeit
time after time by entering Confederate camps.
Connelley then proceeded to Hickok’s role in the next phase of American
history – the Indian Wars:
As valuable as were his services ... in saving the Union, they were fully equalled by his
work on the frontier ... No other scout rode through such dangers ... He rode by night and
watched by day for years ... from fort to fort, from post to post.
And finally, on to the cowtown frontier: Here Hickok “ruled with an iron
hand, presenting the unique spectacle of one man, by his courage and skill,
holding at bay all the lawless element”.52
The archetypal gunfighter myth thus constructs, in the form of an epic,
allegedly biographical narrative, a comprehensive pattern of the stages
through which, and the indispensable means by which, the American nation
is supposed to have progressed:
• the violent conquest of the morally inferior Southern “rebels” during the
Civil War;
• the equally violent defeat of the culturally inferior “savages” during the
Indian wars;
• the no less violent elimination of the “outlaws” posing a threat to stabil-
ity during the final phase of frontier settlement.
To sum up: The case study of a particular and prominent gunfighter legend
illustrates those clichés that are central to the American mythology of the
frontier as a place with moral significance, where civilization and savagery
clashed, and of national progress by violence through a succession of fron-
tiers. Allegedly representative of this civilizing process, the mythical Hickok
personifies the force of American patriotism in the fight against Confederate
secession, of advancing white settlement against the roving Plains Indians,
and of law in the unruly frontier towns. In exemplary fashion, Hickok’s
mythical career demonstrates how a moral and civilizing purpose has been
projected onto a violent past and, by constant repetition, has been carried
forward into the present day.
Such fatal continuity indeed permits, as suggested by Richard Slotkin, to
speak of a “gunfighter nation” with regard to patterns of attitude and behavior
unchangingly extolled by books, films, even encyclopediae53 – a popular
52 William E. Connelley: “Hickok, James Butler”, Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. V,
New York 1932, 4.
53 In 1992, a book on Hickok “for young people” was published, whose authors (“with over
sixty years of teaching experience”), after claiming that “the events described all c(a)me
from first-hand reports”, proceeded to dish up every disproved fabrication on record: Mac-
Canles allegedly “stepped forward, his hand moving toward his gun”; “a jury said he
[Hickok] fired in self-defense” when killing McCanles; Tom Custer’s vow “to get even”
182
           
             
     
                   
                     
                   
                  
 
                
             
              
            
                                                                                                                             
              
               
               
                 
                
                  
        
          
culture blending into political culture when, for instance, an American presi-
dent (Dwight D. Eisenhower, in this case) – during 1953 publicly referred to
the leitmotif of his life:54
I was raised in a little town ... called Abilene, Kansas. We had as our Marshal a man named
Wild Bill Hickok. Now that town had a code, and I was raised as a boy to prize that code. It
was: Meet anyone face to face with whom you disagree ... If you met him face to face and
took the same risks, you could get away with almost anything, as long as the bullet was in
front.
That you can get away with almost anything, as long as the bullet is in front:
A more fitting eulogy to Hickok and a more revealing invocation by a presi-
dent of the United States – more revealing, in fact, than John F. Kennedy’s
reference to the “New Frontier” which Slotkin cites – are hardly imaginable.
was the reason for Hickok’s clash with several soldiers in Hays; after accidentally gunning
down a special policeman in Abilene, Hickok – overcome by remorse – “that same night
turned in his badge”; and so forth (Carl R. Green/William R. Sanford: Wild Bill Hickok,
Berkeley Heights 1992, 4, 15, 30, 33). In addition, one might list recent novels such as The
Memoirs of Wild Bill Hickok by Richard Matheson (New York 1996), or And Not to Yield.
A Novel of the Life and Times of Wild Bill Hickok by Randy Lee Eickhoff (New York
2004, Winner of the Western Heritage Award 2005).
54 Steckmesser (as in n. 7), 158, n. 16.
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From the frontier on to the Red Planet: “One moment, I stood in the starlight
on the Arizona hills. The next instant, I opened my eyes upon a strange and
weird landscape. I knew that I was on Mars.” An obvious literary figment,
originating from the fertile pen of Edgar Rice Burroughs. Not so when it
comes to the following sentences: “The next century will see pioneering men
and women working and living throughout the inner Solar System. Through
vigorous leadership on the space frontier, America can make this happen.”
They were set down by none other than President Reagan’s National Com-
mission on Space under the chairmanship of former NASA Administrator
Thomas Paine. The frontier metaphor had early on permeated discourses on
America’s space effort – testimony to the power of a cultural cliché which
has conditioned America’s popular and political culture through its promises
of further expansion. Serving to interpret new experiences as recurrences of
familiar happenings, the frontier myth may reflect a deep-seated refusal to
learn. The following article was written as a contribution to the multidisci-
plinary volume Imagining Outer Space, published by Palgrave Macmillan in
2012.
Projecting Landscapes of the Human Mind onto Another
World: Changing Faces of an Imaginary Mars1
Reporter: ‘Is there life on Mars?’
Returning Astronaut: ‘Well, you know, it’s pretty dead most
of the week, but it really swings on Saturday night.’
(Popular NASA joke)
1 Deceptive World 
For centuries, the planet Mars continued to deceive terrestrial observers like
no other celestial body in our solar system. Believing to discern ever more
distinct features on Mars through Earth-bound telescopes, astronomers desig-
nated these as continents, oceans, even canals, to which they gave names.
With exceedingly rare exceptions, however, the markings did not correspond
1 This chapter’s argument is partly based on Rainer Eisfeld and Wolfgang Jeschke, Mars-
fieber, Munich: Droemer, 2003. Much like Robert Markley’s subsequent Dying Planet.
Mars in Science and the Imagination, Durham: Duke University Press 2005, the book dis-
cussed both the imagined Red Planet and the actual Mars progressively unveiled by robotic
missions.
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to geomorphological, or rather areomorphological, structures. Actually, they
originated from the different reflectivity of bright and dark surface regions
changed in its turn by wind activity which has continued to transport and
deposit fine dust across the planet. Space probes, rather than telescopes, were
needed to explain these processes and to shed light on the Red Planet’s true
characteristics1.
Until robotic explorers arrived, no other planet seemed to offer such
clues for educated guessing – first to the conjectural astronomy of the 19th
century, subsequently to the science fiction of the latter part of that period
and the 20th century. Conjectural astronomy was the term used, in the wake
of Bernard de Fontenelle’s 1686 Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds
and Christiaan Huyghens’ 1698 The Celestial Worlds Discover’d, or Conjec-
tures Concerning the Habitants, Plants and Productions of the Worlds in the
Planets, to denote that branch of the discipline which engaged in hypothesiz-
ing on ‘the living conditions and natural environments of other celestial bod-
ies’2. While expected to be not directly contradicting astronomical observa-
tions, such suppositions were, to a high degree, matters of interpretation,
often based on ‘few definitely established and unambiguous data’3.
In contrast to the discipline’s mathematical branch, conjectural astrono-
my was intended to bridge the widening rift of mutual incomprehension be-
tween the humanities and the sciences. From the 17th to the 19th century, the
encyclopaedic outlook on learning, so central to the Enlightenment, included
both the spiritual and the material world. Inexorably, however, the progress
of scientific research fostered specialization. Conjectural astronomy, in con-
trast, increasingly resorted to manifest speculation, relegating stellar and
planetary astronomy to the role of ancillary sciences in the service of a pre-
conceived, stoutly held idea, based on philosophical considerations: that
intelligent life existed throughout the universe, including the solar system’s
planets.
German astronomers’ Wilhelm Beer and Johann Heinrich Maedler’s
mid-19th century assumption that it would ‘not be too audacious to consider
Mars, also in its physical aspects, as a world very akin to our earth’4, went
unchallenged in its time. By 1906, however, when American astronomer
Percival Lowell published his spectacular – and highly speculative – interpre-
tation Mars and its Canals, scientists debated issues such as the composition
of the Martian atmosphere or the planet’s climate controversially and much
more sceptically. Within a year, a devastating rebuttal by British biologist
Alfred Russel Wallace appeared under the title Is Mars Habitable? Wallace
answered the question in the negative: Realistic temperature estimates pre-
2 Wilhelm Beer and Johann Heinrich Maedler, Beiträge zur physischen Kenntniss der himm-
lischen Koerper im Sonnensysteme, Weimar: Bernhard Friedrich Voigt, 1841, VII.
3 Beer and Maedler, Beiträge, ibid.
4 Beer and Maedler, Beiträge, 124, 125.
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cluded animal life; low atmospheric pressure would make liquid water – let
alone Lowell’s supposed irrigation works – impossible. Science and fiction
were irrevocably parting ways.
A mere decade after Beer and Maedler had published their treatise on the
solar planets’ physical properties, the term ‘Science-Fiction’ was introduced
in 1851 by British essayist William Wilson in his work A Little Earnest Book
upon a Great Old Subject. When coining the expression, Wilson referred to a
‘pleasant story’, ‘interwoven with… the revealed truths of Science’, itself
‘poetical and true’. By the 1890s, the emerging genre included not merely
pleasant, but definitely unedifying tales putting mankind at the mercy of
technically superior beings from other celestial bodies. The planetary novel
was coming into its own: No longer were planets conceived as self-contained
distant places. Rather, their inhabitants might seek out other worlds with
either benevolent or inimical intent5.
Mars, supposedly older than the Earth (according to what was then be-
lieved about the formation of the solar system), particularly fired the imagi-
nation. Intersecting around the turn of the century, conjectural astronomy and
science fiction served as vehicles for succeeding generations to ‘project
[their] earthly hopes and fears’ onto Mars6. These pipe dreams and night-
mares came to vary not least according to the economic, social, and political
upheavals that would figure uppermost in men’s minds during successive
periods. Two examples illustrate the remarkable length to which some au-
thors were prepared to go in offering their allegories:
In the wake of the October Revolution, Soviet writer Alexei Tolstoi and
movie director Yakov Protazanov imagined during the early 1920s that it
would take the arrival by spaceship of a terrestrial revolutionary, Gusev, to
whip the exploited workers of Mars into a proletarian uprising (Aelita). The
‘world’ to be revolutionized by the ‘vanguard of the proletariat’ did not need
to be identical with Earth…
By the mid-1950s, with female emancipation considered a dire threat in
many quarters, a British flick portrayed Nyah, Devil Girl from Mars, as land-
ing her flying saucer by a country tavern, explaining to the male customers
that the birth rate had fallen alarmingly after the introduction of matriarchy.
For breeding purposes, her planet needed men! Rather than, in post-Victorian
resignation, ‘closing their eyes and thinking of Mars’, however, the British
males put up embittered resistance7.
5 Brian Aldiss and David Wingrove, Trillion Year Spree. The History of Science Fiction,
London: Paladin, 1988, 603 n. 47; Martin Schwonke, Vom Staatsroman zur Science Fic-
tion, Stuttgart: Enke, 1957, 43.
6 Carl Sagan, Cosmos, New York/London: Random House, 1980, 106.
7 This brief reference to the British film goes back to Marsfieber, 163. Devil Girl on Mars
was subsequently discussed by Robert Markley, Dying Planet, 227-9.
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Looking at the ‘mainstream’ (there were always mavericks, of course) of
the ways in which the treatises, the novels and short stories, the movie scripts
by successive generations of astronomers and science fiction writers depicted
an imaginary Mars, we may discern a sequence of ‘faces’ attributed to the
planet on which this chapter’s subsequent sections will focus:
An Arcadian Mars (1865 ff.) exhibiting ‘all the various kinds of scenery
which make our earth so beautiful’; a highly civilized Advanced Mars (1895
ff.) crisscrossed by immense canals; a forbidding Frontier Mars (1912 ff.)
where the rugged adventurer and the toiling pioneer might again come into
their own; a Cold War Mars (1950 ff.), source of an assault on the Earth, or
haven for refugees after our planet would have perished from nuclear war;
finally, a Terraformed Mars (1973 ff.), again with strong frontier under-
tones, lending itself to human colonization and exploitation. While these
‘types’ would often overlap – with the frontier metaphor, in particular, per-
sisting into the present -, each type set the tone for a generation.
2 Arcadian Mars
‘Life, youth, love shine on every world… This divine fire glows on Mars, it
glows on Venus’8. With unmatched fervor and elegance of style, Camille
Flammarion (1842-1925) argued the case for intelligent extraterrestrial life
during the second half of the 19th century, bolstered by the authority of the
renowned astronomer who, in 1887, founded the Société Astronomique de
France. His description of the Martian environment, in his very first work La
pluralité des mondes habités, which would be reprinted 30 times until the
century’s end, informed the astronomical and popular discourse on the Red
Planet for nearly a generation:
The atmospheres of Earth and Mars, the snowfields seasonally expanding and shrinking on
both planets, the clouds intermittently floating over their surfaces, the similar apportion-
ment of continents and oceans, the conformities in seasonal variations: all this makes us
believe that both worlds are inhabited by beings who physically resemble each other… In
our mind’s eye, we behold, here and there, intelligent beings, united into nations, vigorous-
ly striving for enlightenment and moral betterment9.
In 1840, Beer and Maedler had drawn the first chart of Mars. Capital letters
denoted observed ‘regions’ – darker spots on bright ground. (Before the Mar-
iner 9 space probe permitted production of the first ‘reliable map’10, more
8 Camille Flammarion, Les Terres du Ciel, Paris: Marpon & Flammarion, 1884, 208.
9 Camille Flammarion, Die Mehrheit Bewohnter Welten, Leipzig: J. J. Weber, 1865, 51-2,
71. Flammarion published the book as a 20 year old.
10 Oliver Morton, Mapping Mars, New York: Fourth Estate, 2002, 37-8.
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than 130 years would elapse). The letters used by Beer and Maedler remained
in use for two and a half decades, until Richard Proctor replaced them by the
names of Mars observers on the map which he composed in 1867. Proctor
also ‘improved’ on the way his compatriot John Phillips had, three years
earlier, designated darker parts as ‘seas’ and brighter, reddish tracts as
‘lands’. Proctor’s chart showed continents and islands, oceans and seas, inlets
and straits. These features had a suggestive effect. They seemed to portray a
second – albeit smaller – Earth, with just a different division into zones of
land and water.
The suggestion was deliberate. Proctor depicted Mars as a ‘miniature of
our Earth’, waxing hardly less rhapsodically than Flammarion about the pret-
tiness of the place:
The mere existence of continents and oceans on Mars proves the action of… volcanic
eruptions and earthquakes, modelling and remodelling the crust of Mars. Thus there must
be mountains and hills, valleys and ravines, water-sheds and water-courses… And from the
mountain recesses burst forth the refreshing springs which are to feed the Martia[n] brook-
lets…
And in a brilliant phrase, which Percival Lowell would later reclaim for enti-
tling his final book, Proctor called Mars ‘the abode of life’, without whose
existence ‘all these things would be wasted’11.
Proctor (1837-1888) was Honorary Secretary of the Royal Astronomical
Society. Like Flammarion’s work, his study of our solar system’s planets
subtitled ‘under the light of recent scientific researches’ continued to be re-
printed until the advent of the 20th century. Public fascination was spurred
further when the Mars opposition of 1877 led to the discovery of two small
moons by Asaph Hall – and to the observation, by Giovanni Schiaparelli, of
markings that the Italian astronomer took for canali, channels furrowing the
planet’s surface, some of which he compared to ‘the Strait of Malacca, the
very oblong lakes of Tanganyika and Nyassa, and the Gulf of California’12.
After Schiaparelli reported that some of the lines he had sighted between
1877 and 1882 ran for 4800 kilometers, attaining a width of 120 kilometers,
it came as no surprise that Flammarion was among the first to comment:
One may resist the idea, but the longer one gazes at [Schiaparelli’s] drawing, the more the
interpretation suggests itself… [that] we are dealing with a technological achievement of
the planet’s inhabitants.13
11 Richard A. Proctor, Other Worlds than Ours, London: Longmans, Green, 31872 [11870]
85, 109-0.
12 Giovanni Schiaparelli, Astronomical and Physical Observations of the Axis of Rotation and
the Topography of the Planet Mars: First Memoir, 1877-1878, translated by William
Sheehan, MS, Flagstaff: Lowell Observatory Flagstaff (Archives), 1994, 124.
13 Giovanni Schiaparelli, ‘Découvertes nouvelles sur la planète Mars’, Révue d’Astronomie
populaire 1.7 (July 1882), 218 ; Camille Flammarion, ‘La planète Mars’, Révue
d’Astronomie populaire 1.7 (July 1882), 216.
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In the minds of some of the period’s foremost astronomers, the image of a
lush and youthful Arcadian Mars would soon begin to give way to that of a
much more ancient world possessing no natural water-courses, but artificial
waterways surpassing anything so far constructed on Earth.
3 Advanced Mars
As judged by a present-day astronomer, after Giovanni Virginio Schiaparelli
(1835-1910) had taught a whole generation of observers how to see Mars, it
became eventually ‘impossible to see it any other way. Expectation created
illusion’14. If channels discernibly divided Mars to the extent of making its
topography ‘resemble that of a chessboard’, if several such canali even
‘form[ed] a complete girdle around the globe of Mars’ – could they any long-
er be interpreted as natural attributes, ‘like the rilles of the Moon’15? Might
they not more convincingly be explained as non-natural features, as canals
serving a purpose which had to be derived from the planet’s characteristics?
The landscape of Advanced Mars which was construed by Percival Low-
ell from 1895 in response to Schiaparelli’s revelations differed dramatically
from that of Arcadian Mars. No more stately oceans, no impetuous rivers. A
much grimmer environment predominated on Earth’s neighbor world: ‘The
rose-ochre enchantment is but a mind mirage… Beautiful as the opaline tints
of the planet look, …they represent a terrible reality… [a] vast expanse of
arid ground…, girdling the planet completely in circumference, and stretch-
ing in places almost from pole to pole’16.
Erudite descendant of a wealthy Boston family, excelling in mathematics
and literature, composing Latin hexameters at 11 and using his first telescope
at 15, Percival Lowell (1855-1916) became enthusiastic about Flammarion’s
impressive compilation La Planète Mars (1892) and his views on the habita-
bility of the planet. In 1894 he founded his own observatory near Flagstaff,
Arizona Territory, with the express purpose of studying the conditions of life
on other worlds, particularly on Mars. From his first twelve months of obser-
vations, Lowell drew conclusions which he immediately published in a book
that ‘influence[d] and shape[d] the imagination of writers’ such as Wells and
Lasswitz17. The darker regions of Mars he took to be “not water, but seasonal
14 William Sheehan, The Planet Mars, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996. 85.
15 Schiaparelli, Astronomical and Physical Observations, 123, 124.
16 Percival Lowell, Mars as the Abode of Life, New York/London: Macmillan, 1908, 134
17 Mark R. Hillegas, ‘Martians and Mythmakers: 1877-1938’, in Challenges in American
Culture, eds. Ray B. Browne et al., Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Popular
Press, 1970, 156.
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areas of vegetation”, with the planet depending, for its water supply, “on the
melting of its polar snows”. Then came the clincher:
If, therefore, the planet possess inhabitants,… irrigation, upon as vast a scale as possible,…
must be the chief material concern of their lives… paramount to all the local labor, wom-
en’s suffrage, and [Balkan] questions put together18.
After the ironic aside, Lowell turned his attention to the canals which, he
held, were dug precisely for such “irrigation purposes”:
What we see is not the canal proper, but the line of land it irrigates, dispos[ing] incidentally
of the difficulty of conceiving a canal several miles wide… What we see hints at the exist-
ence… [of] a highly intelligent mind… of beings who are in advance of, not behind us, in
the journey of life19.
Much later, Carl Sagan would famously quip that, most certainly, intelligence
was responsible for the straightness of the lines observed by Lowell. The
problem was just “which side of the telescope the intelligence is on’20.
While the 19th was turning into the 20th century, canals – like automo-
biles, dirigibles and airplanes – had come to symbolize progress, the triumph
of technology over nature. In 1869, the Suez Canal had reduced the sea route
to India by 10,000 kilometers, permitting Phileas Fogg and Passepartout to
accomplish their imaginary journey around the world in 80 days. Work on
the Panama Canal had begun in 1880, and even if the first French effort had
foundered, a second American construction attempt was under way. Canals,
whether on Earth or (supposedly) on another world, continued to make for
headlines: On 27 August 1911, the New York Times captioned a one-page
article. ‘Martians Build Two Immense Canals in Two Years’, its headline
read. ‘Vast Engineering Works Accomplished in an Incredibly Short Time.’
And Lowell’s arid, aging Mars offered a further fascinating perspective:
A community that had forsworn armed conflict21, unified by a common en-
deavor, valiantly fighting its imminent doom, demonstrated to war-torn Earth
what a civilization might achieve once it had overcome strife and hate.
Sunlight might be converted into electricity on Mars’ high plateaus, even
stones into bread by extracting protein and carbohydrates from rocks, soil, air
and water. And material advancement might release additional energies
needed for moral improvement. Such was the vision offered by Kurd Lass-
witz in his 1897 novel Auf zwei Planeten. While an abridged English transla-
tion would only appear by 1971, the book was immediately translated into a
number of other European languages and a popular German edition, which
18 Percival Lowell, Mars, Boston/NewYork: Houghton, Mifflin, 1895: 122, 128-9
19 Lowell, Mars, 165, 208-9.
20 Carl Sagan, ‘Hypotheses’, in: Mars and the Mind of Man, New York: Harper & Row, 1973,
13.
21 Percival Lowell, Mars and its Canals, New York/London: Macmillan, 1906, 377
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continued to be reprinted, was published in 1913. Until the Nazis branded the
book as ‘un-German’, the novel sold 70,000 copies in Germany22.
Lasswitz portrayed a Mars on which the ‘colossal effort’ required by irri-
gation had united the original 154 states into a single league. Thanks to the
canal system – and here Lasswitz sounded like pure Lowell -, ‘the desert
region was traversed by fertile strips of vegetation nearly 100 kilometers
wide which included an unbroken string of thriving Martian settlements’23. A
one-year mandatory labor service for both sexes helped maintain the network
of canals. The discovery of anti-gravity had made Martians ‘the masters of
the solar system’, permitting them to construct a wheel-shaped space station
6,356 kilometers above Earth’s North Pole. Due to terrestrial arrogance, the
first contact between men and ‘Nume’ ended in the occupation of Europe by
the league of Martian states and the establishment of a protectorate aimed at
‘re-educating’ mankind.
Wielding power over the Earth, however, worked to morally corrupt the
Martian conquerors. When they threatened to extend their protectorate to the
United States, American engineers secretly succeeded in copying Martian
arms and taking over their space station. Faced with a choice of violating
their highest values by resorting to a war of extinction, or leaving the Earth,
the Martians chose to depart. Terrestrial nations not just concluded an alli-
ance, but went on to adopt new constitutions in a Kantian ‘spirit of peace,
liberty and human dignity’24. A peace treaty with Mars ensured co-existence
on the basis of equality.
However, an alternative scenario might be imagined, derived from the
hypothesis that Martians had failed ‘in attempting to safeguard the habitabil-
ity of their planet’. In that case, might not beings with minds ‘vast and cool
and unsympathetic’ feel tempted to resort to aggression, pitilessly exterminat-
ing mankind in search of ‘living space’? Rather than Lasswitz’ pacifist vi-
sion, the result would be the social-Darwinist War of the Worlds that Herbert
George Wells envisioned in the same year. Skilfully, Wells gave the debate
about the significance of the surface features on Mars a new twist. ‘Men like
Schiaparelli’, he wrote, ‘failed to interpret the fluctuating appearances of the
markings they mapped so well. All that time the Martians must have been
getting ready’25.
Contrary to what a cursory reading of his tale might suggest, Wells did
not depict the inhabitants of Mars – a Mars, it should be repeated, much older
than the Earth, according to prevailing opinion – as alien monstrosities. Ra-
22 Franz Rottensteiner, ‘Kurd Lasswitz: A German Pioneer of Science Fiction’, in SF: The
Other Side of Realism, ed. Thomas D. Clareson, Bowling Green: Bowling Green University
Popular Press, 1971, 289.
23 Kurd Lasswitz, Auf zwei Planeten, Frankfurt: Zweitausendeins, 1979 [11897], 98.
24 Lasswitz, Planeten, 875.
25 H. G. Wells, The War of the Worlds, New York: Pocket Books, 1953, 2.
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ther, regarding their appearance, he projected on them those ‘characters of the
Man of the remote future’ which he had predicted as the final stage of human
evolution in an earlier essay26: An expanding brain and head, diminishing
bodies and legs, unemotional intelligence, nourishment by absorption of
nutritive fluids – blood in the case of the Martian invaders -, atrophy of ears,
nose, and mouth, the latter ‘a small, perfectly round aperture, toothless, gum-
less, jawless’. Wells’ Martians were not so much invaders from space as
invaders from time, ‘ourselves, mutated beyond sympathy, though not be-
yond recognition’27.
Lasswitz, in a Kantian vein, had intended to confront Europe’s imperial-
ist powers with the alternative notion of a world governed by reason and
peace. Wells’ War of the Worlds remorselessly held the mirror up to contem-
porary colonialism. During 1897/98, Imperial Germany occupied the Chinese
port of Kiautschou; China had to cede a further part of Hongkong to Great
Britain; France consolidated its position in West Africa; the United States
annexed the Hawaiian Islands. In Asia, in Africa, in the Pacific, native popu-
lations were being subjugated or pushed back. ‘Are we such apostles of mer-
cy’, Wells asked rhetorically, ‘as to complain if the Martians warred in the
same spirit?’28.
Finally, Wells could not only count on an audience turned receptive, by a
spate of recent novels – such as George Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking
(1871), William Butler’s The Invasion of England (1882), William Le
Queux’s The Great War in England (1894) –, to the notion of French and
(more frequently) German raids on England. Moreover, these authors had
already begun to explore a theme on which Wells focused his attention in The
War of the Worlds: The disappearance of any distinction between battle
fronts and zones where civilians might feel reasonably safe, the expansion of
mechanized ‘total’ warfare to engulf entire populations29.
Such total war was raging in China forty years later, after Japanese ar-
mies had invaded the country in 1937. For a brief moment, it had been avoid-
ed in Europe after Czechoslovakia had yielded, under British and French
pressure, to the Munich Agreement. The war scare was still fresh in many
Americans’ minds when CBS, on 30 October 1938, aired The War of the
Worlds as a 60-minute radioplay, directed by Orson Welles, with the action
transferred to New Jersey. Presented as a series of increasingly ominous news
bulletins, the first half of the broadcast produced mass hysteria: All over the
United States, people ‘were praying, crying, fleeing frantically… Some ran to
26 H. G. Wells, H. G. (1893): ‘The Man of the Year Million’, in A Critical Edition of the War
of the Worlds, eds. David Y. Hughes and Harry M. Geduld, Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1993, Appendix III, 291-2, 293.
27 Frank McConnell, The Science Fiction of H. G. Wells, New York/Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 1981, 128, 130.
28 McConell, Science Fiction, ibid.
29 McConnell, Science Fiction, 132-3
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rescue loved ones. Others… sought information from newspapers or radio
stations, summoned ambulances and police cars’30.
An estimated 250,000 people believed the United States to be under at-
tack by either Germany, Japan – or indeed from Mars. In a bewildering world
troubled by prolonged economic depression, wars and political crises, many
Americans thought anything might happen.
By the time, H. G. Wells had turned social reformer, slowly despairing of
men’s folly. His last ideas about an invasion from Earth’s ‘wizened elder
brother’ Mars, published under the title Star Begotten shortly before Orson
Welles’ broadcast, differed considerably from his first – though not without a
self-deprecating glance back31:
Some of you may have read a book called The War of the Worlds – I forget who wrote it –
Jules Verne, Conan Doyle, one of those fellows. But it told how the Martians invaded the
world, wanted to colonize it and exterminate mankind. Hopeless attempt! They couldn’t
stand the different atmospheric pressure, they couldn’t stand the difference in gravitation…
To imagine that the Martians would be fools enough to try anything of the sort. But –
But if they resorted to cosmic rays instead? Modifying the genetic structure
of unborn children, creating new beings that were, in fact, their spiritual
children? That was the obsessive idea with which the tale’s protagonist wres-
tled, until he discovered that his wife, their son – that he himself was star
begotten, a changeling. The change, however, was benevolent, meant to
salvage mankind – ‘a lunatic asylum crowded with patients prevented from
knowledge and afraid to go sane’ 32- from stupidity and immaturity by mak-
ing humans more flexible, more open-minded, more innovative.
Mature Martian civilization emerged as a deus ex machina for solving,
by imperceptible intervention from outside, those pressing problems which
mankind found itself unable to surmount.
4 Frontier Mars
Implying, as it did, that the Red Planet’s inhabitants would beat humans to
accomplishing space flight, the idea of Advanced Mars ran counter to deeply
engrained expansionist impulses of the imperialist age. Small wonder the
tabloid journalist Garrett Putnam Serviss immediately responded to Wells’
tale with a serial in the sensationalist New York Evening Journal. Entitled
Edison’s Conquest of Mars and published in 1898, it depicted the ‘wizard of
30 Hadley Cantril, The Invasion from Mars. A Study in the Psychology of Panic, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1940: 47.
31 H. G. Wells, Star Begotten, London: Chatto & Windus, 1937: 50-51.
32 Wells, Star Begotten, 167-8.
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Menlo Park’, aided by Lord Kelvin and Konrad Roentgen, as devising both a
disintegrator ray and an electric spaceship (admittedly based on the operating
principles of the Martian machines). Financed by the great powers, 100
spaceships – armed with 3,000 disintegrators – were built and flew to Mars,
where they wrecked havoc by forcibly opening the ‘floodgates of Syrtis Ma-
jor’, thereby deluging the planet’s equatorial regions.
Lasswitz had already attributed the defeat of his Martian conquerors to
American engineering talent and ‘daring’. By presenting an entire arsenal of
innovative weapons, Serviss left no doubt about America’s claim to global
leadership: Technologically superior, the ‘new world’ had outrivaled the
‘old’ as the torchbearer of progress.
Yet, Serviss’ tale did not set a new trend in wishful thinking about the
Red Planet. Lowell’s arid Mars was taking hold in the public mind, and
Serviss’ vast oceans and floodgates were just too wildly off that mark. For a
significant change in perspective to occur, American cowboy, gold miner,
salesman and – finally – novelist Edgar Rice Burroughs (1875-1950) had to
write A Princess of Mars in 1912. He rechristened Mars, gave it the name
Barsoom – and henceforth Mars exploration would be ‘as much a re-creation
of the past as a vision of the future’33.
American rather than European science fiction authors now took the lead
in projecting their fantasies onto the Red Planet, building on a ‘force-
ful…cultural tradition’ that would eventually inspire the U. S. space program
no less than it initially spurred ‘romantic vision[s]’ of exploring, even colo-
nizing Mars: the myth of America’s western frontier34. Rather than ‘high-
brow’ European-style literature, the ‘entertainment industry’35 of ‘lowbrow’
American pulp fiction with its international outlets provided the medium for
two generations of writers including, subsequent to Burroughs, most promi-
nently Leigh Brackett (1915-1978). Burroughs and his heirs retained Low-
ell’s deserts and canals, but discarded the idea of a sophisticated Martian
civilization. Instead, they depicted towns, ancient beyond imagination, lying
in the southern hemisphere of Mars, their outskirts touching the shores of the
dried-up Low Canals that once discharged their waters into the now dust-
blown bed of a long-vanished ocean. The towns, once ruled by pirate kings,
bore names such as Jekkara, or Valkis, or Barrakesh. Their women – partly
resembling Indians, partly Mexicans – wore tiny golden bells chiming tempt-
ingly. Barbarian tribes came to these places from distant deserts, such as
Kesh and Shun. Santa Fe on Mars…
33 Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, Washington/London: Smith-
sonian Institution Press, 1997, 2.
34 McCurdy, Space, Washington/London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997: 2, 233-4.
35 Benjamin S. Lawson, ‘The Time and Place of Edgar Rice Burroughs’s Early Martian
Trilogy’, Extrapolation 27.3 (March 1986), 209.
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A Terran spaceport did exist at Kahora, not far from Olympus Mons. But
only hard-boiled adventurers dared approach the Low Canals, after having
galloped across the Drylands on half-wild saurians. They had ‘the rawhide
look of the planetary frontiers’ about them36 and wore their ray-guns low in
their holsters. For Barrakesh, Jekkara, Valkis were towns outside the law.
The scenario was Leigh Brackett’s, dreamt up during the 1940s. Like its
American counterpart, the ‘planetary frontier’ signified no demarcation line,
as the term was understood by Europeans, but rather the advancing rim of
settlement, site of the violent clash between savagery and civilization. After
the U. S. government had announced, in 1890, the ‘closing’ of the frontier in
its statistical meaning of less than six inhabitants per square mile, the frontier
– ‘by transcending the limitations of a specific temporality’ – came to be
projected from the past into the present and even the future. Creating a spe-
cific ‘moral landscape’ by depicting the course of American history as pro-
gress through violence (or, as Burroughs would have it in A Princess of
Mars, Ch. XXVI, ‘through carnage to joy’), the myth of the frontier contin-
ues to provide patterns of identification and legitimization for individual and
collective attitudes and behavior to the present day37. The rugged individual-
ist – the onward-thrusting pioneer – the hardy adventurer, all armed and
morally justified to shoot or to slash in a stereotyped black-and-white situa-
tion of good versus evil: These are the vivid images evoked by the frontier
metaphor. They re-emerged in ‘the “space opera” (as opposed to “horse
opera”)’ with the ‘typical structures and plots of westerns’, but the ‘settings
and trappings of science fiction’38.
Burroughs virtually defined the sub-genre, creating the quintessential
space opera character: Captain John Carter, a ‘gentleman of the highest type’
and former plantation owner from Virginia, who had proved his prowess in
the Civil War, and who was magically teleported from Arizona – where he
had been battling Apaches – to Mars39. He made no effort to conceal that
John Carter was modeled on Captain John Smith, a 17th century Virginian
colonist who figured prominently in another American legend – the narrative
of Pocahontas, Indian ‘princess’ of the Powhatan tribe. Supposedly, Pocahon-
tas (at the tender age of 12 or 13) had become enamored of Smith and had
rescued him from torture by her tribe. After arriving on a Mars peopled by
warlike black, red, green and yellow races, Burroughs’ John Carter met and
married the ‘incomparable princess’ Dejah Thoris, daughter of the Jed (ruler)
of Helium, chief of a red-skinned people that exhibited ‘a startling resem-
36 Leigh Brackett, The Secret of Sinharat, New York: Ace Books, 1964, 8.
37 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation. The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century Ameri-
ca, New York: Atheneum, 1992: 4-5, 6-7, 14, 24.
38 Lawson, ‘Time and Place’ , 213.
39 Edgar Rice Burroughs, A Princess of Mars, New York: Random House, 2003 [11912]:
XXIII-IV, 14-5.
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blance… to… the red Indians of…Earth’40. In The Princess of Mars and
Burroughs’ subsequent Mars novels, it was Carter’s task to repeatedly save
Dejah Thoris, with the extraordinary physical powers lent to him by Mars’
lesser gravity, from a fate ‘worse than death’. To leave not the slightest doubt
about the tradition he was embracing, Burroughs chose this context to revive
another stereotype of frontier melodrama: With ‘a cold sweat’, his main pro-
tagonist reflected that if he should fail, it would be ‘far better’ for Dejah
to‘save friendly bullets…at the last moment, as did those brave frontier
women of my lost land, who took their own lives rather than fall into the
hands of the Indian braves’41.
Frontier Mars became a place where only-too familiar characters lounged
in the doorways of Earth’s latest colony – Northwest Smith for one, created
in 1933 by writer Catherine L. Moore (1911-1987), ‘tall and leather-brown,
hand on his heat-gun’; where everybody understood the ‘old gesture’ when
that gun was drawn with a swift motion, sweeping ‘in a practised half-
circle’42; where John Carter, Northwest Smith and their likes fought human
or half-human tribes; where conflicts were invariably ‘resolved’ by resorting
to weapons. An ‘extension of our original America’, with ‘Martians
await[ing] us’ whom ‘we [could] assimilate to our old myths of the Indian’,
Frontier Mars was destined to remain a very ‘parochial’ planet43, familiar
rather than alien.
5 Cold War Mars
‘Watch the skies!’ moviegoers were counseled in 1951 at the end of the sci-
ence fiction film The Thing from Another World. The Cold War had turned
hot in Korea. Who knew what the Communists, ‘masters of deceit’ (FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover), aggressively pushing from outside, subversively
boring from within, threatening ‘the continuance of every home and fire-
side’44, might have up their sleeve?
Two years later, the 10 year-old stargazing protagonist of Invaders from
Mars did watch the skies at night, only to observe a flying saucer landing and
burrowing in the sandy ground across from his home. Everyone who investi-
40 Burroughs, Princess, 152.
41 Burroughs, Princess, 75.
42 Catherine L. Moore, ‘Shambleau’, in idem, Northwest Smith, New York: Ace Books, 1981
[1933], 2, 3.
43 Leslie A. Fiedler, The Return of the Vanishing American, London: Paladin, 1972, 25;
Lawson, ‘Time and Place’, 208.
44 J. Edgar Hoover, Masters of Deceit. The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight
it, New York: Pocket Books, 1958, VI.
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gated next morning – the child’s father, his mother, a neighbor girl, two po-
licemen, finally the local chief of police – was ‘transformed’ in succession,
displaying an implant in the neck and behaving robot-like.
Invaders from Mars recounted not just an invasion, but a ‘conspiracy’, an
emerging ‘fifth column’ of concealed infiltrators. Neither parents nor friends
could be trusted anymore – a patent allusion (including the unfeeling atti-
tudes displayed by affected adults) to rampant paranoia about the supposed
subversion of American life by Communists. The invaders themselves were
depicted as puppets, telepathically controlled by a ‘supreme intelligence’. As
might be expected, the military – alerted by the boy’s school psychologist
and her friend, an astrophysicist – arrived in time to save the day and blow up
the Martian saucer.
‘By the beginning of the decade, movies were America’s most popular
entertainment’; only from the mid-fifties would they be outranked by televi-
sion. Destination Moon (1950) ‘made the idea of space travel not only plau-
sible but fascinating’. The Thing from Another World (1951) ‘brought the
idea of creatures from other planets coming here to vivid life’45. From 1950,
too, the screen added Martian landscapes to those portrayed in the printed
media. Rocketship X(pedition) M(oon), Kurt Neumann’s bleak movie of
humans arriving on a Mars destroyed by nuclear war, and The Martian
Chronicles, Ray Bradbury’s seminal novel of the Red Planet’s colonization
against the backdrop of atomic war eventually engulfing Earth, both came out
during that year.
In Rocketship XM, the first manned spaceflight to Earth’s satellite was
thrown off course by a swarm of meteors and forced to land on Mars. The
crew found themselves in a post-nuclear wasteland, deducing ‘from artefacts
and ruins so radioactive they can’t approach them that there had once been a
high civilization on Mars, but that atomic warfare reduced the Martians to
savagery’46. Mutated Martians attacked the expedition, killing two and
wounding a third crew member. The rest of the crew escaped, but the rocket
ran out of fuel on its return flight and crashed. A year before, the Soviet Un-
ion had detonated its first nuclear device. President Truman had ordered
development of the hydrogen bomb in early 1950. ‘The idea that we now had
the potential to wipe out civilization entirely was beginning to permeate mass
culture’ – and was projected onto Mars by ‘the first film to expound such a
grim warning about our possible future’47.
The Soviet explosion and Truman’s announcement drew an immediate
response from a 30 year-old writer, Ray Bradbury, who felt that man might
‘still destroy himself before reaching for the stars. I see man’s self-
45 Bill Warren, Keep Watching the Skies. American Science Fiction Movies of the Fifties, Vol.
1, Jefferson/London: McFarland, IX, 2.
46 Warren, Keep Watching, 11.
47 Warren, Keep Watching, ibid.
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destructive half, the blind spider fiddling in the venomous dark, dreaming
mushroom-cloud dreams. Death solves it all, it whispers, shaking a handful
of atoms like a necklace of dark beads’48.
On May 6, 1950, Collier’s published one of Bradbury’s most powerful
stories, There Will Come Soft Rains. It had no human protagonists. Rather, it
focused on the final ‘death’ of an electronically programmed house, left
standing empty among glowing radioactive ruins, after its occupants had
perished, their images – as had happened in Hiroshima – ‘burnt on the wood
in one titanic instant’49. The story was included by Bradbury as a chapter in
his loosely-knit classic of the same year, The Martian Chronicles, intended
by the author to ‘provide a mirror for humanity, its faults, foibles, and fail-
ures… an allegory transplanted to another world’50.
Before being killed off by chicken pox which American colonists had in-
troduced to Mars, the planet’s golden-eyed ‘natives’ had inhabited crystal
houses at the edge of the canals that – attuned to nature – ‘turned and fol-
lowed the sun, flower-like’. The settlers not only brought chicken pox. They
also brought gas stations, and luggage stores, and hot-dog stands. With their
hammers, they ‘beat the strange world into a shape that was familiar’, they
‘bludgeon[ed] away all the strangeness… In all, some ninety thousand people
came to Mars’. But the majority left again when flashing light-radio messag-
es from Earth reported that there was war, that everybody should come home.
To those who had remained on Mars, the night sky soon offered a horrible
sight51:
Earth changed... It caught fire. Part of it seemed to come apart in a million pieces… It
burned with an unholy dripping glare for a minute, three times normal size, then dwindled.
Humans had turned two worlds, Mars and Earth, into ‘tomb planet[s]’52.
However, Bradbury – influenced by both Burroughs and Brackett – had
also decided ‘that there would be certain elements of similarity between the
invasion of Mars and the invasion of the Wild West’53. The frontier myth
held that America and its democracy would be reborn at every new frontier
between Atlantic and Pacific – and beyond. One family, more fortunate than
the folks annihilated in There Will Come Soft Rains, had escaped the inferno
on Earth (with rumours maintaining that a second one had also made it to
Mars). The father had promised the children that they would set out for a
picnic and would see Martians. Now they were gazing at their reflections in a
canal – and the Martians stared back at them.
48 Ray Bradbury, quoted in William F. Nolan, ‘Bradbury: Prose Poet in the Age of Space’,
Magazine of Fantasy & Science Fiction 24.5 (May 1963), 8.
49 Ray Bradbury, The Martian Chronicles, New York: Bantam Books, 1951, 185.
50 Sam Weller, The Bradbury Chronicles, New York: William Morrow, 2005, 156, 159.
51 Bradbury, Martian Chronicles, 2, 86, 158.
52 Bradbury, Martian Chronicles, 172.
53 Ray Bradbury, as quoted in Weller, Bradbury Chronicles, 155.
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The implication was evident. Bradbury’s ‘intensely critical examination’
of the frontier myth – of ‘the shallow and mercurial properties of America’s
predominant cultural construct’54 – notwithstanding, Mars emerged as anoth-
er ‘virgin land’ (Henry Nash Smith) where America might both survive and
regenerate. The Frontier Mars image, in other words, had proved its adapta-
bility to the hydrogen bomb age, reducing Cold War Mars to a mere variation
of an already familiar theme. And, as would soon become evident, the fron-
tier metaphor had not exhausted its usefulness.
6 Terraformed Mars
For American engineer Robert Zubrin, the writing presently ‘is on the wall’:
He holds that ‘without a frontier from which to breathe life, the spirit that
gave rise to the progressive humanistic culture that America for the past sev-
eral centuries has offered to the world is fading.’ Zubrin is convinced that
“the creation of a new frontier presents itself as America’s and humanity’s
greatest need’. And he ‘believe[s] that humanity’s new frontier can only be
Mars’55.
Zubrin, and the Mars Society formed in 1998 on his initiative, consider
privately funded Mars flights and the establishment of a permanent Mars
base as just initial steps. To fulfil the planet’s mission of reinvigorating ter-
restrial civilization, its atmospheric and surface conditions need to be dramat-
ically changed by a long-term project. Mars must be ‘terraformed’.
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, terraforming im-
plies a process of planetary engineering, aimed at creating an extraterrestrial
environment that would be habitable for humans. First use of the term has
been credited to science fiction writer John Stewart (‘Jack’) Williamson in a
1942 novella. The concept started to gain a certain scientific acceptability
after Carl Sagan had published an article in 1961 on introducing algae into
the atmosphere of Venus to slowly change that planet’s extremely hostile
conditions. In 1973, Sagan followed with a brief piece ‘Planetary Engineer-
ing on Mars’56, kicking off the debate with regard to the Red Planet.
To terraform Mars, both atmospheric pressure and surface temperature
would have to be raised. The ‘global warming’ process – basically compara-
ble to that which Earth is presently experiencing – would require an increase
54 Gregory M. Pfitzer, ‘The Only Good Alien is a Dead Alien: Science Fiction and the Meta-
physics of Indian-Hating on the High Frontier’, Journal of American Culture 18.1 (Spring
1995), 58.
55 Robert Zubrin, The Significance of the Martian Frontier, www.javanet.com/-campr.2/New
Mars/Pages/Frontier 1.html, 1998.
56 Carl Sagan, ‘Planetary Engineering on Mars’, Icar us 20 (1973), 513-514.
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in ‘greenhouse gasses’, such as carbon dioxide or more powerful fluorocar-
bons, for which several ways have been proposed, and the subsequent build-
up of a hydrosphere providing the water necessary to sustain life57.
The idea was, of course, picked up by science fiction – most elaborately
by Kim Stanley Robinson in his trilogy Red Mars/Green Mars/Blue Mars
(1992-96). The work focused on the century-long conflict between ‘Greens’,
whose sense of mission prompted them to contaminate the Red Planet with
robust mosses and lichens at every opportunity, and the ‘Red’ environmental-
ists who were finally driven underground.
As before, such imaginary landscapes have revealed more about the de-
sires, the hopes, the anxieties of those who designed them, than about any
future ‘green’ or ‘blue’ Mars. While Zubrin took care to link the emergence
of a terraformed Martian frontier to the promotion of values such as individu-
alism, creativity and belief in the idea of progress, his basic approach was far
more hard-nosed58:
If the idea is accepted that the world’s resources are fixed, then each person is ultimately
the enemy of every other person, and each race or nation is the enemy of every other race
or nation. The inevitable result is tyranny, war and genocide. Only in a universe of unlim-
ited resources can all men be brothers.
Put differently: Either a new frontier will be opened up – or containment,
rather than self-containment, will become the ‘natural’ order of things…
Objections against such reasoning were the exception. In terms reminis-
cent of Bradbury, but more starkly, historian Patricia Limerick in her contri-
bution to the 1992 volume Space Policy Alternatives emphasized the social-
Darwinist consequences of ‘rugged individualism’ that had shaped the ‘con-
quest’ of the American West, including greed and corruption, violence
against ‘aliens’ (Indians and Mexicans), environmental destruction. She re-
jected the simplified picture, again extolled by Zubrin, of equating westward
expansion with democracy and progress, for that picture had ‘denied conse-
quences and evaded failure’59.
Because of ‘America’s pioneer heritage, technological pre-eminence, and
economic strength, it is fitting that we should lead the people of this planet
into space’, the Paine Commission had stated in 1986. Chaired by an earlier
NASA Administrator, it included UN Ambassador Jeane Kirckpatrick, for-
mer test pilot Charles Yeager and retired Air Force General Bernard Schriev-
57 Christopher P. McKay, Owen B. Toon and James F. Kasting, ‘Making Mars Habitable”,
Nature 352 (8 August 1991), 489-96; Christopher P. McKay, ‘Restoring Mars to Habitable
Conditions: Can We? Should We? Will We?’, Journal of the Irish Colleges of Physicians
and Surgeons 22.1 (January 1993), 17-9.
58 Zubrin, Significance.
59 Patricia Nelson Limerick, ‘Imagined Frontiers: Westward Expansion and the Future of the
Space Program’, in Space Policy Alternatives, ed. Radford Byerly, Jr., Boulder: Westview
Press, 1992, 249-262.
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er (who had directed IRBM Thor and ICBM Atlas development). In their
report, tellingly entitled Pioneering the Space Frontier, the members had
proposed to ‘stimulate individual initiative and free enterprise in space’, and
had resolved that ‘from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars’,
America should ‘make accessible vast new resources and support human
settlements beyond Earth orbit’60.
This was no space opera. This was a National Commission on Space, ap-
pointed by the President of the United States, issuing a declaration that, with
its ‘fervent optimism and cheeriness’, was ‘vintage 1890’s… a picture of
harmony and progress where historical reality shows us something closer to a
muddle’61.
Abstracting and reducing from reality, the frontier myth has created a
historical cliché. Clichés, as Richard Slotkin – among others – has reminded
us, may serve to interpret new experiences as mere recurrences of past hap-
penings, reflecting a refusal to learn. Identifying Mars as merely another
‘frontier’, projecting a moral purpose on the adaption of that so-called plane-
tary frontier to human settlers’ needs, tops a tradition of invoking a highly
problematic cultural stereotype.
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The following chapter was written for the book Portugal in the 1980’s: Di-
lemmas of Democratic Consolidation, edited by Kenneth Maxwell and pub-
lished in 1986 by Greenwood Press. The text examines the structural prob-
lems involved in Portugal’s relationship with Western Europe; almost in
passing, it also reconstructs an important phase in the European Union’s
history. It argues that the constraints of Portugal’s persisting political and
economic imbalances might overwhelm the advantages of EC entry. Politi-
cally, at least, the chronic instabilities generated by the rapid turnover of
successive governments have since abated. Economically, however, the vi-
cious circle of accumulating current account deficits and harsh austerity
programs has persevered, culminating in the present financial crisis. Factors
identified in the subsequent chapter continue to afflict Portugal: low indus-
trial and agricultural productivity, inferior vocational training and education
standards, weak competitiveness, severe unemployment, high public debt,
inefficient bureaucracy. With regard to GDP per capita, Portugal continues
to rank third lowest in the euro area.
Portugal and Western Europe:
Shifting Involvements
A Hesitant Relationship’s Politics and Economics
The year was 1970, and the occasion was Portugal’s opening bid for the ne-
gotiations about to begin in Brussels, finally resulting in the Portuguese-EC
Free Trade Agreement of 1972. The year 1972 had also been fixed as the date
when the United Kingdom’s accession to the Common Market would become
effective. Great Britain was Portugal’s most important foreign market; seven
years later, it would still absorb one-third of Portuguese exports. The United
Kingdom and Portugal had been among the states establishing the European
Free Trade Association in 1960. Portugal, at the time, had been the sole coun-
try to be conceded substantial non-reciprocal advantages by Annex G to the
EFTA Convention: Portuguese elimination of import duties on industrial
products was allowed to proceed much more slowly than was reduction by
the other Six – zero duties only by 1980, instead of 1966. Moreover, Portugal
was permitted to introduce new duties for protecting "infant indus-
tries".Between 1960 and 1970, Portuguese exports to EFTA countries in-
creased by 15 percent, while exports to EC member states declined by 3.5
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percent.1 Obviously, the EC common tariff hurt Portugal’s trade, and when
the United Kingdom joined the Common Market, Portugal was "virtually
forced" to come to terms with the European Community.2 Portugal at the
time was (and had progressively become since 1961) a "warfare state",3 allot-
ting over 40 percent of `its annual budget to military expenditures that fi-
nanced the increasingly savage colonial wars in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and
Mozambique. The trade agreement’s political implications, therefore, were
severely criticized by the exiled Portuguese socialists, the European Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions, and by the Dutch opposition parties. The treaty
not only diplomatically strengthened the Caetano dictatorship, it also enabled
Portugal "to continue and increase her military expenditures," thereby con-
tributing to continued armed repression of the African independence move-
ments.
The Dutch government, however – and its attitude may be taken as ex-
emplary for the EC – officially kept to the view that "purely commercial"
arrangements were at issue. The Portuguese minister of foreign affairs fol-
lowed suit. "You keep asking political questions," he told the journalists
interviewing him in Brussels, after he had presented his country’s opening
statement to the EC Council. "I am concerned simply with the economics of
the situation.”4
On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (Mo-
vimento das Forças Armadas, MFA), reacting to the deteriorating military
situation in Africa, overthrew the Salazar-Caetano “Estado Novo." On June
27, a mere two months after the coup, the First Provisional Government
asked the European Community for economic support. On November 25/26,
the Third Provisional Government presented urgent proposals for new special
trade terms (under the two-year-old free trade agreement) and for a compre-
hensive arrangement protecting Portuguese emigrant workers in EC member
countries: there were 850,000 Portuguese in France alone by 1974.
These proposals, however, were submitted after General António de Spi-
nola had gone on television for his dramatic farewell address to the country.
The MFA had picked Spinola, former military governor of Guinea-Bissau
(then Guiné Portuguesa), as Portugal’s new president. While evolutionary
rather than revolutionary change – movement toward "a representative demo-
cratic regime similar to others in Western Europe… in which the interests of
1 Data provided by Klaus Esser, et al.: Portugal: Industrie und lndustriepolitik vor dem
Beitritt zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Berlin 1977, p. 221
2 Peter Guinee: Portugal and the EEC, Amsterdam 1973, p. 66.
3 Douglas Porch: The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution, London/Stanford 1977,
p. 12.
4 Cf. Guinee, Portugal and the EEC, pp. 73 ss.; the quotes are on pp. 74, 88.
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the propertied would be defended"5 – seemed at first guaranteed after the
April coup, its immediate chances were destroyed by Spinola’s gamble, sup-
ported by conservative groups, to extend or regain his personal powers during
successive crises in July and September 1974 (and, finally, by an abortive
military coup on March 11, 1975). These crises radicalized a part of the MFA
and mobilized an ever widening segment of the population. The industrial
workers of Lisbon and Setubal and the rural proletariat of the southern
Alentejo contributed to the accelerating mass movement that, during the
summer of 1975, began to bear the traits of a social revolution.
Following Spinola’s resignation from the presidency, "the Community
leadership lacked the will… to give rapid satisfaction to the demands put
forward by the Portuguese”.6 EC attitudes were particularly important for
Portugal because of its rapidly deteriorating economic situation: While mer-
chandise exports rose only from $1.8 billion (1973) to $2.3 billion (even
declining in 1975 and 1976), merchandise imports shot up from $2.8 billion
to $4.3 billion in 1974. Because of climbing international prices, by far the
most marked increases were not in amounts but in value of cereal and, espe-
cially enormous, of crude oil imports. Income from tourism and emigrant
remittances fell drastically; clandestine capital outflow through the un-
dervoicing of exports alone has been estimated at $108 million for 1975.
Labor migration from Portugal decreased by 45 percent (barely 45,000 per-
sons as against nearly 80,000 in 1973) after France, West Germany, and other
countries had reacted to the 1973-75 world recession by unilaterally suspend-
ing the import of labor. Meanwhile, due to returnees from Angola and
Mozambique, and to the demobilization of military personnel, Continental
Portugal’s population swelled from 8.43 million in 1973 to 8.68 million in
1974 and 9.09 million in 1975, unemployment and underemployment rising
stiffly with it.7 Judged against the background of worsening terms of trade
and international recession, Portuguese revolution and decolonization could
hardly have happened in a more unfavorable situation.
The EC Foreign Ministers’ Council, however, during Portugal’s "hot
summer" of 1975, on May 26 and again on June 24, hedged on economic aid,
5 Lawrence S. Graham: "The Military in Politics: The Politicization of the Portuguese Armed
Forces," in Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, eds.: Contemporary Portugal, Aus-
tin/London 1979, p. 234.
6 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly: Report on the Situation in Portugal, Doc.
3609, Strasbourg, April 21, 1975, p. 18.
7 For the data, cf. Robert N. McCauley: “A Compendium of IMF Troubles: Turkey, Portugal,
Peru, Egypt", in Lawrence G. Frank and Marilyn J. Seiber, eds., Developing Country Debt,
New York 1979, p. 151; World Bank, ed.: Portugal: Current and Prospective Economic
Trends, Washington D.C., 1978, p. 34; Manuel Barboza and Luis Miguel P. Beleza: "Ex-
ternal Disequilibrium in Portugal 1975-78”, in Fundaçao Calouste Gulbenkian, ed.: II In-
ternational Conference on the Portuguese Economy, Vol. 2, Lisbon 1980, pp. 57, 62; in-
formation supplied by the Ministry of Social Communication in Lisbon.
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voicing its concern with "political stability" and "democratic development" in
Portugal. Finally, on July 17, France’s president "vetoed a Community
loan… for fear of subsidizing a socialist-communist alliance”.8 The EC
Council of Heads of State and Government, instead, presented Portugal with
what amounted to a "virtual ultimatum":9 "The EC, because of its political
and historical tradition, can grant support only to a pluralist democracy.”10
By "pluralist," the Council was, of course, referring to the North American-
Western European public philosophy11 – and not to the creed professed by
the MFA: Four weeks earlier, the group of Portuguese officers that had over-
thrown the Caetano regime had declared that their aim consisted in a "social-
ist pluralism" repudiating "the implantation of socialism by violent or dicta-
torial means" and implying "recognition of the existence of various political
parties, even though they do not necessarily defend socialist options”.12
Conducive to the Western European attitude was the concern of political
and military strategists over what they termed "NATO’s crumbling Southern
flank": Soviet naval buildup and Communist Party strength around the Medi-
terranean were perceived as two blades of a scissor fragmenting NATO polit-
ical cohesion and endangering NATO military communications; the revolu-
tionary process in Portugal seemed to pose an immediate threat to both.13
Accordingly, the threshold was quickly reached after which any real change
in the status quo became "intolerable"14 to NATO: Portugal was not viewed
as a developing policy and society in its own right; the country’s situation, on
the contrary, was put squarely into the context of the East-West conflict.
Contrary to the EC Council, the Commission had, in a memorandum of
June 11, 1975, pleaded for "immediate" and "spectacular" economic aid to
"strengthen Portuguese democracy”.15 As Hans Beck, deputy chief of cabinet
to the EC Commission’s vice president Wilhelm Haferkamp (a West German
Social Democrat), asserted in the periodical Neue Gesellschaft (published by
the SPD-affiliated Friedrich Ebert Foundation), the Commission’s motivation
can be taken to have stemmed "not from political altruism" but rather from
8 Jonathan Story: "Portugal’s Revolution of Carnations: Patterns of Change and Continuity,"
International Affairs 52 (1976), 431.
9 Tad Szulc: "Hope for Portugal," New Republic, August 30, 1975, p. 9.
10 Cf. Commission of the European Communities: Die Beziehungen zwischen der EG und
Portugal, Brussels 1976, p. 8
11 The role of the concept of pluralism as a guideline and justification of Western European
(and U.S.) foreign policy has been explored in the author’s Sozialistischer Pluralismus in
Europa: Ansätze und Scheitern am Beispiel Portugal, Cologne 1984
12 For a translation of the entire MFA Program text, cf. Appendix IV to Porch, Portuguese
Armed Forces, pp. 248 ss.
13 Cf. David Rees: "Southern Europe: NATO’s Crumbling Flank," Conflict Studies, No. 60
(1975), 2/3, 13.
14 Tad Szulc, "Washington and Lisbon: Behind the Portuguese Revolution," Foreign Policy,
No. 21 (Winter 1975/76), 9.
15 Commission of the European Communities, Beziehungen (n. 10), ibid.
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"our own interest in preserving and stabilizing our political system” whose
"credibility and efficiency, confronted with communism…, is at stake in
Portugal."16
However, a $180 million European Investment Bank loan was only
granted Portugal on October 7, after a new, de facto social democratic, provi-
sional government had been in office for three weeks; the first disbursements
were not made before April 1976. The trade agreement of 1972 was finally
amended in June of the same year. Evidently, aid from Western Europe could
not be obtained without a commitment to the West.
General Francisco da Costa Gomes, Spinola’s successor to the Portu-
guese presidency, has made abundantly clear that the EC attitude, from the
autumn of 1974 onward, was interpreted by the Portuguese governments not
in economic terms, but along political lines as "inimical" foreign pressure.17
The Common Market’s "power of denial,"18 demonstrated from May to
July 1975, could not have failed to impress, first and foremost, President
Costa Gomes, Foreign Minister Major Melo Antunes, and ambassador itiner-
ant Major Vitor Alves (the latter visiting Western European capitals between
April and September 1975). One week after the EC Council had been in ses-
sion, Costa Gomes, in a discourse to the MFA Delegate Assembly, made no
secret of his conviction that, because of Portugal’s economic "dependence on
the West," the country could not endure "Western enmity" as long as its eco-
nomic ties with Third World and socialist countries had not been further
developed. Advancing the revolution was conceivable only after the coun-
try’s external condition had become such that the global powers’ "fields of
influence would cancel each other."19 Antunes and Alves led the MFA offic-
ers’ "Group of Nine" whose August 7 document, signaling open discord in
MFA ranks and sharply criticizing the cabinet’s "revolutionary vanguard"
politics, was instrumental in ending the short period of left—leaning gov-
ernments (frequently called "Gonçalvist," after Prime Minister Brigadier
Vasco Gonçalves). They were tacitly supported by Costa Gomes, who agreed
with their opinions, if not with their methods.20
The Group of Nine document contained the first reference to the alleged
necessity of "strengthening and deepening the ties with certain economic
areas (Common Market, EF'TA)."21 Elsewhere, too, the European Council’s
declaration had not gone unremarked in Portugal. Proof is provided by a
"revolutionary critique" of the Group of Nine document, published by offic-
16 Hans Beck, "Portugal und die EG - Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit einer Gemeinschafts-
hilfe für Portugal," Neue Gesellschaft 22 (1975), p. 532.
17 Cf. Francisco da Costa Gomes, Sobre Portugal, Lisbon 1979, p. 59.
18 Story, "Portuga1’s Revolution" (n. 8), ibid.
19 Francisco da Costa Gomes, Discursos Politicos, Lisbon 1976, p. 201.
20 Costa Gomes, Sobre Portugal, p. 81.
21 Cited in Guenter Schroeder (ed.): Portugal: Materialien und Dokumente, Vol. 3, Giessen,
1976, p. 133.
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ers close to Brigadier Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the April 25 coup’s military
architect who now commanded the MFA special forces (COPCON). The
critique found that the economic perspective of the Nine would “reinforce the
country’s subjugation under a pernicious dependence. Whoever may still
have entertained illusions has now lost them considering the recent condi-
tions tied to ‘financial aid for Portugal."22
Melo Antunes himself – and along with him an important MFA faction –
would originally have preferred a "Third World option," the emergence –
from a position of nonalignment – of a Lisbon/Maputo/Luanda "axis."23 This
position, as has been demonstrated, proved unattainable, with both sides in
the East-West conflict “not prepared or not able to tolerate the withdrawal of
an associate.”24
In 1977, after the new constitution had been promulgated a year before,
Mario Soares’ First Constitutional Government applied for Portuguese EC
membership. Soares went so far as to assert that the application had not been
"the decision of a government," but "the decision of a people," "the meeting
of a country with its own destiny.”25 (Four years later, 67 percent of the Por-
tuguese population had no exact idea about the Common Market.26)
For their part, the EC Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the
Commission, and the EC Economic and Social Committee unanimously
stressed the political aspect – consolidating democracy in Portugal and
Southern Europe – as the "overriding objective" of Portugal’s EC acces-
sion.27 Just about everybody in the EC, however, also voiced immediate
concern about "the economic, financial, agricultural, and social difficulties
Portugal will face."28
Thus, as during the preceding periods – the dictatorship and the revolu-
tionary interlude -hesitancies again could be perceived, each time fed by
either the politics or the economics of the situation. Once again, political and
economic considerations seemed to be at odds with each other – a not unfa-
miliar experience for both parts in the mutual Portugal—EC involvement
before and after Portugal’s liberation by golpe. What, if any, has been the
22 Cited ibid., p. 149.
23 Cf. José Medeiros Ferreira, “Aspectos Intemacionais da Revolugao Portuguesa”, paper
presented at the II International Meeting on Modern Portugal, Durham, 1979, p. 6.
24 Horst Bieber, „Entwicklungen und Zielsetzungen der Aussenpolitik Portugals seit April
1974“, Berichte zur Entwicklung in Spanien, Portugal und Lateinamerika 3 (1977), p. 32.
25 Mario Soares, "Portugal and Europe," European Yearbook, 24 (1978): 16.
26 Cf. Diario de Noticias, December 25, 1981, p. 1.
27 Cf. Commission of the European Communities: "Portugal and the European Community",
Europe Information 34/80, Brussels, 1980, pp. 2, 3.
28 Cf. Eric N. Baklanoff, The Economic Transformation of Spain and Portugal, New
York/Lisbon, 1978, p. 156, citing the EC Council of Ministers’ 1977 joint position regard-
ing the Portuguese candidacy.
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underlying common denominator guiding perceptions on either side of the
"hesitant relation-ship"?
The standard of joining the EC was first raised, in 1976, by the PS in a
politically motivated attempt to attach Portugal more firmly to Western Eu-
rope. "Europa connosco" became the slogan symbolizing the PS project to
advance its electoral appeal and, at the same time, to consolidate parliamen-
tary democracy in Portugal.
Even in 1972, however, the Caetano regime, after signing the free trade
agreement, had evoked the economic perspective of extending the treaty, via
its evolutionary clause, into the fields of technological aid and industrializa-
tion.29
The MFA, for its part, expressly defined its basic aims in 1974 as "De-
colonization – Democratization – Development." It is the notion of develop-
ment that has increasingly been gaining ground in Portugal: As no endoge-
nous and autonomous process of socioeconomic modernization has occurred
in the country, integrating Portugal into the EC ought to mean "priming the
pump", mobilizing for a dynamic process of structural transformation which
is to be pushed from outside.30
Although a case can be made that such transformation is the object that
has been emerging into the foreground of official Portuguese aspirations,
considerations of military security may be considered to rank paramount if an
underlying consistency is looked for in Western European attitudes and be-
havior toward Portugal.
In 1949, under Salazar, "the capital importance of [Portugal’s] geo-
strategic situation" was already deemed "sufficient to justify its admission
into NATO, even if internally it was characterized by a dictatorial and auto-
cratic regime."31 By the time Caetano was negotiating with the Common
Market, the "necessity of harmony in consultations between the EEC and
NATO" was being stressed by Joseph Luns, and the "enlargement of the
Community" was judged "very important in encouraging closer defense co-
operation."32 Conversely, the EC balked in 1974/75 after Portugal had been
de facto excluded from NATO intelligence in general and nuclear contingen-
cy planning in particular, and the country’s NATO membership had even
seemed about to come under review at the NATO summit in May 1975.33
29 Cf. Guinee, Portugal and the EEC, pp. 40, 45.
30 Cf. Emani Rodrigues Lopes, "Desinvolvimento Economico e Social e Integracao Europeia.
Dois Desafios para a Decada 80," Manuscript, 1981, pp. 23-24 and passim; excerpts printed
in Diario de Noticias, May 26, 1981, pp. 17 ss.
31 Cf. Assemblée de l’Atlantique Nord, Commission Economique: "La Situation économique
et les besoins d’aide économique et militaire du Portugal”, Doc. Y 87-EC/P (81), May l,
1981, p. 2.
32 The latter by the United Kingdom’s Geoffrey Rippon; for both quotes, cf. Guinee, Portugal
and the EEC, p. 81.
33 For details, cf. Szulc, "Washington and Lisbon”, pp. 42 ss.
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The EC’s more affluent "center" is, of course, identical with most of
NATO’s "core" members, promoting and facilitating joint action. Moreover,
the North Atlantic Alliance, to the EC countries, offers a habitual military
substitute for a European Defense Community nowhere in sight, and security
considerations are rather automatically invoked in arguments about EC poli-
cies. In a West German official’s discussion of the second EC enlargement’s
consequences for the Mediterranean, the very first sentence deduced the
"special importance, to the EC," of that region from its "strategic situation."34
Rather habitually, when considering possible EC solutions for Mediter-
ranean countries’ economic problems, the specter has been evoked of a pos-
sible "rise in the influence of other, rival, powers”, meaning the Soviet Un-
ion, "with potentially important strategic implications for the Community”.35
Concerning, more specifically, Portugal’s accession demand, it was held that
the North Atlantic Alliance also had "to take an active interest in that coun-
try’s economic development" because "recent events lend even more urgency
to enforcing NATO’s southern flank”, and Portugal’s economic stability was
seen as a necessary prerequisite for the country "to keep its defense engage-
ments”.36
Security considerations, however, even if they do not provide the sole
explanation for Westem European attitudes toward Portugal, may combine
with built-in sociopolitical resistances in the country itself against more than
minimal structural change. As an altemative to socioeconomic development,
a stagnating "marginal" society in Portugal remains more than a mere "fig-
ment of imagination”,37 continuing to offer bases to NATO, migrant labor
(when and if welcomed again by the more prosperous EC countries), a con-
venient, if limited outlet for Common Market exports, and attractive resorts
for tourism.
Portugal’s Polity and Economy: A Persistent Structural Crisis
Between April 1974 and December 1978, Portugal has had 16 governments –
6 of them provisional (until the new constitution’s promulgation in 1976), the
34 Rudolf Morawitz (FRG Ministry of Economics), "Die Auswirkungen der Süderweiterung
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf das Mittelmeerbecken“, Europa-Archiv, No. 6 (1980),
p. 179.
35 Robert Taylor, "Implications for the Southern Mediterranean Countries of the Second
Enlargement of the European Community”, Europe Information, Brussels (1980), p. 15. Cf.
also the literature cited by Heinz Kramer, "Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und der Mittel-
meerraum“, Jahrbuch für Ost-West-Fragen 1979, Cologne, 1979, p. 317, n. 3.
36 Assemblée de l’Atlantique Nord, "La Situation économique”, p. 3.
37 Cf. Lopes, "Desinvolvimento”, p. 18.
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other 10 constitutional. The most recent parliamentary election – the fifth
since l976 – were held on October 6, 1985. If the popular vote had been mov-
ing to the right slowly but steadily until 1980 (from 40 to 47.5 percent of
votes cast), the trend was stopped in 1983, after the governing conservative-
liberal coalition Alianca Democrática (AD) had fallen apart. However, the de
facto social-democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS), which polled
just above 36 percent and thus a plurality of the vote had, in matters of eco-
nomic policy, already made clear that it could be expected to look more after
business than labor interests.
The Ninth Constitutional Government with Mário Soares as prime minis-
ter was based on a bloco central, including the conservative-liberal Partido
Social Democrata (PSD), the party that had been, before the 1983 elections,
the major AD coalition partner. Following the collapse of the Soares-led
coalition in June 1985 and facing the impending loss of his own presidential
powers in July, General Eanes dissolved the Assembly on July 10, setting
October 6, 1985 for anticipated general elections.
In Portugal, large differences in electoral behavior have persisted, corre-
sponding mainly to deep socioeconomic and sociocultural rifts between the
country’s North, Center, and South. Thus, the Communist Party (Paitido
Comunista Português, PCP) has continued to attract between 14 and 19 per-
cent of the electorate, mainly among the "agnostic" rural and industrial prole-
tariat of the Lisbon-Setubal "industrial belt" and the sparsely populated agrar-
ian South. The PSD and the conservative Social Democratic Center (Centro
Democrático Social, CDS) have derived their main electoral strength from
among the small and medium peasantry of the populous North; the PSD, at
the same time, has been competing with the PS for the vote of the urban
white collar strata and part of the more skilled Porto and Lisbon industrial
workers.
Apart from socio-cultural differences between Continental Portugal’s
"two (or even three) nations," electoral movements and governmental insta-
bility may be traced, in large part, back to the fact that, while a social majori-
ty was resolved to break with the Salazarist dictatorship’s more extreme
political, social, and economic inequalities, deep and continuing rifts have
persisted about the scope and direction a transformation of the Portuguese
society’s hierarchies and values ought to assume. These rifts have made
themselves particularly felt among the electorate and membership of the two
largest political parties, PS and PSD. Thus, a political majority in favor of a
distinct alternative did not – in spite of the 1976 constitution’s socialist com-
mitments – assert itself, and the "limited" social revolution occurring during
1974/75 immediately after the military coup has been succeeded by what
might be termed a "limited" restoration.
The "socialist" PS developed out of the Acao Socialista Portuguésa
(ASP), founded during 1964 in Geneva and later admitted into the Socialist
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Intemational. With the support of the West German Social Democratic Party
(SPD) and the Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the ASP was transformed into
the PS at Bad Münstereifel (FRG) in 1973. The report of its general secretary
Mário Soares at the time found it lacking not only in organizational capacity
but also in theoretical training and reflection.38 While verbally rejecting, in
its 1974 program, "social democratic" solutions maintaining, "on purpose or
in fact, capitalist structures”, it had, by 1976 (strongly influenced and fi-
nanced by SPD and FES39, and probably also receiving U.S. money "fun-
neled by the Central Intelligence Agency through Western European Socialist
parties and labor unions"40) developed into an "orthodox Western party."41
Twice, large parts of its left wing seceded from the PS. A recent Interna-
tional Herald Tribune commentary described Soares as "probably farthest to
the right among Western European socialist party leaders”, blaming his auto-
cratic regime for the lack of inner-party democracy.42 With Soares as prime
minister, the PS formed the I Constitutional Government in 1976/77 as a
minority cabinet and led, in 1978, the II Constitutional Government under an
informal arrangement with the CDS. These two administrations were suc-
ceeded in 1978/79, due to lack of a parliamentary majority, by three presiden-
tial cabinets of "independents”, the first two ranging from liberal to conserva-
tive, the third a mere caretaker administration headed by a progressive Catho-
lic, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo.
38 For details, cf. Partido Socialista, ed., Destruir o sistema - Construir uma NovaVida, n. p.,
1973, pp. 25, 27, 31, 39.
39 The only SPD statement offering any quantitative information referred, in January 1975, to
DM 882,000 in FES aid for political training and organization building (cf. "Sozialdemo-
kraten helfen," Sozialdemokrat Magazin, No. 1 [1975]: 21). A news report specified in
1979 that the FES had altogether supported the PS with DM 10-15 mio; in 1977 alone, 2.9
mio of these were paid out of FRG government subsidies (cf. "Immer auf der Sonnenseite
des Lebens," Der Spiegel 33, No. 16, April 16, 1979, p. 47). When former West German
Chancellor Willy Brandt visited Portugal and conferred with the PS during October 19-21,
1974, the SPD did not mince its words, commenting that Brandt’s travel made "plain the in-
fluence Germany’s social democracy is exerting on the development of democracies in Eu-
rope" (Friedhelm März, "Solidarität mit Portugal," Sozialdemokrat Magazin, No. 11 [1974]:
14). Half a year later, Brandt stated that "ideological export models" in Portugal would "not
be tolerated" ("Vor ldeologie-Export gewarnt," Vorwärts, July 3, 1975). A press article
friendly to the Socialist lnternational has been quite candid in reporting that, as West Ger-
man trade union officials traveled to Portugal, "it was not uncommon that they carried a
suitcase full of money as a gesture of solidarity" (Nina Grunenberg, "Frieden, Freiheit und
ein Traum: Die Sozialistische Internationale," Die Zeit, Dec. 26, 1980, p. 11). The report’s
further assertion that “dependencies did not result" may, however, be called into question,
considering Soares’ own judgment, quoted above, on the PS’s initial lack in theoretical
training and the party’s subsequent ‘socia1 democratization.’
40 New York Times, September 25, 1975, pp. 1, 25.
41 Tom Gallagher: "Portugal’s Bid for Democracy: The Role of the Socialist Party”, West
European Politics 2 (1979), p. 203.
42 Cf. John Darnton, "Soares - The Comeback of a Natural Politician”, International Herald
Tribune, April 27, 1983, p. 5.
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The CDS, established in 1974 by public figures from the Caetano re-
gime’s economy and bureaucracy, has most consistently appealed to "those
groups which [were] most content with the old system."43 It was the only
party to vote against the 1976 constitution.
Also founded in 1974, the PSD experienced even more profound faction-
al strife than the PS. In the course of impassioned internal debates (followed
by several splits), whether the party was essentially a moderate-to-
progressive group concerned with a selective opposition to post-1974 revolu-
tionary results or a conservative organization fundamentally opposed to the
revolution, the PSD, under the direction of Francisco Sá Carneiro (who had
led the short-lived “liberal wing" of the Salazarist state party Acçao Nacional
Popular and was killed in a 1980 plane crash) moved steadily toward the
right.44 In the 1979 and 1980 parliamentary elections, the Aliança
Democrática (AD), a coalition of PSD and CDS with a smaller monarchical
group, won an absolute majority of seats. When Sá Carneiro’s successor as
prime minister, Francisco Pinto Balsemão, attempted to steer a more liberal
course, the PSD’s internal discords erupted with a vengeance that twice re-
sulted in Balsemão’s resignation and finally led to the elections of April
1983.
The PCP, finally, only gained a minority representation in the first six
provisional governments. Banned in 1927 and viciously repressed between
1933 and 1974, conditioned by what have been most aptly termed the "trau-
matic experiences" of a "Hobbesian world”,45 it has rightly been judged still
a "party from the times of Dimitrov”, with a "hardly fertile theoretical dog-
matism.46 However, it had been the only party to survive in the underground;
at least in the Alentejo, by its tradition of resistance, it was firmly established
among the exploited rural workers.
It was the rural workers of the Alentejo, as has been indicated, together
with the workers of the Lisbon-Setúbal "industrial belt" and the dwellers of
the shantytowns or miserable quarters of Porto, Lisbon, and Setubal, that
during 1974/75 contributed to the beginnings of a social revolution by occu-
pying latifundist farms, vacant government and private housing, finally in-
dustrial firms whose owners were either declaring themselves bankrupt or
seeking to close down their factories. Workers’, occupants’, and residents’
commissions were formed to manage cooperatives, voice demands, organize
strikes, and push for government support. The PCP, but also smaller, more
militant groups of the revolutionary Left (especially PRP, the Partido Revo-
43 Ben Pimlott, "Parties and Voters in the Portuguese Revolution”, Parliamentary Affairs
(Winter 1977), p. 42.
44 Cf. ibid., p. 41; Tom Gallagher: "The 1979 Portuguese General Election”, Luso-Brasilian
Review 18 (1981), p. 256.
45 Tom Gallagher, "The Portuguese Communist Party and Eurocommunism”, Political Quar-
terly 50 (1979), pp. 205, 206.
46 Marcio Moreira Alves, Les Soldats socialistes du Portugal, Paris, 1975, p. 156.
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lucionario do Proletariado, and MES, the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista)
came to secure influence among the military, workers committees and trade
unions, municipal administrations, and part of the mass media.
Because of prevailing paradigms and even the popular "demonology" of
the East-West conflict, scholarly and political assessments of the years 1974-
75 have tended to play down the role of Portuguese social movements, as
well as of the smaller organized groups on the left. Instead, concentrating on
political elites – parties and their leaderships – and arguing along the familiar
lines of the "pluralism vs. totalitarianism" approach, interpretations have
usually stressed inter-party strife, especially between the PS and PCP, and
have tended to cast the latter party in the role of the acting villain, while the
PS was pictured as the reacting, finally triumphant martyr. The popularity of
that perception was enhanced, of course, by the presentation of the Portu-
guese situation put forward abroad by Mário Soares and his followers. How-
ever, it enormously simplified the realities of a social eruption in which nei-
ther the MFA nor the Communist Party were pulling all the strings.47
Accordingly, when the MFA reacted to the social movement in the South
and Center by increasingly intervening directly into the political process,
ideological conflicts began to divide the officers into warring factions. At the
same time, the conservative peasantry of the North remained opposed and
indeed, encouraged by the Catholic Church, became violently hostile to the
leftward trend.
After the North had, by sheer numerical weight of its people, decided the
1975 Constituent Assembly elections in favor of the PS (and the PSD), the
PS increasingly challenged both the PCP and MFA. A mi1itary-political
coalition came to unite the MFA’s moderate socialist faction, "operational"
officers extolling traditional military professionalism over structural social
change, and the PS. It proved its effectiveness on and after November 25,
1975, when an uprising of left-wing units was suppressed by measures so
carefully prepared that they have been judged equal to a "centrist coup”,
"coolly planned and executed" by troops under the command of Lieutenant-
47 More sober accounts have repeatedly disclaimed the "gross oversimplification to view
today‘s (i.e. Summer 1975) political scene in Portugal exclusively as a forum in the battle
between Democratic freedom and Communist dictatorship" (Tad Szulc, "Volatile Portu-
gal”, New Republic, August 16-23, 1975, p. 18). In contrast to Mário Soares’ speech mak-
ing "as the demagogic defender of socialism and democracy. . . struggling against the forc-
es of totalitarianism" (Robert Harvey, Portugal: Birth of a Democracy, London, 1978, p.
39), former PS Agricultural Minister Lopes Cardoso has always insisted that the "hot sum-
mer" of 1975 cannot be considered as "um periodo de pre-ditadura comunista" (Tempo,
November 26, 1981, p. 11). Cardoso had, in 1978, left the PS and joined in establishing the
UEDS, or Uniao da Esquerda Democrata Socialista. That small party formed an electoral
alliance with the PS in 1980 which was dissolved again a year later.
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Colonel Ramalho Eanes”,48 who thereby prepared the ground-work for his
later succession to President Costa Gomes.
These events, expanding into a purge of left-wing officers, put an end to
the existence of the MFA. The military "returned to the barracks"; only the
Council of the Revolution remained as a military constitutional court until it
was abolished in 1982.
The new constitution’s economic and social parts had already been voted
by the Constituent Assembly between August and October 1975. Promulgat-
ed on April 25, 1976, it proclaimed as its fundamental principle the "plurality
of democratic expression and democratic political organization" in order “to
ensure the transition to socialism”, emphasizing the rights of workers’ com-
mittees, trade unions, and self-managed (rural or industrial) cooperatives. The
nationalizations of 1975 in industry and finance were confirmed; precedence
was given to the further socialization (not, however, nationalization) of the
means of production.
Yet political parties and governments did not rally behind the constitu-
tional model of "socia1ist plura1ism" nor attempt to realize its prospects.
When the revised constitutional text was voted by the AD and PS in 1982,
previous references to the peaceful continuation of the revolutionary process
and to the intended realization of a self-management economy (according to
Soares, "excessive ideological ideas of more or less utopian character;49 the
"fundamental law’s Marxist, collectivist, militarizing orientation," in AD
terms50) had disappeared. The emphasis on agrarian reform had been re-
duced, the indicative character of economic planning appropriately strength-
ened.
In the meantime, the pre-1974 bureaucracy has largely remained in place,
"rather than being modernized by the infusion of new people and new ide-
as.”51 And the "men of April 24," as ironical parlance began to call the for-
mer administrative, economic, and military elites, have increasingly regained
their ground – not least as a result of the considerable influence in military
and civil matters wielded by Ramalho Eanes. Promoted to general after No-
vember 25, voted into the president’s office in 1976 and again in 1980, Eanes
early commenced to press not only for apolitical professionalism and disci-
pline in his military appointments (implying the renewed ascendancy of con-
servative officers), but also, in forming two presidential cabinets, for a return
of “technocrats” linked to the overthrown dictatorship.
48 Cf. Ben Pimlott, "Portugal’s Soldiers in the Wings," New Statesman, September 24, 1976,
p. 393.
49 Cf. Partido Socialista, ed., Confiar no PS - Apostar em Portugal, Lisbon, 1979, p. 67.
50 Aliança Democrática, "Programa de Revisão Constitucional - Linhas Gerais," Povo Livre,
September 17, 1980.
51 Kenneth Maxwell: "A Evoluçao Contemporanea da Sociedade Portuguesa," in: Fundaçao
Calouste Gulben-kian, ed., II International Conference on the Portuguese Economy, vol. 1,
p. 32.
219
  
             
               
          
          
               
           
            
           
            
         
           
          
        
          
         
            
            
           
            
            
         
            
             
             
            
             
           
           
         
             
           
            
            
           
           
           
         
           
              
                                                                        
                  
     
             
     
At the same time, Eanes – at the outset nicknamed the "symbol of social-
ism with a stone face" – by his stem, taciturn manner managed to convey the
impression of political integrity, seriousness, and competence. If that made
him stand out personally among his political surroundings, the powers con-
ferred on him by the constitution (which he did not hesitate to use) have put
him into the role of institutional opponent confronting, among several prime
ministers, Soares last though far from least. The latter, who fought an under-
dog campaign in 1986 against Freitas do Amaral, became Eanes` successor,
since constitutional rules bar the general from running for a third term.
In view of growing public disillusionment with party in-fighting, gov-
ernmental stalling over key issues, mounting corruption, and an overdose of
IMF-decreed Social Darwinist austerity policy pursued by Soares, an "eanist"
movement provisionally called “ex-CNARPE" (after the 1980 Comissão
Nacional de Apoio a Recandidatura do Presidente Eanes) sprang up, crystal-
lizing into the Partido Renovadora Democratica (PRD) during February
1985. Still in its organizational throes and, so far, without Eanes’ official
blessings, the new "party of the president" did surprisingly well in the Octo-
ber 1985 parliamentary elections. At least part of its potential constituency,
however, was preempted by the early declaration of candidacy by the popular
Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, who supported Eanes in 1980 and has been or-
ganizing another politically renovative group, the Movimento para o Apro-
fundamento da Democracia, or MAD. It may be doubted whether the attempt
at an "Eanist altemative" turns out to be the viable political solution it pur-
ports to be. The impression left by the "Eanistas’" maneuvering is not unlike
that of the Aliança Democrática which, having promised to effect mudança –
change – instead pursued a policy defined "rather by negation of what it
[was] opposed to, than by an affirmation of its own project.”52
The Eanists’ emergence, however, adds to the pall of indecision once
more enveloping Portuguese politics. Economically tied to the prescriptions
of a renewed "government by the IMF”, the Soares administration – the only
coalition both, in contrast to a PS/PCP alliance, practically conceivable and
not previously tried out—was stymied by the mere perspective of the 1986
presidential elections.53 lf President Eanes may be said to have been the ce-
ment holding together the disjointed bloco central, the prospect of the presi-
dential candidacy was also sufficient to trigger, between November 1984 and
January 1985, first a two-week coalition crisis between the two governing
parties and, subsequently, renewed in-fighting among PSD factions that top-
pled party chairman Mota Pinto. And it was presidential politics which final-
ly broke the coalition apart in June 1985 following the election of a new
52 Mario Raposo, "A AD, O Bloco Central e a Definiçao do Estado," Diario de Noticias, Nov.
27, 1981, p. 2.
53 Cf. José Rebelo, "Grandes manoeuvres electorales sur fond d’austérité," Le Monde diplo-
matique (October 1984), p. 22.
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leader by the PSD convention, Anibal Cavaco Silva. In spite of a comfortable
parliamentary majority, therefore, the bloco central became a symbol of the
apparent fragility and paralysis of the political system in a country where, "in
terms of behavior and psychology, it is not clear how much really changed"
after 1974.54
During 1983, consumer prices in Portugal rose by 25 percent. Real wages
per head fell by 8 percent and by mid-1985 were below 1972 levels, with
"official" unemployment standing at 11 percent and mounting. The current
account deficit in the balance of payments had, by 1982, widened to $3.2
billion, or more than 10 percent of GDP. Three-fourths of what the Portu-
guese ate had to be imported. The foreign debt, with approximately $13 bil-
lion, had come to surpass the value of foreign exchange reserves. In 1984,
Portugal’s external debt service was $1.8 billion.55
During recent years, the country certainly has been affected domestically
by repeated droughts and internationally by a renewed deterioration in its
terms of trade. The rate of inflation, however, between 1977 and 1983, al-
ready had attained an annual average of 22 percent. The "statistical" unem-
ployment rate has fluctuated around 8 percent over the same period; because
of contradictory data and debatable statistical methods, however, annual
estimates have run as high as 15 percent. Of the nominally unemployed, only
24 percent are receiving unemployment benefits. Continued and considerable
underemployment (especially in agriculture) is a virtual certainty. In 1983,
public and private enterprises started stemming losses by ceasing to pay wag-
es on a massive scale, counting on workers to show up to avoid being fired
for absenteeism. Portugal is at present the one country in Western Europe
where an estimated army of 150,000 workers was owed, during the first half
of 1984, some $187 million in back wages, most of which they will probably
never receive.56
In desperate straits because of its huge external debt and accelerating cur-
rent account deficit, the country again has had to negotiate for an IMF loan.
To obtain a stand-by credit of 445 mio special drawing rights and additional
compensatory financing of 258 mio SDRs, the Soares government, in a "let-
ter of intent" to the IMF signed in 1983, had to agree to a rigorous austerity
policy. While the current account deficit was halved to $1.6 bio in 1983 (and
is expected to be halved again during 1984, running up to an estimated $830
mio), steeply decreasing imports were signaling the economic and social
impact of the governmental austerity measures as, once again, food subsidies
54 Maxwell, "A Evolucao," pp. 31-32.
55 For the figures, cf. OECD, Economic Survey: Portugal, Paris 1984, pp. 16, 41; "Portugal
weiterhin auf Restriktionskurs," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 27, 1984, p. 19; "Seminário
para Banqueiros Estrangeiros Análisa Política Económica Portuguesa," Diario de Noticias,
Nov. 6, 1984, p. 2.
56 Cf. Frederick Painton, "Portugal: Bare Survival," Time, April 30, 1984, p. 10.
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were cut, public utility prices raised, new taxes introduced, and credit costs
pushed up.
The situation is not novel, neither to the Portuguese nor to their prime
minister – with the one exception that the economic "recovery policy" tied, in
1977, to another IMF credit brought down the first Soares administration,
admittedly a minority government. After Portugal had raised, during the first
eight months of 1976 alone, some $750 mio in loans from Common Market
reserve banks and, in 1977, had secured foreign government and commercial
credits of $600 mio, a $750 million OECD "package" was made contingent
on a Portuguese stand-by agreement with the IMF. Desperate to replace
short-term borrowing (still $1.3 bio by mid-l978, after restructuring had al-
ready started) by medium-and long-term debt, Soares twice during 1977
introduced austerity measures which, however, failed to satisfy the OECD
and the IMF. In the end, Soares went before parliament with a program ac-
ceptable to the IMF and was defeated by a vote of no confidence.57
Data such as these point not merely to conjunctural disadvantages but to
structural distortions of the Portuguese economy, inherited from 40 years of
an autocracy traditionalist by intent, colonialist in ideology and economic
base, and corporatist in its meshing of business and government operations to
a point where the controlling "one hundred families" in industry and agricul-
ture could feel protected, even supported, in their "delayed-capitalist" atti-
tude.58 Conglomerate holdings, such as Companhia União Fabril (CUF),
Champalimaud, Borges/ Quina, and Espirito Santo e Comercial, wielded
enormous power by controlling banks, insurance companies, and large parts
of refining, shipbuilding, steel, and cement production.59 The large majority
of firms in the manufacturing industry, however, were and are small to medi-
um, with 5-10 or 20-50 employees and a low capital- labor ratio.60
For their output, the cartelized large groups – and whole sectors of ineffi-
cient industries in their shadow – profited from exploiting the preferences of
the colonial "escudo area," from delayed tariff reductions under the EFTA
treaty, but especially from "tight controls . . . of the level of industrial wag-
57 For the data, cf. Rodrigo Marques Guimaraes, "Die portugiesische Währungspolitik," ETFA
Bulletin, No. 1, 1977, p. 12; Basil Caplan: "Interview with Rui Vilar, Vice-Governor of the
Bank of Portugal," Banker (October 1978), p. 54; McCauley, "IMF Troub1es” (as in n. 7),
pp. 154-55 (the quote is on p. 155); Banco de Portugal, Report of the Board of Directors for
1979, Lisbon 1980, p. 101.
58 Cf. Lawrence S. Graham, Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order,
Beverly Hills/ London, 1975, p. 18; Harry M. Makler: "The Portuguese Industrial Elite and
its Corporative Relations," Economic Development and Cultural Change 24 (1976), pp.
498, 509.
59 For details, cf. Mario Bacalhau: "Naciona1izações e Socialização" Vida Mundial, May 1,
1975, pp. 23/24.
60 Cf. Esser et al., Portugal (as in n. 1), pp. 72-73.
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es”.61 Qualified labor was scarce in a country that spent, by 1971, only 2
percent of its GNP on education. The obsolete educational system and short-
age of teachers resulted in a labor force where hardly 10 percent had received
a secondary and 2 percent a higher education; between 20 and 30 percent
were considered illiterate.62 In agriculture, the corresponding percentages for
farmers, by 1968, were 1.3 percent with a secondary or higher education and
an illiteracy of 43 percent, which has decisively contributed to their low tech-
nological receptiveness and innovatory capacity.63
Circumstances such as these further aggravated the drastic deficits of
Portuguese agriculture, which still employs one-quarter of the labor force,
while contributing less than 10 percent to GDP. This has meant, for instance,
that Portugal’s agricultural trade deficit quadrupled from 1970 to 1973.64 The
virtual stagnation of agricultural productivity and produce have been "a
commonplace of any analysis of the Portuguese economy over the last two
decades”.65 In the northern half of the country, subsistence peasant farming
has been perpetuated on soils fragmented by hereditary tradition; capitalist
farming on medium-sized plots has made only slow headway. In the southern
half, traditional absentee ownership of big estates produced extensive farm-
ing and – even more so than in industry – chronically underpaid (farm) work-
ers.66 Thus, by 1968, landholdings from 0.5 to 5 hectares numbered 77.7
percent of all landholdings, but only occupied 14.9 percent of the overall
farmed area, while holdings over 100 hectares, numbering 0.6 percent of the
total, controlled 45.3 percent of the land under cultivation.67 The State Secre-
tariat from Agriculture had no rural extension services worth the name.
Legal as well as clandestine migration on a massive scale – especially af-
fecting the districts in the north – became the means to absorb population
61 World Bank, Portugal, p. 1. Cheap and disciplined labor also played a significant role
when, after 1963, the Salazar regime decided "to step up the rate of economic development
in the face of mounting defense [i.e., colonial war] expenditures" by stimulating foreign di-
rect investment (cf. Baklanoff, Economic Transformation, pp. 105-06): Multinational firms
from West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States responded to an extent that
reduced part of the colonial power Portugal’s domestic - and, it might be added, overseas -
economy to a “state of virtual ‘colonisation’" itself (Council of Europe, Report, p. 15).
62 Cf. Maria Emilia Freire, "The Economic Value of Education in Portuga1," in Fundação
Calouste Gulbenkian, ed., II International Conference on the Portuguese Economy, Vol. 2,
p. 1029.
63 Cf. Secretariado Tecnico do Planeamento, "Alguns Aspectos Fundamentais da Economia
Portuguesa antes de 25 de Abril," unpubl. manuscript, Lisbon, 1975, p. 30.
64 Cf. Esser et al., Portugal, p. 17.
65 A. Cortez Lobao et al., "Politica Agricola e Integração na CEE," in Fundação Calouste
Gulbenkian, ed., II International Conference on the Portuguese Economy, Vol. 2, p. 761.
66 Cf. Albert Silbert, Le Portugal méditerranéen d la fin de l’ancien régime, Vol. 2, Lisbon
1978, pp. 720, 752, 822; José Cutileiro, A Portuguese Rural Society, Oxford, 1971, pp. 13
ss., 59 ss.
67 Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Agrarian Structures and Recent Rural Movements in Portu-
ga1," Journal of Peasant Studies 5 (1978), p. 438, Table 9a.
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increase and avoid military service in Africa. Migration drained undeveloped,
already depleted districts "of the most active and dynamic parts of their popu-
lation… contribut[ing] to a further degradation."68 Emigrant remittances,
together with tourism receipts, helped and are still contributing to cover the
external trade deficit. Mainly invested for the purpose of "moving up in the
village social ladder through the purchase of prestige symbols”, this income
provided "the trimmings of modem civilization, without altering the infra-
structure”, and thus did not promote technological progress but rather helped
to perpetuate subsistence farming.69
The Salazar-Caetano economy was thus based on a “dependency on the
export of labor, reliance on remittances, tourism, and colonial balances to
cover metropolitan deficits, [plus] the action of the state to repress collective
bargaining and hold down wage rates."70 These safety valves – including the
colonial raw material and the international labor markets – finally closed for
Portugal during 1974/75.
A wave of occupation of latifundist farms in the Alentejo by wage labor-
ers during the revolutionary period transformed approximately 1.1 mio hec-
tares into 550 collective production units (UCPs) and cooperatives where the
PCP had a strong influence. Governmental decrees in July 1975 legalized
these seizures to a large extent; however, the occupied estates never con-
trolled more than 14 percent of the country’s cultivated soils.71 In 1976, the
Agrarian Reform Zone was limited substantially to the districts Evora, Beja,
Portalegre, and Setubal, but 500,000 additional hectares which fell under the
decrees of 1975 never were expropriated; credits initially available for in-
vestments and for the payment of wages were increasingly restricted. The
Basic Agrarian Reform Law of 1977, which superseded the decrees of 1975,
not only expanded "reserves" returned to former landowners, it also accorded
considerable discretionary powers to the agricultural ministry for their further
augmentation.
Interpreted by both the AD and PS in terms of their attempt to wrest po-
litical influence from the PCP, the law has inaugurated a continuing attempt
to replace collective farms by individual, small to medium-sized plots. By the
end of 1981, altogether 135 UCPs or cooperatives had been disbanded; many
more were severely threatened in their existence. Stymied for essentially
political reasons, the attempt at agrarian reform in the Alentejo could only
68 Heinz-Michael Stahl, "Portuguese Migration and Regional Development," in Fundação
Calouste Gulbenkian, ed., II International Conference on the Portuguese Economy, Vol. 1,
pp. 391-92.
69 Caroline Brettell, "Emigration from Rural Portugal," Paper presented at the II International
Meeting on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.C., 1979, p. 8.
70 Maxwell, "A Evolução Contemporanea” (as in n. 51), pp. 33-34.
71 Cf. Afonso de Barros, "A Reforma Agraria em Portugal e o Desinvolvimento Economico e
Social," Revista Critica de Ciéncias Sociais 3 (1979), p. 61; Cabral, "Agrarian Structures,"
p. 427.
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contribute in a very limited way to solving the social and economic problems
of agricultural employment and productivity. In 1977/78, 73 percent of jobs
were permanent and 27 percent seasonal – a net reverse of the 1968 ratio,
when only 35 percent of agricultural workers had been permanently em-
ployed. However, out of 71,900 workers in 1975/76, only 59,000 remained,
representing 13.3 percent of all paid labor in agriculture; they produced but 9
percent of GAP. Three years later, governmental policies in the Alentejo had
left a mere 25,000 workers.72
Cattle raising and mechanization had at first substantially expanded on
the UCPs. In the Agrarian Reform Zone as a whole – of whose cultivated
soils, paid agricultural labor, and GAP, UCPs and cooperatives never repre-
sented more than 30 to 35 percent – yie1ds of major crops, however, seem to
have more or less stagnated during the 1974-78 period. Stagnation of crop
yields in Portugal’s North was hardly less pronounced during the same peri-
od. Severe droughts during and after 1980, as mentioned above, contributed
to a further deterioration of agricultural production.73
A law alleviating conditions of tenancy (which, in 1968, had accounted
for 14 percent of landholdings) was passed in 1975, but partly revoked in
1977. Regionalized extension services, but no agrarian reform centers, have
been established north of Castelo Branco. In 1979, an attempt was started to
cycle emigrant remittances, by a system of saving-credit, into the installation
of agro-pastoral enterprises. General borrowing modalities have only started
to become less complex, after the Financing Institute for the Development of
Agriculture and Fisheries (IFADAP) was established in 1977/78 as an at-
tempt to centralize credit facilities. Less than 5 percent of overall credit has
gone to the agricultural sector,74 while the World Bank has estimated that
more than $400 million in investments would be necessary to solve its most
pressing prob1ems.75
Further measures would have to include prohibiting further partition, of-
fering incentives for augmenting landholdings, stimulating cooperatives, and
presenting a social program for retiring farmers. At the cost of a host of polit-
ically influential middlemen, attractive commercial circuits would have to be
placed at the farmers’ disposal; and the severe lack of secondary, polytech-
nical, and other advanced education would have to be attacked. However, for
fear of meeting resistance and alienating electoral support, successive AD, as
well as PS (-led) governments have abstained from any attempt at a compre-
hensive agrarian reform in the North. .
72 Cf. Barros, "A Reforma Agraria," pp. 61, 66; Secretariado e Uniões das UCPs e Cooperati-
vas Agricolas, ed., 6.a Conferéncia da Reforma Agrária, Evora, 1982, pp. 3-4, 12, 17-18.
73 Cf. Barros, "A Reforma Agraria," pp. 61, 64; OECD, Economic Survey: Portugal, Paris,
1980, p. 26.
74 According to Robert Graham, "Portugal - Banking, Finance and Investment”, Financial
Times, July 2, 1981, p. 1.
75 Cf. Diario de Noticias, July 12, 1981, p. 25.
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In industry and finance, banks, insurance, transports, and basic industries
– largely controlled by the conglomerate groups listed above – were national-
ized in 1975. The enlarged public sector, "instead of being an instrument for
the full socialization of the economy," never constituted more than "a partial
solution in the frame of a market economy."76 In 1975, it accounted for 11.5
percent of employment (France, 8.7 percent; Italy, 11.6 percent), 33.6 percent
of gross fixed investment (33.5 and 28 percent), and 14 percent of sales (10
and 8.1 percent).77 In manufacturing, private enterprise predominates even
more, with 79.5 percent of sector GDP and 90 percent of employment.78
Concentrated in the large, regionally centralized, capita1-intensive basic
industry firms, the public sector has offered little incentive to the improve-
ment of employment and the regional imbalance. In spite of their control over
banking, public authorities never got around to define a coherent investment
financing policy. After advent of the austerity policy, nationalized enterprises
during 1977/78 began—and have continued~—to borrow heavily abroad, so
that their financial position has deteriorated very significant1y.79 Moreover,
the public sector was used as a pasture for political patronage by successive
governments, under whose rapid turnover administrative reform has come
nearly nowhere. Few removals from the Salazar-Caetano bureaucracy actual-
ly took place, and there has been little change in the traditional operation of
economic ministries.80
Altogether, no initiative for a comprehensive strategy of restructuring
and diversifying the Portuguese economy has come from the public sector.
Instead, its existence has merely served to trigger sharp political conflict over
public and private sector limits. After the constitutional revision, cement and
fertilizer industries, insurance, and banking were opened up to private enter-
prise in 1983.
For the private sector, the problems of regional imbalance, disadvanta-
geous firm size, and low productivity may conveniently be illustrated by
referring to textiles and clothing, with 26.3 percent (1977) the single largest
item in an export balance which has continued to concentrate on traditional
products highly sensible to changes in consumer income, i.e. , (besides tex-
tiles), cork, wood, and leather products, wines, and glassware. In 1974, small
firms (less than 10 employees) in the textile and clothing sector numbered 17,
76 Paulo Pitta e Cunha, "Portuga1 and the European Economic Community”, paper presented
at the II International Meeting on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.C., 1979, p. 35.
77 Cf. Ivo Pinto: "Sector Publico Empresaria antes e depois do 11 de Marco”, Analise Social
12 (1976), p. 745.
78 Data for 1977; cf. Celso Ferreira, "Aspectos Economicos do Sector Publico Empresarial,"
Economia e Socialismo 4, No. 40 (1979), pp. 7, 17.
79 Cf. OECD, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1984, pp. 27-28.
80 Cf. Lawrence S. Graham, „Problems of Portuguese Bureaucracy and Prospects for Admin-
istrative Reform“, paper presented at the II International Meeting on Modern Portugal,
Durham, N. C., 1979, pp. 8, 19, 23.
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and medium—sized (10-50 employees) 45 percent; only 22 percent had more
than 100 employees (only 9.7 percent in manufacturing as a whole, where
figures were even more reminiscent of mere workshop size). Global industri-
al productivity has been estimated at one-third to one-fourth of Western Eu-
ropean countries81 In 1981, 40 percent of the textile industry were considered
"moribund" and 20 percent "seriously ailing" by the Portuguese Association
of Textile Engineers.82
Portugal’s industry is concentrated excessively along the coast, centering
there on the Porto-Braga and Lisbon-Setubal areas. Textiles and clothing
again offer only an example: 69 percent of their gross output, in 1975, origi-
nated from the districts of Braga and Porto.83 Inadequate communications,
stagnating urbanization, poor social infrastructures, and minimal financial
resources continue to function as serious drawbacks of the extensive "hinter-
land”.84 The 1978 law assigning their own tax receipts and additional allot-
ments of state taxes to mu-nicipal administrations was bitterly fought by the
centralized bureaucracy and has become a source of continuous political
friction (especially, but not exclusively where a PCP majority exists) between
municipal councils and the central government. A new scheme for local au-
thority finance was only adopted in 1984. Regional planning agencies have
been established since 1977 but are still embryonic.
The data for the Portuguese economy have been summarized by pointing
to a simultaneous "bloqueio estrutural, instabilidade politica e crise económi-
ca”, fundamentally due to Portugal’s transition "from a dependent capitalism,
with a determined pattern of accumulation and growth, to a new form of
dependency not yet stabilized and internally structured”.85 It is precisely this
precarious new dependency of peripheral Portugal with the EC "core" that is
at issue when the alternatives of exogenously induced development or further
stagnation are envisaged.86
81 Cf. Esser et al., Portugal, pp. 73, 76; Assemblée de l’Atlantique Nord, "La Situation
Economique” (as in n. 31), p. 16.
82 Cf. Diario de Noticias, November 3, 1981, p. 25.
83 Cf. OECD, Regional Problems and Policies in Portugal, Paris, 1978, p. 39; Bodo Freund,
Portugal, Stuttgart, 1979, p. 93.
84 Cf. OECD, Regional Problems, p. 47.
85 Mario Murteira, "Trajectoria de Longo Prazo do Capitalismo Português," Economia e
Socialismo 3, No. 32/33 (1978), pp. 28, 30.
86 António Inocencio Pereira, "Adesão a CEE: Reflectindo sobre lncertezas”, Diario de
Noticias, January 4, 1982, p. 19.
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The Halting Rapprochement: Common Market Policy Constraints and 
Portuguese Non·Reciprocity
If in 1970 the level of GDP per capita was 5 times higher in Hamburg and 4
times higher in Paris compared to the EC’s poorest regions in the west of
Ireland, the margin, by 1977/78, of the Community’s most prosperous re-
gions (Hamburg, Paris, Brussels) over the Irish west had risen to between 6
and 8. It will increase again drastically to 12:1 between Hamburg and Vila
Real-Braganca (or 10:1 for Hamburg over the four poorest Portuguese re-
gions) after Portugal will have joined the Common Market.87
Income disparities, however, whether measured at current prices and ex-
change rates or by comparing purchasing power parities, have been augment-
ing not only at regional but also at country levels in the Community. If GDP
per capita is determined as a percentage of EC average for the EC ten and for
the two application countries, a four-tier community increasingly emerges,
where Denmark and the FRG are leading the upmost group, with Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain united at third level, the United Kingdom in be-
tween, and Portugal at a separate bottom tier by 17 to 20 percent.88
Against the background of the general fall and rising disparities in GDP
growth, the rise and increasing divergence of inflation rates, the wide differ-
ences in exchange rate changes and current account positions in the balance
of payments, the absurd common agricultural policy’s mounting financial
difficulties, and finally, steadily worsening unemployment, "crippling uncer-
tainties"89 have beset the Common Market. It is faced not just with its second
enlargement but with a more profound challenge the Rome Treaty does not
seem to be equipped to handle: Inspired "less [by] the Welfare State than [by]
a degree of laissez faire which would have dismayed Keynes”, that agree-
ment became "a classical statement of the assumption that the free working of
the market, if properly policed," would "ensure economic and social pro-
gress," promote "the constant improvement of living and working condi-
tions," and "reduce the…backwardness of the less favored regions”.90 The
87 Cf. Frieder Schlupp, "Anmerkungen zum Status quo-Europa," EG-Magazin 7 (1980), p. 5;
Commission of the European Communities, "Wirtschaftliche und sektorielle Aspekte - A-
na1ysen der Kommission als Ergänzung zu den Betrachtungen über das Problem der Erwei-
terung“, KOM(78) 220 endg., Brussels, 1978, p. 149.
88 Data for 1976/77; cf. E. C. Hallett, "Economic Convergence and Divergence in the Europe-
an Community: A Survey of the Evidence”, in Michael Hodges and William Wallace, eds.,
Economic Divergence in the European Community, London, 1981, pp. 25 ss.; Loukas
Tsoukalis, "Economic Divergence and Enlargement," in Hodges and Wallace, eds., Eco-
nomic Divergence, pp. 152, 153.
89 Commission of the European Communities, "Commission Report on the Mandate of 30
May 1980”, COM(81) 300 final, Brussels, 1981, p. 7.
90 The first quote is from Stuart Holland, The Socialist Challenge, London, 1975, p. 320; the
second is taken from the Preamble of the Rome Treaty.
228
            
          
         
           
            
          
           
           
         
            
            
             
           
           
             
             
         
          
          
          
           
          
           
             
         
           
            
          
           
            
              
             
           
             
           
          
           
          
           
                                                                        
          
            
        
           
treaty stresses measures of negative market integration (i.e., the removal of
discrimination and trade impediments) at the expense – excepting agriculture
– of positive development integration (meaning the introduction and applica-
tion of common trade cycle, industrial, and social policy instruments), which
it treats in a "vague and permissive, instead of definitive and mandatory"
manner. The EC, therefore, has remained "bias[ed] against economic union”
with its redistributive and welfare aspects, favoring instead a common market
limited, essentially, to an industrial and agricultural tax and customs union.91
Such a "philosophy" was barely compatible with the Community’s func-
tioning as long as the Common Market remained an instrument for drawing
together highly developed industrial countries – which, in fact, the EC had
originally been designed for, and as long as the business cycle continued to
flatten itself out – whereby precisely that environment of sustained economic
growth was created that allowed the instruments for implementing the Rome
Treaty to be circumscribed in the way they were. Between 1973 and 1975,
however, the rug was pulled out from under the EC. The first enlargement
augmented the number and area of structurally underdeveloped regions with-
in the Common Market; the oil price-induced recession introduced industrial
decline into regions which had been prosperous. With the resulting adjust-
ment problems far from successfully tackled, and with austerity measures
persisting in virtually every Western European country, the EC for political
and military reasons chose to include, after Ireland. another industrializing
society, Greece, while two more countries of the same developmental stage,
Spain and Portugal, will enter on January 1, 1986. The Community has not,
however, adapted either institutionally or politically to its increasing devel-
opmental tasks – and that is the crux of the matter.
In response to the Common Market’s first enlargement of 1972, and after
a first Council debate in 1971 of "unprecedented inadequacy”,92 the Europe-
an Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was finally established in 1975. By
1980, the Fund’s budget was 1,165 billion EUA (European units of account),
or roughly the amount the ERDF had dispensed of during its first three years;
by 1983, it had risen to 2 billion ECU (European currency units), still equiva-
lent to only 0.08 percent of the Community’s GDP. Until 1984, disburse-
ments were subject to an amended quota system, under which Italy and the
United Kingdom received the highest amounts, but France slightly more than
Greece and West Germany only a little less than Ireland.
When, in 1979, a quota-free section was introduced for programs in re-
gions "affected by other Community measures" or by especially severe
events, the Council limited expenditure to 5 percent of total ERDF endow-
91 Cf. Jan Tinbergen, International Economic Integration, Amsterdam/London/New York,
1965, pp. 76 ss.; John Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration”, World To-
day, (1968), pp. 90, 97 ss., 100 ss.
92 Walter Hallstein, Die europäische Gemeinschaft, Dusseldorf/Wien, 1973, p. 236.
229
  
            
              
            
           
           
          
          
           
             
         
    
         
           
           
          
            
          
           
            
           
           
              
          
            
         
            
            
        
            
              
           
           
            
            
              
          
           
            
  
            
            
                                                                        
             
        
ment. Commission proposals to stock up the quota-free section to 20 percent
and shift quotas from states to regions (those with GDP per capita lagging at
least 25 percent behind the EC average) were rejected by the Council. In-
stead, national quotas were merely substituted, in 1984, by ranges indicating
the upper and lower limits of member states’ shares, without substantially
altering the previous allocation (though Ireland’s range now surpassed West
Germany’s by two percentage points, and Greece managed to overtake
France by one percentage point). However, the new regulation did stipulate
that a part of ERDF appropriations, increasing over three years, up to 20
percent, should be used to finance comprehensive development programs,
including multinational Community programs.
Concerning the Mediterranean, the Council during 1979/80 approved the
financing of specific measures in the Mezzogiorno and in South-west France
both by ERDF quota-free and quota sections, after formally subscribing to
the view that the imminent Southern enlargement "could endanger the devel-
opment of a certain number of weak Community regions”.93 If priorities were
thus being established, the Commission in 1983, following demands by
Greece, attempted to enlarge the "specific measures" into a package labeled
"integrated Mediterranean programs”, or IMPs. At a total cost of 6.6 billion
ECU (or $4.7 billion), these proposals were to include Greece (approximately
38 percent of appropriations), Italy (nearly 45 percent), and France (17 per-
cent). After the Council failed to react, Greece, at the Dublin EC summit of
December 1984, demanded that, as a precondition to continuing negotiations
with Spain and Portugal, the IMPs be approved. When other EC governments
refused to commit themselves, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou
threatened to veto further accession talks, thus initiating what amounts to a
continuing attempt (which Italy has indicated it might join) to pressure the
Community into adopting a substantial Mediterranean development program.
At the Dublin summit, in a situation where the established timetable for
admitting Spain and Portugal into the EC by January 1, 1986, was at stake,
past neglects finally caught up with the Common Market. The developmental
challenge it is confronted with by its imminent second enlargement (already
underway, as far as Greece is concerned) has become very much apparent
since the first EC enlargement. That challenge is now most distinctly typified
by the needs of Portugal’s – to a substantial part – obsolete industry and agri-
culture and by corresponding Portuguese hopes for the EC’s transformative
capacity. Slackening in its economic performance, the EC, however – much
like Portugal, if for different reasons – also appears politically weak and
structurally stymied.
Under the Free Trade Agreement of 1972 (already referred to in the ini-
tial section) as amended in 1976 and 1979, agricultural products – not cov-
93 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, European Regional Development Fund -
Fifth Annual Report 1979, Brussels, 1980, p. 10.
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ered by the EFTA Treaty – were included, non-reciprocity for Portugal was
retained, and "infant industry" protection was again authorized to be main-
tained by the country. Tariff preferences, generally around 50 percent, were
conceded for several agricultural products, especially tomato concentrates,
canned fish, fruit, olives, and certain wines.
However, to the EC, tomato paste, canned sardines, and wines were at
the same time "sensitive".products. Their production had been increasing not
only in France and Italy, but also in Greece and in the Maghreb and Mashreq
countries, which were linked to the Common Market through bilateral coop-
eration and trade agreements. Consequently, to obtain tariff concessions,
Portugal had to accept either floors to its export pricing (sardines), or ceilings
to amounts exported (wines), or both (tomato concentrates). Quantitative
restrictions, moreover, were also placed on "sensitive" industrial commodi-
ties: textiles and clothing, cork and wood (paper) products.
These, however, are exactly the product groups where Portugal is com-
petitive, and if Portugal’s trade deficit with the Common Market more than
doubled between 1973 and 1978, there is every reason to believe that EC
policies have played their part. French, Italian, and Dutch exports of tomato
paste into the UK and Denmark, for instance, have been perceptibly subsi-
dized; France and the UK have introduced quotas to protect their textile in-
dustries.94 During accession negotiations with Portugal, the Customs Union
"dossier" remained blocked for nine months because the Ten, among them-
selves, could not agree on howto deal with Portuguese textiles and clothing
exports during the (presumably up-to-ten-year) transition period. The formula
that finally emerged was that future procedures should be "inspired" by pre-
sent rules providing for "self-limitation”.95
The EC pre-accession aid granted to Portugal in 1981 is another case in
point. Portugal had asked for 425 million EUA; the Commission, after study-
ing the Portuguese request, proposed 350 million, of which 230 million were
to be grants and 120 million loans. The Council reduced the amount by an-
other 75 million and at the same time reversed the ratio between loans and
grants (150: 125 million EUA). The final decision was a net result of French-
British "in-fighting" over the Community budget.96
In the Community, there is a definite tendency during the present reces-
sion to try and maintain what remains of social peace "through the prevention
94 Cf. Michele Cifarelli, "Stel1ungnahme des Landwirtschaftsausschusses zum Bericht des
Ausschusses fur Aussenwirtschaftsbeziehungen über die Wirtschafts- und Handelsbezie-
hungen zwischen der Gemeinschaft und Portugal“, Europäisches Parlament, Doc.
187/77/rev., September 15, 1977, p. 26; Jimmy Burns, "Le Déficit commercial a doublé
durant les quatre premieres années d’application de l’accord de libre-échange”, EFTA-
Bulletin, No. 2 (1980), p. 2.
95 Cf. Diario de Noticias, July 12, 1981; author’s interviews.
96 Cf. João Vale de Almeida, "Vem ai as Unidades de Conta," Diario de Noticias, Oct. 13,
1980, p. 15.
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or slowing down of structural adjustment processes”,97 cushioning sectors
like textiles, steel, and agriculture against the impact of enlargement. As
increasing exports to the Maghreb and Mashreq countries have, moreover,
helped the Common Market to offset its huge oil deficit, and as these coun-
tries, through their political alignment with the oil-producing states, have
gained in geo-strategical (i.e., security) importance, the EC will hardly weak-
en its position vis a vis them by definitely jeopardizing their export earnings
from, again, textile and agricultural products98 These domestic and foreign
policy-induced "sensitivities" apply in a situation where the accession negoti-
ations, to a large part, are "not really negotiations, but rather requests made
by Portugal to the Community”.99
Dilemmas and Risks: Portugal in a Four-Tier European Community
Already by 1977, the EC Commission had concluded that it would be "illuso-
ry" to think that the gap in economic development separating Portugal from
the Community "could be overcome within the space of a transition period of
ten years”.100 Considering available data on the accession’s presumable con-
sequences, it moreover stands to reason that (with positive development inte-
gration apt to remain, at best, a torso) the country will suffer quite severely
from unmitigated negative market integration. The reasons for submitting this
argument, apart from those already referred to, may be summed up into the
following considerations:
In agriculture, Portugal’s main import commodities have been wheat and
maize, beef and sugar, roughly 75-90 percent of which have been supplied by
the United States and South America. After accession, Portugal will either
have to buy these amounts from the EC or pay import levies corresponding to
current EC threshold prices. In 1977/78, wheat and maize imports would
have cost the country an additional 150 mio units of account (ua) for import
levies, or approximately half that sum if trade had been diverted to higher-
priced EC cereals. Sugar purchases would have absorbed 47 mio ua and beef
imports another 20-25 mio ua.101Additional expenditure, therefore, may well
97 E. Guth and H. O. Aeiskens, "Imp1ications of the Second Enlargement for the Mediter-
ranean and ACP Policies of the European Community," Europe Information (Brussels)
(1980), p. 14.
98 Cf. Taylor, "Implications for the Southern Mediterranean” (as in n. 35), pp. 6 ss.
99 Soares, "Portuga1 and Europe”, ibid. (as in n. 25).
100 As reported by Philippe Le Maitre, Le Monde, September 18-19, 1977, cited after Stuart
Holland, Un-Common Market, London, 1980, p. 168.
101 Cf. Agra Europe, ed., The Agricultural Implications of EEC Enlargement – Part II: Portu-
gal, London, 1980, pp. 45 ss., 48 ss., 53 ss., 63 ss. (ua = units of account, now ECU).
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run up to double the 75 plus or minus 15 mio ua in Portuguese annual levies
to the EC estimated by the Commission in 1978,102 and sugar, maize, and
beef imports are likely to rise further.
This would substantially aggravate the country’s serious current account
deficit. Through raising consumer prices – by 20-30 percent according to one
estimate,103 although part of the increase might be offset by monetary com-
pensation amounts due to the devalued currency – it would increase runaway
inflation, intensify wage demands and labor conflicts, and thereby affect the
competitiveness of export industries.104 Consumer prices would also be hit
by the need to progressively dismantle a variety of agricultural (producer and
consumer) subsidies inconsistent with EC rules,105 and following the substi-
tution of the IT (imposto de transacçoes) by the VAT, or value-added tax.
The latter measure would affect 500,000 instead of the present 90,000 tax-
payers, and while the IT touches only roughly 30 percent of total consump-
tion, that percentage may rise, with VAT, to between one-half and two-
thirds.106
Any possibility of partly offsetting import losses by additional earnings
from the export of wines and of tomato paste should suffer from the fact that,
for both these products, Spain and Greece (apart from the Maghreb countries)
will be directly competing with Portugal. Moreover, the transitional period
for tomato concentrates, in the case of Greece, was fixed at seven years; and
for wines, measures like preventive obligatory distillation, increased producer
responsibility, and stepped-up quality controls are under discussion to pre-
vent the expected surplus, especially from Spain.
In theory, higher Common Market prices for cereals, meat, dairy prod-
ucts, and sugar (for the latter, an additional production quota will have to be
negotiated) should stimulate, as they doubtlessly will for wines, Portuguese
production. However, not only will crop and livestock husbandry have to be
markedly improved, it will also be necessary to disseminate accounting, raise
quality control, and develop marketing structures. ("Until very recently, what
were sometimes huge increases in agricultural producer prices were not suffi-
cient to bring about an increase in supply because of the inadequacy of factor
productivity and also because of the inadequacy of the transport and commu-
nications system.”107) Meat and dairy production, moreover, will suffer from
102 Cf. EC Commission, "Wirtschaft1iche und sektorielle Aspekte“ (as in n. 87), p. 100.
103 Cf. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Portugals Beitritt zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft - Perspekti-
ven und Strategien, Bonn, 1980, p. 18; also Lobão et al., "Politica Agrico1a“ (as in n. 65),
p. 781.
104 Cf. Ebert-Stiftung, Portugals Beitritt, p. 781.
105 Cf. Telex Méditerranée, May 5, 1981, p. 5.
106 Cf. Xavier de Basto: "O IVA Abrangera 500 mil Contribuintes," Diario de Noticias, July
13, 1981; "Preços Podem Agravarse com a Introdução do IVA," Diario de Noticias, Nov. 1,
1984, p. 5.
107 OECD, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1984, p. 22.
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increased feed grain prices, until pasture feeding of livestock is sufficiently
increased. Meanwhile, the Common Market farmers’ stronger and more ag-
gressive marketing organizations should be able to penetrate urban consumer
markets thoroughly, largely crowding out Portuguese competition.108
That subsistence peasant farming in the North – the 77.7 percent of land-
holdings under five hectares referred to earlier – will survive by simply "stay-
ing out of the market" is extremely doubtful. Rather, these plots, coming
under economic pressure, should continue to diminish as they did, but more
rapidly, in favor of medium-sized capitalist farming. This, like any substan-
tial rise in agricultural productivity, will entail a large shift of manpower out
of agriculture. A renewed drift from the land into emigration, however, re-
mains impossible. Considering soaring unemployment in the Community,
Portugal will not succeed in negotiating anything but a transition period of
seven years, as in the case of Greece, for the free movement of its workers.
Even after that, persisting technological, i.e., structural, unemployment in the
EC "core" countries can be expected to work against a renewed migratory
"wave."
The alternative, then, for displaced labor would be to migrate to the al-
ready congested Porto-Braga-Lisbon-Setubal coastal region, aggravating
housing, infrastructure, and employment problems there. For it is extremely
unlikely that a "supply-push" of labor out of agriculture would be met by a
sustained "demand-pull" from Portuguese industry. In attempting to assess
the impact of accession on Portuguese industry, a strategy of export-led
growth relying on comparative wage advantages, similar to that followed in
the past by South Korea or Ireland, has been recommended to the country.109
Still, already now the share of labor-intensive industries in total manufactur-
ing value-added has declined to between 38 and 42 percent. Reliance on
export promotion could, moreover, prove a dangerous option in a world
economy gripped by stagflation.110 Alternatively, it has been proposed to
combine the development of import substitution and Portugal’s domestic
market on at least a par or even priority basis, with the attempt at improving
the country’s export performance: Although Por- tugal should try to diversify
and increase exports in, e. g. , machinery, equipment, or petrochemicals, the
country should also concentrate on the processing and manufacturing of food
products, on the development of basic and investment goods industries ex-
108 Cf. Agra Europe, ed., Agricultural Implications, pp. 33, 36, 64; Lobão et al., "Politica
Agricola“, pp. 784 ss.; Ebert-Stiftung, Portugals Beitritt, pp. 18, 19.
109 Cf. Bela Balassa, "Portugal in the Face of the Common Market," in Fundação Calouste
Gulbenkian, ed., II International Conference on the Portuguese Economy, Vol. II, p. 655.
110 Cf. Jürgen Donges, "On Portuga1’s Industrial Competitiveness in an Enlarged Communi-
ty," Paper presented at the Conference on Portugal and the Enlargement of the European
Community, Lisbon, 1980, p. 4; Ebert-Stiftung, Portugals Beitritt, p. 9; Stuart Holland:
"Comentario," in Fundacao Calouste Gulbenkian, ed., II International Conference on the
Portuguese Economy, Vol. II, pp. 748-49.
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ploiting its own pyrite, wolfram, zinc, and iron ore deposits, and on construc-
tion to reduce housing and infrastructural deficits.111
If these considerations outline, however vaguely, an industrializing strat-
egy, a cautious assessment has estimated that, after joining the EC/Nine,
Portuga1’s annual manufactured imports would increase by 11.6 percent over
actual EC imports, with manufactured exports virtually stagnating. Besides,
Spain’s more diversified and technologically superior industry is expected to
penetrate the Portuguese market.112 A similar argument has been advanced
for Greece,113 and Portugal would also have to face, under existing EC
agreements, access to its market of exports from the ACP and Maghreb coun-
tries.114
This may indeed mean that Portugal, after even gradually introducing the
common customs tariff, could fall victim to the two blades of a scissor: new
industries with high capital intensity would suffer from the Common Market
member states’ competition; and traditional, labor-intensive sectors would be
undercut by the low-wage supply from developing countries.115 Not only
would no additional employment be forthcoming, but present employment
would suffer further. Thus, because of the very long periods involved in the
development of both agriculture and industry from their present levels, mere
transitional provisions might not prevent Portugal from finding its economy
and society quite severely strained.
Successive PS and AD governments have persisted in an "exaggeration
of the benefits and minimization of the pains"116 that will be caused by EC
accession. Details about problems and objectives have, to the public, re-
mained "in almost complete nebulosity.117 Trade unions and parties were late
and only rarely consulted by governments. It took a member of the EC Coun-
111 Cf. Grant S. McClellan, Spain and Portugal: Democratic Beginnings, New York, 1978, p.
208; Klaus Esser, "Portugal in der west-europäischen Arbeitsteilung: Alternative Strate-
gien," Berichte zur Entwicklung in Spanien, Portugal und Lateinamerika 3, No. 13 (1977):
37 ff.; Klaus Esser, "lntegration zwischen Industrie und teilindustrialisierten Ländern - Por-
tugal in der EG“, in Burghard Claus et al., Zur Erweiterung der Europäischen Gemein-
schaft in Südeuropa, Berlin, 1978, pp. 71 ff; Holland, “Comentario”, ibid.
112 Cf. Donges, "Portugal’s Industrial Competitiveness," pp. 7 ff.; Christian Deubner, Der
unsichere "europäische Konsens" in den iberischen Ländern, Ebenhausen, 1981, pp. 74-75.
113 Cf. A. G. Portela, "Exportação Naciona1 - Mercado Comum," in Fundação Calouste Gul-
benkian, ed., II International Conference on the Portuguese Economy, Vol. II, pp. 703, 730.
114 Cf. Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace, A Wider European Community?, London,
1976, p. 48. Jürgen Donges et al., The Second Enlargement of the European Community,
Tübingen, 1982, pp. 127 ss., 131 ss., have argued that Spain and Portugal might come to
lead protectionist tendencies against ACP countries, whose position might thereby deterio-
rate.
115 Cf. Ebert-Stiftung, Portugals Beitritt, p. 8.
116 Maxwell, "A Evolução Contemporaneo” (as in n. 51), p. 36.
117 Encarnação Viegas, "As Teses de Natali e a Adesão de Portugal a CEE," Diario de No-
ticias, June 5, 1981, p. 15.
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cil of Ministers’ General Secretariat to qualify as "not unjustified"118 the
apprehensions expressed by the PCP which would seem to have contributed
essentially to that party’s position of rejecting accession, proposing instead a
series of preferential treaties.119 That alternative – fundamentally extending
the 1972 trade agreement – has again been evoked, as late as 1984, by none
other than the Confederação da Industria Portuguesa (CIP).120
In 1981, workers reacted against the AD government’s social and labor
policies by strikes involving 1.5 million employees over the year.121 During
the first week of 1982, another 900,000 workers went on strike, and in March
and May of the same year the Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portu-
gueses (CGTP) proclaimed the first general strikes since 1934. These at-
tempts were only partly successful, and strikes since have abated under pres-
sure from the harsh economic squeeze and the daily struggle for survival.
Urban and rural workers are still a minority in Portugal, and labor unrest may
be muted for some time, even if the misery mounts further. At the same time,
however, the lower classes in farming and business may, to a considerable
extent, become imperiled in their social existence to the point of being mar-
ginalized.122 Intensely traditionalist, they rose violently in 1975 against the
perceived economic and ideological threat from the left. Adversely affected
by economic rationalization and Common Market (including, psychologically
important, Spanish) competition, they might react to imminent proletarization
in a poujadist manner that could destroy the heterogeneous PS constituency,
push the conservative parties further to the right, and, by prompting an au-
thoritarian response among the Portuguese military with their established
pronunciamiento tradition in a situation where governmental legitimacy is
declining,123 might not even end there.
118 Karl H. Buck, "‘Europäischer Konsens’ in Südeuropa," Integration 1 (1982), p. 40.
119 Cf. Carlos Carvalhas, "A Alternative a CEE," in Partido Comunista Português, ed., Não ao
Mercado Comum - Efeitos Globais de Adesão a CEE e Alternativa, Lisbon, 1980, p. 142.
The PCP has published several detailed studies concerning accession problems, e. g., Não
ao Mercado Comum - Agricultura, Lisbon, 1980.
120 Cf. "Criticas da CIP Visam Retorno ao Estatuto Europeu de 1972," Diario de Noticias,
Nov. 1, 1984, p. 2.
121 Cf. Diario de Noticias, December 25, 1981, pp. 17, 18; December 28, 1981, p. 2; for the
subsequent figure, January 4, 1982, p. 3.
122 For the following "educated guesses," cf. Heinz Kramer, "Lagenotiz zur Situation in Portu-
gal zu Beginn der Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft," Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, Dok. SWP-LN 2203, Ebenhausen, 1979, pp. 25, 28; Claus Leg-
gewie, "Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft nach Süden“, Leviathan 7 (1979),
p. 182; Maxwell, "A Evolução Contemporaneo," p. 37; Ebert-Stiftung, Portugals Beitritt,
pp. 14-15; Deubner, Der unsichere "europäische Konsens“, pp. 47-48, 86.
123 For the Armed Forces, cf. now Maria Carrilho, Forças Armadas e Mudança Politica em
Portugal no Seculo Vinte, Lisbon, 1985, summarized in O Jornal, November 1, 1984, p. 11.
236
  
          
          
              
                
             
          
             
            
             
         
            
           
           
           
            
             
          
         
           
          
          
       
           
            
            
          
        
           
              
           
           
          
           
           
          
                                                                        
              
           
             
           
 
Ex Post Derogation: A Last Resort for Portugal
The Fontainebleau EC summit resolved that accession negotiations should be
completed by September 1984. This proved impossible, talks continuing into
1985. In the end, however, almost at the last moment if the planned January
1, 1986 accession date was to be met, a treaty was agreed to and drawn up.
On June 12, 1985, in ceremonies in Madrid and Lisbon, the two Iberian coun-
tries and the Community signed the accession treaty. The successful comple-
tion of the negotiations coincided with a major political crisis in Lisbon. The
coalition between the PS and the PSD split apart following the surprise elec-
tion of Cavaco Silva as leader of the Social Democrats. Both socialists and
social democrats claimed policy differences were responsible for the break-
up of the "bloco central”, but in reality, although such differences certainly
existed, the conflict was related more to presidential politics about which
Soares and Cavaco Silva took very different positions. Soares sought to pro-
mote his own candidacy, Cavaco Silva was more inclined towards attempting
to recapture the old AD constituency. The crisis, however, had the immediate
effect of forcing an early dissolution of the assembly and the convocation of
anticipated general elections; scheduled for October 6, 1985, with the pro-
spect of presidential, municipal, European, and perhaps more general elec-
tions over the winter of 1985-86, the prospects for effective government
seemed bleak. Moreover, the restrictive policies of the Soares government
made it unlikely that the country would overcomeits austerity-led recession
by the time Portugal joined the EC.
Believing that the "normal" enlargement of 1972 could and should be re-
peated, the EC Council has insisted, vis a vis Portugal, that adjustment prob-
lems would have to be solved not by derogating from the acquis communau-
taire but only by transitional measures.124 Derogation, in principle, would
mean formal acknowledgment of the emerging economic multi-tier commu-
nity, which cannot be papered over anymore by transitional measures. It
would, in fact, be equal to a move in the direction of the institutionalized
political multi-tier community introduced as a concept first by Brandt and
then, in the context of Economic and Monetary Union proposals, by Tinde-
mans. "Institutionalized" refers to the provision that some member countries,
following more or less accurately pre-defined rules, would be either exempt
from existing or not participating in newly created common policies (the
operation of the so-called snake is a case in point).125
124 Cf. Klaus von Dohnanyi, "Zur Eröffnung der Verhandlungen zwischen der EG und Portu-
gal“, Bulletin der Bundesregierung, No. 118, Oct. 19, 1978, p. 1099.
125 For a detailed discussion, cf. Hans-Eckard Scharrer, "Abgestufte Integration - eine Alterna-
tive zum herkömmlichen Integrationskonzept?“, Integration, No. 3 (1981), pp. 123 ss.
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Formal, ex ante, derogation, once conceded, would in principle have to
apply to every tier of the Community. Because such a solution would impose
quite severe institutional strains on the Common Market, it was not consid-
ered during accession negotiations. However, Portugal might profit from the
experience of Greece: Since the present Greek prime minister’s socialist
PASOK carried the 1981 elections, the country, as already referred to earlier,
has been demanding a special statute – or, at least, massive support for re-
gional and agricultural development – to mitigate the structural impact of
accession. By acting likewise, Portugal might proceed to ex post derogation
from parts of the acquis in an effort to prevent "perverse" consequences,
"perverse" in the sense that better-off and more efficient countries would
profit from Portuguese EC membership, with conceivably disastrous effects
for Portugal’s society and polity. This, on the other hand, should not prevent
the country from agreeing to the common assignment of specific sets of ac-
tions to specific development stages and to provide for joint findings on their
implementation. The challenge to Portugal’s economy and the calculability of
developments for the EC countries may thereby be maintained.
One indisputable result should emerge from any analysis of the "hesitant
relationship": Portugal has been and is, economically as well as politically, a
weak applicant. It will remain weak during the rest of the 1980s. The Europe-
an Community cannot prevent that. But contrary to what is commonly said or
even assumed, accession might make matters, by its impact, considerably
worse for the country.
A Chronology of Events
1949 Portugal founding member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)
1951 Signature of Paris Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (ESCS) – the Six (Belgium, France, West Germany, Ita-
ly, Luxembourg, Netherlands)
1957 Signature of Rome Treaty by the Six establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAC, Euratom)
1960 Portugal founding member of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA –the Seven (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom)
1965 Signature of treaty establishing a single Council and a single Com-
mission for ESCS, EEC, and EAC, referred to henceforth as the Eu-
ropean Communities (EC)
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1972 United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland join EC (now the Nine);
Portugal and EC conclude Free Trade Agreement; Finland and Ice-
land join "rest-EFTA"
1974 (April 25) Caetano dictatorship overthrown
1975 (July 17) EC Council refuses Community loan during Portuguese
"hot summer”; (October 7) EC grants $180 mio European Invest-
ment Bank loan to Portugal
1976 Free Trade Agreement of 1972 is amended; EFTA sets up Industrial
Development Fund for Portugal ($100 mio over live years)
1977 (March 28) Portugal applies for EC accession, followed by Spain in
June
1978 (October 17) Commencement of accession negotiations
1979 Second amendment of EC-Portuguese Free Trade Agreement
1981 Greece joins EC (now the Ten); Portugal is granted $275 mio pre-
accession aid ($150 mio in loans, $125 mio in grants) by EC
1982/83 EC budget problems, mainly revolving around UK contribution,
continue to block Community policies; in accession negotiations
with Portugal and Spain, EC pursues "pan-Iberian" approach of ad-
mitting both countries simultaneously into the Common Market; EC
reservations over Spanish competition result in slowing of negotia-
tions with both countries
1984 (June 26) EC Fontainebleau summit resolves conclusion of acces-
sion negotiations until September 30 to allow for Portuguese-
Spanish accession by January 1, 1986; negotiations slowed again
because EC proves unable to agree on common position for re-
striction of surplus wine production; (October 22) Portugal and EC
sign preliminary constat d’accord; (December 4) Dublin EC summit
agrees on wine plan; as proposed Mediterranean aid program is not
adopted, Greece reserves right to block further accession talks.
1985 (June 12) Treaty signed between Spain, Portugal, and EC
1985 (July 11) Portugal’s Assembly of the Republic ratifies Treaty of
Accession
1986 (January 1) Portugal accedes to the EC
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As summed up in 2005 by Carlos Gaspar, Director of the Portuguese Insti-
tute of International Relations at Lisbon University, when he talked on „In-
ternational Dimensions of the Portuguese Transition“: „The strategies of the
external actors were decisive to determine the final outcome of the Portu-
guese post-authoritarian transition.“ 20 years earlier, I had written no less.
Gaspar’s and my assessments may be expected to be perused today in a fairly
detached mood. Impact in 1985 was rather different, at least in Portugal
where several of my articles on the „revolution of carnations“ and its after-
math – including the following one – were published: The weekly O Jornal, in
a one-page write-up, reported on my findings under the caption: „How the
Portuguese Revolution Was ‚Tamed’“. In the final analysis, that’s precisely
what happened: International pressure was exerted on a small country’s
domestic politics.
External Influences on the Portuguese Revolution:
The Role of Western Europe1
I
On June 21, 1975, the group of officers which had overthrown the dictatorial
Caetano regime declared their objective to consist in a „socialist pluralism
(which) includes the coexistence, in theory as in practice, of various forms
and conceptions of building a socialist society. The MFA repudiates the im-
plantation of socialism by violent or dictatorial means… (This) implies
recognition of the existence of various political parties, even though they do
not necessarily defend socialist options.“2
When the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) undertook to thus de-
fine its basic program, the original „liberation by golpe“ (Philippe Schmitter)
had already turned into a social revolution. In April, 1974, the slogan had
run: „Decolonization – Democratization – Development“. Now it went: „Lib-
eration – Democracy – Socialism“. The difference of emphasis was the result,
1 Published in Portuguese as „Influências Externas sobre a Revoluçāo Portuguesa: o papel da
Europa Ocidental“ (cf. sources at the end of this book). For reasons which could not be
sorted out afterwards, the concluding paragraph was omitted from the printed text. - This is
the revised version of a paper presented at the III International Meeting on Modern Portugal
(„1974-1984: Portugal and the Portuguese Ten Years After“), Durham NH, May 31-June 3,
1984. I remain grateful to Kenneth Maxwell (New York), Christian Deubner (Ebenhausen),
Franz-Wilhelm Heimer (Lisbon) and Uwe Optenhögel (Hamburg) for their critical sugges-
tions.
2 „Plano de Acçāo Política do MFA“, in: Ramiro Correa et al.: MFA e Luta de Classes,
Lisbon, n. d., p. 176 (author’s translation).
241
  
             
            
            
            
          
            
  
           
            
              
           
               
          
           
              
              
             
           
  
           
                
           
           
        
           
        
            
              
         
          
            
           
            
         
           
                                                                        
              
           
    
                 
                 
       
               
      
              
first, of a series of struggles within the military, resulting from three political
crises which had mobilized ever larger parts of the population; and, secondly,
of a social mass movement, mainly by the industrial proletariat of the Lisbon-
Setúbal region and the rural workers of the Baixo Alentejo, which strongly
contributed to accelerating the revolutionary process, but hardly managed to
touch the large number of small peasants and medium-sized farmers in the
North.
Figurehead of April 25, António de Spínola became the Republic’s first
president. Counting on the aid of military, economic and political groups, he
attempted three times (twice in 1974, the third time on March 11, 1975) to
extend or regain his powers – first, by an institutional maneuver, subsequent-
ly by appealing to the „silent majority“, finally by a military coup. In no case
did he succeed. Guinea-Bissau’s former military governor stood for „a repre-
sentative democratic regime similar to others in Western Europe… in which
the interests of the propertied would be defended.“3 The first two crises had
their major effect on foreign policy, i. e. on the pace of liquidating Portugal’s
colonial ventures in Africa. The abortive coup of March 11, however, in the
wake of which Spínola fled the country, transformed the domestic scene
fairly drastically.
Already the general’s attempt to win over the „silent majority“ had alert-
ed the MFA to the fact that, in vast areas of the country, little had changed
with regard to social and ideological structures – hence, the subsequent „cul-
tural dynamization“ campaigns in the center and north.4 Soon it became evi-
dent that conglomerate holdings, such as Borges-Quina, Champali-maud,
Companhia Uniāo Fabril (CUF), and Espírito Santo e Comercial not only
wielded enormous economic power by controlling banks, insurance compa-
nies, and large parts of refinery, ship building, steel and cement production,5
but that at least part of them had also supported Spínola.6 After March 11,
banks and insurance were nationalized, followed by transports, basic indus-
tries (steel and cement), transports, petrol refinery and distribution, and elec-
tricity. Additional decrees in July 1975 legalized to a large extent the occupa-
tions of latifundist farms in the Alentejo by wage laborers.
The wave of occupation by seasonally unemployed and – even more so
than in industry – chronically underpaid farm workers7 transformed approxi-
mately 1,1 million hectares into 550 collective production units (UCPs) and
3 Graham, Lawrence S.: „The Military in Politics: The Politicization of the Portuguese
Armed Forces“, in: id./ Harry M. Makler (eds.): Contemporary Portugal, Austin/London
1979, p. 234.
4 Cf. Insight Team of the Sunday Times: Insight on Portugal, London 1975, pp. 192 ss.
5 See the details in: Bacalhau, Mário: „Nacionalizações e Socialização“, Vida Mundial No.
1859, May 1, 1975, pp. 22 ss.
6 Cf. Harsgor, Michael: Portugal in Revolution, Washington Papers Vol. III No. 32, Beverly
Hills/ London 1976, pp. 44 ss.
7 Cf. Cutileiro, José: A Portuguese Rural Society, Oxford 1971, pp. 59 ss.
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cooperatives.8 It was only the final stage in a movement of labor unrest
which had gotten under way already before the military coup, fueled by ac-
celerated industrialization, agricultural stagnation, internal migration, and
increasing inflation. After April 25, this movement erupted in „a series of
social struggles for minimum conditions“ in fields, factories, and shanty-
towns.9 Vacant state- and later also privately owned buildings were occupied
by dwellers of squatter settlements and the most run-down quarters of Lis-
bon, Setúbal and Porto; occupants’ and residents’ commissions were estab-
lished to voice demands and obtain government support;10 workers’ commit-
tees, elected by general assemblies, organized strikes to push for national
minimum wages, better working conditions and the saneamento of those
employers most conspicously linked to the deposed „corporate state“.11
Around 750, mostly small-and-medium-industry, firms whose owners had
declared themselves bankrupt, or had closed down, were occupied and reor-
ganized either as production cooperatives (the majority, over 650) or self-
managed enterprises under the control of workers’ committees.12
Before the Constituent Assembly elections of April 25, 1975, the MFA,
„considering the situation resulting from the suppression of the counter-
revolutionary coup of March 11“, had prevailed upon the political parties
„engaged in the… consolidation and enlargement of the hitherto realized
democratic accomplishments“, to sign a Platform of Constitutional Agree-
ment „which allows for the continuation of the political, economic and social
revolution begun on April 25, 1974, in line with political pluralism and the
transition to socialism“.13 Concordant with these principles, the new constitu-
tion which became effective on April 25, 1976, opted for „a peaceful advance
of the revolutionary process“, emphasizing the rights of workers’ commit-
tees, trade unions, production, marketing, and consumer cooperatives. Trade
unions were given participatory rights in supervising the implementation of
8 Occupied estates, however, never controlled more than 14% of the country’s cultivated
soils (cf. Barros, Afonso de: „A Reforma Agrária em Portugal e o Desinvolvimento
Económico e Social“, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, 1979, No. 3, p. 61). Likewise in
industry, the nationalized sector in 1975 accounted for 11.5% of employment (France,
11.2%; Italy, 11.6%), 33.6% of gross fixed investment (France and Italy, respectively, 33.5
and 28%), and 14% of sales (again in France and Italy, 10 and 8.1%). Cf. Pinho, Ivo: „Sec-
tor público empresarial: antes e depois do 11 de Março“, Análise Social XII (1976), p. 745.
9 Downs, Charles: „Comissões de Moradores and Urban Struggles in Revolutionary Portu-
gal“, unpubl. manuscript, II International Meeting on Modern Portugal, Durham 1979, p. 5.
10 Cf. Leitão, Luis et al.: „Mouvement Urbains et Commissions de Moradores au Portugal
(1974-1976)“, Les Temps Modernes 34 (1978), pp. 660 ss., 670 ss.
11 Cf. Insight Team, op. cit., pp. 120 ss.
12 Cf. Barros, José: „Empresas industriais geridas pelos trabalhadores“, Análise Social XIII
(1977), p. 687; Costa, Fernando Ferreira da: „Le Coopératisme au Portugal“, Révue des
Etudes Coopératives, No. 194 (1978), p. 47.
13 Complete text in: Portugal Hoje, Ministério de Comunicação Social, Ano I, No. 50, April
19, 1975 (author’s translation).
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economic and social plans, the preparation of labor legislation, and the man-
agement of social security institutions. Workers’ committees elected by gen-
eral assemblies were entitled to supervise the management of enterprises and
to participate in drawing up both labor legislation and economic plans for
their respective sectors. Agrarian cooperatives and farmers’ organizations, in
turn, were to be involved in the planning and implementation of agrarian
reform. The constitution directed the state to promote the establishment of
agrarian, industrial and consumer cooperatives; it gave precedence to the
further socialisation (not, however, nationalisation) of the means of produc-
tion, based on self-managed enterprise, community property managed by
local authorities, and the cooperative sector.14
The turn to the left in Portuguese politics, however, was short-lived, last-
ing only from spring to autumn of 1975. The constitutional text voted during
that period triggered no sweeping commitment of political forces aimed at
realizing its prospects. Already during 1976-79 (before a liberal-conservative
coalition obtained a parliamentary majority),15 successive administrations
conducted a policy which effectively reversed „socialist pluralism“ as a con-
stitutional model and an evolutionary process.16 While, on the one hand,
goals and methods different from the „Atlantic“ political and socio-economic
context failed to take root domestically and, on the other hand, penetrative
processes occurred on the international level, those values and institutions
prevailed which corresponded to the socio-political systems of the North
Atlantic Alliance. The result was a political and economic regime „strongly
supported by, and oriented towards the West“.17
II
In a seminal essay on concept-building in international relations, James N.
Rosenau identified a society’s penetration as the authoritative allocation of
14 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Office of the Secretary of State for Mass Commu-
nication, Lisbon 1978, Art. 2, 9, 10, 55-58, 61, 81, 84, 90, 96, 100, 1004.
15 None of the first five constitutional administrations (which succeeded the six „provisional“
governments between 1974 and 1976) could count on a parliamentary majority. The first
was a PS minority cabinet, the second again a PS government that, under an informal ar-
rangement, included „figures from the CDS“. The third to fifth were presidential cabinets of
„independents“ – the first two led by liberal-conservative technocrats –installed by Presi-
dent Ramalho Eanes.
16 Addendum 2011: From 1982, successive constitutional revisions did away with references
to the peaceful continuation of the revolutionary process and to the intended realization of a
self-management economy, emaciated the chapter on agrarian reform, strengthened the
merely indicative character of economic planning, and ended by re-privatizing the public
sector.
17 Pimlott, Ben: „Socialism in Portugal: Was it a Revolution?“, Government & Opposition 12
(1977), p. 349.
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socio-political aims and values – including mobilization for the attainment of
these goals – by non-members of the penetrated society, acting in concert
with some of its members.18 A society’s capacity for penetration results from
its „structural“ power (Johan Galtung), permitting it to more or less subtly or
drastically reduce other societies’ autonomy. In the context of an internation-
al inter-dependence fundamentally „lopsided“ and „asymmetric in power“,19
penetrative activities may serve as efficient tools of a „total diplomacy“ pyr-
amiding „labor, diplomacy, intelligence, and business activities in foreign
policy“.20
The arrival of total diplomacy has been facilitated by a development
which has added new transnational to traditional international players.
Groups such as political parties, trade unions, and multinational corporations,
residing in the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, by transporting ideologies,
funds, information, persons and goods across frontiers21 may turn into in-
struments of their respective governments’ foreign policies.22
In introducing the concept of penetration, Rosenau emphasized the ulti-
mately binding character of such processes, citing a „shortage of capacities“
on the penetrated society’s part as underlying reason for the participation of
non-members in its politics. Defining that lack „in nonevaluative terms“
permitted him to gloss over the fact that, admittedly, „external penetration
may not always be gladly accepted by the officials and citizens of a socie-
ty.“23 As other authors have pointed out, some groups of the penetrated so-
ciety, by acting as a „bridge-head“, may advance their interests and gain „a
degree of autonomy“ in the process. However, because such additional au-
tonomy „may only evolve within the limits of the strategy pursued by the
penetrating society“, it is bound to „remain relatively small.“24
Still, penetration should evidently not be confused with mere manipula-
tion. As the aims and policies of the penetrating society will usually neither
be unknown nor without following in the penetrated country, the process of
18 Cf. Rosenau, James N.: „Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy“, in: R. Barry Farrell
(ed.): Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston 1966, p. 65.
19 Vernon, Raymond: „Multinational Business and National Economic Goals“, International
Organization XXV (1971), p. 705; Morse, Edward L.: „Transnational Economic Process-
es“, International Organization XXV (1971), p. 393.
20 Cox, Robert W.: „Labor and Transnational Relations“, International Organization XXV
(1971), p. 555.
21 Cf. Strange, Susan: „The Study of Transnational Relations“, International Affairs 52
(1976), pp. 334 ss.
22 Cf., e. g., Radosh, Ronald: American Labor and United States Foreign Policy, New York
1969, passim; Behrmann, Jack N.: National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise,
Englewood Cliffs 1970, pp. 101 ss.
23 Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 64, 68.
24 Kiersch, Gerhard/Mettler-Meibom, Barbara: „Die US-Amerikanische Penetration in Frank-
reich nach dem 2. Weltkrieg“, in: Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel (ed.): Kapitalistische Penetration
in Europa, Hamburg 1976, p. 31.
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interaction is both more complex and more dynamic. Domestic controversies
(latent or already begun) may be started or fueled by external protagonists
through ideological interpretation which takes the effect of „contagion“;
external norms, reinforced by enticements or pressures, may be invoked by
domestic groups (or even factions of such groups) to generate additional
legitimacy for their political strategies; and the original perceptions of these
groups may be transformed in the course of such a process as it will be con-
sidered here.
Conducive to the North American-Western European interest in Portu-
guese developments and, subsequently, formal and informal penetration of
that NATO member country during 1974/75 was the concern of political and
military strategists over what came to be termed „NATO’s crumbling South-
ern flank“: Soviet naval build-up in and Communist party strength around the
Mediterranean were perceived as two blades of a scissor fragmenting NATO
political cohesion and endangering NATO military communications. The
revolutionary process in Portugal seemed to pose an immediate threat to
both.25 Accordingly, the threshold was quickly reached after which any real
change in the status quo became „intolerable“ to NATO.26
The Institute for the Study of Conflict in London published a scenario
which already envisioned Portugal’s „existing obligations“ as having been
„abrogated“, with the Soviet Union attempting to „establish a base“ in the
Azores and the North-Atlantic forces securing the archipelago „in the defense
of its own paramount interests“ – an act „evidently facilitated“ if it were
legitimized „by a democratic Portuguese government in exile“.27 Funds for
setting up the London institute and its journal Conflict Studies had come, five
years earlier, from Kern House Enterprises, a Delaware-based CIA „front“.
Leaked documents suggested that the institute continued to work hand in
glove with the CIA (and, probably, British intelligence services) by offering
„professional and authoritative-sounding analyses“.28 Considering the insti-
tute’s background, the Conflict Studies scenario illustrates the prevailing
25 Cf. Rees, David: Southern Europe: NATO’s Crumbling Southern Flank, Institute for the
Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies No. 60, London 1975, pp. 2 ss., 13.
26 Szulc, Tad: „Washington and Lisbon: Behind the Portuguese Revolution“, Foreign Policy
No. 21, Winter 1975/76, p. 9.
27 Rees, op. cit., p. 16.
28 Cf. Weissman, Steve: „The CIA Makes the News“, in: Philip Agee/Louis Wolf (eds.): Dirty
Work: The CIA in Western Europe, London 1981, pp. 206, 207 ss. Kern House Enterprises
had begun by establishing the London-based news (and propaganda) service Forum World
Features. This was intended to replace an earlier service which had been operating as part
of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, when that group’s covert funding by the CIA came
under public scrutiny. Forum World Features, in its turn, set up a subsidiary „research ser-
vices center“ which, by 1970, was transformed into the Institute for the Study of Conflict.
Addendum 2011: The quote characterizing the Institute’s activities may be found on
http://www.powerbase.info/ index.php/Institute_for_the_Study_of_Conflict (accessed
6/14/2011).
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tendency to put the Portuguese „case“ squarely into the context of the Cold
War: Portugal was not viewed as a developing polity and society in its own
right, but merely in terms of another theater in the East-West conflict.
NATO, US and EC attitudes became particularly important for Portugal
because of the country’s deteriorating economic situation. While merchandise
exports rose only from $1,8 billion (1973) to $2,3 billion (even declining in
1975/76), imports shot up from $2,8 to 4,3 billion in 1974. Because of climb-
ing international prices, the most marked increases were not in amounts but
in value of cereal and – especially enormous – of crude oil imports. Income
from tourism and emigrant remittances fell drastically. Clandestine capital
outflow through the undervoicing of exports alone has been estimated at
$108 million for 1975. Labor migration decreased by 45% (barely 45,000
persons as against nearly 80,000 in 1973), after France, West Germany and
other countries had reacted to the 1973 oil-price induced world recession by
unilaterally suspending the import of labor. Meanwhile, due to returnees from
Angola and Mozambique, and to the demobilization of military personnel,
continental Portugal’s population swelled from 8.43 million in 1973 to 9.09
million in 1975, unemployment and underemployment rising stiffly with it.29
Judged against the background of worsening terms of trade and international
recession, Portuguese revolution and decolonization could hardly have hap-
pened in a more unfavorable situation.
As Portugal’s accessibility to penetration increased, external attempts at
exerting influence intensified to the extent that the leftward trend of the coun-
try’s social and political power struggles was reflected by the composition of
successive „provisional“ cabinets and by their socializing measures. During
the provisional period, i. e. before promulgation of the new constitution,
Portugal had left-leaning – as distinct from moderate or de facto social-
democratic – governments, often referred to as „Gonçalvist“, only from
March to September, 1975. It was during that period that values and means
initially inspired by anticommunism, but more and more directed against the
entire Left were determinedly pushed from the outside in an effort to reverse
the course which seemed set after the events of March 11.
29 For the data, cf. Robert N. McCauley: „A Compendium of IMF Troubles: Turkey, Portugal,
Peru, Egypt“, in: Lawrence G. Frank/Marilyn Seiber (eds.): Developing Country Debt, New
York 1979, p. 151; World Bank (ed.): Portugal: Current and Prospective Economic
Trends, Washington D. C. 1978, p. 34; Manuel Barboza/Luis Miguel P. Beleza: „External
Disequilibrium in Portugal 1975-1978“, in: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian (ed.): II Inter-
national Conference on the Portuguese Economy, Vol. 2, Lisbon 1980, pp. 57, 62; infor-
mation supplied by the Ministry of Social Communication in Lisbon.
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III
In a telex of January 27, 1975 (which was partially leaked later),30 the West
German Embassy in Lisbon recommended that the Bonn government should
„double funds for Portuguese farmers’ organization“ – probably the Associ-
ação Livre de Agricultores (ALA), predecessor of the militant Confederação
des Agricultores de Portugal (CAP). The „DM 50,000 proposed by Vice
President [of the German Farmers’ Association] v. Feury“ were judged „in-
adequate“, because „PCP organises workers and small peasants“. The embas-
sy suggested that the funds should be transferred through the German associ-
ation.
From „confidential sources in the Luso-American community“, Rona M.
Fields learned in March 1975 that Portuguese immigrants had been sending
money to the conservative-liberal Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) and
the conservative Centro Democrático Social (CDS), and that „considerable
private funds“ had been supplemented by „indirect contributions“ from the
CIA and the State Department.31 In a circular letter dated December 17,
1975,32 Kai-Uwe von Hassel, President of the European Union of Christian
Democrats, and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) deputy Elmar Pieroth, a
board member of that West German party’s Small-and-Medium-Business
Association, had requested donations to help the CDS „train functionaries,
hold conferences and meetings“, adding that financial aid was „urgently
required“ to „facilitate our friends’ daily struggle against the strong Com-
munist forces“. On February 25, 1976, the CDU announced that it would
support the CDS (which was also receiving help from the British Conserva-
tives)33 in the organisation of its campaign for the April 25 elections.34
Founded in 1974 by public figures from the Caetano regime’s economy
and bureaucracy,35 the CDS appealed to „those groups which were most
content with the old system“.36 The PPD, renamed Partido Social Democráta,
PSD, in 1976, experienced profound internal strife over the question whether
30 Published by Berliner Extra-Dienst IX, No. 21, March 11, 1975, p. 2. The telex had been
included in the West German Foreign Ministry’s „Yellow Service“ distributed to every em-
bassy. Publication in the Extra-Dienst seems to have been based on information received
from the Cairo Embassy’s Press Attache Erich Knapp and Embassy Secretary Peter Laza-
rek. Knapp was immediately dismissed; Lazarek committed suicide. Cf. subsequent 1975
Extra-Dienst issues.
31 Fields, Rona M.: The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement, New
York/London 1977, p. 230. Also Szulc, op. cit., p. 11.
32 Facsimile reproduction in Portugal-Nachrichten No. 18, January 12, 1976, p. 13.
33 Cf. Harvey, Robert: Portugal: Birth of a Democracy, London 1978, p. 73.
34 Herzog, Werner: „Staatspräsident wird ein Militär“, Frankfurter Rundschau, February 26,
p. 2.
35 Details in Antunes, Albertino et al.: Portugal – Républica Socialista?, Lisbon 1975, p. 235.
36 Pimlott, Ben: „Parties and Voters in the Portuguese Revolution“, Parliamentary Affairs,
Winter 1977, p. 42.
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it was essentially a moderate group, concerned with selective opposition to
revolutionary results, or a conservative organization, principally concerned
„to protect and to preserve“, fundamentally opposed to the revolution.37
In any case, not just anti-communism but categorical opposition to the
Left were already embedded in the entire conservative-liberal spectrum, from
ALA and CAP to PPD and CDS. With regard to these organizations, availa-
ble indicators point more to limited external support than to penetration in the
above-defined sense. Moreover, in spite of the influence wielded by these
groups in the Portuguese North during 1974/75, there can be no doubt that
the period’s principal players, apart from the PCP, were the MFA – including
the governments which it headed – and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista,
PS) under the direction of Mário Soares.
The MFA was an „African movement“ in more than one sense. The un-
dogmatic Marxism of Amílcar Cabral (PAIGC, Guinea-Bissau) and
Agostinho Neto (MPLA, Angola) had impressed the professionally and polit-
ically disillusioned captains, who had served in Africa on combat as well as
on civil-military („counter-insurgency“) missions, and had made them recep-
tive to socialist goals in the widest sense. But while that socialism remained
vague in its details, ideological cleavages developed between various military
factions to the extent that both foreign and Portuguese parties and foreign
governments impressed their political projects on the officers. Domestic and
external pressures made themselves felt, to which men like Prime Minister
Vasco Gonçalves, Special Forces (COPCON) Commander Otelo Saraiva de
Carvalho – the April 25 coup’s military architect – and the MFA’s political
thinker, Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, responded quite differently.
If the MFA was programatically insecure, the PS – as conceded by no
less an authority than its general secretary Mário Soares in 1973 – lacked
theoretical training, reflection on the Portuguese „way to Socialism“ and
finally, due to former „tactical ambiguities“, political profile.38 The Acção
Socialista Portuguesa, founded during 1964 in Geneva und admitted into the
Socialist International in 1972, was transformed into the PS at Bad Mün-
stereifel (Germany) a year later with the support of the West German Social
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). After
April 25, the PS (again according to Soares) “lacked more or less everything
necessary for making an autonomous impression on the nation’s political life:
numerous and active members in every town and village, an experienced and
solid organization, effective information channels, money…“39
37 Cf. Pimlott, op. cit., p. 41.
38 Mário Soares, in: Partido Socialista (ed.): Destruir o Sistema – Construir Uma Nova Vida,
n. p. 1973, pp. 25, 27, 31, 39.
39 Soares, Mário: Portugal: Que Revolução?, Lisbon 1976, p. 77 (emphasis added).
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During 1975 (and subsequently),40 Portugal’s cabinets (thereby affecting
the MFA) and the PS were targeted in a concerted combination of entice-
ments and pressures by the West German and US administrations, the EC and
NATO Councils, by SPD and FES, the Socialist International and associa-
tions of the international workers’ movement. Considering, on the one hand,
that this was the period marked in the United States by the ramifications of
the Watergate shock and, on the other hand, that the SPD was represented in
West Germany’s government, one cannot but conclude that the United States
were eclipsed, in the pursuit of that strategy, by the EC countries, particularly
West Germany.
IV
On April 4, 1975, the Hermes Insurance Agency, managing federal credit
guarantees for the protection of West German exporters against economic
and political risk, announced it would suspend covering exports to Portu-
gal.41 Five days later, the West German government postponed a decision on
DM 70 million financial assistance. On April 16, the SPD published a joint
letter to Vasco Gonçalves by the EC Confederation of Socialist Parties and
the European Parliament’s Socialist Group, exhorting the MFA to distance
itself from the PCP, praising Soares, insinuating the perspective that it might
work to promote (or, between the lines, to impede) EC aid. On May 19, the
FRG government granted the DM 70 million to Foreign Minister Melo An-
tunes. But a week later, the EC Foreign Ministers’ Council hedged on a Por-
tuguese request already submitted a year earlier.
A mere two months after the coup, on June 27, 1974, the I Provisional
Government had asked the EC for economic support. On November 25/26,
40 Two examples: Pressing for „apolitical professionalism (and) discipline“ (Sen. Edward W.
Brooke: „Statement“, in: Military and Economic Assistance to Portugal, U.S. Senate,
Washington DC 1977, p. 4) in an effort to reorient the Portuguese military toward NATO, a
joint U.S.-West German and two U.S. military advisory teams were sent to Portugal in
1976. In the wake of these visits, Portugal received extensive military aid from both coun-
tries. – During 1978/79, funds from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, transferred through the
Fundação José Fontana, helped the PS to set up the União Geral dos Trabalhadores (UGT)
on a parity basis with the PSD’s „Tendência Sindical Reformista Social-Democrata“
(TESIRED). The FES/PS/PSD intention was to undercut the largely (by a two thirds major-
ity of its Secretariat) PCP-controlled CGTP (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portu-
gueses), which had emerged from the Intersindical „umbrella organization“ established in
opposition to the Caetano regime. The two ideologically polarized trade union confedera-
tions have been developing into pliable party instruments, to the detriment of their socio-
economic strength. Cf. Partido Socialista (ed.): Confiar no PS – Apostar em Portugal, Lis-
bon 1979, pp. 37 ss.; author’s interview with former Secretary of Labor Francisco Marcelo
Curto, February 20, 1980.
41 Details of this chapter are based on reports in Berliner Extra-Dienst, Süddeutsche Zeitung
and Frankfurter Rundschau, and on information published by the EC Commission.
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the III Provisional Government presented urgent proposals for new special
trade terms (under the Free Trade Treaty concluded in 1972) and for a com-
prehensive agreement protecting Portuguese emigrant workers in EC member
countries (850,000 in France alone by 1974). These proposals, however, were
submitted after Spínola had already resigned the presidency and gone on
television for his dramatic farewell address to the country. From that mo-
ment, „the Community leaders lacked the will…to give rapid satisfaction to
the demands put forward by the Portuguese.“42 On May 26, 1975, as already
mentioned, and again on June 24, the EC Foreign Ministers’ Council hedged
on economic aid, voicing its concern with „political stability“ and „democrat-
ic government“ in Portugal. Finally, on July 17, French President Giscard
d’Estaing „vetoed a Community loan…for fear of subsidizing a socialist-
communist alliance“.43 The EC Council of Heads of State and Government,
instead, presented Portugal with what amounted to a „virtual ultimatum“:44
„The EC, because of its political and historical tradition, can grant support
only to a pluralist democracy“45 – evidently referring, by „pluralist“, to the
North-American-Western European ‚public philosophy’,46 rather than to the
„socialist-pluralist“ creed professed by the MFA four weeks earlier.
A $180 million European Investment Bank loan was only granted Portu-
gal on October 7, after a new, de facto social-democratic – the VI Provisional
– government had been in office for three weeks. The first disbursements
were not made before April, 1976. The 1972 trade agreement was finally
amended in June of the same year. Evidently, aid from Western Europe could
not be obtained without a commitment to the West.
General Francisco da Costa Gomes, Spínola’s successor to the Portu-
guese presidency, has made abundantly clear that the EC attitude, from the
autumn of 1974 onward, was perceived by the Portuguese government as
„inimical“ foreign pressure.47 The Common Market’s „power of denial“,48
demonstrated from May to July 1975, could not have failed to impress, first
and foremost, Costa Gomes, Melo Antunes, and ambassador itinerant Major
Vítor Alves who visited Western European capitals between April and Sep-
tember. One week after the EC Council had given the thumbs down on aid,
42 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly: Report on the Situation in Portugal, Doc.
3609, Strasbourg, April 21, 1975, p. 18.
43 Story, Jonathan: „Portugal’s Revolution of Carnations: Patterns of Change and Continuity“,
International Affairs, Vol. 52 (1976), p. 431.
44 Szulc, Tad: „Hope for Portugal“, The New Republic, August 30, 1975, p. 9.
45 Commission of the European Communities: Die Beziehungen zwischen der EG und Portu-
gal, Brussels 1976, p. 8.
46 The role of the concept of pluralism as a guideline and justification of Western European
and U.S. foreign policy has been explored in the author’s „A Revolução dos Cravos e a Pol-
ítica Externa: O Fracasso do Pluralismo Socialista em Portugal a seguir a 1974“, Revista
Crítica de Ciências Sociais, Nr. 11 (1983), pp. 95 ss.
47 Costa Gomes, Francisco da: Sobre Portugal, Lisbon 1979, p. 59.
48 Story, ibid. (note 43).
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Costa Gomes, in a discourse to the MFA Delegate Assembly, made no secret
of his conviction that, because of its economic dependence on the West, Por-
tugal could not endure „Western enmity“ as long as its economic ties with
Third World and socialist countries had not been further developed.49 An-
tunes and Alves led the MFA Officers’ „Group of Nine“ whose August 7
document, signaling open discord in MFA ranks and sharply criticizing the
cabinet’s „revolutionary vanguard“ politics, was instrumental in ending
„gonçalvismo“. They were tacitly supported by Costa Gomes, who agreed
with their opinions, if not with their methods.50
Melo Antunes would originally have preferred a „Third World option“,
the emergence – from a position of non-alignment – of a Lis-
bon/Maputo/Luanda „axis“.51 This position, however, proved unattainable,
and the Group of Nine document contained the first reference to the per-
ceived necessity of „strengthening and deepening the ties with certain eco-
nomic areas (Common Market, EFTA)“.52 Final proof of the EC Council
declaration’s significant effect is provided by a „revolutionary critique“ of
the Group of Nine document, published on August 13, 1975 by COPCON
officers close to Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. The critique included the state-
ment that „whoever may still have entertained illusions has now lost them
considering the recent conditions tied to ‚financial aid for Portugal’“.53
V
In January 1975, the PCP, supported by the MFA, had prevailed upon the II
Gonçalves Administration to back the principle of unicidade, i. e. of a single
national trade union association, which the new constitution would rescind a
year later. That meant a legal monopoly for Intersindical, which was largely
controlled by the Communist Party.54 The decision would prove a Pyrrhic
victory: For the first time since April 25, the PS confronted the PCP „publicly
and by mobilizing the masses“:55 To an Intersindical demonstration of nearly
100,000 workers, the PS responded with a counter-demonstration of 40,000
participants.
49 Cf. Costa Gomes, Francisco da: Discursos Políticos, Ministry of Social Communication,
Lisbon 1976, p. 201.
50 Cf. Costa Gomes, Sobre Portugal, p. 81.
51 Cf. Ferreiro, José Medeiros: „Aspectos internacionais da Revolução Portuguesa“, unpubl.
manuscript, II International Meeting on Modern Portugal, Durham 1979, p. 6.
52 A translation of the document may be found in Schröder, Günter (ed): Portugal: Materialen
und Dokumente, Vol. 3, Giessen 1976, p. 133.
53 As in Schröder, op. cit., p. 149.
54 However, trade unions were under no obligation to affiliate to Intersindical, and a vote by
secret ballot of a union’s entire membership on whether or not to affiliate was required. Cf.
Insight Team, op. cit., p. 212.
55 Merz, Friedhelm/Rego, Victor Cunha (eds.): Freiheit für den Sieger, Zürich 1976, p. 76.
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However, the FRG government, West Germany’s Social Democrats and
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation were not unaware that the PS executive pur-
sued farther-reaching schemes. In the already referred-to telex of January 27
(first denied by Bonn, but later proved authentic), the West German embassy
in Lisbon reported that „Soares tends triggering governmental crisis 3 or 2
weeks before [Constituent Assembly] elections… Should c-g. [Costa Gomes]
not go along, sp. [Spínola] would emerge from retreat with explicit public
statement. Effect demission and statement c-g. or sp. would be coupled to
split MFA… Eventual coup Copcon-Carvalho due to obtained majority on
election eve…if necessary be thwarted by appeal to NATO. C.-g., sp. or
fabião56 then able to supplement moderate majority Constituent Assembly by
government without PC.“57 During a visit, Under-Secretary of State Jorge
Campinos (PS) advised his interlocutors at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on
March 10 that „the Portuguese socialists (had) – in conjunction with Presi-
dent Costa Gomes – considered… to obtain a replacement of Prime Minister
Vasco Gonçalves even before April 12 [the original date for electing a Con-
stituent Assembly], so that they might be able to secure, after the elections,58
an even more active participation in political decisions.“ Spínolas abortive
coup attempt by next day, according to the Foundation, „invalidated Campi-
nos’ statement“.
Following Willy Brandt’s visit in Portugal and his discussions with the
PS from October 19 to 21, 1974, the SPD did not mince its words, stating that
„Brandt’s trip has made plain the influence which German Social Democracy
is exerting on the evolution of democracies in Europe.“59 No less than the
Atlantic Alliance, the party was concerned that popular front governments
might emerge in France, Italy and Portugal. Both after World Wars I and II,
the SPD had met communism head-on; nevertheless, its experience was that
the conservative parties were able to mobilize the electorate’s latent anti-
communism against social democracy. Now it feared that these parties might
benefit if popular front governments should obtain majorities in Southern
European countries. Consequently, the SPD tried to prevail in the Socialist
International over the French, Italian and Greek socialists led by Mitterrand,
and it was also concerned that „our American friends…should not confuse
social democracy and communism“ (Brandt).60
56 Major (later Brigadier) Carlos Fabião, originally close to Spínola, Army Chief of Staff
subsequent to September 28, 1974, continued to be considered a „moderate“.
57 As in n. 30.
58 Esters, Elke: Aktennotiz betr. Portugal vor den Wahlen zur Verfassunggebenden Versamm-
lung, Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, March 17, 1975, p. 1.
59 Merz, Friedhelm: „Solidarität mit Portugal“, Sozialdemokrat Magazin, No. 11/1974, p. 14.
Merz was editor-in-chief of the SPD members’ magazine.
60 Brandt quote in Stender, Ralf: Reaktionen und Einflussnahme der SPD auf die Entwicklung
in Portugal vom April 1975 bis zum April 1976, Thesis, Free University of Berlin 1977, p.
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For support, the SPD could count on the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the
trade unions and the West German government. The Foundation’s president,
Alfred Nau, was SPD Treasurer from 1946 to 1975, and was subsequently
made a honorary member of the party’s executive. Trade Union Federation
(DGB) head Heinz Oskar Vetter sat on the Foundation’s Board. His prede-
cessor, Ludwig Rosenberg, belonged to the Foundation’s Board of Trustees,
which was chaired by Walter Hesselbach, President of the Bank für Gemein-
wirtschaft (whose Supervisory Board, in turn, was presided over by Heinz
Oskar Vetter). In 1975, the Foundation had 441 employees and a budget of
DM 77.4 mio.61 Like its Christian Democratic, Christian Social and Free
Democratic counterparts, the Konrad Adenauer, Hanns Seidel and Friedrich
Naumann Foundations, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation continues to be sub-
sized by the Ministries of Economic Cooperation and of the Interior. Outlays
are administered confidentially; publication of accounts is not mandatory;
and subsidies are assigned globally, allowing foundations a large margin of
autonomy in their use.62
The Friedrich Ebert Foundation has always interpreted „the legacy of
Weimar tied to the name of Friedrich Ebert“ as an obligation to „support
democrats in the defense of their state against any enemy, whether on the left
or on the right“. Consequently, the Foundation opposes social-democratic
factions „vehemently if they do not adhere to the SPD policy, defined in
these terms, as an omnibus party“.63
Basically, attempts at „exercising influence on social and political pro-
cesses in [any one] country“ (in the words of the Foundation’s Annual Report
for 1977) are guided by a „communism syndrome“ – a syndrome which may
lead to „erroneous judgments concerning the possibilities and limits of com-
munist infiltration“.64
More sober accounts have repeatedly disclaimed the „gross oversimplifi-
cation to view today’s [i. e. the 1975] political scene in Portugal exclusively
as a forum in the battle between Democratic freedom and Communist dicta-
torship“,65 as well as the equally gross affirmation that „freedom of the press
died with the caso República“.66 In contrast to Mário Soares, who propound-
77. Cf. also Stender, op. cit., pp. 154 ss., and Hübner, Hans: Portugal – Prüfstein der De-
mokratie?, Cologne 1976, pp. 127/128.
61 Cf. Vieregge, Henning von: „Zur politischen Bildungsarbeit der parteinahen Stiftungen“,
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. B 7-77, February 19, 1977, pp. 30/31, 36.
62 Ibid., pp. 28/29, 34.
63 Ibid., p. 31.
64 Bley, Helmut/Tetzlaff, Rainer (eds.): Afrika und Bonn, Reinbek 1977, pp. 117, 170. The
quote from the Foundation’s 1977 Report is on p. 62.
65 Szulc, Tad: „Volatile Portugal“, The New Republic, August 16-23, 1975, p. 18.
66 Szulc, Tad: „Washington and Lisbon“ (as above, n. 26), p. 41; cf. also Graham, The Mili-
tary in Politics (as above, n. 2), p. 245. The PCP’s participation in occupying the newspa-
per República (affiliated to the PS) by typographical workers was „at best indirect and may
have been merely a reaction to the militancy of workers organized in the Maoist UDP“
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ed that view abroad, former PS Agricultural Minister Lopes Cardoso, who
later left the party, has always insisted that the ‚hot summer’ of that year
cannot be considered as „um período de pré-ditadura communista“.67
The PCP had certainly secured influence among the military, municipal
administrations, the trade unions, and part of the mass media. Obviously, it
received continuous financial support from the USSR and several orthodox
communist parties. Nevertheless, four points should be considered.
First, the PCP could count on a position of „hegemony“ only among the
rural proletariat, never among the industrial workers, even less among the
armed forces. In the MFA’s principal political institutions – the Council of
the Revolution and the Delegate Assembly -, the number of its supporters
was limited. As regards the military hierarchy, the party could hardly count
on any adherents: neither among COPCON or in the Lisbon Military Region
commanded by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho; nor in the North, where „Gon-
çalvist“ commander Eurico Corvacho found himself unable to rely on his
own units; nor, finally, in the Military Regions South and Center whose
commanders Pedro Pezarat Correia and Franco Charais had signed the Group
of Nine document.
Second, the party entered into an unconditional alliance with the MFA.
There – or so it seemed to the PCP – lay the „political“ power (regulatory and
coercive) which the party considered instrumental for consolidating the „so-
cial“ power it had acquired on the fields of the Alentejo, in the North’s mu-
nicipal administrations, the trade unions, television, and the press.68 Depend-
ing on the MFA’s support and cohesion, it limited its capacity for conducting
a dialogue with other parties, particularly the PS. That exclusivist strategy
failed: On August 10, 1975, PCP Secretary General Álvaro Cunhal admitted
to „a certain social and political isolation“ of his party, even „among those
military whom we may consider as progressive“.69
Three, at no time was the PCP in a position to „dictate strategy“. Having
turned more militant with the radicalization of the MFA after March 11, it
could only continue to react. In July/August, the party found itself „essential-
ly a marginal spectator to the drama played out in the MFA Assembly and the
Council of the Revolution“.70
Four, globally considered, the policy pursued by the USSR with regard to
Portugal and the PCP seems to have been „largely situational, frequently
(Mujal-Léon, Eusebio M.: „The PCP and the Portuguese Revolution“, Problems of Com-
munism, Vol. XXVI [1977], p. 31).
67 Tempo, October 26, 1981, p. 11.
68 Cf. Schmitter, Philippe C.: „Le Parti Communiste Portugais entre le Pouvoir Social et le
Pouvoir Politique“, Etudes Internationales, Vol. VI (1975), pp. 380 ss.
69 Cunhal, Álvaro: „Rede auf der Plenarsitzung des Zentralkomitees der PCP“, in: id.: Zur
portugiesischen Revolution. Reden 1974-79, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 57 ss.
70 Mujal-Léon, op. cit., pp. 30 ss.
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contradictory rather than coherent“.71 Recognizing the advantageous com-
mercial and technological aspects of easing tensions with the United States,
the Soviet leaders feared that „Portugal could turn into an obstacle for the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe“.72 Not wishing to risk
„détente“, they preferred resorting to a position which has been characterized
as „essentially a low-risk, limited-investment operation“.73
Not so the West German and international Social Democracy, aided and
abetted by the United States and the European Community. They gave their
complete support to that „first-rate political tactician“ Mário Soares, whose
rhetoric as „demagogic defender of socialism and democracy… for a while
were to give him the air of an authentic Portuguese martyr, struggling against
the forces of totalitarianism“.74 Soares had boosted his international prestige
by negotiating decolonization in 1974, as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the
period of radicalization, which followed March 11, the U.S. and Western
European governments came to place their bets on him; and when his party
obtained 38% of the vote in April, 1975, the PS Secretary General concluded
it was only proper that he should direct national policy, along lines accepta-
ble to both NATO and EC.
These were elections for the Constituent Assembly, of course, not for
Parliament; and during the electoral campaign, the PS had emphasized that it
stood for a „socialist“ revolution, different from either a „social-democratic“
or a „social-bureaucratic“ (referring to the PCP) path. Besides, the Platform
of Constitutional Agreement specified that the outcome would not affect the
composition of governments until parliamentary elections would have been
held under the new constitution. Soares, however, argued that his party’s
„representative“ legitimacy now rivaled the MFA’s „revolutionary“ legitima-
cy. Nominally challenging the PCP, but in fact the MFA, he did not hesitate
„to call his forces onto the streets in their tens of thousands“75 and to „enter
into a tacit alliance with more conservative, and in some cases, open reac-
tionary forces which only now recommenced to show themselves in pub-
lic.“76
At this point, the support by the Committe of Friendship and Solidarity
with democracy and Socialism in Portugal, an initiative of the Socialist Inter-
national, was only the final step in „an auxiliary action whose story cannot
yet be told“.77 The Committee, established on September 5, 1975 in London,
71 Wettig, Gerhard: Die sowjetische Portugal-Politik 1974-1975, Berichte des Bundesinstituts
für ost-wissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 60, Cologne 1975, p. 90.
72 Brandt, Willy: Begegnungen und Einsichten, Hamburg 1976, p. 632.
73 Szulc, Tad: „Washington and Lisbon“ (as above, n. 26), p. 57.
74 Harvey, op. cit. (as in n. 33), p. 39.
75 Gallagher, Tom: „Portugal’s Bid for Democracy: The Role of the Socialist Party“, West
European Politics, Vol. 2 (1979), S. 210.
76 Mujal-Léon, op. cit., p. 32.
77 Brandt, op. cit., p. 631.
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was chaired by Willy Brandt; Bruno Kreisky, François Mitterrand, Olof Pal-
me, Joop den Uyl and Harold Wilson were also members. While the Commit-
tee strove to „contact numerous individuals with political and military re-
sponsibilities“ in Portugal and to influence „European governments and play-
ers of the international political scene“,78 the SPD and its foundation had long
begun to grant considerable aid to the PS under the Leitmotiv „explicit rejec-
tion of popular front ideology“.79 In April 1974, the PS – as quoted above –
had no money and no organization worth mentioning. In April 1975, it was
able to outspend any other party during its election campaign. Outside dona-
tions to the PS alone equaled the PPD’s total election expenses. The sale of
publications was reported by the party to have fetched five times more than,
again, in the case of the PPD, possibly hiding „laundered“ contributions.
While the PS claimed 35 971 new members in relation to 1974 (and 44 623
in relation to 1975), membership dues amounted to hardly 1% of its in-
come.80
The only SPD statement offering any quantitative information on finan-
cial support referred to DM 882,000 in Friedrich Ebert Foundation aid for
political training and organization building.81 A news report specified in
1979 that the Foundation had altogether supported the PS with DM 10-15
mio.; in 1977 alone, 2.9 mio of these were paid out of FRG government sub-
sidies.82
The Dutch Partij van de Arbeid reportedly contributed another 3 mio.
dollars; further news reports referred to financial aid by the socialist parties
of Austria and Sweden.83 And on September 25, 1975, the New York Times
wrote that, according to „four official sources in Washington“, the U.S. gov-
ernment, subsequent to the May 30 NATO summit in Brussels and after con-
sultations with the West European governments, had decided to join in sup-
porting the PS. According to the newspaper, the U.S. funds were to be „fun-
neled by the Central Intelligence Agency through Western European socialist
parties and labor unions“, where the CIA had been reviving „dormant but
traditionally existing relations with anti-communist socialist workers’ move-
78 Brandt, Willy: „Das portugiesische Volk kann sich auf uns verlassen“, in: Merz/Rego, op.
cit. (as in n. 55), pp. 187 ss.
79 Wagner, R.: „Klare Absage an die Volksfront“ (commenting on Brandt’s 1974 visit to
Portugal), Vorwärts (main SPD newspaper), October 24, 1974, cit. by Stender, op. cit. (as
in n. 60), p. 15.
80 Figures reported on parties’ income and expenses are from Antunes, Albertino et al.: Por-
tugal – República Socialista?, op. cit. (as in n. 35), pp. 164 ss., membership numbers from
Partido Socialista (ed.): Confiar no PS – Apostar em Portugal, Lisbon 1979, p. 73.
81 Cf. „Sozialdemokraten helfen“, Sozialdemokrat Magazin No. 1/1975, p. 21.
82 Cf. „Immer auf der Sonnenseite des Lebens“, Der Spiegel, Vol. 33 No. 16, April 16, 1979,
p. 47.
83 Cf. Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1975, p. A 20; International Herald Tribune, Aug. 30, 1975,
pp. 1ss.
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ments.“84 (The newspaper was referring to the fact that, in France, AFL – the
American Federation of Labor – and CIA funds, distributed by the AFL, had
contributed in 1947 to splitting the Confédéraion Génerale du Travail, close
to the PCF, and establishing the competing Force Ouvrière; it was also refer-
ring to West Germany, where both AFL and CIO – Congress of Industrial
Organizations – had, in 1947/48, used CIA funds to create anti-communist
trade unions.)85
It was planned subsequent press article friendly to the Socialist Interna-
tional has been candid in reporting that, as West German trade union officials
traveled to Portugal, „it was not uncommon that they carried a suitcase full of
money as a gesture of solidarity“. What may be called into question is the
report’s further assertion that „dependencies did not result“.86 In 1973, Soa-
res had found the PS lacking in theoretical training and reflection on social-
ism. In its 1974 ‚Declaration of Principles’, the party had announced that its
aim consisted in the „construction of a classless society“, opting for a „social-
ism that includes and develops pluralism“, rejecting „social democratic“
solutions that would „maintain, on purpose or in fact, capitalist structures“.
Commencing in that year, the PS not only received massive aid from abroad,
but also saw itself confronted with no less massive expectations tied to that
aid. In such situations, varieties of informal penetration – particularly if
founded in ‚socialist solidarity and friendship’ – certainly played their part in
the Partido Socialista’s „social democratization“, its rapid evolution „into an
orthodox Western party“.87
Álvaro Cunhal never left any doubt about his conviction that „Leninism
is the Marxism of transition from capitalism to socialism“.88 Conditioned
under the dictatorship by what have been aptly termed the „traumatic experi-
ences“ of a „Hobbesian world“89, the PCP had remained a „party from the
times of Dimitrov“, with a „hardly fertile theoretical dogmatism“.90 By its
tactic, the PCP contributed its share to the 1975 wave of anti-communism in
Portugal, indirectly favoring a PS whose politics resulted in a weakening of
the entire Left, including the Partido Socialista itself.
84 New York Times, No. 42,978, Sept. 25, 1975, pp. 1, 25.
85 Cf. Radosh, American Labor (as in n. 22), pp. 319 ss., 323, 438.
86 Grunenberg, Nina: „Frieden, Freiheit und ein Traum: Die Sozialistische Internationale“,
Die Zeit, December 12, 1980, p. 11.
87 Gallagher, op. cit. (as in n. 75), p. 203.
88 Cunhal, Álvaro: „Die PCP und der reale Sozialismus“, address of May 6, 1978, in: id., op.
cit. (as in n. 69), p. 203.
89 Gallagher, Tom: „The Portuguese Communist Party and Eurocommunism“, Political
Quarterly, Vol. 50 (1979), pp. 205/206.
90 Alves, Márcio Moreira: Les Soldats Socialistes de Portugal, Paris 1975, p. 156.
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Drawing attention to the role of formal and informal penetration in its various
dimensions, culminating in „total diplomacy“, does not mean disputing the
importance of domestic developments such as, e. g., the virtual uprising in
the rural parts of the North against the leftward shift of the revolutionary
process and, more particularly, against the PCP, unleashed in July/August
1975 by the catholic clergy and by CAP, the militant alliance of wealthy
farmers, large landowners and middlemen. Or the conflicts which increasing-
ly divided the MFA into ideological factions, lasting until November 25,
1975, when an uprising of left-wing units was suppressed by measures so
carefully prepared that they have been judged equal to a „centrist coup“,
„coolly planned and executed“ by ‚operational’ officers extolling traditional
military professionalism.91 The golpe expanded into a purge of left-wing
officers and terminated the MFA’s existence as a „movement“.
Internal turmoil contributed to these developments, but even there, the
PS struck „political alliances with unlikely political forces“.92 On July 13,
1975, the wave of sacking and burning PCP offices started in Rio Maior,
which would soon become the CAP’s principal bastion. A month later, with
Soares present, PS Secretariat member Manuel Alegre declared that „this soil
has become a symbol… Here the people demonstrated what should be done if
a minority attempts to manipulate it…“93
While ideological and political rifts widened in the MFA Assembly and
the Council of the Revolution between adherents of PS, PCP and radical-
socialist parties, it was the Group of Nine that chose to bypass both Assembly
and Council by circulating its August 7 critique of „revolutionary vanguard-
ism“ among military units. Aiming at the collection of further signatures, it
was also effectively eroding the political structure introduced into the Armed
Forces after March 11. The operation led to a coalition which combined the
Nine, the above-mentioned „operationals“, and the PS.94 That coalition
proved its effectiveness on and after November 25 – and, as shown above, it
had been the Group of Nine which had responded most noticeably to formal
penetration, as the PS executive had reacted to the informal variety.
„Ideological export models“ would „not be tolerated“ in Portugal, Willy
Brandt had affirmed that same year. Referring to Portugal, German Chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt would sum up later that „in this little area of world poli-
91 Pimlott, Ben: „Portugal’s Soldiers in the Wings“, New Statesman, September 24, 1976, p.
393.
92 Gallagher, „Portugal’s Bid…“ (as in n. 75), p. 210.
93 Portugal Socialista, August 27, 1975. Cf. also Soares: Portugal: Que Revolução? (as in n.
39), p. 152.
94 Cf. Soares, Portugal – Que Revolução?, op. cit., p. 163 ss.
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tics, the Americans followed our advice. And they have no reason for re-
gret.“95
From the aborted „revolution of carnations“, another lesson was learnt. A
decade later, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in
the United States. Designed to finance „democratic institution-building“
abroad – i. e. to promote „American-style pluralistic societies“ -, it was en-
dowed by Congress, for the first year of its existence, with $26.3 mio. in
federal funds: 13.8 mio. were to be spent by the American Institute for Free
Labor Develop-ment (jointly directed by the American Federation of Labor
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations; since renamed the American
Center for International Labor Solidarity), 2.5 mio. by the new Center for
International Private Enterprise (set up by the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States), and 5 mio. each by the two recently established international
offshoots of the Democratic and Republican National Committees. Further
annual appropriations would be forthcoming.96
The NED project was first mentioned by Ronald Reagan, when he spoke
to the British Parliament in 1982, with the U.S. President expressly referring
to the West German party foundations as a model. It is highly possible that
his advisors97 acquainted him with the „positive“ results obtained by the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Portugal – at least by those activities which
served as instruments of „total diplomacy“. In a country with a divided left
and political forces – civilian no less than military – lacking a consistent
reform program, such diplomacy may well prove decisive for the final out-
come.
95 Schmidt, Helmut: „Die internationale Verantwortung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“,
address of April 9, 1976, cit. in Stender, op. cit. (as in n. 60), p. 77.
96 Cf. „Project Democracy Takes Wing“, New York Times, No. 56,059, May 29, 1984, p. B
10. – Addendum 2011: For an overview of NED activities and critical assessments („a lot
of what NED does today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA“), see, e. g., the Wik-
ipedia write-up on the Endowment, with further sources (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Na-
tional_ Endowment_for_Democracy, accessed 7/9/2011).
97 In 1981, Frank C. Carlucci was appointed Deputy Defense Secretary by the Reagan Admin-
istration; he became the President’s National Security Advisor in 1986, and Secretary of
Defense a year later. Carlucci had been ambassador to Portugal from 1974 to 1977 and had
subsequently served as CIA Deputy Director.
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